



Library of

Wellesley




College.

Purchased from  
Sweet Fund.

No 66700







THE EXPOSITOR  
VOL. IX.



## List of Contributors to Volume IX.

- REV. E. H. ASKWITH, D.D.  
REV. PROFESSOR W. EMERY BARNES, D.D.  
REV. J. LLEWELYN DAVIES, D.D.  
REV. PROFESSOR ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, D.THEOL.  
REV. PROFESSOR S. R. DRIVER, D.D.  
REV. C. W. EMMET, M.A.  
REV. PRINCIPAL E. GRIFFITH-JONES, B.A.  
PROFESSOR J. RENDEL HARRIS, M.A., LITT.D.  
REV. PROFESSOR KIRSOPP LAKE, D.D.  
PROFESSOR A. MACALISTER, M.D., D.SC., F.R.S.  
REV. PROFESSOR H. R. MACKINTOSH, D.PHIL., D.D.  
REV. J. B. McCLELLAN, D.D.  
REV. PROFESSOR D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, M.A., LITT.D.  
REV. G. MARGOLIOUTH, M.A.  
REV. PROFESSOR J. B. MAYOR, LITT.D.  
REV. GEORGE MILLIGAN, D.D.  
REV. PROFESSOR J. H. MOULTON, M.A., LITT.D.  
REV. PROFESSOR JAMES ORR, D.D.  
PROFESSOR SIR W. M. RAMSAY, D.C.L., LL.D., D.D.  
REV. G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS, M.A.  
REV. R. H. STRACHAN, M.A.  
REV. W. L. WALKER.

# THE EXPOSITOR

EDITED BY THE REV.

SIR W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, M.A., LL.D.

*SEVENTH SERIES*

Volume IX

HODDER AND STOUGHTON  
WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C

---

MCMX




66700

BUTLER & TANNER,  
THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,  
FROME, AND LONDON.

Sw

B  
410  
E7  
IV.7





THE PERSONAL RELIGION OF AN EVOLU-  
TIONIST.<sup>1</sup>

FOUR months ago a notable assemblage of the representatives of almost all branches of human knowledge gathered together in Cambridge from all parts of the civilised world to commemorate the centenary of the birth of Charles Darwin. It was a testimony to the universal appreciation of the changes in scientific and philosophical outlook which have taken place during the half-century that has elapsed since the publication of the *Origin of Species*, and consequent on that publication.

Darwin was the last of the great triad of Cambridge men who in three successive centuries have been leaders of progress in the world of thought, Bacon in the seventeenth, Newton in the eighteenth, Darwin in the nineteenth.

300 years ago Bacon published his *de Sapientiâ Veterum*, and was engaged in the composition of the *Novum Organum*. From him the scholasticism, which had for centuries dominated the universities of Europe, received its death-blow. It was his ambition to recast the whole of human knowledge into a system founded on a basis of observation and experiment, whereby men would be delivered from those preconceptions and traditional hypotheses which had so long enslaved them, and would be led to seek the truth with a mind open to accept whatever conclusions can be established by a legitimate induction.

Newton, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, had by the publication of his *Principia* and other works

<sup>1</sup> Murtle Lecture delivered at Aberdeen Nov. 7, 1909.

advanced the construction of this new world of science. Pioneers in quest of truth had made discoveries in different departments of Nature, and these discoveries Newton extended, co-ordinated and unified both by experiment and deduction; establishing the universality of physical law throughout inorganic nature in all parts of the universe within human ken.

Darwin, by the study of a wide range of phenomena in the world of living beings, was led to formulate a concrete theory of organic evolution which is the foundation of modern biology. The principles underlying this theory have proved to be applicable in other directions, and the variety of sciences represented by the delegates at the centenary is an objective illustration of the area of knowledge affected by Darwin's great inductions and shows how inextricably linked together are all departments of thought, not only in the intellectual area, but also on the ethical, emotional and religious sides of human life. The same may be said of Darwin's two Cambridge predecessors, each of whom in turn, by introducing a new point of view, influenced the religious life of his time. Bacon's philosophy was a child of the reformation. The galaxy of persons upon whose work he built, Telesio, Ramus, Palissy, Galileo, had been regarded as heretics by the dominant Church; and his own teaching was viewed with suspicion by the Cambridge Platonists, while it was used by Hobbes as part of the ground of his philosophy. Newton worked in a calmer atmosphere; but though the victory of the Copernican theory over the obscurantism of both Rome and the Reformers was practically won before his day, yet, in spite of the reverential tone and teleological bias of his writings his orthodoxy was impugned by the heresy-hunters of his time. His religious philosophy, which shows traces, perhaps unwittingly, of the influence of Henry More, was

satirised by Leibniz and was an offence to the French mathematicians of a later age. Those of us who have watched the rise and progress of Darwin's theory remember how at its first promulgation it was denounced by some as a deadly heresy, while by others it was hailed as a means of deliverance from a bondage of superstition. In the calm which has succeeded the heat of controversy the implicates and limits of evolution have become better understood, and now this principle is recognised by men of almost every school of thought as a reasonable explanation of the co-ordination of phenomena not only in biology but in other sciences. Thus as a great unifying conception it can be put alongside the discoveries of Newton in the inorganic world ; but in another respect Darwinian evolution, like Newtonian attraction, is no ultimate explanation, but is in itself a phenomenon to be investigated. Evolution can only claim to be considered as a process, not as a self-acting power. It presupposes a power somewhere, and a potentiality on the part of its subjects to respond to that power, but it tells nothing of the nature of the power except that it works this way not that. The hypothesis is concerned with the relations between things and their behaviour under definite conditions. It postulates that certain changes take place by the action of the power, but it takes no account of the origin of the conditions under which they take place.

We whose education began in pre-Darwinian days were brought up believing in a cataclysmic cosmogony ; and few of you, who have lived in an atmosphere in which evolution is a commonplace, can realise the difficulty which beset us in becoming accustomed to the orientation of the new environment ; for the change of viewpoint altered the aspect of nearly every region of human thought. In some minds, as Bacon predicted, the discovery of a scheme



of secondary causes filled the whole mental horizon, and left no chink through which to see anything beyond, and with many there was a tendency to throw all beliefs into the melting-pot. To one young friend who was thus disquieted, and who consulted Darwin as to what he ought to believe, the Sage replied that the ultimate problem of existence seemed to him to lie beyond the range of the human intellect, but he added this practical advice. "But man can do his duty."

I take this counsel of the great scientific teacher as a text. It appears simple, but it is the statement of a problem which grows in complexity the more it is studied. It is of the essence of this problem that each of us must work out its solution for himself, so I can only attempt to sketch in outline how this duty appears to an ordinary man, working among the problems of biology, but not professing to be either a philosopher or a metaphysician. I find myself to be an item in the scheme of nature, and have a part to play on the world's stage. I ought to do this as well as I can. I cannot divest myself of the sense of responsibility, but to whom am I responsible? In a sense to my fellows; but I have also a vague sense that I am related to some higher power. It is therefore the first part of my duty to learn what I can of my environment and of its history. I believe that I am the outcome of evolutionary processes; what can I learn of these and of their implicates? To go back to the beginning—concerning the origin of the Universe of which I am a part—Science tells me nothing, and speculation in the present state of knowledge is useless. As to the origin of life, in like manner, neither experiment nor observation has hitherto given the faintest clue. Guesses there are in plenty but knowledge none. The postulate of evolution with which we begin is that the primordial bearers of life, however they may have originated, consisted of elements

which were liable to vary in different ways (why, we do not know), and that these varieties were propagated in their descendants (how, we do not know). Even in the simplest of these evolutionary processes recent discoveries show that the necessary interactions must have been indescribably complex, and of their ultimate dynamical nature we have not the smallest conception. Surveying the final outcome of the whole process of terrestrial evolution as it appears in the world of to-day, we see that, from the beginning, through the countless ages since life appeared on the earth, organic nature has been moving harmoniously forward step by step from its primitive simplicity towards its present complex order, along a course which, to one who views the result after the event, seems to have been inevitable, but nowhere has it been apparent at any earlier stage what the future order is about to be. At every point in the evolution a perfect equilibrium appears to be associated with the condition of continuous change. No generation has played its part because it foresaw the outcoming result, yet that result is a self-consistent cosmos. This process is only intelligible to me on the hypothesis that behind it there is a continuing agent in whose thought all these actors and their several parts are perfectly present. To believe that all the countless myriads of centres of co-operation and co-ordination which have been required for this cosmos could have been originated and maintained by unintelligent force acting fortuitously makes an immensely greater strain upon faith than the alternative hypothesis.

We are sometimes led into fallacies by the misuse of terms. Laws of nature are often spoken of as if they were causal forces. A postulated law of continuity is said to forbid, compel, constrain this or that. Science knows nothing of such laws. She knows observed sequences, from the contemplation of which, by induction, hypotheses

are framed. Law is a symbol correlating facts which have been observed, an abstract by-product of our method of arranging phenomena, more or less diagrammatic rather than comprehensive. Law is the expression of faith that nature is self-consistent. Another phrase used in connexion with evolutionary process is also liable to cause confusion of thought. The unknown force premised to be unintelligent is called the world-order, but it seems to me that order is a condition inseparable from the ordered material in which it is realised and cannot precede the material as a determining force. It is a confusion of subject and object to identify the order with that which orders.

As an anatomist my daily work brings me continually in contact with evidences of this order that I can only understand on the hypothesis of purpose; indeed it is impossible to describe the phenomena with which I have to deal without using terms implying end. It is the fashion to treat teleology with scant courtesy, even Bacon labels it an idol of the cave; but I believe that it deserves more attention than it gets to-day. Perhaps this discredit is due to the apparent limitation of its purview by the name commonly given to it, the argument from design, leading to the notion that it is only concerned with concrete cases of adaptation such as those dealt with in the Bridgewater Treatises, whereas the proposition involved is that the sequences of evolution have been, from their inception, throughout the whole universe, co-ordinated to the production of the cosmos as a definite end. The induction is imperfect, because our knowledge is incomplete; but the range of facts upon which it is based extends to the horizon of human knowledge. It is said that on account of this imperfection we may be led to infer design in cases where with a wider knowledge the semblance would disappear; but this *argumentum ad ignorantiam* is of little force, for we



have no reason to infer that our knowledge, so far as it goes, is not in accordance with truth. It is also said that adaptation is not necessarily design but may be fortuitous, due to some casual coincidence; but, when throughout all nature that is accessible to examination we find the perfect co-operation of disparate forms of energy producing effects which are congruous with their environing circumstances, which are themselves the effects of other antecedents, and all apparently working together to a common end, it is legitimate, and to me seems inevitable, to infer that the ordering has been the product of a designing power whose will is causal of the whole evolution. The common objection to teleology is that it is anthropomorphic, and therefore a heresy, which has been styled by a recent writer the seventh and most deadly of deadly sins. There is a *ψευδοταπεινοφροσύνη* in the use of the term as a label of contempt. If the best in man be idealised, I know not how to conceive of a higher ideal. Man is the only agent known to us in the universe who can, at his will, modify or alter the arrangements of the cosmos. Human will is the only intelligent dynamic factor of which we have direct experience, so this is only an *argumentum ad hominem*, the attempt to disparage by the use of a nickname. When we seek from the author just quoted for light on the nature of human will we are referred to the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychological Research.

Design, it is said, is the characteristic of a finite agent who finds difficulties and gets over them somehow, sometimes clumsily. This is not an objection to teleology in the abstract, but to the limited form of design that we find in man's work. It is based on the predicate that we know all the end that the designer had in view. If we do not, the objection is invalid, for in that case there can be no adequate criticism of method. I do not conceive of the designing power as being just strong enough to overcome the utmost

resistance of matter, but as being so related to matter that it cannot resist Him at all. I do not postulate the appearance of special purposive forces casually introduced for the production of particular ends. The government of Nature does not require supplemental estimates to supply deficiencies in its budget. There are no traces of arbitrary interferences amending mistakes made owing to want of foresight in the ordering of evolutionary processes, like the work of the clockmaker to whom Leibniz compared the God of Newton. What we find are not alterations of universal sequences, but changes in the disposition of bearers of the forces that fulfil these laws, alterations which are of the same order as those that the human will can make in the specific coefficients that indicate the amount of the participation of each part in universal modes of development. That some products of evolution appear to be imperfect has been urged as irreconcilable with the existence of ends in nature, but this implies that we have an infallible criterion whereby to determine what constitutes perfection. The fulfilment of the designed end is the one thing needful; the absolute perfection of each part in relation to ends which it is not required to serve is an irrelevance.

The notion of the existence of imperfection arises from looking on the lower forms of life from the museum standpoint, as if they were trial specimens made to be rejected, incidental products thrown off in the progress of advance towards a higher stage. This is an artificial view of nature. Each form has its place in the scheme, and were it the last in its series would be regarded as perfect for the filling of its niche. Nature does not present to us a linear progression; hence the difficulty experienced in classification. Neither is nature a passively ordered system of typical forms like a row of specimens in a museum. The type of the systematist

is an artefact, a product of abstraction. Rather does nature show us a countless living throng of individuals, each enjoying its own existence, helping, hindering, striving with its fellow and displaying endless and individual variety of characteristic traits. We miss this individuality in our study by our undue attention to the artificial method of abstraction of type characters and concentration on morphological features which we use for systematic purposes instead of regarding the whole living actuality. It is here that the standpoint of the anatomist differs from that of the morphologist, for our business is to consider the individual in its totality, and to ignore selective abstraction. But even the anatomist, if he confine himself to structure and ignores the play of function, sees but in part. We do not exhaust the significance of our subjects when we view them as actors dressed for the play if we ignore the play in which they take part. It may be that in the progress of evolution the natural order may be subject to an ultimate moral or spiritual order. Design is a theory of the guiding force; evolution is a metaphysical expression regarding its mode of action; survival of the fittest is a teleological conception.

But the problem before me has a higher import than that concerned with the material elements of the animal. I cannot refuse to believe that the great causal force behind nature is rational, for it is the source of the reason of humanity and of the intelligence of the most gifted men, even of such as the great triad to whom we have referred. The order of the All must include that of its parts. We do not give the universe its appearance of rationality by projecting our reason into it, but we are rational because we are in continual relation to a rationally constituted cosmos. We have to deal with a power to which as a source we must attribute the intellects of the Bacons, Newtons and Darwins of our race. "What if that power happen to be God?" To this

conclusion I find myself shut up by these and other lines of thought into which time prevents me entering now.

In reaching this conclusion I am passing beyond the bounds of science from whose data the existence of God can neither be demonstrated nor negated, but the evidence on which I depend is of the same order as that which we deem cogent in the ordinary affairs of life. We have no right to demand evidence of a different order from that which it is possible to obtain. We cannot help explaining to ourselves, in some way, how it is that from the study of ourselves in relation to nature there arise the impulses which compel us to pass in thought from the world of sense to the supersensuous region beyond science.

I am saved from the need of discussing a difficulty which confronts me here, as it was dealt with by Mr. Rashdall in a former Murtle Lecture. If there be such a first cause, the source of reason and intelligence, an impersonal intelligence is inconceivable; can we attribute to Him personality? Does not that necessarily imply limitation in the contrast between self and not-self? But it seems to me that this is only an apparent difficulty due to the imperfection of language. Selfhood is recognised by an act of ideation, not of contrast: self and not-self are not two notions each of which owes its content to its contrast with the other. Every self has the ground of the determination of its selfhood in the consciousness of the value it has before any contrast is made, indeed the discriminating thought in the contrast is guided by the certainty of self, which is prior to the relation, and causal of the contrast when it arises. We whose experience is fragmentary and progressive may require the force of the contrast to establish our personality, but that condition cannot affect the First Cause. Any such analytic process must be applied in this case with diffidence, for we, who know ourselves to be finite and con-



ditioned creatures, can only apprehend God in the form in which He chooses to allow us to discover Him, and it seems to me that He permits us to think of Him under the self-imposed conditioning of personality, because otherwise we could not think of Him at all.

If I believe that this great first cause is a personal intelligence who is purposeful, I am constrained to inquire, What is His purpose concerning the only free purposeful intelligences who are, as far as we know, the highest products of the evolutionary creation? and, in particular, what is His disposition towards me? On the discovery of this obviously depends the nature of my duty to Him. We and all our fellows, savage and civilised, recognise within ourselves some degree of moral consciousness, the worth of some feelings, the value of some duties, and the obligation to recognise the rights of others. Our faith in the persistence of these values is the essence of all religions.

Some modern authors question the existence of any reality underlying the human appreciation of God and of our relationship to Him. If there be no such reality at the back of those aspirations out of which religion has arisen, we have an unexampled and inexplicable condition, a universal desire which nature provides no means of satisfying. I have little belief in the cogency of arguments based on analogies of natural with spiritual phenomena, but there is one such which may serve as a suggestion towards, if not an actual illustration of, the truth. In the specialisation of structure which takes place in animal evolution new organs do not develop unless there is a function for them to discharge connected with a correlated external condition. For example, the lowest animals have no organs whereby to appreciate light, and are not sensitive to it except as a chemical stimulus. In those of a higher grade pigment spots appear which react with light; in

higher organisms a refractive apparatus develops and the eye becomes capable of appreciating form and colour. If the organisms of the lowest grade are sufficiently conscious to comprehend their environment, there can be among them no appreciation of light ; nevertheless light exists : in the second stage there is no recognition of form and colour, yet these conditions are present. The realities are there all along, but the appreciation progresses as the organ becomes capable of recognising it. The application of the parable is obvious.

Can we believe, in view of all that we have learned from our study of nature, that behind the highest and purest of our religious beliefs there is no reality, that they are, as many of those who profess to be authorities on comparative religion tell us, pure inventions, delusions of the non-critical intellect and delusions of the over-confident will ? Their contention seems to be :—thus and thus have these religious conceptions grown ; here is their method of elaboration, therefore there is no reality behind them. This is a conclusion that the premisses do not warrant. As a biologist I cannot but believe that every enlargement of human faculty has reference to actual external existence. Now in another department of anthropology those who have traced the development of human art lay it down as a canon that no race ever invented a pattern. Those used are, they tell us, all permutations and combinations of forms copied from nature ; yet those who deny to man the capacity of originating a design would have us believe that the highest religious and moral ideals are but human inventions with no reality behind them. That the stages of religious appreciation have been correlated with the progress of evolution in human capacity is historically demonstrable ; but it is more consistent with what we know of the course of evolution to believe that these emotions and feelings, which are far

more dynamic in the life of humanity than the concepts of the intellect, should be related to something in the character of God than that they should be baseless and unrelated. If life is to be intelligible, these, on account of their insistence and worth, must have their proper place in its scheme, and it seems to me impossible to regard them otherwise than as real approaches of worshippers to a real object of worship.

Doubtless this view that the experiences of the spiritual life are real, although, being immediate, they cannot be rationalised or included in any continuous system, will be stigmatised as mysticism, but I am not ashamed of the name. I cannot get away from mysticism in life. Every unselfish friendship, every affection, every enthusiasm is mystical. All real poetry, all ideals are mystical. Rob life of its mysticism and you take from it almost everything that gives it value. I pity the man to whom Browning's poem "Fears and Scruples" does not appeal with a sense of thrilling reality.

At this point, in seeking to learn my duty toward God I am confronted with the insoluble enigma which has been the puzzle of man since he began to think at all. If the world be framed and ruled by an infinitely powerful God, what about evil? why has it been permitted? can the power at the back of Nature be infinitely good? This was the problem which led Darwin to give up, as insoluble, any inquiry concerning the ultimate power behind nature. This is too large a subject upon which to enter now, but it is worth noting that there are here two questions, connected, but not identical: the first, relating to suffering in nature; the second, concerning sin and its consequences in man. In regard to the first, there is an element of false sentimentality in the way in which the cruelty of nature is depicted. Death is indeed the common lot of organic beings, but in any conceivable system of evolution working towards progress this

must be so ; to the lower creatures, who have no outlook beyond the present, there is little pain in it. We are apt, for polemical and sentimental purposes, to project our own self-consciousness into the lower animals and to speak as if they suffer as we suffer, but this we know from the structure of their nerve-centres is physiologically untrue. The impartial observer of nature, as far as it is unaffected by man, cannot fail to see that the amount of happiness which the lower animals enjoy immensely outweighs the suffering ; and the extinction of their life causes their companions neither regret nor remorse. Animated nature, as far as we can understand it, is aglow with pleasure.

It is in the case of man that the question of moral evil arises, for here on all sides we see misery, pain and wretchedness, innocent and guilty suffering alike, so that we are prone to despair of finding that goodness exists at the centre of nature. But, before we allow ourselves to be panic-stricken with the cumulative effect of this general view, we ought to analyse the phenomena and trace their elements to their sources. When we do so we find that much more than ninety-nine per cent. of the sorrows of humanity are due to conditions preventable by human effort and will. On the one side sloth, ignorance, evil passions, strong drink ; on the other side greed, selfishness, ambition, the exploitation of one class by another in the haste to be rich, are the responsible causes. (I speak that I know ; I have served as Poor Law Medical Officer in the poorest parts of the poorest city in the empire, and have lived among the people). Humanity possesses the terrible gift of free-will, and these are the penalties paid for the deliberate choice of the evil. As long as the life of the individuals who constituted the ancestry of man was that of the mere animal, a lowly developed self-consciousness was probably the centre of reference of sensations and volitions. The ends to which its



impulses were directed were those of the maintenance of the individual and of the species, and the norm of life did not rise above the fulfilment of the desires of the senses. In such a condition there was no responsibility, little but transient suffering and the actors were non-ethical. Where no law is there is no transgression. But when mankind in some way unknown and inexplicable in the present state of our knowledge attained the position at which his realities of self-consciousness had become characteristically unfolded, and his sense of responsibility awakened, when his powers of social organisation had become strengthened by his extended ability to communicate his thought to his fellows, when his emotional nature had become capable of realising the existence of a supreme Power, his relationship in respect of conduct in the presence of that Power was changed. Certain obligations, as far as he had become able to apprehend them, became an integral part of his consciousness. He must respect them or suffer for his failure to do so. There was set before him an end towards the attainment of which his whole life must be directed; that end is the advancement of humanity to its highest goal, and any defect of duty which interferes with his self-fulfilment becomes a sin against the divine order. The evolution ceases to be by natural selection and becomes purposive, the struggle being not with external nature but with the turmoil of passion within. By this discipline men can rise on stepping stones of their dead selves to higher planes of moral and spiritual life. Those who regard suffering as a reflexion on the moral character of God forget the elementary postulate that struggle is the condition on which evolution depends. We may imagine a universe in which, by Divine power, evil was non-existent and uprightness inevitable, but, so conditioned, man ceases to be a willing moral agent and becomes a plaster-cast saint to

whom all progress would be impossible. Man's personal conflict with these lower inherited tendencies, which in the animal were conative and non-moral, is needful if he is to realise the highest moral ideal. If on self-examination we are conscious that we have not striven with all our might for the conquest of evil, the spread of goodness, and the lightening of the burden of our fellows we have no right to throw the blame on God, for it is the wilful choice of these selfish desires that produces evil as its fruit and wrecks the happiness of the world. The alternative is set before every man, and before we impugn the righteousness of God let each one ask himself, What am I doing toward this consummation? Am I doing all I can to lighten the load of suffering and sin? Each man's duty is writ plain: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Nevertheless there are causes of suffering such as the catastrophes of nature which are beyond our control, but the sorrows they cause are not one-hundredth part as great as those whose incidence depends on human conduct. If we reflect how small a part of the plan of nature we know, we need not be surprised that there are here perplexities out of which we can see no way. The ascent from the animal to the man is tremendous and cannot be achieved without a colossal struggle. Even with the heritage of the moral growth of the past, should any seek to know why do men choose the evil rather than the good, let him interrogate his own past, and he will find that the determining factor is his own deliberate choice.

Man has, from the earliest time of which we have any knowledge, entertained some form of belief that to the great unknown Power he owes some duty or service, with its corollary that God is not indifferent to him nor can he be indifferent to God. Every race has, therefore, sought to find out God, and as mankind advanced in culture these

discoveries became crystallised into specific religious systems which were magical, ethical, or spiritual according to the trend of the respective racial dispositions. In the growth of these, the evolutionary processes by which they were moulded may generally be traced, their characters being conditioned by the environments of the race, while the theory and forms of ritual were, in general, the outcome of the spiritual insight of those who were the religious leaders in each people. But all through the ages the religious consciousness of humanity has been earnestly in quest of some response from God to the solicitous expectation of man, some revelation or immediate communication which would therefore be authoritative. Can God make such a response, whereby we may learn His purposes concerning us? We can do the like to one another, a man can communicate the expression of his will to his fellow, on what ground can we deny to God the power to do likewise to the creatures whom He has made if He so will? Is He as free from the restraint of an external determinism as any man who can cast a stone, light a fire or lift a child out of a pit? If not, He is not God; but if so, it is reasonable to believe that God may not only fulfil the universal desire of His creatures and make such a communication, but may, if He will, accompany the revelation by immediate phenomena which will arrest man's attention. To assert that such is impossible, that there can be no ultimate fact which can upset the stability of our outlook based on the hypothetical continuity of nature is a position which no theist can logically assume; for, in the first place, the hypothesis of continuity is only a postulate of experience which is limited, so, unless we make the assumption that the experience of ourselves, or of the majority of mankind, exhausts the possibilities of nature, we are arguing from the particular to the general. But, secondly, to assert such a limitation on the Divine

action is to predicate that there is a power above God to which He is subject which determines what He can and what He cannot do. On no other ground can we deny to Him the power to initiate new series of events not conditioned by those that preceded them whenever it pleases Him to do so for the fulfilment of His own ends.

The Christian doctrine is that God has given to man such a revelation in that he has become incarnate as Christ Jesus to teach man, as he could not otherwise be taught, God's attitude to men and man's duty to God and to his fellows. Such a doctrine lifts Christianity wholly out of the plane of evolution, and belief in it requires evidence that the character of the revelation is such as to compel our acceptance of it. To the impartial student Christ stands out as a unique personality, the highest ideal of moral and spiritual life of which humanity could conceive, and His teaching is unique in its comprehensiveness, its adaptation to the wants of man's nature, and its finality. Some of these teachings are truths that had been discovered by earlier seekers after God, but these He has raised to an immeasurably higher plane. The scheme of human life which He sets before us is on a level far above that to which any evolution could raise it, because He brings man into fellowship with God. Humanity has always felt some sense of sin, as is shown by the universality of sacrifice in worship, but nature appeared inexorable and unforgiving. This sense of sin is rendered incomparably more acute when we contrast ourselves in motive and life with His sinless holiness, notwithstanding which He has shown that, in spite of our failures, God in His infinite love is ready to receive and pardon the repentant sinner. With this elevation of character we get a new sense of our duties to one another. He teaches us that life fulfils itself in loving service to God and to our neighbour, that its requirements are purity of heart and motive,



sincerity, courage in striving for the right and disregard of the transitory ideals of this world, and by these He enables man, by the exercise of will reinforced by the impulse which He gives, to reduce the chaos of desires and purposes into conformity with a moral order in spite of inherited tendencies. Through Christ man is encouraged to hope eventually to attain to the highest weal in the complete coincidence of the highest good and the highest happiness, even though the way thereto may lie through pain. If we believe in the Incarnation, which is the greatest event it is possible to imagine, then the Virgin-Birth and the Resurrection are not only credible but appeal to our consciousness as the inevitable concomitants of an occurrence so transcendently important.

The discharge of duty implies effort: if we are to be helpful to our neighbour, we are bound to communicate to him the knowledge of the path of peace we have found ourselves. No man is doing his duty unless he is an active propagandist of the faith which is in him.

As the preparation of man for this revelation was a long evolutionary process, the ancient record of the education of humanity through the ages when men's notions were crude must of necessity include much that is legendary and unauthentic of which a judicious criticism will purge it. The review of that history of the universe and man shows that it began with an event, the primal creative impulse, which was immediate and not evolutionary, as it preceded the whole process. It is fitting, therefore, that the final act should be one which is also above the possibilities of evolution, and one which sheds a retrospective ray of light over the long panorama of the ages as it reveals the purpose underlying the whole process. It also sends an anticipatory beam forward into the future; for although it doth not yet appear what we shall be, yet as Christ raises those who

follow Him into fellowship with Himself they have reason to hope that they shall be like Him; and every one that hath this hope in him purifieth himself even as He is pure.

A. MACALISTER.

*THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE PSALTER.*

WITH SPECIAL APPLICATION TO SOME OF THE MESSIANIC  
PSALMS.<sup>1</sup>

IN the lectures which I have been invited to give on this subject, there is naturally much with regard to the Psalms, which I must suppose to be understood and taken for granted. I cannot, for instance, describe the varied contents of the Psalter, or dwell upon its high devotional value, or explain, so far as we know them, the stages by which it gradually reached its present form. I shall only, by way of introduction, place before you a few things which we must bear in mind when we endeavour to arrive at what I conceive I was intended to help you to understand—the original meaning and purport of a few representative Psalms. I hope that the examples I shall take may place some of those who hear me in the way of applying the same method in other cases.

i. The foundation of all fruitful study of the Psalms, as of every other part of the Old Testament, is an exact translation—resting, of course, if possible, upon a sound knowledge of the original language. But even without this independent knowledge of the original language—which all are not able to obtain—a clear and exact translation is alone often enough to teach us much: it removes many

<sup>1</sup> Expanded from lectures delivered at a meeting of clergy in Oxford in July, 1908, and repeated, with some additions, at a Summer School of Theology held at Oxford in September, 1909.

difficulties, and corrects many misunderstandings. The Prayer-book version of the Psalms, with which at least English Churchmen are most familiar, while incomparable in literary style—it was the work of Miles Coverdale, a gifted master of vigorous and idiomatic English—often, unhappily, sadly misses the sense; and there are few Psalms in which some point or other is not in consequence seriously obscured. When we remember the date at which this version was made (1539), the existence of such blemishes is at once intelligible. What translation of what author, made nearly 400 years ago, would be adequate to the needs of the present day? It is to be regretted that the Church of England should so long have allowed her sons to use a version of the Psalms which constantly obscures or conceals their true meaning; and it is matter of sincere congratulation that a motion brought forward last year in Convocation for a revision of the Prayer-book version was agreed to with great unanimity. We do not indeed want to change the *style* or *form* of our Psalter: but we do want to make it more *exact*; and a gentle and conservative revision of the Prayer-book Psalter, which, while leaving its general style untouched, and retaining its many master-strokes of idiomatic and felicitous paraphrase, would remove its more glaring errors, and bring it into reasonable conformity with the original, is loudly called for. Inimitable as the rhythm and style of the Prayer-book version are, those who compare it carefully either with the original or with an exact translation of it, cannot be long in discovering that, if we wish to arrive at the true meaning of a Psalm, its renderings must often be discarded altogether, and new ones substituted. In pp. xl.–xlii., xlv.–vi. of my *Parallel Psalter*, I have indicated the lines along which, as it seems to me, a revision of the P.B. version should be conducted. The translation in my *Parallel Psalter*

is based upon the Prayer-book version, its words being preserved wherever possible. To preclude misunderstanding I should, however, say distinctly that it is not designed to be a revision to supersede it: the changes are greater than would be necessary or desirable for that purpose: it is intended to be read *beside* the Prayer-book version, and to explain it. And to turn for a few moments to the Revised Version of the Old Testament, those who use this version must recollect that they should never neglect the *margins*: they must remember that the margins have a double character; they are sometimes indeed inferior to the text, but sometimes they are greatly superior to it. As a rule, they are inferior to it, where they merely repeat the renderings of the Authorised Version; they are superior to it, where they differ from that version. To use the Revised Version properly, the reader should ascertain, with the help of a good commentary, which marginal renderings or readings are superior to those of the text, and which he may leave unnoticed. He should place a line against the former, and draw his pen or pencil through the latter.<sup>1</sup> It must, however, be admitted that the influence of the Authorised Version has sometimes prevented the renderings of the Revised Version from being as clear and exact as they might be; and especially it must not be forgotten that numerous readings from the Ancient Versions, undoubtedly correct, and often both illuminative and important, are not represented in the Revised Version at all. For examples, I may refer to Professor Cheyne's *Prophecies of Isaiah and Book of Psalms* (ed. 1, 1888), to my own *Book of Jeremiah in a Revised Translation* (ed. 2, 1908), with short explanatory notes, to the more recent volumes of the *Cambridge Bible*, and

<sup>1</sup> See more fully on this subject the Preface to my edition of *Job in the Revised Version* (Clarendon Press, 1906), pp. xxiv.-xxxiii.



to those of the *Century Bible*.<sup>1</sup> We must be prepared to accept emendations of the Massoretic text, not even excluding those based solely on conjecture. As Dr. Gray has shown recently in an interesting paper ("English Versions and the Text of the Old Testament," in the volume of essays dedicated to Dr. Fairbairn), the older English Versions, being more or less dependent on the Vulgate, have in many passages preserved readings superior to those of later versions translated directly from the Hebrew; and, the present Hebrew text being what it is, the alternative to refusing altogether to emend it is often conjectural translation of a very improbable kind.<sup>2</sup> But we must be on our guard against emending too freely or too readily: we must remember the dangers of violent or arbitrary emendation; and we must be especially cautious in seeking to force the text into conformity with a metrical or other standard which does not rest upon a perfectly sound foundation. I venture to think that the safest rule is to deviate from the Hebrew text only where the grounds are cogent, and the advantage gained is unmistakable and clear. It is true, a large number of emendations are embraced under these conditions, but by no means so many as are necessary if we make metre our guide.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The reader conversant with German may also consult with advantage the new and enlarged edition of Kautzsch's *Die Heilige Schrift des A.T.* (vol. i., containing Gen.—Kings, Is., Jer., Ez., just completed), with numerous exegetical as well as critical notes.

<sup>2</sup> For a good example, see Job xxxiii. 10 A.V. and R.V.

<sup>3</sup> The Hebrew student will find an invaluable collection of various readings, in numerous cases unquestionably original, derived partly from the Ancient Versions, partly from the conjectures of modern scholars, in Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica*, 1905 (the *additions*, p. 1320 [Ed. 2, p. x.] ff., must not be neglected). The Hebrew text of this Bible is a careful reprint of that of Jacob ben Chayim in the great Rabbinical Bible published by Bomberg at Venice in 1524–5. The student should only be aware that it falls within the scope of this work to notice often various readings from the Versions, which, though in one way or another interesting, have no claim to represent the original text. The notes are in some places very

ii. In order to understand the Psalms, and realise their place in the history of Israelite religion, we must, as far as we can, discover the historical situation out of which they spring. (1) The Psalms are seldom as impersonal as a modern hymn. They often describe the writer's experience; they allude to, or even celebrate, historical events. They thus invite us, if we can, to determine the situation out of which they spring. Their dates we can only determine broadly. The criteria that we have are (a) the historical allusions, (b) the diction and literary style, (c) the relations to other writings whose dates are known, and (d) the character of the religious ideas expressed. And these rarely enable us to do more than refer a Psalm

numerous; and it is interrupting and disappointing, when the reader turns to the footnote to see what the various reading is, to find one which perhaps differs from the Massoretic text only orthographically, or one which has no claim to be the original reading. To facilitate the practical use of this edition of the Hebrew Bible, the following method is strongly recommended. Let the student, when he is reading a book carefully for the first time, whether with a good commentary or with a teacher, put a *red* mark against the references to those various readings which he decides are practically certain, and a *blue* mark against those which he thinks are more or less probable, but does not regard as certain as those which he has marked red: when he comes afterwards to read or refer to the book again, he will see at a glance which various readings he ought to refer to, and which, for his present purpose, he can afford to disregard. In the first instance, as Kittel himself points out in a note of four pages, called "Einige Winke über die Verwendung der Bibl. Heb. ed. Kittel im Hebräischen Unterricht" (to be obtained from the publisher, Hinrichs, Leipzig), the student would do well to confine himself to the various readings introduced by *l.* (*lege*, 'read').

It should be remembered that we have a measure of the corruptions that have been possible in Hebrew MSS. (1) in the Massoretic text itself, in the variations found between parallel passages (comp., e.g., Ps. xiv. with Ps. liii., Ps. xviii. with 2 Sam. xxii., Jer. lii. with 2 Kings xxiv. 18-xxv. 21, 27-30, and the margins of R.V. on Gen. xlvi. 10 ff., 1 Chron. vi. 16 ff., 34-68, xi. 27 ff., Ezr. ii. 2 ff., etc.); and (2) in the renderings of the ancient versions, especially the LXX, which presuppose texts often differing remarkably from the present Massoretic text. The Septuagint supplies cogent evidence of the strange mixture of readings, some unquestionably superior to those of the Massoretic text, others as undeniably inferior to it, found in the Hebrew MSS. from which the Greek translation was made.

to a tolerably wide period of the history—exilic, or early or late post-exilic, for instance. Yet even this is of use, if we are interested in the growth of religious ideas, or wish to study the thought and feeling of particular ages. I can here only state briefly the conclusions, for which reasons are given in my *Introduction*. The Psalter, it is clear, assumed its present form gradually, through the combination of different shorter collections by a compiler or compilers. Very few Psalms in it are earlier than the seventh century B.C., and the great majority are exilic or post-exilic. Even Book I. (Ps. i.-xli.) contains Psalms showing that it cannot have been compiled till after the exile. Of the 73 Psalms ascribed to David, internal evidence—the situation presupposed, or the ideas, or sometimes the lateness of the Hebrew—shows that certainly the greater number are of much later date.<sup>1</sup> The Psalter reflects the religious feelings and experiences of a long succession of pious men of Israel; and it is no doubt to this that it owes its extraordinary variety of mood, and style, and theme. (2) Though we can seldom or never fix the actual historical occasion of a Psalm, we can often do what is of great value, reconstruct—at least in Psalms of a personal character—from the allusions and terms used, the *kind* of situation in which the poet was, and out of which the Psalm sprang. It is essential to make an effort to do this. To understand any ancient poem with topical allusions we must throw ourselves back into the position and circumstances of the writer, see with his eyes, and strive

<sup>1</sup> It is not denied that there may be a nucleus of Davidic Psalms. For an endeavour to determine some Psalms which may be Davidic, see Burney, *Interpreter*, Oct. 1909, p. 58 ff. All positive external evidence for the existence of Davidic Psalms is virtually destroyed by the untrustworthiness of the titles: where so many are demonstrably incorrect, it is clear that these, at any rate, cannot rest upon a genuine tradition. This being the case, the value of the titles generally is impaired; and we cannot feel confident that in *any* case they rest upon a genuine tradition.

to understand how what he says is determined by the situation in which he is placed. There is great variety in the situations presupposed by the Psalms. In Psalm iii. the poet is surrounded by foes, who unite in declaring that there is no help for him in his God: but he appeals with confidence to Jehovah, who has defended him hitherto; and foretells the discomfiture of his assailants. In Psalm iv. the writer is surrounded by impatient and distrustful companions, who blame him for some misfortune which has befallen them: he bids them regain a right frame of mind, and trust; in the joy of faith he himself can lie down and rest securely. In Psalm xi. society is in disorder. In the confusion the lives of the righteous are imperilled. The poet's despondent friends urge him to seek safety in flight: it is hopeless to attempt to stem the tide of anarchy. He replies in tones of calm and unabated confidence in Jehovah, who dwells far above the clouds which envelop the earth, and who will give the righteous their due, and speedily destroy the ungodly. The writer of Psalm xii. lives in an age of duplicity, insincerity, and untrustworthiness. By smooth words the unscrupulous threaten to get the poor into their power. The Psalmist expresses his confidence that Jehovah will deliver them. In Psalm xli. we have a most odious character presented to us. The Psalmist is ill: one who had been his intimate friend comes to visit him; he professes sympathy, but in reality is eagerly looking out for signs that he will not recover; his confederates are waiting and whispering together outside, hoping for the worst; he goes out and conveys to them with satisfaction the good news that the Psalmist's end is near. In Psalm xlii.-xliii.—really one Psalm, which has become accidentally divided into two—the author is somewhere in the Hermon region [“concerning” in the Prayer-book version of xlii. 8 is a misrendering of the Latin *de*, “from,”



in Seb. Münster's Latin translation of the Old Testament, 1534-5],<sup>1</sup> and debarred from worshipping in the Temple; he is taunted by heathen foes with being deserted by his God. With great pathos he utters his yearnings for God, describes his dejection and distress, recalls the happiness of the past, and prays earnestly for restoration to the privileges of the sanctuary. Psalm xlv. is a national Psalm. Some great defeat has overtaken the nation; they are a scorn and derision to their neighbours. They have been true and faithful to God, and yet He has cast them off. They beseech Him to bestir Himself and save them. In Psalm lii. some wealthy and powerful noble is denounced for ruining innocent persons, and, probably, enriching himself at their expense, by malicious slanders or false evidence. His fall is confidently anticipated, while the Psalmist will be secure in the strength of his God. In Psalm lv. the poet is in great peril and mental distress. He lives among foes in a city whose walls they occupy with their patrols. He would gladly, if he could, escape to the desert. The treachery of a false friend is the bitterest ingredient in his cup of suffering. Nevertheless, in spite of the feelings of terror and indignation stirring within him, he closes with thoughts of hope and trust. Psalm lviii. is a denunciation of unjust judges. In Psalm lix. the Psalmist is in a city full of threatening and insolent foes, whose speedy fall he both prays for and expects. Psalm lx. is a prayer for victory after some great disaster. And so in other cases. We can reconstruct from the language of the Psalm the kind of situation in which its author was placed, though we cannot determine its actual writer, or the actual occasion on which it was written. It is worth bearing in mind that the characters and social conditions alluded to in the Psalms can often be illustrated from the prophets.

<sup>1</sup> See my *Parallel Psalter*, p. xxii.

iii. A Psalm—except two or three which are evidently composite [in the case of Psalm cviii. we can demonstrate this, for it is composed of Psalm lvii. 7–11 and Psalm lx. 5–12]—is a *unity*, and must be interpreted so that its unity is preserved. The Hebrew tenses are often in themselves ambiguous. They must be rendered so that the unity of the situation is maintained. Thus the future “shall” in the Prayer-book version of xviii. 5, 25–27, lxviii. 10, cxvi. 4, makes the Psalm incoherent. The “is” in Psalm xxxii. 2, and the “will” in the following verse, do the same. The principle has to be borne in mind in interpretation. We must not interpret a verse in a sense inconsistent with its context. The old atomistic style of interpretation, which often did this, must be abandoned. The Psalms are in this respect like the prophecies and the Epistles. The Bible is not a collection of disconnected dogmatic statements, any one of which may be taken, and used, regardless of its context. It is a collection of writings, each having its historical place, and each having its own unity—the unity of an historical narrative, a poem, a prophetic discourse, an epistle, as the case may be.

iv. In interpreting the Psalms, as in interpreting the other poetical books of the Old Testament and the writings of the prophets, a distinction must be drawn between the original sense and the application. The words of a Psalm may be applied to many persons and situations which were entirely out of the mind of the original writer; and we must be careful not so to apply a Psalm as to confuse the application with the interpretation. This has a bearing on the use made of the Psalms in the New Testament, and also by the Church (to which I shall revert later); and to avoid confusion and mistake it is important to bear it in mind.

Let us then consider Psalm ii. and see whether it is possible to reconstruct the historical situation presupposed by it.

The Psalm is artistically constructed, and falls into four strophes of nearly equal length; it also displays great poetical vigour and dramatic power. Its central thought is the world-wide dominion of the King of Zion.<sup>1</sup>

First strophe (*vv.* 1–3). The poet begins by describing a confederacy of subject nations, mustering for a revolt, and eager to cast off their allegiance to the theocratic king of Israel:—

- 1 Why do the nations throng tumultuously,<sup>2</sup>  
and the peoples meditate<sup>3</sup> emptiness?
- 2 The kings of the earth take their stand,  
and the rulers sit in conclave<sup>4</sup> together,  
against Jehovah and against his anointed (, saying):
- 3 'Let us knap their thongs in sunder,  
and fling away their cords from us.'

The scene in *vv.* 1, 2 is presented with dramatic vividness; we see the actors all in movement before us (the Hebrew student will notice the imperfect tenses in *vv.* 1*b*, 2*a*). The 'thongs' are the thongs of the yoke, which, in the case of a literal yoke, bound it round the animal's neck (see *Jer.* v. 5; xxvii. 2). Before *v.* 3 we must, as often in Hebrew poetry, supply in thought, '(saying)': instead of describing what the kings and rulers do, the poet, more graphically and dramatically, represents them as declaring defiantly what they intend. In English, in such cases, to make the meaning clear, we should use naturally inverted commas.

<sup>1</sup> The notes are not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to explain or illustrate points of interest.

<sup>2</sup> The root is rare in Heb. (only the subst. *throng* twice besides, *Ps.* lv. 14, lxiv. 2 [see R.V.m.]; but the meaning is clear from Aramaic; see *Dan.* vi. 6, 11, 15 (R.V.m.). In the Targums the verb is often used for the Heb. תִּצְרַח (e.g. *Ps.* xlvi. 6*a*). (Where the Hebrew and English verse-numbers differ, as they often do in the Psalms,—the titles, if long, being counted as *v.* 1 in the Heb.)—the references here and in the sequel are always to the *English*.)

<sup>3</sup> Properly, *murmur* or *mutter*. So always.

<sup>4</sup> Or, changing one letter, *assemble themselves*. See the note.

In *v.* 2 'sit in conclave' is in Heb. נִסְדָּו—in this sense only Ps. xxxi. 13 [Heb. 14] besides. Elsewhere the verb always means to *found* (Ps. xxiv. 2). Perhaps the primary idea of the root was to *fix firm* or *close*, usually taken in the sense of *to found*, but also having in Nifal, in the reflexive sense of the conjugation, the meaning *fix* or *seat themselves close together*, i.e. "sit in conclave." But Lagarde's נִסְדָּו, *meet by appointment, assemble themselves* (Ps. xlvi. 4 [5]; and esp. Neh. vi. 2), is a very probable emendation. As Dr. Gray has recently pointed out (in the paper cited above, p. 23), to adopt a conjectural *emendation* of the Hebrew text—provided it be not a violent one—is not more arbitrary or venturesome than to assign a conjectural *meaning* to a Hebrew word. To treat יָסַד here as a denom. from סָדַד, or as a parallel form of סָדַד, and to render *confer* or *consult together* (Duhm, Bāthgen, *al.*), is precarious. It is true, סָדַד, like *swōd* in Syriac, means properly *intimate* or *friendly converse* (see my note on Am. iii. 7 in the *Cambridge Bible*); but no verb סָדַד is found in the Old Testament, its first and, seemingly, its only occurrence being Ecclus. vii. 14 (Heb.); in Syriac the form regularly used is the reflexive ܣܘܕܘܘܬܐ (so ܣܘܕܘܬܐ or ܣܘܕܘܬܐ in the Aramaising Hebrew of Ecclus. viii. 17; ix. 3, 14; xlii. 12). Where there is so little evidence that סָדַד was a genuine Hebrew verb, it is hazardous to assume, on the strength of Ges.-K. §§ 77c, 78b, a parallel form to it, יָסַד.

Second strophe (*vv.* 4–6). Jehovah mocks from heaven their puny efforts; His king is firmly established upon Zion.

- 4 He that sitteth in heaven laugheth :  
the Lord mocketh at them.  
5 Then shall he speak unto them in his anger,  
and dismay them in his hot displeasure :  
6 'But *I* have installed<sup>1</sup> my king  
upon Zion, my holy mountain.'

<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere in this sense only Prov. viii. 23. The Heb. verb *nāsakh* in all other passages means to *pour out* a libation (Ps. xvi. 4, etc.), or, of molten metal, to *cast* (Is. xl. 19; cf. the derivative *massēkhāh*, a *molten* image); hence, in default of any better explanation, it used generally to be supposed either that to *pour out* in these passages meant to *anoint*, or, as cast metal becomes afterwards solid and firm, that the verb had acquired the secondary sense of *fix* or *set firm*. Neither of these explanations was, however, satisfactory. It is now known (Delitzsch, *Ass. H.W.B.*, p. 472) that there is an Assyrian verb *nasāku*, used of *setting up*, or *installing*, a king, with a deriv. *nasīku*, *prince*, corresponding to the Heb. נָסִיך, *prince* (Ps. lxxxiii. 11 *al.*). It can hardly be doubted that the Hebrew verb, as used in Ps. ii. 6 and Prov. viii. 23, is to be explained from this



*He that sitteth* (viz. enthroned, which is often the implication of the word: see e.g. xxix. 10, lv. 19) *in heaven* is a title in finely-conceived contrast to the inhabitants of earth, vainly plotting to thwart His purpose. For the anthropomorphism *mocketh*, cf. Psalm lix. 8. Before *v. 6* we must again supply in thought, ‘(saying).’

Third strophe (*vv. 7–9*). The king is here suddenly introduced speaking, and reciting the Divine decree of sonship which gives him authority over the nations of the earth. This assures him of his position, and gives him confidence.

7 I will tell concerning the decree :

Jehovah said unto me, ‘Thou art my son ;

‘I have this day begotten thee :

8 ‘Ask of me, and I will give the nations for thine inheritance,  
‘and the ends of the earth for thy possession :

9 ‘Thou shalt break them with a mace <sup>1</sup> of iron ;

‘thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter’s vessel.’

In *v. 7* (‘I will tell’) the speaker is the king; there are in Hebrew poetry many similar cases, in which the speaker has to be inferred from the context. The ‘decree’ is the promise given by Nathan to David (2 Sam. vii. 12–14):  
<sup>12</sup> ‘When thy days are fulfilled, and thou shalt sleep with thy fathers, I will set up thy seed after thee, which shall proceed out of thy bowels, and I will establish his kingdom.  
<sup>13</sup> He shall build an house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever. <sup>14</sup> *I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son* : if he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men (i.e. as human fathers are wont to correct their children,—as far as may be necessary, yet

Assyrian word. There must have been in Hebrew—as analogously in many other cases—two distinct roots, *nāsakh*,—one, occurring frequently, meaning to *pour out*, and the other, preserved only in two places, meaning to *set up, install*, with the derivative ׀׀׀, *prince*, properly one *installed* into some dignity.

<sup>1</sup> The ‘spiked iron mace used in war’ (Cheyne). Or, *sceptre* (fig. for *rule*), as Ps. xlv. 6.

not so far as to cast them off); <sup>15</sup> but my kindness shall not depart from him, as I took it from Saul, whom I put away from before thee. <sup>16</sup> And thine house and thy kingdom shall be made sure for ever before me (so LXX); thy throne shall be established for ever' (compare the poetical amplification of the passage in Psalm lxxxix. 26-37). In the original promise, it will be noticed, the words refer either to Solomon, or, as the word 'seed' in *v.* 13 and the context generally suggest, the Davidic dynasty in general (in which case *v.* 13 will be a later gloss <sup>1</sup>); in either case the possibility of the ruler spoken of *sinning* is expressly contemplated (*v.* 14*b*). In Psalm ii., however, the poet takes the promise of *v.* 14*a* absolutely, and leaves this possibility out of the question. 'Thou art my son' was perhaps (Gunkel)<sup>2</sup> a formula of adoption: hitherto the king has had only a human father; now he is to have a Divine father. 'I have this day begotten thee' expands and enforces 'Thou art my son'; the 'day' is the one on which the king had been anointed, and formally installed into his kingly rights. This august title had been conferred upon him then.

It ought to be remembered that the figures applied here to the king are used elsewhere of the *nation*. Thus Israel was figuratively Jehovah's 'son,' his 'firstborn' (Exod. iv. 22; Hos. xi. 1)—the relation being conceived, not, as was often the case among heathen nations, as a physical one, but as a *moral* one, implying on the one side fatherly affection and care, and on the other filial devotion and obedience.<sup>3</sup> Even the same word 'begotten' is used of the nation, Deut. xxxii. 18: 'Of the Rock that *begat* thee thou wast unmindful, and forgattest God that

<sup>1</sup> See Kennedy's note on the passage in the *Century Bible*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ausgewählte Psalmen übersetzt und erklärt* (1904), p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Isa. i. 2 (of individual Israelites), and see more fully my *Deuteronomy*, pp. 156 (on xiv. 1), and 352 (on xxxii. 5).

was in travail with thee.' There, however, the word is used as a figure for the origin of the nation ; here it is a figure for the king's installation into the rights of sonship.

Vv. 8-9. Inheritance is the natural right of sonship ; and as Jehovah's adopted son, the king here spoken of has but to ask his Father, and He will give him the whole earth as his possession ; if any of his subjects presume to revolt, he will bring upon them complete and irreparable destruction.

For *break them*, the LXX, pronouncing תִּרְעֵם for תִּרְעֵם has 'thou shalt *shepherd* them' (ποιμανεῖς αὐτούς—fig. for *rule*, as 2 Sam. v. 2 ; Ps. lxxviii. 72 *al.* [R.V. *feed*]), and this is the source of to 'shepherd the nations with a rod of iron' in Revelation ii. 27, xii. 5, xix. 15 ; but the parallel *dash to pieces* supports the Massoretic vocalisation 'shalt *break* them.'

Strophe 4 (vv. 10-12). The poet speaks, drawing the practical lesson from Jehovah's words. Let the nations yield willing submission to Jehovah's son, instead of resisting to their own destruction.

- 10 Now, therefore, O ye kings, be wise ;  
     be admonished, ye judges of the earth.  
 11 Serve Jehovah with fear,  
     and rejoice with trembling.  
 12 Kiss the son, lest he be angry, and ye perish as regards the  
     way ;  
     for his anger burneth quickly :  
     happy are all they that take refuge in him.

V. 10. *Be admonished* ; properly, *Let yourselves be admonished* (the *Nifal tolerativum*, Ges.-K. § 51c). Cf. the same word, addressed to Jerusalem, in Jer. vi. 8. Notice that in P.B.V. *be learned* is a euphemism for *be taught*, according to an old usage of 'learn' (so lxxxii. 5 'They will not be *learned*,' i.e. be *taught* ; xxv. 4 'Lead me forth in thy truth and *learn* me), still current among the poorer classes, and dialectically.

V. 11. It is possible that for גילו, *rejoice*, we should read חילו, 'Be in awe' (see Ps. xcvi. 9, cxiv. 7 [R.V. *tremble*]). It is true, of course, that in the attitude of a religious man towards his God joy and fear are no incompatible emotions: but regard must be had to the context; and it seems more likely that insurgent rebels would be exhorted to be in awe than to rejoice. *Reverence* (P.B.V.) in the next line is incorrect: רערה denotes never religious fear, but always *alarm* or *trembling*: see Ps. xlvi. 6, xxxiii. 14, Job iv. 14; רע Ps. lv. 5, Exod. xv. 15; and the verb in Ps. civ. 32.

V. 12. *Kiss the son*, the 'son' spoken of above, the Israelitish king: pay him the homage that is his due, lest He (i.e. Jehovah) be angry with you for resisting the king who is His 'son,' and His wrath kindle against you with destructive force. The kiss is a figure for homage and regard (1 Sam. x. 1; 1 Kings xix. 18; Hosea xiii. 2; Job xxxi. 2—in the last three passages, paid to a deity). The Aramaic *bar* (elsewhere in Hebrew only three times in the late passage, Prov. xxxi. 2) is strange, especially as we have the Hebrew *ben* in *v.* 7; but it would be accounted for if the Psalm were late; and it is difficult to find a more satisfactory rendering; nor are the emendations that have been proposed convincing. We must admit the uncertainty of the passage, but happily it does not affect the general sense of the Psalm: as the sequel shows, there must have stood here, however it may have been expressed, some admonition to submit to either Jehovah or His king.

The chief other renderings are (1) LXX δρᾶξασθε παιδας 'Lay hold of instruction'; hence Jerome in the Vulg. *apprehendite disciplinam*; Targ. קבילו אילפנא, 'receive the teaching.' The origin of this rendering is uncertain; it *may* imply a different reading (כויסר—cognate with the verb rendered 'be admonished' in *v.* 7—for בר, כוי having dropped out after the קו of נשקו, and כר having become corrupted into בר); it *may* depend on a Midrashic explanation of בר, as signifying the 'law.'<sup>1</sup> The meaning *lay hold of* for

<sup>1</sup> Some of the Rabbis interpreted *bar*, 'corn,' in Prov. xi. 26, as a figure for the *law* (*Sanh.* 92a: in Wünsche's transl., *Der Bab. Talm. in seinen Haggadischen Bestandtheilen übersetzt*, II. iii., 1889, p. 154 f.); and they understood Ps. ii. 11 in the same sense, 'Kiss the corn of the law!'



נִשְׂק is also very uncertain. (a) The corresponding word in Arabic, *nasaka*, means to *arrange together in order*, as pearls on a string, or a discourse (cf. *sermo* from *serere*); (b) in Hebrew it occurs three times with some such idea as *handling* a bow (Ps. lxxviii. 9; 1 Chron. xii. 2), or a bow and shield (2 Chron. xvii. 17); but exactly *what* idea it denotes in this connexion can only be conjectured; (c) then, further, the cognate *nēshek* denotes a *weapon*, or, collectively, *armour* (Job xx. 24, Ezek. xxxix. 9; 1 Kings x. 25, 2 Kings x. 12); but again, what the etymological meaning of the word is, is quite uncertain. Thus the rendering *lay hold of* rests upon a very insecure philological foundation; it would no doubt suit (b) if this stood by itself, but it is difficult to connect with (a) and (c).

(2) Hitzig rendered *Lay hold of* (or *Embrace*) *obedience* (cf. Kirkpatrick, in the *Cambridge Bible*, p. 12, 'or, perhaps, *obedience*'), deriving *bar* from the Arab. *barra*, to be *pious* towards God, *dutiful* towards parents, *kind* towards others, whence *bir*, *piety*, *dutifulness*, and *kindness*, and especially *obedience* towards God (Lane, *Arab. Lex.*, pp. 175, 176c). But apart from the doubtful rendering *Lay hold of*, the strong Arabism is not probable.

(3) Aquila rendered *καταφιλήσατε ἐκλεκτῶς* (cf. Cant. vi. 9), and Symmachus *προσκυνήσατε καθαρῶς* (cf. Job xi. 4), whence Jerome, in his own translation from the Hebrew, *adore pure*—all taking בָּר as an adv. (cf. כִּר יִכְיִין, Isa. xxxiii. 7); so Dr. Briggs, only vocalising בָּר, and construing as an adv. accusative, 'kiss in purity'—let your homage be unsullied by any secret blemish (Job xxxi. 27 f.). This construction is quite grammatical (cf. אֲהַבְּם נְרִיבָה, Hos. xiv. 4 [5], Ges.-K. § 118q); but both *bar*, *clean* or *pure*, and *bōr*, *cleanness*, *purity*, are rare (Job xi. 4, and of the heart Ps. xix. 8, xxiv. 4, lxxiii. 1; of the hands Ps. xviii. 20, 24, Job xxii. 30); and one rather wonders whether either is a likely word to have been used here. Still, the rendering is certainly more probable than either (1) or (2). It is remarkable that none of the Ancient Versions, except the Syriac, should have given what seems to be the most natural rendering of the Hebrew, *Kiss the son*, not even Aq., Symm. and Jerome, though they plainly had before them the same consonantal text which we have, and though, too, the explanation of a Hebrew word from the Aramaic is anything but uncommon in the versions, especially in the LXX. Jerome mentions the rendering *Kiss the son*, but seems to think it scarcely worth considering: his words are 'Pro eo quod in Graeco dicitur *δράξασθε παιδείας*, in Hebraeo legitur *NESCU BAR*, quod interpretari potest, *adore filium.*'

(*ibid.*; Midrash *Tehillin*, on Ps. ii. 11, in Wünsche's transl., p. 30; Midrash *Mishlê* on xi. 26), and even Prov. xxxi. 2 (Midrash *Bemidbar Rabba*, on Num. vi. 2; in Wünsche's tr., p. 214).

(4) Lagarde (*Novae Psalterii graeci editionis specimen*, 1887, p. 24 f.), assuming that the LXX really read מוֹקֵר, argues in favour of adopting these consonants, but vocalising them differently, and adding a suffix, would read מוֹקֵרוּ [or, better, מוֹקֵרוֹ], i.e., 'Lay hold of his thongs' (so Cheyne, *Origin of the Psalter*, p. 351, 'Put on (again) his bonds<sup>1</sup>'): נִשָּׂק, 'lay hold of,' in v. 12 would then, he points out, form an effective alliterative antithesis to נִתַּק, 'knap in sunder' in v. 3. But 'lay hold of,' even if (see above) it were certainly the meaning of נִשָּׂק, does not seem to be quite the idea that we should expect in connexion with 'thongs.'

(5) It has often been remarked (cf. the note above) that 'rejoice' in v. 11 agrees indifferently with 'trembling': and Professor Bertholet, of Bâle, has made recently (*Z. für alttest. Wiss.*, 1908, p. 58 f.) an ingenious suggestion for removing at one stroke both this incongruity and the troublesome *bar*. He suggests viz. that two words have been accidentally transposed: the original text being

וּנְשָׁקוּ בְּרִגְלוֹ בִּרְעָדָה<sup>2</sup>

a scribe, he supposes, accidentally omitted the second to the seventh letters from the right, which he added afterwards at the end, thus producing

וּנְגָלוּ בִּרְעָדָה נִשְׁקוּ בַר

we should then get for the original form of the verse—

11. Serve Jehovah with fear,  
and *kiss his feet* with trembling;
12. Lest he be angry, and ye perish, etc.

And he points out that to 'kiss the feet' is a common expression in Assyrian, used both of submission to a conqueror, and also in particular of homage to a deity.<sup>3</sup> Bertholet afterwards found that he had been partly anticipated in his conjecture, both by Sievers (*ibid.* p. 193), and by the learned Dominican scholar, Père Lagrange (*Revue Bibl.*, 1905, p. 40, cited *ibid.* p. 234). It is an objection to Bertholet's suggestion, not met by the parallels cited by him (נִגַּע,

<sup>1</sup> Discarded in *Psalms*, ed. 2 (1904), in favour of a different conjecture.

<sup>2</sup> In the autographs, and early copies, of the Old Testament writings, the divisions between words must have been often imperfectly marked, even if they were marked at all (they are often not marked in inscriptions): the renderings of the LXX often presuppose a division of words different from that in the present Massoretic text; and in the Massoretic text itself there are undoubted instances of words incorrectly divided (in Gen. xlix. 19-20, for instance, we must certainly read עֲקֹבֶם אִשָּׁר for עֲקֹב מֵאִשָּׁר, in 2 Sam. xxi. 1 וְאֵל בֵּיתָהּ דְּרַמִּים for וְאֵל בֵּית הַדְּרַמִּים, and in Hos. vi. 5 וּמִשְׁפָּטֶי אֹר for וּמִשְׁפָּטֶיךָ אֹר. See further examples in my *Notes on Samuel*, p. xxxi f.

<sup>3</sup> Bertholet cites, for examples, Jastrow, *Die Relig. Bab. u. Ass.* i. 514, ii. 103, and Delitzsch, *H. W. B.* p. 486b.

רַבֵּק, construed with ב), that נִטַּק is construed often with ל (as well as with an accus.), but never with ב. Still it is possible that ברנלו itself, in the MS. which was copied incorrectly, might be an error for an earlier לרנלו. Even so, however, to 'kiss the feet' is an expression not elsewhere found in Hebrew; and though the feet of Marduk or a goddess might be kissed by a worshipper in Assyria, it may be doubted whether such an anthropomorphism would be used by a worshipper of Yahweh in Israel. There seems also to be no apparent reason, such as an *δμοιοτέλετον*, to explain the scribe's supposed error. The case is one in which, while the traditional text, and generally accepted rendering, are not above suspicion, the alternative renderings or readings proposed are not free from objection.

The Psalmist ends by congratulating those who place themselves under Jehovah's protection, by accepting the rule of His king. The rendering of P.B.V., A.V. and R.V. 'put their trust in him' obliterates the suggestive figure of the original, which is that of *taking refuge* or *shelter*. The same figure is often obliterated elsewhere: see the passages cited in the Glossary to my *Parallel Psalter*, under *refuge*, p. 454. The expression, when referred to Jehovah, always implies trustful confidence; but the sense of the figure is often consciously felt, and it is a loss to confuse the word with the ordinary word for *trust*. Comp. Jud. ix. 15, where the bramble says to the other trees, 'Come and *take refuge* in my shadow,' Isa. xxx. 2, 3 'to *take refuge* in the shadow of Egypt,' Ruth ii. 12 'under whose wings thou art come—not to "trust" but—to *take refuge*' (so here R.V.). In Psalms xxxvi. 7, lvii. 1, lxi. 4, xci. 4 (in all with 'wings') R.V. also has rightly *take refuge*. Comp. the cognate subst. בַּחֲסֵה, regularly rendered *refuge*—in Isa. iv. 6 from a storm, and often figuratively of Jehovah (Ps. xiv. 6, xlvi. 1, etc., and expressly from a storm, Isa. xxv. 4).

Is it possible to determine the occasion of the Psalm? Insurrections in the reigns of David or Solomon have



been suggested: but though these kings had their foes, there is no mention or probability of a revolt of subject-nations from either of them, such as is here depicted. We might think better of a later king, when some of Israel's neighbours—Edom, Moab, or Ammon—subdued by David (2 Sam. viii.) may have assailed Judah; and this may have been painted by the poet as a revolt of subject-nations generally, the actual occasion being magnified and made the basis of an ideal description of the triumph of Jehovah and His king. It is very possible, however, that Bâthgen is right in regarding the whole representation as ideal: the prophets had spoken of the assaults of nations upon Israel, and of their defeat—sometimes of actual assaults, as of the Assyrians, Isaiah xvii. 12–14, sometimes of imaginary ones, like that of Magog, whom Ezekiel (ch. xxxviii., xxxix.) represents as advancing against the restored Israel only to be annihilated by Divine intervention (xxxviii. 21 f.); they had proclaimed Israel's supremacy over other nations; they had also drawn the picture of Israel's ideal king, and of his victories over his foes. On the basis of these representations there had grown up the idea, current in apocalyptic writings, of the advent of an age when the heathen who held Israel enthralled would be subdued, and when Israel would rule in freedom and glory over the world. The Psalmist does not give the reins to his imagination as these writers do; but he is moving on the same lines. 'He lived in an age when Israel was surrounded by powerful foes; but he was also inspired by strong religious and national feeling' (Bâthgen). On the basis of older prophecies of the rule of the ideal king, combined with reminiscences of the rule of David and Solomon, and the promise of Nathan in 2 Samuel vii. 14, the poet constructs an imaginative picture of his rule established over all the earth, of the nations and their kings revolting,



of their failure, and of the re-establishment by Jehovah of the rule of His ideal king (so Bächtgen). This view is attractive: whether it is correct, is more than we can say. If it is, the Psalm will contain a poetical representation of world-wide empire conferred by Jehovah upon the ideal ruler of the future, and solemnly confirmed to him by Him. If *bar* in *v.* 12 is correct, and means 'son,' the Psalm is almost certainly post-exilic; the Aram. רגש in *v.* 1 points in the same direction: and it is to the post-exilic age—perhaps early in the Greek period, when Syrians and Egyptians were contending for the possession of Coele-Syria and Palestine—that, if the Psalm is rightly interpreted in the last-mentioned sense, it will most naturally be assigned.

The Psalm is thus, if the 'king' spoken of in it is an actual king of Israel, 'typically' Messianic, i.e. it invests the actual king, and his rule, with such ideal features as to make him typical of a future *ideal* king: if the 'king,' in accordance with the last suggestion, is the future ideal ruler of Israel, it will be directly Messianic. 'Messiah'—properly מלכה משיחא, 'the anointed king,' κατ' ἐξοχήν—was the name given by the later Jews to the ideal ruler, whose figure they constructed on the basis of representations in the Old Testament, and who they believed would one day appear to deliver them from the tyranny of the nations, and assume the rule of the world<sup>1</sup>: stripped of its worldly features, and spiritualised, the ideal was appropriated and realised by Jesus. In either case, the Psalm is 'Messianic' not by being a direct prediction, but through its describing an

<sup>1</sup> Comp. e.g. in the so-called 'Psalms of Solomon' (written probably c. 70 B.C.), where there is a prayer to God that He will 'raise up to them their king, the son of David,' who will 'destroy the ungodly nations with the word of his mouth,' and 'gather together a holy people' round himself in Jerusalem, whom he will 'lead in righteousness,' while he will 'possess the nations of the heathen to serve him beneath his yoke' (xvii. 23, 27, 28, 32). See in Ryle and James' edition, p. 137 ff.

*ideal* rule which, in a larger and more spiritual sense than the Psalmist's words actually suggest, was fulfilled by Christ. And so the Psalm is quoted, more than once, in the New Testament, with reference to Christ. Verses 1 and 2 are quoted by St. Peter in Acts iv. 20 f.—not indeed as a *prediction*, for there was then no rebellion of subject-nations against a king, such as the Psalm depicts (notice *v.* 3), but—as describing a hostility, *exemplified* then, in a signal manner, by the Jews and Gentiles confederate against Him. In Acts xiii. 33, *v.* 7 ('Thou art my son,' etc.) is quoted as testifying to the truth of Christ's resurrection: again, not as a prediction, because, as has been shown, the words relate in reality to something entirely different, but because the resurrection of Jesus was a signal testimony to His being in the fullest sense of the word (and not only as the Psalmist took it) the 'son' of God, and the true 'Messiah.' Psalm ii. is accordingly read appropriately in the Anglican Church on Easter-day. And in Hebrews i. 5, the same verse, together with 2 Samuel vii. 14*a*,<sup>1</sup> is quoted as showing Christ's superiority to the angels: no angel had ever been addressed in terms such as those used in these two passages. But again it must be recognised that the apostle understands the words in a higher and larger sense than that which they actually bear in the Old Testament itself: in the case of the Psalm this follows from what has been said above in the note on the verse; and it is, if possible, even clearer in the case of 2 Samuel vii. 14*a*; for there, as the context shows (*v.* 14*b*; see p. 32), the term 'father' cannot be used in a loftier sense than that in which it might be used in relation to a 'son,' the possibility of whose sinning is expressly contemplated by the writer.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare Rom. i. 4 'marked out as the son of God with power . . . by the resurrection of the dead' (meaning His resurrection; see Sanday and Headlam on the sense of the Greek expression used).

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Westcott, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 19: 'The whole passage

As we proceed we shall meet with other illustrations of the varied use made of Old Testament passages in the New Testament. But our method of dealing with them must in all cases be the same : as in all exegesis, our first duty must be to discover, as accurately as we can, the exact picture, or idea, which the Old Testament writer means his reader to form ; when we have done this, we shall be in a position to appreciate rightly the manner in which it is applied in the New Testament.

S. R. DRIVER.

(2 Sam. vii. 14), with its reference to "iniquity" and chastening, can only refer to an earthly king; and still experience showed that no earthly king could satisfy its terms. 'The kingdom passed away from the line of David.' It was necessary, therefore, to look for another 'seed,' of whom its terms should be true without reservation (*v.* 14*b*) or restriction.

*STUDIES IN THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT.*

I. THE BEATITUDES.

So long as the study of the New Testament continues, it is probable that Mrs. Lewis's discovery of the Sinaitic Palimpsest will rise rather than decline in importance. With her text, with the Curetonian and the Peshitta, we have something like the three terms of a mathematical series, whence the character of the series can be determined, and earlier or later terms inferred. A series 2, 4, is ambiguous, but a series 2, 4, 6, or 2, 4, 8 certain. And for certain purposes we have in the Harklensian and Palestinian Versions two further terms. For the latter Mrs. Lewis has again done admirable service, while the merit of locating it correctly, as in the case of the Peshitta, belongs to Professor Burkitt.

The writer who has hitherto—so far as the undersigned is aware—pursued this line of inquiry with the greatest success, is one whose recent death makes a painful gap in the ranks of European Semitists, Professor Adalbert Merx. Long known by his works on Syriac grammar as a painstaking student, in his work on the Syriac Gospels<sup>1</sup> he displayed a degree of acuteness and power of generalisation which perhaps his earlier writings did not indicate. He speedily convinces his reader that in the case of a text so important as that of the Gospels various readings and renderings, however minute, are fraught with tremendous significance; an alteration for “and” to “or” may embody the result of a long train of thought and controversy. In the history of the Gospel text the Higher and the Lower Criticism meet, and it is hard to say where one ends and the other begins.

Bulky as is the commentary of Merx, it does not exhaust

<sup>1</sup> *Die vier kanonischen Evangelien nach ihrem ältesten bekannten Texte.* Berlin, 1897–1905.



its subject, and there seems to be some opportunity left for building on the foundation which he has laid. And this is the intention of the present studies. The first subject will be the Beatitudes.

Of these there are two records, that of Luke, who records *four*, and that of Matthew, who offers *nine*. The respective records are as follows.<sup>1</sup>

Luke vi. 20-23.

- a. Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.
- b. Blessed are ye that hunger now, for ye shall be filled.
- c. Blessed are ye that weep now, for ye shall laugh.
- d. Blessed are ye when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate you from their company and reproach you, and cast out your name as evil for the Son of Man's sake. Rejoice in that day and leap for joy; for, behold, your reward is great in heaven; for in the same manner did their fathers unto the Prophets.

Matthew v. 3-11.

- a. Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
- c. Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.
- e. Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.
- b. Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled.
- f. Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.
- g. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.
- h. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of God.
- i. Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
- d. Blessed are ye when men shall reproach you and persecute you and say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad; for great is your reward in heaven; for so persecuted they the Prophets which were before you.

What is the relation of these two texts to each other?

In the first place it is clear that the Lucan beatitudes are, with the exception of *d*, epigrammatic and unqualified. if "you" means "all mankind," they constitute a eulogy on present misery, on the ground that there is to be a com-

<sup>1</sup> The translation follows the R.V.

plete reversal of conditions. Just as in the Parable of Dives and Lazarus nothing is said of the moral qualities of the two, but only of their respective condition in this world and the next is an account given, so here (if "you" have that sense) present misery is said to be the prelude to happiness.

In the Matthaean versions of *a, b*, this is altered. Qualifications are introduced, such as seriously alter the sense. It is no longer poverty, but poverty in spirit, which earns the kingdom of heaven; not real hunger and thirst, but hunger and thirst [after] righteousness, which are to be satisfied. In *c* mourning is not to turn into laughter, but to be solaced. And the additional beatitudes *e, f, g, h, i*, are all eulogistic of moral qualities, not of physical conditions.

In *a* the Syriac versions exhibit one difference of rendering, apparently slight in character; LS [Lewis Syriac] and CS [Curetonian Syriac] render *poor in their spirit* for *poor in spirit*, introduced by PS [Peshitta Syriac] after the Greek, and retained in JS [Palestinian Syriac]. And (like some of the other authorities) they vary in the location in Matthew of the beatitude *e*; CS places it after *a*, whereas the others place it after *c*.

The beatitude *e* excites suspicion, because it is a *Rabbinic* aphorism, based on Psalm xxxvii. 11, "The meek shall inherit the earth." This is rendered in the Peshitta of the Old Testament, "The *poor* shall inherit the earth," in accordance with a very common confusion between the Hebrew words for *poor* and *meek*, which originally appear not to have been distinct.<sup>1</sup> The addition of the words *in spirit* gives us the transition between "poverty" and "meekness"; the one is humble in means, and the other humble in spirit.

The beatitude *e*, then, of which the place is uncertain, appears to be an insertion of the same type as that of the

<sup>1</sup> עניים and עניים. Arab. ساء = "captive."

word "in spirit" in beatitude *a*; perhaps it does not absolutely imply that its author had the beatitudes before him in Hebrew, but it implies that its author was acquainted with the ambiguity of the Hebrew word for "meek," and felt safe in adding a beatitude which simply embodied a text of the Psalms, and which is practically found in the Oral Tradition.<sup>1</sup> What is uncertain is whether *e* was meant to displace *a*, or to be an addition to the list. Since the "poor in spirit" and "the meek" are identical, probably the former was the case.

The same hand is easily traceable in beatitude *h*, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of God." The argument lying at the basis of this text is from Judges vi. 24, where an altar is called *Jehovah Shalom* [Jehovah Peace]; whence the Rabbis infer that Peace is a name of God. "Great is Peace," we read in the Oral Tradition, "because the name of God is Peace," and that verse is quoted. Hence the "Sons of Peace" = the Sons of God. There was a rule that the salutation "Peace be upon you" might not be said in an unclean place, because of Peace being a divine name.<sup>2</sup>

The same hand is probably traceable in beatitude *g*, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." This would seem to be evolved from Isaiah vi., where the Prophet says that he, being a man of unclean lips, is ruined because he has *seen God*. "Uncleanness of lips" is afterwards identified with iniquity; whence the Targum has some justification for its rendering of the phrase "worthy to be reprov'd" or "tainted with iniquity." And indeed for the identification of the lips with the heart evidence could be found in the Gospel itself: "Out of the fullness of the heart the mouth speaketh." And the argument from Isaiah might seem as sound as the others.

<sup>1</sup> B. *Succah*, 29b.

<sup>2</sup> B. *Sabbath*, 10b.

The objection to this teaching is not that it is unsound, but rather that it is like (and not *unlike*) the teaching of the Scribes. That teaching consisted in the evolution of precepts from the text of the Old Testament by methods which at times were reasonable, at others (to our minds) the reverse; but they lacked personal authority—the “*I say unto you*”—which the Speaker of the Lucan beatitudes possessed. Hence these precepts give the commentator little trouble; the genuine sayings, with their uncompromising authoritativeness, seem at times to require the analogue of smoked glass to prevent their proving too dazzling for the common eye.

Beatitude *c* in Matthew exhibits the “smoked glass” as compared with its Lucan form. The change from mourning to laughter is something positive; the transition to “being comforted” is neutral. However for the assertion that the mourners would be comforted the writer could cite authority. The comforting of mourners, according to Jewish authorities, took priority over visiting the sick. Even the bereaved Gentile was to be “comforted,” i.e. visited and sat with. A verse of Job was used to prove that the *mourner*, like the bridegroom, should sit at the head of the table.<sup>1</sup> In Ecclesiasticus the practice of “comforting” is recommended, and the mourner told to accept the comfort. Hence “because they shall be comforted,” i.e. “because comforters will come to visit them,” is from the Rabbinic standpoint quite defensible.

Beatitude *f*, “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy,” is also part of the Rabbinic stock. It is a comment upon Deuteronomy xiii. 18: “And He may give thee mercy and have mercy upon thee.” The comment in the Oral Tradition runs thus:<sup>2</sup> “Whoso is merciful unto mankind

<sup>1</sup> Authorities in פתח:יצחק, s.v. מְבֹרָכִים, etc.

<sup>2</sup> B. *Sabbath*, 151b.



receives mercy from heaven ; and whoever has no mercy on mankind receives no mercy from heaven." " Shall give thee mercy " was then interpreted as " make thee merciful " ; and the occurrence of " and have mercy upon thee " immediately after lends this gloss some colour. The old authorities appear all to take this view. The Peshitta of the Old Testament offers an alternate rendering, " shall love thee," for " shall have mercy upon thee," in which case the phrase " shall give thee mercy " might be rendered " shall show thee mercy " ; the Vulgate omits one of the phrases.

Beatitude *b* in Matthew reveals the fact that it has been altered, by the difficulty of its Greek. In that language these verbs rarely take the accusative ; <sup>1</sup> the addition is not quite so strange in the Syriac versions. The nature of the comment is similar to that of the Targum on Isaiah lv.1. : " Ho every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters " ; in the Targum, " Ho every one that wishes to learn, let him come and learn."

The beatitude *d* shows more signs of alteration than any. The form in Luke is characterised by some remarkable Hebraisms. " Blessed are ye when men hate you, excommunicate you, reproach you, and defame you for the Son of Man's sake." Here the word " defame," in Greek " cast out your name as evil," has been rightly identified with the Hebrew expression of Deuteronomy xxii. 14,<sup>2</sup> etc. Of this " reproach " might seem to be an alternative rendering, as the Greek is not really intelligible. In Matthew LS alone preserves what is practically the same triad, " when men hate, persecute, and say what is evil about you." Clearly in the two Gospels we have different renderings of the same idiom : that idiom is literally *bring out an evil name*, and while in Luke it is the name that is supposed to be cast out of the

<sup>1</sup> οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην.

<sup>2</sup> הוֹצִיא שֵׁם רַע.

community, in Matthew the evil name or word is supposed to be *uttered*. The latter appears to be the more scholarly rendering. "Persecute" and "excommunicate" may represent the same word; perhaps "persecute" is a euphemistic mistranslation,<sup>1</sup> such as sometimes occurs. For "hate" the other authorities have "reproach," though the difference in the order of the words shows that there has been tampering with the text. "Reproach" is not identical with "say what is evil about," yet the two are distinguished by a nuance only; and it is not clear why "reproach" should have displaced "hate" rather than the phrase which it so nearly resembles in meaning.<sup>2</sup>

The translation given above is that of the R.V.; the original is likely to have meant "Blessed shall ye be, when men shall hate, excommunicate and defame you"; it contains a prophecy of future persecution, for which the reason has to be given, and that is represented in Luke by "for the Son of Man's sake," in LS of Matthew "for my name," and in PS, etc., by "on my account." The later tradition of Matthew is not satisfied with this, and adds the word "falsely," which appears before "for my name," etc., in CS and most authorities, and after it in PS. It is already involved in the words rendered "defame," and adds nothing to the sense.

The clause with which beatitude *d* ends in Matthew is, according to LS, "for so did their fathers persecute the Prophets." The Greek has "for so did they persecute the prophets which were before you." CS, according to its custom, gives both: "for so did your fathers persecute the prophets which were before you." Evidently what is literal and right is "for so were the prophets persecuted

<sup>1</sup> מַנְדִּין, interpreted מַנְדִּין.

<sup>2</sup> In the next paper we shall find grounds for thinking "hate" and "reproach" various renderings of שָׂנֵא.

by them which were before," of which "their fathers" of LS and Luke is a paraphrase.

The beatitude that remains in Matthew (*i*) "Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," appears to add little to *d*. Yet its *tense*, to which PS only of the Syriac authorities attaches much importance, is remarkable. The doctrine which it contains is that of the Book of Wisdom rather than of the Gospel. In the Jewish Oral Tradition it is deduced from Job viii. 7: "Thy beginning shall be from affliction [*sic*; or "afflicted"], and thy latter end very great." R. Eleazar said: "God brings afflictions on the *righteous* in this world, in order that they may inherit the world which is to come." <sup>1</sup> He then quotes the verse of Job as his authority. The relation then of *i* to *d* is similar to that of *e* to *a*.

The form taken by *d* in Matthew furnishes clear evidence of the originality of the Lucan form. For this is addressed to *the disciples*, and contains a warning and an exhortation appropriate to the monly. And in Luke all the beatitudes are so addressed, and the word *now* is inserted with *b* and *c* to distinguish them from *d*, which refers to the future. Merx points out that in the LS form of the Sermon in Matthew it is addressed to the disciples only, whereas the later authorities imply that it is addressed to the crowds. Addressed to the disciples, the words are in the highest degree sublime and inspiring; poor, hungry and thirsty, and distressed, they are assured that what they have got is better than any earthly kingdom; that their apparent sufferings are the prelude to all that the heart can desire; and that their future sufferings for His cause will class them with the Prophets of whom all Israel was proud. That—if the phrase may be used without irreverence,—is the strength of convic-

<sup>1</sup> B. *Kiddushin*, 40b.

tion that moves mountains ; and only reverence prevents the citation of something resembling it in recent history.

But the words *you* and *now* were overlooked by "Matthew," and the precepts were applied to the whole world. Naturally the propositions seemed staggering ; for that hunger, poverty and sorrow were invariably the prelude to their opposite seemed too plainly contradicted by experience. Hence they had in each case to be so interpolated that the *Jewish* reader would perceive that they were in accordance with what the Rabbis taught. And while Rabbinising what the tradition supplied, the editor felt justified in adding some other beatitudes for which chapter and verse could be cited out of Holy Scripture. For *four* seemed an insufficient number. But it seems to the present writer that these Rabbinic beatitudes, depending on the literal interpretation of the text, form a strange prelude to that authoritative discourse in which a new revelation, a new stage of evolution, is substituted for the Law and the Prophets.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.



*THE EPITAPH OF M. JULIUS EUGENIUS,  
BISHOP OF LAODICEIA.*

THIS important document, composed about A.D. 340-342, has been inserted by Dr. Erwin Preuschen in the new edition of his most useful *Analecta : Kürzere Texte zur Geschichte der alten Kirche und des Kanons*, pp. 149, 150. Unfortunately, he gives a text which is in several respects inexact and misleading; and, while he follows the arrangement in lines as on the sarcophagus throughout his first sixteen lines, and gives numbers accordingly, he neglects the arrangement in the last three (which he prints as four); and numbers the nineteen lines of the text as twenty-two. He also omits most of the scanty literature of the subject.<sup>1</sup>

When I wrote about this interesting memorial of the last great persecution, I had not seen the original stone. In April, 1909, we visited Ladik; my daughter made a drawing of the elaborately ornate surface, so as to show the exact situation of the lines and the way in which they are adapted to the ornamental details. Mr. Calder and I carefully verified the text and made some important corrections.

As Dr. Preuschen's text is intended for common use, it is important that it should be printed in an intelligible form. The errors in it arise partly from taking Mr. Calder's preliminary text without reading his commentary, and partly from pure error in reprinting that text.

The most serious fault in it is that he prints at the end τὰ προ[γεγραμμένα] ταῦτα ἐποίησα ἐπιγρ(ά)φιν ἐμὸν τῆς τε

<sup>1</sup> Ramsay, *EXPOSITOR*, December, 1908, pp. 546 ff., and *Luke the Physician and other Studies in the History of Religion*, pp. 339-351.

ἐκ[δοχῆς] τοῦ γένους μου. This is a meaningless and impossible reading. The nature of the necessary correction is obvious to any epigraphist,<sup>1</sup> and appeared to me so convincing that I wasted no words on it beyond stating the cause of the corruption. There can be no doubt that the purpose of the construction was stated at this point in the epitaph; and the purpose was that the whole monument and property should be the grave of Eugenius and of certain others belonging to his family. This is beyond question to any one who is familiar with the epigraphic style of Asia Minor; but Dr. Preuschen's studies have not lain in this unimportant and remote corner of the great field of learning. Now the ε which follows after ἐπιγρ(ά)φιν is the last letter of a line; and I suggested that the eye of the scribe wandered on to a later ε, and thus he omitted certain letters, just as he omitted α in ἐπιγράφιν, and ς in ἀπλῶς: the original text then was ε(ἰς τύμβον ἐ)μὸν,<sup>2</sup> "to be the tomb of myself and of [certain other persons] belonging to my family."

When we saw the stone in April, 1909, it was evident at the first glance that at the beginning of the last line there is a gap (which Mr. Calder had not indicated in his copy), and that this gap had held about nine letters. There was no error of the engraver: the words which we had suggested to supply a supposed omission had been actually engraved on the stone, but were subsequently defaced. The restored text, as I printed it, was correct, except that square brackets (indicating a lacuna in the stone) should be substituted for curved parentheses.

Another even more important correction is in the same line. The restoration ἐκ[δοχῆς] is wrong: the letter following κ was certainly Δ, and not Δ. Also, the lacuna is slightly

<sup>1</sup> The exact words are, of course, uncertain, although the general meaning is indubitable.

<sup>2</sup> Calder in his commentary gives ἐπι instead of εἰς, but this misses the sense.

larger than we had allowed ; and the letter O comes after the lacuna and before τοῦ.

The text then is ἐ[ις τύμβον ἐ]μὸν τῆς τε ἐκλ[ογῆς ἀπ]ὸ τοῦ γένους μου. This is an extremely interesting reading. The ἐκλογή is the collective noun indicating the whole body of ἐκλεκτοί, "all who are selected," "all the Elect." The expression ἐκλογῆς μέρος in Clement of Rome (*ad Cor.* xxix. 1) indicates (as Lightfoot points out) "the Christian people, the spiritual Israel, who under the new covenant have taken the place of the chosen people under the old ; as 1 Peter ii. 9, ὑμεῖς δὲ γένος ἐκλεκτόν. . . . Thus μέρος ἐκλογῆς here is coextensive with οἱ ἐκλελεγμένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ in § 50<sup>1</sup> (compare § 64)."

Eugenius constructed the whole palisade and monument (πέλτα καὶ σορός) "to be the grave of me and of the Elect from my race." He belonged to a family some of whose members were still pagan ; and he restricted the right of sharing this sepulchre to those members who were Christian. Similar regulations are found on Phrygian graves about the end of the third century and the early part of the fourth : in one case, the sepulchre of the five children (martyrs) who perished on the same day is declared to be common to the brethren (τὸ ἡρώιον κοινὸν τῶν ἀδελφῶν).<sup>2</sup>

The other correction which we made on the text is less important. The first name of the wife of Bishop Eugenius was not [Γ]Α, i.e., Gaia, but ΦΑ, i.e., Flavia. Her full name Flavia Julia Flaviana, indicates a person of high birth,

<sup>1</sup> Compare Harnack, *der erste Klemensbrief in Berlin. Akad. Sitzungsber.*, January 14, 1909, pp. 53-54, *die Christen . . . sind τὸ ἐκλογῆς μέρος und die ἀγία μερὶς § 30, erwählt aus der Völkerwelt (§ 29).*

<sup>2</sup> *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, ii. pp. 730-532. The five (martyrs) are called the children of the maker of the tomb : I take the maker to be the Bishop, and the five to be members of his congregation, his children according to the spirit.

which corresponds to the emphasis which the epitaph lays on the marriage.

Dr. Preuschen has other slight faults in the text which he prints. In line 4 he reads  $\Gamma a$ , where he should have printed  $\Gamma]a$ ,<sup>1</sup> and  $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$  for the correct (but ungrammatical) reading  $\sigma\tau\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ . In line 16 he rejects my suggestion ( $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ )  $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ , and prints the impossible  $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ : the use of  $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$  for simple  $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu$  is frequent in the Phrygian and Anatolian Greek.<sup>2</sup> He may possibly be right in preferring Calder's ( $[\lambda\iota\psi\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon]\nu\omicron\varsigma$ ) to my  $[\acute{\alpha}\rho\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon]\nu\omicron\varsigma$ , but I believe that the latter conjecture is in the right direction and that the one which he prefers is not. A careful reproduction by Calder of the epigraphic text will shortly appear in the German Journal *Klio*.

As the *Analecta* will be widely used, and probably pass into many editions, I trust that Dr. Preuschen will pardon me for making these criticisms, and also for suggesting that the remarkable little epitaph<sup>3</sup> dated in the time of the persecution by Decius, and the long epitaph dated under Maximin,<sup>4</sup> both commemorating champions of the anti-Christian reaction, might advantageously be added to his most useful book. I have gratefully to acknowledge his courtesy in sending it to me.

I may also use this opportunity to correct an error of interpretation which I have fallen into (along with Mr. Calder). M. Henri Grégoire has convinced me that  $\kappa\epsilon\nu\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  means "mosaics"; and it is an interesting point that in this

<sup>1</sup> The same error is found in Mr. Calder's text: the first letter is illegible, but the second is certain.

<sup>2</sup> It occurs also in Eusebius, as Calder points out in his commentary, and probably more widely.

<sup>3</sup> *Pauline and Other Studies*, p. 109. Reprinted recently by M. E. de Stoop with all the connected group of inscriptions, including the one mentioned in the following note.

<sup>4</sup> *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, ii. p. 566.



Laodicean Church, built 320-340 A.D., mosaics formed so important a feature of the equipment and decoration. It remains, of course, still true that there were doubtless screens used in this church, as in the contemporary one at Tyre. We have found several examples of screens represented on Christian gravestones of this same period and region.

W. M. RAMSAY.

## SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.

### I.

#### NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM.

WHAT we name Sin is, from the religious point of view, the tragedy of God's universe. What it is, how it came, why it is permitted to develop itself into the havoc and ruin it surely entails, what is to be the end of it, above all, how its presence and working are to be reconciled with goodness, holiness, love, in the God who has permitted it—these are the crushing questions that press upon the spirit of every one who thinks deeply on the subject. In its very conception sin is that which *ought not to be*; which ought never to have been. How, then, or why, is it here, this awful, glaring, deadly, omnipresent reality in human history and experience?

For sin *is* here: this conscience and universal experience attest. The evidences of its presence are not slight or intermittent. Men may belittle it, try to forget it, treat it as a superstition or disease of imagination—there are, as we shall see, no lack of such attempts in the thinking of to-day—but the grim reality reasserts itself in the dullest consciousness, and compels acknowledgment of its existence and hateful power. Drug conscience as deeply as one may, a time comes when it awakes. Turn in what direction one will, sin confronts one as a fact in human life—an experience of the heart, a development in history, a crimson thread in literature, a problem for science, an enigma for philosophy.

Sin—moral evil—is but a section of the larger problem of evil generally in the universe. But it is the hardest part of it. The strain of suffering and death in the natural system, the physical ills attendant on sentient life, are difficult enough facts to explain, and one knows the use to which they are

often put as arguments against the wisdom, benevolence, and omnipotence of the Creative Power.<sup>1</sup> Theodicy cannot leave these facts out of account, and is not at liberty to minimise them. One stands appalled, sometimes, at the terrific and seemingly indiscriminate way in which Nature hurls about destruction in the earthquake, the tornado, the avalanche, the flood, the thunderstorm.<sup>2</sup> Physical suffering, however, is, after all, only a relative evil, save as moral considerations are connected with it; whereas moral evil, as Kant would say, falls under the unconditional "ought not" of the imperative of duty. The connexion also of physical evil with moral evil in the sphere of humanity is often very close—closer than is always realised. Eliminate from the sum of human suffering in time all that is due to the play of forces that are morally evil—to the follies, the vices, the inhumanities, the oppressions and cruelties of men themselves—and the problem of natural evil becomes reduced to very moderate dimensions. One has only to cast the mind abroad, and think of such facts as the horrors of the slave-trade, the devastations and brutalities of wars, of Congo atrocities, of barbarian feuds and savage immolations, of the misgovernment and oppression under which millions of the race groan, of Armenian massacres, of the connexion of poverty and distress among ourselves with drunkenness and vice, of economic evils, as "sweating," due to selfish greed of gain, to feel the force of this consideration. Cure moral evil—sin—and the root of most of the evils that afflict society

<sup>1</sup> J. S. Mill's indictment of Nature in his *Three Essays on Religion* (pp. 28 ff.), and the theological consequences he draws from it, are familiar. Hume had already said nearly all that is to be said on the subject in his *Dialogues on Natural Religion* (x.-xi.). As a modern specimen, see St. George Stock's essay on "The Problem of Evil," in the *Hibbert Journal*, vol. ii. pp. 767 ff.

<sup>2</sup> An interesting account of the celebrated controversy of Voltaire and Rousseau on the Lisbon earthquake, which is typical here, may be seen in Appendix V. to Janet's *Final Causes* (E.T.).

will be removed; the problems that remain will prove easy of solution.

This deep-seated presence and baleful operation of moral evil in the world, prolific of such untold mental and physical anguish, has pressed as a frightful burden on the minds of men in all ages, and has given rise to every sort of theory and effort—to great world-systems in thought and elaborate penitential and propitiatory devices in religion—for its explanation and alleviation. What an array of speculations and of methods for obtaining deliverance and peace, arising from this cause, has the world witnessed—witnesses still! Who shall recount them—dualisms, Gnosticisms, asceticisms, Manichæisms, pessimisms? As instances in religion it may be sufficient to name the Persian Zoroastrianism, and Indian Brahmanism and Buddhism. The Jewish and Christian religions are penetrated by the sense of sin in a way that no other religion is, or can be; of this we shall speak after. Sin, therefore, is a terrible fact, the reality, seriousness, and universality of which cannot reasonably be gainsaid.<sup>1</sup> It is possible to exaggerate the aspects of natural suffering, as, in the opinion of many modern evolutionists, is done in the over-emphasising of the keenness of “the struggle for existence” in the organic world (the “Nature red in tooth and claw” view of things);<sup>2</sup> but it is, in soberness, hardly possible to exaggerate the persistence, the gravity, the depraving and destroying power of this evil thing we call sin.

<sup>1</sup> Professor J. H. Muirhead, writing from a different standpoint, says in a discussion on the subject: “There can be no question of the reality and significance in human life of the sense of sin. Controversy can only be concerned with the manner of interpreting the relation in which sin places us to the Father of our spirits, and of the nature of the process of reconciliation” (*Hibbert Journal*, iii. p. 32).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion* (E.T.), pp. 183–4. There is sound sense in Paley’s remark: “It is a happy world after all. The air, the earth, the waters, teem with delighted existence” (*Nat. Theol.*, chap. xxvi.). Cf. also Dr. H. Stirling’s *Darwinianism*, pp. 205 ff.



It is a gain in studying any subject when one is able, as here, to start from a basis of assured fact. Jesus, in meeting the questionings of Nicodemus, expressed surprise that a Jewish teacher should be ignorant of those things of which He spoke. "Verily, verily," He responded, "I say unto thee, We speak that we do know, and bear witness of that we have seen; and ye receive not our witness. If I told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you heavenly things?"<sup>1</sup> In dwelling on the need of regeneration by the Spirit as the condition of seeing, or entering into, the Kingdom of God, Jesus had been speaking of things the evidence of which lay within and all around His hearer ("earthly things"). If these were not understood or credited, how could Nicodemus understand or believe when He spoke of matters relating to His own mission, and to God's purpose of love in man's salvation ("heavenly things")? It is because sin is an "earthly thing" in the sense of being evidenced and verified in human experience, that we have a sure  $\pi\omicron\upsilon\ \sigma\tau\hat{\omega}$  in dealing with the thoughts of the day about it.

What sin is in Christianity will become clearer as the discussion advances. It is enough at this point to observe that it is connected with two ideas, without the right apprehension of which it cannot be properly conceived. The one is the idea of the *Divine Holiness*; the other is the idea of *Moral Law*. To these may perhaps be added a third—the idea of the *moral end*, of the Chief Good, identified, as Ritschl rightly held,<sup>2</sup> with the Kingdom of God. Transgression of moral law alone does not give the full idea of sin in the Christian sense; even as the moral law itself, in Christianity, cannot be severed from the idea of the holy God, whose law it is, and whose character is expressed in it. Sin, in

<sup>1</sup> John iii. 11, 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Justif. and Recon.*, iii. (E.T.), pp. 35, 329 ff.

other words, is not simply a *moral*, but is peculiarly a *religious* conception.<sup>1</sup> Sin is transgression *against God*; the substitution of the creature will for the will of the Creator; revolt of the creature will from God. It is this relation to God which gives the wrong act its distinctive character as *Sin* (cf. Ps. li. 4). It is, therefore, only in the light of God's character as holy—perfected in Christ's teaching in the aspect of Fatherly love—and of God's end for man, that the evil quality and full enormity of sinful acts can be clearly seen. Hence the impossibility of so much as discussing the Christian teaching about sin without reference to the Divine holiness, and to man's relation to this. Hence also the vital importance, as Christ's words to Nicodemus suggest, and as will afterwards be seen, of just conceptions of sin for the right understanding of the higher Christian doctrines. It is in inadequate and mistaken views of sin that the root of so much misapprehension of these doctrines lies.

This leads now to the fact which it is a main object of this series of studies to take account of, viz., that in a large part of the thought of our time there is a *wide, often a complete, departure* from these presuppositions of the Christian doctrine of sin, with, as the result, a serious alteration—a weakening down, sometimes almost an obliteration—of the idea of sin itself. There is need, indeed, for guarding here against exaggeration, and also for reminding ourselves that this defection from Christian ideas is not, as some would seem to imagine, a peculiar product of the twentieth century, but is a phenomenon constantly reappearing, with altered intellectual and moral conditions, in the course of the ages. There are tens of thousands to-day in all the Churches, many of them as intelligent and well educated as others, to whom sin is as serious and vital a fact as ever it was; who

<sup>1</sup> Ritschl, *ut supra*, p. 27.

are not deluded into underestimating it by the "winds of doctrine" which blow on them from so many different quarters, but who go on their way, and do their Christian work, with ever-growing assurance of the truth of the Gospel on which their faith reposes. It suits the objector largely to ignore this class; he is too busy digging the grave of Christianity, and looking about for a substitute for it, to notice their existence.<sup>1</sup> But they are there, the force behind most of the earnest, self-denying, religious and philanthropic work done in the land, and they have too fixed an experimental ground for their conviction to be readily moved away from it. As regards the past, there has ever been plenty of denial and perversion of the Christian idea of sin—in early Gnosticism, at the Renaissance, in the Deism and Rationalism of the eighteenth century, whenever there has been a decay of religious life, with marked change in mental and social conditions. It is hardly necessary to recall Bishop Butler's often-quoted words in the "Advertisement" to his *Analogy* on the prevalence of unbelief in his age; but a sentence of David Hume's in one of his Essays may show that it was not reserved for the iconoclasts of our own time to trumpet the downfall of Christianity. "Most people in this island," writes the philosopher, "have divested themselves of all superstitious reverence to names and authority; the clergy have lost much of their credit, their pretensions and doctrines

<sup>1</sup> One is reminded sometimes in reading articles of this class of Professor Huxley's caustic comments on Mr. Harrison's advocacy of Positivism: "There is a story often repeated, and I am afraid none the less mythical on that account, of a valiant and loud-voiced corporal, in command of two full privates, who, falling in with a regiment of the enemy in the dark, orders it to surrender under pain of instant annihilation by his forces; and the enemy surrenders accordingly. I am always reminded of this tale when I read the Positivist commands to the forces of Christianity and of science; only the enemy shows no more signs of intending to obey now than they have done any time these forty years" ("Agnosticism," in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb., 1880). We would not, however, as seen below, minimise the very formidable character of the attack, from various sides, on Christianity.

have been ridiculed, and even religion can scarcely support itself in the world.”<sup>1</sup> Yet a mighty spiritual movement, with the sense of sin in the heart of it, soon came, as had happened before at the Reformation, and has happened frequently in the history of the Church since, to change the omens, and render the description of the prince of sceptics obsolete.

Nevertheless, it cannot be questioned that, for the present, a large, meanwhile perhaps a growing, section of our modern thinking has definitely broken with the presuppositions of the Christian teaching on sin ; and that in the *spirit* of the time, as reflected in current speech, books, and discussions, there is a notable and unfavourable change in the manner of the consideration and the treatment of the fact of sin itself. What are the peculiarities of this changed temper of the times, what forces have contributed to its production, and how should Christianity relate itself to it ?

1. A particular *diagnosis* is not easy. It is becoming common to hear it said that the world no longer troubles itself about sin, and there is a truth in the statement, though it is not one to rejoice over. A good deal of this apparent change, possibly, is more on the surface than in reality. It may spring from new modes of thought and altered ways of expression, rather than from a really weakened sense of the evil of wrong-doing. Something may also be set down to love of smart phrases and paradoxes—to rhetorical flippancies and clevernesses, which are not to be taken *au pied de la lettre*. No earnest mind, one would hope, can really be insensible to the gravity in a moral system of deliberate transgression. If Sir Oliver Lodge, a serious thinker, jars on us by saying: “As a matter of fact, the higher man of to-day is not worrying about his sins at all, still less about their punishment ; his mission, if he is good for anything, is

<sup>1</sup> *Works* (1854), iii. p. 51.



to be up and doing ”<sup>1</sup>; this has to be taken with what he says elsewhere of “ Divine wrath as a real and terrible thing ” against “ blatant ” sins : “ I am sure what may without irreverence be humanly spoken of as fierce Wrath against sin, and even against a certain class of sinner, is a Divine attribute.”<sup>2</sup> If Mr. R. J. Campbell makes merry over the absurd notions of “ ordinary Church-going people,” who actually think of God as “ stationed somewhere above and beyond the universe, watching and worrying over other and lesser finite beings—to wit ourselves. . . . This God is greatly bothered and thwarted by what men have been doing during the few millenniums of human existence. . . . He takes the whole thing very seriously ”<sup>3</sup>, he must pardon those who charge him with inexcusable levity in dealing with so grave a subject, but he would resent the imputation that he thinks more lightly than others of selfishness, ingratitude, or crime. If there is here and there the open denial of sin, attempts to explain it away, wilful revolt against the restraints on individual liberty which the opposite doctrine imposes, it is to be granted that far oftener one meets with serious attempts—inadequate enough, perhaps—to understand this condition of vice and misery in humanity, and trace it to its causes—to explain it, to work out a solution of it. This effort confronts us in all directions—in science, in

<sup>1</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, ii. p. 466.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, iii. pp. 12, 13. In explanation : “ When we are speaking of the sin against which God’s anger blazes, we do not mean the sins of failure, the burden of remorse, etc. . . . There are many grades of sin ; and any one may know the kind of sin which excites the anger of God by be- thinking himself of the kind which arouses his own best and most righteous anger. . . . The fierce indignation that would blaze out if one were maliciously to torture a child or an animal in view of an ordinary man or woman, would surely be a spark of the Divine wrath ; and we have been told that a millstone round the neck of a child-abuser is too light a penalty ” (pp. 13, 14).

<sup>3</sup> *The New Theology*, p. 18 ; cf. pp. 52-3. Mr. Campbell has no room for the “ wrath ” which Sir Oliver Lodge is willing to recognise.

psychology, in philosophy, in literature, in sociology—and if the theories which are its results are not always Christian, are often violently antipathetic to Christianity, they are yet evidences of how profoundly the problem exercises the mind of the age.

Two leading tendencies, in fact, will, it is believed, make themselves apparent to every careful observer of the time on this subject of sin. There is the tendency already noticed to *weaken down* the idea and sense of sin, to belittle it, to get rid of the elements of fear in connexion with it, to assert liberty, and throw down the restraints by which moral conduct has hitherto been guarded. This tendency finds plenty of soil to work on in the secularism, and moral and religious indifferentism of the time, as well as in the natural desire of the sinful mind for unrestricted freedom in choosing its own paths. But alongside of this, in singular contrast with it, is to be traced, often in the most unlooked-for quarters, the other tendency—a *deepened sense* of sin, a feeling, even if it be in the temper of rebellion, of sin's awfulness, of its tragedy, of its irresistible seductiveness, its deceitfulness, its certain disillusionments ("apples of Sodom"), of the relentless Nemesis which dogs it, the hell of remorse it brings to its victims—the bitter desire and craving, too, for *atonement* which awakens, often when it is too late.

Which of these two tendencies is the stronger, or which is more likely for the time to prevail, it is difficult, in the existing readiness to break down existing sanctions, to predict; but, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, one would like to believe it is the latter. There can be no question, at any rate, as to which is the *deeper*, and which it is one's duty to ally oneself with to the utmost. The novel, the drama, poetry, as well as more serious literature, may be appealed to in proof that the tendency is there, and powerfully operative,<sup>1</sup> and there are many indications of a more

<sup>1</sup> Illustrations will come later.

general kind. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that, with all its weaknesses and follies, there never has been an age with conscience more sensitive to social wrongs—more sympathetic with the downtrodden, the helpless, the oppressed, more indignant at wanton cruelty, more bent on redress of injustice, more insistent in its demand for equity—than our own. If this spirit is sometimes found divorced from avowed religion, it may fairly be claimed that it is not to be divorced from Christianity. It is not simply that Christianity is in affinity with it, but, traced to its deepest springs, it may be discovered that Christianity—the teaching and ideals of Jesus—are the source of it. Unconscious evidence is constantly afforded that Christ's spirit has passed into the age, and is operative, frequently, where Christianity would not be acknowledged. When Mr. Blatchford, for instance, in his book, *God and My Neighbour*, assails Christianity, what is the ground on which he proceeds? Chiefly, strange as it may seem, the ground that Christian society fails to realise the ideals of its Master. "This is a Christian country. What would Christ think of Park Lane, and the slums, and the hooligans? What would He think of the Stock Exchange, and the Music Hall, and the race-course? What would He think of our national ideals? . . . Pausing again over Exeter Hall, I mentally apostrophise the Christian British people. 'Ladies and gentlemen,' I say, "you are Christian in name, but I discern little of Christ in your ideals, your institutions, or your daily lives' . . . If to praise Christ in words, and deny Him in deeds, be Christianity, then London is a Christian city, and England is a Christian nation. For it is very evident that our common English ideals are anti-christian," etc.<sup>1</sup> What does all

<sup>1</sup> From Preface. The book is full of such passages. E.g., "Is Christianity the rule of life in America and Europe? Are the masses of people who accept it, peaceful, virtuous, chaste, spiritually-minded, prosperous,

this mean, one asks, if not that it is the sin of Christendom that it is *not* obeying the precepts of Christ its Master who is still held up as the Ideal to be obeyed? A stranger indictment against a religion surely never was penned!

All this being allowed for, the fact is still to be recognised that a very considerable part of the thought of the age, in its estimate of sin, as in other respects, has moved away from Christianity—not simply from Christianity as we have been accustomed to conceive of it, but from Christianity in its most essential ideas and declarations, as these are historically preserved to us. Men may, of course, if they will, extract from the teaching of Jesus, or the Creeds of the Church, some residuum which they are pleased to baptize with the name “Christianity.” But this is not the Christianity of the Gospels and Epistles; not Christianity as the world has ever known it. It is a residuum which tends constantly to become less—smaller in amount and vaguer in form.<sup>1</sup> But even the residuum, in many circles, is being parted with, and the confession of Strauss in his *Old and New Faith*, as far back as 1872, is freely endorsed: We are no longer Christians. Sin, as Christianity has understood it, the wrath of God against sin, are bugbears of which the world is to be happily rid.

2. The separate *causes* which have led to this altered trend of thought in the age are too numerous and complex to be here more than briefly alluded to. Some go far back, and

happy? Are their national laws based upon its ethics? Are their international politics guided by the Sermon on the Mount?” etc. (p. 166, Pop. Edit.). This is a strange basis for the conclusion: “This is not a humane and civilised nation, and never will be while it accepts Christianity as its religion” (p. 197).

<sup>1</sup> As one example from a reverent thinker, E. Boutroux, in his interesting work, *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, finds the essence of religion, as of Christianity, in the two truths—the existence of a living, perfect, almighty God, and the living communion of God with man (E. T., pp. 391–4).



are related to causes still more remote. The whole must await more special investigation.

One general cause may be said to lie in the spirit of *emancipation* from all external authority which Hume spoke of in his day, and which now is widely prevalent. Some boast of this as the legitimate outcome of the Protestant principle of the right of private judgment. Genuine Protestantism, however, in substituting for the authority of man in the priesthood the authority of God speaking in His word of truth and salvation, did not construe its principle as the renunciation of *all* authority; and earnest minds, whether the seat of authority be placed without or within, will never assent to mere subjectivity in opinion, but will apply themselves to the search for objective standards of judgment. The sense of emancipation, none the less, is sweet to many, and they revel in knocking about established beliefs and institutions, simply to prove their superiority to their neighbours.<sup>1</sup> One thinks of the Sophists of ancient Greece whom Socrates had to deal with, and of the so-called "Illumination" (*Aufklärung*) of the eighteenth century, whose superficialities of thought and complacent optimism it fell to Kant and his successors to put an end to. The diffusion and popularisation of knowledge, leading to the spreading of the mind over a great variety of objects—hence to diffusion rather than to concentration—fosters the development of a new *Aufklärung*.

The deeper and real causes of the change, however, are to be traced to *more important* influences. Among these are specially to be reckoned the bold and independent course taken by philosophic thought during the last century—its roots go back as far as thought itself—the profoundly changed

<sup>1</sup> The thoughtful section on "The Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Humanity—Redemption and Emancipation," in Martensen's *Christian Ethics* (pp. 191 ff.), is full of suggestion for our age.

conception of the universe, and of man's place in it, as the result of the advances of the physical sciences, specially of the entrance of the idea of evolution, the enlarged knowledge of other (including ancient) peoples and their faiths, and the comparative study of religions, the development and application of the methods of a rigorous historical criticism. One can hardly wonder if the effect of the co-working of these, and numerous related factors—especially at a time when material ideals tend to eclipse spiritual—has been, on the one hand, to undermine, or profoundly modify, older beliefs in God, man, the world, sin, human progress and destiny; and, on the other, to create an attitude of mind unfavourable to the reception of any system of beliefs which involves supernatural elements, as the Christian system, fairly interpreted, unquestionably does.

That this, in any case, has been the *result* of the new influences few will be disposed to dispute. And at no point is the change more apparent than in the treatment of the idea of sin. On the theological side, the immanence of God is being pushed to an extreme (where God is not resolved into the monistic Unknowable Power) which merges God's life in the life of the developing universe, and of necessity takes up sin as a strain into that life. On the scientific side, evolution is applied to show man's rise by slow gradation from the animal, to disprove the idea of a "fall," and to establish an "ascent," through perhaps half a million of years, from semi-brutishness, savagery, and prolonged barbarism, to his present happier intellectual and moral condition. Sin becomes, during by far the larger portion of his history, a negligible quantity. Philosophy sees in sin a necessity of man's development—of his coming to the true knowledge of himself—and speaks freely of it as good in the making.<sup>1</sup> Science,

<sup>1</sup> For a valuable criticism, see Galloway's *Principles of Religious Development*, pp. 324 ff.

philosophy, and ethics alike are often found arguing for a "Determinism" which strikes at the basis of moral responsibility. Still bolder tendencies are in operation, which, regarding existing moral ideas as the fruit of obsolete beliefs and outworn conventions, would sweep them away, with revolutionary results in the relation of the sexes, in family life, and in society.<sup>1</sup> As a culminating phase in the revolt, Nietzscheism would invert the moral standards of Christianity altogether.

These are only indications, for which proof must subsequently be given, but they leave no doubt as to the extent and complexity of the problems opened up to the Christian inquirer by the modern treatment of sin.

3. It is hardly necessary to point out how fundamentally the *whole system of ideas* in Christianity is affected by the changed attitude to the doctrine of sin now described. Professor Henry Jones has a remark in his Essay in the volume, *Jesus or Christ*, which tells in more directions than that in which he applies it. He observes: "Such is the unity of spiritual experience, even when it is not reflective, that no particular opinion can be adopted, rejected, or changed, except by modifying the whole of that experience."<sup>2</sup> It cannot be impressed too strongly that Christian doctrines are not a collocation of isolated conceptions, any one of which may be altered or abandoned without effect upon the rest, but have an internal unity and coherence, binding them together as a whole, so that one cannot be tampered with without injury to every part. Peculiarly is this the case with the doctrine of sin. It is in its doctrine of sin, apprehended in its own way, that Christianity bases its

<sup>1</sup> Startling illustrations of how far this has gone in public teaching is furnished, if with some one-sidedness and exaggeration, in papers by Mr. H. Bolee in the *American Cosmopolitan*, May, 1909, and after. Reference may be made to these again.

<sup>2</sup> P. 83.

teaching on the indispensableness for man of redemption and spiritual renewal, and of the provision of God, in His abounding love, for the accomplishment of these ends. If, accordingly, from any cause, the facts about sin are misconceived, or are inadequately conceived, it is useless, as already hinted, to attempt to come to any understanding with these higher doctrines. It is not different with the Christian conceptions of duty and of the spiritual life.

One point at the very centre of Christianity may be referred to as vitally affected by the modern discussions about sin. It is no other than the question of the possibility of a *Sinless One*. Till a comparatively recent time there was a shrinking, even in advanced circles, from seeming to breathe a doubt of the moral perfection of Jesus. That can no longer be said. It is, no doubt, only logically consistent that, if humanitarianism is to rule, the claim to be without sin should be denied to Jesus. How should One arise without sin in a humanity to which sin belongs by essential constitution? In a world without miracle a sinless Being is excluded by the laws of human existence. It is entirely characteristic, therefore, that more and more the sinlessness of Jesus is coming to be challenged or surrendered by writers of the modern school. The highest grade of moral purity is conceded to Jesus, but not *perfect* holiness. His own words, "Why callest thou me good?"<sup>1</sup> are quoted against Him. Oscar Holtzmann, Wernle, Schmiedel, Bousset, G. B. Foster, now R. J. Campbell, a host more, will be found uniting here.<sup>2</sup> The question, with its implications, will occupy us

<sup>1</sup> Mark x. 18.

<sup>2</sup> The opinions of Schmiedel, Foster, and others are sufficiently well known. It may serve to refer to the first and last of the names quoted. O. Holtzmann, in his *Leben Jesu* (p. 36), expresses the view that the idea of the sinlessness of Jesus originated with Paul, and thinks that Jesus Himself is shown by Mark x. 18, xiv. 36 to have held a different opinion. Mr. Campbell, in his recent essay on *Jesus or Christ*, goes so far as to say: "To



later. It is glanced at here only to show to what results, in judging of Christianity, the newer speculations conduct.

These are the issues. What attitude, it is to be asked finally, in the midst of this whirl of conflicting opinions—of doubts, denials, speculations—is open to one who retains the Christian position, and believes it to be true and vital? How is he to deal with the fact and doctrine of sin? Very plainly a *theological* treatment of the doctrine—such a treatment as might be fitting in the circle of those accepting the fundamental Christian conceptions—is totally useless here. The mind of the age is proclaimed to be one that sits loose to all doctrinal formulations—that regards them as in the air, unscientific, antiquated, logical cobweb-spinning, untrue to fact and experience. As little will it avail to build on Biblical data (though these cannot wholly be neglected); for the authority of the Bible, in the old sense, is rejected; texts can be explained away; in any case are not held to bind *us*. This applies not only to the Old Testament—to the Fall-story in Genesis, for example—it applies equally to the New, where Paul is of no authority, and even the word of Jesus is not final. With every single postulate of the Biblical doctrine challenged, how is discussion to proceed?

One thing the believer in the Christian doctrine can do. He can take his own place in this restless whirl of the thought of to-day; can try to understand it, and to interpret it to himself and to *itself*; can seek, as we have already been beginning to do, to trace it to its causes, and to exhibit it in its workings. He can set over against it what seems to him to be the truth of fact and experience, and the Christian interpretation of the facts, and can try to show that it is in the latter that the true key for the understanding of the facts is

speaking of Him as morally perfect is absurd; to call Him sinless is worse, for it introduces an entirely false emphasis into the relations of God and Man" (p. 191).

to be found. The Christian believer, in a word, can look this thought of the day in the face. If Christianity is worth anything, it does not need to shirk looking facts in the face. It will not profess to furnish a perfect solution of the problem of sin. Only Omniscience can do that. It is but parts of God's ways we can trace. Our seeing is through a glass darkly.<sup>1</sup> But the subject may be set in a light which brings it more into consistency with itself, with faith in God, with human experience, and with the other truths of the Christian revelation. This of itself will be a step to a Theodicy.

JAMES ORR.

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

SOME NEW SUBJECTS OF THEOLOGICAL STUDY.<sup>1</sup>

## I.

IN pleading for Comparative Religion as an essential element in the equipment of a theologian, I am to some extent forcing an open door. But perhaps it will not be superfluous if I try to gather together some of the reasons which, in my opinion, make it a matter of urgency that all universities should follow the lead which has already been given them by some. The lead has indeed been given, we might almost say, by the man in the street as clearly as by university senates. Nothing is more conspicuous in the keen debates about religion which are chronic among the intelligent artisans of Lancashire, than the prominence of this subject in the minds of those who oppose Christianity. *The Golden Bough* (at second hand) is the weapon of street-corner secularists; and it is not the fault of Mr. Blatchford and other able men of his school if Professor Frazer's great work is not to-day as veritable a bogey to the uninstructed orthodox as Darwin's *Origin of Species* was fifty years ago.

Before dealing with this side of the subject, I want to bring forward some other reasons why the Science of Religion is becoming indispensable to students of theology. I would note first that it is increasingly necessary to our interpretation of the Bible. Our commentaries are beginning to show the influence of the new methods. Israel is no longer a people that dwells alone. Babylon and the Bible is a subject that within our recent memory has been discussed in royal palaces, and engaged the alert attention

<sup>1</sup>From an inaugural address delivered on October 8, 1909, at Liverpool University, to the members and students of the Board of Theological Studies. The first part dealt with the work of the Board at Liverpool and the Faculty at Manchester; and the claims of Sociology as a subject for theological students were urged.

of the most brilliant and versatile man whom Europe has seen on a throne for generations. Many will think that this particular motive has been overdone, and will call to mind that key to all the mythologies which George Eliot so unfortunately refused her Mr. Casaubon permission to leave with us. Even so it is not likely that the combination of Babel and Bible will sink into an alliteration and nothing more; and for the very purpose of doing away with the extravagances which we may think we recognise in some of the "religious-historical" theories of to-day we need a full equipment in the history of religion. The same is true of other extreme uses that have been made of Comparative Religion in a field that very moderately orthodox Christians do not like to see invaded. A vast amount of ingenious learning has been spent on the curious parallels to the Gospels which may be dug out of folklore and mythology. The fascination of discovery in such fields is very easily understood; and it is not to be wondered at if some really learned men and a good many clever ones have been able to prove with great plausibility that Jesus of Nazareth is a purely mythical figure. I need hardly say that among scholars this fantastic conclusion has achieved very little approval. Indeed, it is to one of the most advanced critics living that we owe the acutest demonstration of the impossibility of such a doctrine to any one who possesses the historic sense. Professor Schmiedel's argument from the famous nine "Pillar" passages has been rather ungratefully received and seriously misunderstood by the orthodox generally, including not a few whose failure to apprehend his purpose is rather surprising. It is therefore perhaps not an unwarrantable digression if I remind you how irrefragable a confutation of the extreme school we may find in the Gospel passages which simply could not have been invented by early Christian writers, because they go directly



counter to all the dogmatic tendencies which developed so strongly in the later decades of the first century. But this, by the way. More to my present point is the reminder that an adequate knowledge of the facts and principles of Comparative Religion is necessary for those who would defend the Gospels in the market-place to-day against a very widespread tendency to follow such writers as Loisy in the doctrine that though Jesus is a historical character, we know very little about Him. Between the fantastic theorists who resolve everything into myth and the moderate scholars who accept the Synoptist narrative as mostly accurate history, there are endless gradations of opinion ; and it is clearly vital for theologians to be equipped for work on this fundamental subject. I would illustrate by referring to one thorny subject of debate, lying as I personally believe quite apart from the foundation doctrine of the Christian creeds, but touching a dogma that is held very firmly by the large majority of Christians. What is the historical worth of the first two chapters of the New Testament ? The rise, late in the first century, of the doctrine of the miraculous birth of Jesus is being very confidently assigned nowadays to the influence of Gentile ideas. I shall not venture to predict what the outcome of the debate will be. It is not the story in itself which gives trouble to many thoughtful Christians to-day, but the silence of the New Testament about it as a whole. The discussion, therefore, within the Church is entirely a discussion concerning the mutual relations of our earliest sacred documents, and the position of an ancient dogma in regard to the fundamental teachings of Christianity. But, of course, for the Science of Religion the issue is wholly different. It has nothing to do with the truth or falsehood of the dogma, but only with the history of its origin. There might be discovered a perfectly clear genealogy of the

idea, tracing it through ages of development in many distant lands—and it might be linked with an objective historic fact all the same. Of course, such a genealogy would be very prejudicial to its acceptance by unbiassed people. Now it is only by scientific methods that we can deal with such possibilities ; and on the purely scientific ground, I would point out, there are a good many problems which have not been solved, and we ought to essay them ourselves. Are these pagan parallels sound, and is there a satisfactory bridge constructed for bringing them into the early Christian *milieu* ? On both of these queries I cannot feel that the last word has been said. Some of the Gentile parallels look extremely plausible when they are set down by an exponent who aims at emphasising the similarity. But when expounded in the original words of their source, or impartially paraphrased by some one who is not thinking of the parallel, the resemblance vanishes into the absurd. I have seen the Virgin Birth of Jesus compared with that of the future son of Zarathushtra in Parseeism, the *Saoshyant* who is to come to redeem the world from the power of the fiend. It is safe to say that there is absolutely nothing in common except the bare fact that the birth is miraculous. And then as to the bridge. Is anything clearer than that the first two chapters of Matthew are entirely steeped in Judaism—that no one but a man bred in the Jewish atmosphere could possibly have written them ? And do we find as a matter of history that Gentile mythology, where it came so near compromising the Jewish idea of God beyond all endurance, was readily accepted and used by Christians of such a stamp and such a spiritual upbringing as the author of our first Gospel ? I do not say there is no answer to my question about the bridge, nor am I going to pronounce for the *pro* or the *con* upon the doctrine as a whole. Either way I see immense difficulties, which make me heartily

glad that the fundamental creed of Christendom is not really concerned in it. But I just use this as an example of the work that lies before us in the necessary process of putting our doctrines on a truly historical and scientific basis.

From the New Testament let me turn to the Old, where our new science has much more to do, though, of course, not in such vitally important matters. It is not too much to say that Comparative Religion has restored us the Old Testament as a sacred literature which twentieth-century Christians can accept and understand. For it is to this science that we owe our modern conception of the progressive growth of the religion of Israel. Records and doctrines which are morally impossible as the last word of Revelation become intelligible when set among its earliest steps. *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum* is the final verdict of Rome's great poet-philosopher on the dreadful story of a father's slaying his child on the altar to win divine help for his army. And our first impulse as we read the Hebrew counterpart of the old Greek story is to echo the verdict of Lucretius and marvel that an inspired Book should harbour such a tale. And yet as we listen again to the words that are spoken by "the daughter of the warrior Gileadite," as we look at the heroism that made Jephthah willing thus to give his all to set his country free, we begin to feel that the horror and pity of human sacrifice was overruled to produce something that was not bought too dearly even at such a price. Our twentieth-century life can be enriched and purified by an example that was only made possible for us by the existence of what, to our eyes, is a foul and hideous superstition. Not here alone in the upward progress of the race have there been birth-pangs ere the new life has come.

And this leads me on to remind you of the light which

the Science of Religion has to throw on the whole history of the ways of God with man. The new science may fairly be regarded as one of the inevitable outcomes of the attitude which Darwin's life-work did so much to establish—the view that all phenomena are alike to be regarded as produced by the working of fixed laws, existing even if not yet formulated in terms of our understanding. If man's body is the resultant of a slow age-long process of minute differentiations, it naturally occurs to students of his mental development that the same general lines are likely to be recognisable here. New factors will be brought in, just as the new factor of life had to be brought in with the passage from inanimate things to plants and animals. But man's language, his institutions, his intellectual development, are likely to be traceable to the working of definite laws if only we can discover them, crossed, of course, by the new factor of the human will that has laws of its own. Is man's religious development to be the great exception to this all-embracing principle? It is hard to say it is, when we have for decades now been accustomed to the thought that evolution enhances rather than destroys our conception of the Fact of God. We no longer regard special creations as bound up with the very fabric of our Theism. Are special revelations to go the same way?

To say yes to this question would clearly be a long step to take at once. Indeed, I who am no scientist should need assurance first that even special creation is finally and absolutely barred out as impossible by the consensus of natural sciences. But, however that may be, I would plead that *a priori* we might expect Revelation to proceed upon the lines of the constitution of man, created, as we can still believe he was, by the fiat of a Power that has been immanent with him in all his later history. And here we note the striking fact which Comparative Religion estab-



lishes afresh with every new body of observed phenomena. All the world over and in all periods of human history we find the most extraordinary resemblance between religious doctrines and practices, where communication is totally out of the question. Coincidences so minute as to seem proof positive of contact between two widely separated peoples are shown beyond possible doubt to be simply illustrations of the wonderful unity of human nature, so that everywhere similar conditions tend to produce similar results. The inference must be that religion—and we must define it in the most inclusive way—is a natural outgrowth of the human mind, born with its very first beginnings and growing with man's upward progress as inevitably as any faculty he possesses. That this sentence does not concentrate the whole philosophy of religion into a few words, I need not stop to admit. There are complex factors of growth and of degeneration that have to be studied in their own way. But all this is as scientific a study as that of the Science of Language, into which there enter not a few factors at present incalculable, simply because we cannot yet reduce to rule the whole working of the human mind. I only claim that the scientific investigation of this highest factor in human development should be taken up with earnestness and decision by all who hold Religion dear. And I humbly record my own conviction that our synthesis, when we have made it by the help of all this new knowledge and these new principles and methods, will be one in which the essential truths of the Christian Faith will stand firmer than ever before. A faith that welcomes reason as an ally, and knows not how to fear the growth of knowledge, will only gain by the appropriation of treasures yet unclaimed.

## II.

The primary subject of study in a Theological Faculty

will necessarily be the interpretation of the Greek Testament. The grounds of this primacy need hardly be set forth here. Men will continue to debate and to differ irreconcilably as to the history and the value of that little library, but there is no sign of their flagging in their concentration upon it as a subject in which both sides will find of necessity their main battleground. I can hardly, therefore, be asking attention to a trivial subject if I speak of a new method which promises to contribute much valuable material for the exegesis of a Book that still offers problems enough for the twentieth century to solve.

That the New Testament was written in Greek is a fact which the man in the street may be presumed to know. But what is Greek? Cynewulf's *Crist*, Chaucer's *Prologue* and Browning's *Paracelsus* are all written in English, but even the Englishman finds that the generic name here covers three very different species. Now the history of Greek covers just about twice as many centuries as that of English; and yet the prevailing assumption of our scholarship has been that the first half of this immense period is to be treated as practically a unity. This would be all right if it meant that scholars studied each separate period carefully and kept the characteristics of each age apart just as they would keep those of the ancient Boeotian, Ionian or Laconian dialects. But, unfortunately, it has been tacitly assumed till our own day that there is but one norm of Greek, the Greek of the period in which Attic reached its perfect development as the very masterpiece of human linguistic evolution. The Greek of later centuries than the fourth B.C. is accordingly treated as a mere poor relation of the Attic. Where it differs from Attic it is assumed to differ for the worse—its developments are degenerations, and its novelties are only so much "solecism." Now in our English parallel we can recognise readily enough that

something has been lost in five hundred years. A musical ear will appreciate the bathos when we pass from

And smalë foulës maken melodye  
That slepen al the night with open yë

to

And small fowls make melody  
That sleep all the night with open eye.

But is Tennyson's English to be called "bad" because that of Shakspeare or of Chaucer is recognised as classical?

The worth of Hellenistic Greek as a subject of serious study for its own sake is a discovery of the present generation. Great philologists like Albert Thumb, now of Strassburg, have realised that the whole development of Greek from Homer to the modern peasant's patois is to be scanned in every period without the disturbing factor of judicial decisions as to its goodness or badness. And, naturally, this impartial study has brought to light much excellence that was lost when the eye was dazzled by constantly gazing on Plato and Demosthenes. Together with this study of Hellenistic for its own sake, there has come an extraordinary augmentation of the materials on which the Greek scholar must work. Vast collections of late inscriptions have accumulated, and have been subjected to minute investigation. And out of the sands of Egypt have come forth the long-buried writings that show us the very talk of common people upon common things, unconscious that any other eye than their correspondent's would ever scan their ill-spelt casual scrawl. Simultaneously with the publication and the study of the non-literary Greek papyri, capable scholars have been at work upon the Greek of mediaeval and modern times, as taken from the lips of the people. And Hellenists who have surveyed this long history of spoken Greek from ancient to modern times have found that the development reveals to us what is practically a

new language. It is the *lingua franca* of the early Roman Empire. It stands quite apart from the language of literature. To a greater or less degree that was always artificial, recalling by a conscious imitative elaboration the great models of the classical period. The unapproachable beauty of the Attic literary style was exchanged for something which does not pretend to compete with it. But it has merits of its own to compensate for its losses. Greek is as lucid, as subtle, as copious an instrument of thought as it ever was. It adapts itself to its manifold humbler uses with unfailing resource. It can convey the short and simple annals of the poor as vividly and as lucidly as once it told the massive story of statesmen and orators and men of renown. And we find that in the days of its supposed decline Greek has made new and vaster conquests. It has stepped out from the narrow limits of Hellas and established itself quietly as the language of the civilised world.

Now, for eighteen centuries past there has been one product of the later Greek which has engaged the attention of scholars. Not a few of them have pulled wry faces over the "badness" of the Greek in which the New Testament books were written. But its subject-matter compelled attention; and as for its bad Greek—well, an excuse could be found for that. It was written by men of imperfect culture, who had moreover the great disadvantage of thinking their sentences out in a Semitic dialect before they painfully wrote them down in Greek. Hence the uniqueness of the Biblical Greek. Theologians even found a special appropriateness in the fact that no profane literature defiled the sacred tongue. It was, as the pious Richard Rothe said, "a language of the Holy Ghost," and we must not expect it, therefore, to condescend to ordinary human rules.

I must not tell over again the story, familiar now to all students of theology, of Adolf Deissmann's discovery and



its consequences for our views of New Testament Greek. Some Greek papyri from Egypt, scanned by chance one day as copied in a friend's hand, suggested irresistibly their close relationship with the Biblical idiom. And soon we came to see that the Holy Ghost spoke in the language of common life as understood all over the Roman Empire. The Book was written in a hitherto unique dialect, simply because its writers neither knew nor cared whether they wrote literature, caring only to make themselves understood by the humblest and least lettered of men.

I have thus briefly sketched the outlines of the new views of Biblical Greek in order to urge the necessity of a new plan in our preparations for New Testament study. The preponderant authority hitherto in the debates on the interpretation of difficult texts has always been the man of classical learning. His presuppositions have been drawn first from the Attic literature with which he began his Greek study as a boy. He has, indeed, read writings contemporary with the Apostles or later than their time. But these were all modelled on those same great masterpieces which Cambridge Senior Classics like Lightfoot and Westcott copied when they wrote Greek prose for their pupils at Trinity or at Harrow. Plutarch and Philo and Lucian belong to the Hellenistic period, but they can only be used as evidence for the real Hellenistic vernacular by those who know how to cut themselves loose from classical associations and start frankly from the other end. Among the comparatively few points in which we can already see the need of an advance upon the English Revised Version of the New Testament, are those which come from our improved knowledge in this particular. The Revisers were thinking of classical Greek when they put in the scrupulous margin that tells us we really ought to read "Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three, and the *greater* of these is

love." But our new vernacular evidence shows us that in the speech of the people—and therefore in the plain Greek of Paul—there was no longer any distinction drawn between comparative and superlative. Westcott now and then seems to have successfully tempted his colleagues to call up from the shades the uneasy ghost of a purposive idea that he was always seeing in clauses introduced by the old final conjunction *that*. And we have now realised that in Hellenistic speech *that they should know* was a complete equivalent of the infinitive *to know* in all its senses. Similar things happen in the interpretation of words, where the correct classical sense is sometimes presented instead of the later developed meaning recognisable in our new or newly interpreted evidence. Some of this evidence was accessible to the Revisers, though most of it was not. They had the invaluable notes of the old purist grammarians, who in days when the classical Attic was long extinct, made desperate efforts to revive it in literary style. These *modistes* of literature are perpetually working themselves up into a frenzy about the "incorrect," the "shocking," the "solecistic" words and forms and constructions that people would use instead of the right and proper Attic. We can see that whether they are right or wrong in their instructions as to the correct Attic that nobody had spoken for centuries, they tell us infallibly enough what people were saying in their own day. And with our new lights we seize on their forbidden fruit and count it great spoil. If they say "Never, never, never use such a word to mean so-and-so," we immediately infer that the word probably does mean this in the New Testament. The classical bias of the scholars of the past sometimes made them miss this. They describe Apollos as "learned" (Acts xviii. 24) instead of "eloquent," the version their predecessors took from Jerome. The very fact that the Atticist Phrynichus con-

demns the latter should have made them suspicious of the rendering they accepted at his hands. In the Parable of the Sower we read of "the *deceitfulness* of riches" in all our versions alike. But our useful Atticist (Moeris this time) expressly tells us that this word meant *pleasure* in Hellenistic, *deceit* in Attic; and Deissmann is probably right in urging that we must give up the familiar version.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, it seems likely enough that *pleasures* in Luke's paraphrase must be taken as pointing this way. These two examples will serve to show how the already existing evidence may come to be read differently in the light which has come from our new witnesses. I cannot stay to illustrate the decisive evidence which we get from these, the often rude and ill-spelt letters of Egyptian peasants, and other vernacular documents of the kind. I believe Deissmann's latest and greatest book, *Light from Anatolia*, will be in our hands before long; and those who have studied it already in the German will be quite content that the case for the new light should be left with his skilful exposition.<sup>2</sup>

JAMES HOPE MOULTON.

<sup>1</sup> See "Lexical Notes," *s.v.* (EXPOSITOR, July, 1908).

<sup>2</sup> The remainder of the address was a plea for the study of Hellenistic as a separate subject from classical Greek, not only as a degree subject at the Universities (as already at Manchester), but especially for candidates for the ministry. These, it was urged, may begin with the far simpler and easier Hellenistic, and only go on to classical Greek if they have time. The substance of this concluding section coincided with the latter part of the essay on "N. T. Greek in the light of modern discovery," *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, pp. 502-505.

*THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH  
GOSPEL.*

VI. THE RESURRECTION. (1)

THE Gospels give us no account of the resurrection. What they tell of is the empty tomb and appearances of the risen Jesus to His disciples singly or in groups. The nearest approach we have to anything which can be called an account of the resurrection itself is that in Matthew, who says, "Behold, there was a great earthquake; for an angel of the Lord descended from heaven and came and rolled away the stone, and sat upon it. His appearance was as lightning, and his raiment white as snow; and for fear of him the watchers did quake, and became as dead men."

We have here an attempted explanation of the way in which the stone came to be rolled away from the mouth of the tomb, and, perhaps we may add, of the reason why the guard was unable to hinder the exit of Jesus from the tomb. It is not part of our present purpose to investigate the historical probability of this statement made in Matthew. It may or may not be substantially true. It is an obvious criticism to make that a large circular stone rolling in a horizontal groove is not exactly a thing on which the angel could have sat. And indeed I confess that I am sceptical about this statement as a matter of history, because it is difficult to see what the evidence for it can be. I believe, however, that it is a well-attested fact that the stone was rolled away, and this apparently by no human hands, and that the body of Jesus, which had been laid in the tomb two days before, was gone.

It will be necessary in the present paper and the next following, in order to vindicate the historicity of the Fourth



Gospel, to consider the whole evidence for the resurrection. For it seems to be thought by many people at the present day that this evidence is of so conflicting a nature that it can no longer be accepted as trustworthy by men of honest mind. We shall then have to examine it with some care and minuteness in order to decide its true nature and value. We shall have to compare the story given in the Fourth Gospel with the accounts of all the Synoptists, and to take account too of the evidence afforded us by the statements of St. Paul in 1 Corinthians xv.

First of all, it will be well to consider the narrative of the Fourth Gospel by itself. For I take it that the writer, if not a personal disciple, at any rate writes as if he were, and he is prominent in the events which he describes. It seems desirable, then, to show that the accounts given in the last two chapters of this Gospel form a consistent whole, explicable on the theory of the Johannine authorship of the book. Afterwards we shall have to examine the relation of the Johannine story with the other accounts of the appearances of the Risen Lord.

Now if St. John be the author of the Fourth Gospel, it is clear that we have in its last two chapters evidence, in the strictest sense of the word, for the resurrection. Even though his Gospel be the latest of all in point of time its value as affording evidence of the resurrection may far exceed that of the Synoptists. We have certainly no right to start with the hypothesis that the Synoptists are here to be preferred to the Fourth Gospel. We ought first to examine St. John on the supposition that it is evidence, as it claims to be. If its claim is supported by consistency and probability, then we shall be able to give our Evangelist a fair hearing when we compare his story with that of the Synoptists.

We shall therefore proceed now to the examination of the contents of the twentieth chapter, and I think we shall find

reasons for believing that we have here the evidence of an eye-witness and not a tradition, and most certainly not a concocted story.

In this chapter, then, we have the account of three appearances of the Risen Jesus, the first to Mary Magdalene and the other two to the assembled disciples, the first time when Thomas was absent and the second time when he was there. Of two of these appearances the Evangelist, supposing him to be St John, was himself a witness ; of the other he could not of course be a witness, but he gives, I believe, substantially the account that Mary Magdalene herself gave of her own experience. The object of the writer seems to be to give in a straightforward way the steps by which he himself came personally to know of and to believe the fact of the resurrection.

He begins by telling of the visit of Mary Magdalene to the tomb which she found empty. She at once reported the fact to Simon Peter and to ' the disciple whom Jesus loved ' : " They have taken away the Lord out of the tomb and we know not where they have laid Him."

Now we may remark in passing that the Fourth Gospel does not say that Mary Magdalene had gone alone to the tomb. It is necessary to insist on this point, for it has been urged as an objection to this Gospel that it is not in agreement with the Synoptists as to the number of the women. If it is not stated explicitly by our Evangelist that there were other women with Mary Magdalene, it is at any rate plainly implied that she had not gone alone to the tomb, for she uses the plural number in making her announcement : *We* know not where they have laid Him. If it be asked why the Evangelist does not explicitly state that other women had gone to the tomb with Mary Magdalene, I should say that it was not essential to his purpose. He is recording primarily his personal experiences in the matter. He tells them, first of

all, how he came to know that the tomb was empty. This he learnt from Mary Magdalene, not from the other women, whom, therefore, it would have been irrelevant to mention.

The Evangelist next goes on to tell of his visit to the tomb in company with Simon Peter and what they saw there. The story is very graphically told, and we can follow each detail of it. The younger disciple outruns the elder and comes first to the tomb, and stooping and looking in he sees the linen cloths lying ; yet entered he not in. Simon Peter, therefore, also cometh following him, and entered into the tomb ; and it is as if the Evangelist were recording how Peter, speaking from within, had described the appearance of the tomb. He beholdeth the linen cloths lying, and the napkin that was upon his head not lying with the linen cloths, but rolled up in a place by itself. Then, he adds, entered in the other disciple which came first to the tomb, and he saw and believed.

Believed what ? Some, with St. Augustine, have thought that the Evangelist meant only that he believed what Mary Magdalene had said, that the body had been taken away and laid elsewhere. But this is an interpretation of the passage which seems to me most unlikely. Much more probable is it that the arrangement of the grave-cloths in the tomb was such that the Evangelist saw that the body could not have been taken away as Mary had supposed. He believed that the appearance of the empty tomb indicated resurrection, of which the Lord had spoken before His death. The disciples had not understood His words, nor did they as yet, the Evangelist says, know the scripture that He must rise again from the dead.

The two disciples then returned to their home. Then follows the account of the appearance of Jesus to Mary Magdalene. If the view we take of the matter be right, then the Evangelist had the story from Mary's own lips, for she

came and told the disciples, "I have seen the Lord," and she told how He had said these things to her. We have, I believe, in these verses (11-17) substantially Mary's own story as she told it to the disciples and as the Evangelist remembered it. She told them how she had seen two angels in the tomb who had said to her, Woman, why weepest thou? how she had answered: Because they have taken away my Lord and I know not where they have laid Him. Then she had turned and saw one standing whom she thought to be the gardener—this, if true, could only have come from Mary herself—and to him she had said: Sir, if thou hast borne him hence, tell me where thou hast laid him, and I will take him away. Then came the sound of her name, by which she recognised the Master. Then the refusal to let her cling to Him—those strange words which seem to me to have the mark of genuineness—"Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended unto the Father, but go unto my brethren, and say to them, I ascend to my Father and your Father, and my God and your God." It is easier to believe that this happened as is here stated than that the story was invented.

The Evangelist now goes on to relate how Jesus appeared to the disciples when they were met together that same evening with closed doors for fear of the Jews. There is no attempt at explanation. He merely says what happened, what he himself had witnessed. Jesus came and stood in the midst and said to them, Peace be unto you. And when He had said this He showed them His hands and His side. Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord, who now spoke to them, giving them their commission: As the Father hath sent me, so send I you. He then breathed upon them and said: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whosoever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained:"

Next comes the story of Thomas, who had been absent



when Jesus appeared the first time. And then follows the statement that these appearances did not stand alone : " Many other signs did Jesus in the presence of the disciples which are not written in this book ; but these are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of God, and that believing ye may have life in his name." So ends the twentieth chapter, which, according to our view, gives us the stages by which the Evangelist knew the fact of the resurrection.

We note that all these appearances recorded in St. John xx. took place in Jerusalem. And they are rejected by some critics on this very ground. For it is said that the earliest tradition places the post-resurrection appearances in Galilee, and that a choice must therefore be made between the two. But then the Fourth Gospel does not stop at the twentieth chapter, and the concluding chapter tells of an appearance in Galilee at the sea of Tiberias. Some have thought that this last chapter is not really a part of the Gospel, but is an addition by a later hand. The majority of critics, however, even those opposed to the historicity of the Gospel, do not support this view. And the internal evidence is all in favour of an identity of authorship.

Is the discrepancy, then, between the earlier and later Gospels in the matter of the post-resurrection appearances all that it has been made out to be ? May there not after all have been appearances both in Jerusalem and in Galilee ?

Now we observe at once in reading the Synoptists that it is certainly not the case that they know only of appearances in Galilee. St. Luke says nothing of appearances in Galilee, but he has a good deal to say of such in or near Jerusalem. But then St. Luke is said to belong to a later stage of the tradition which transfers the appearances in Galilee to Jerusalem, a process which, it is said, is continued or repeated in the Fourth Gospel. But we have already seen that the

Fourth Gospel, while it records appearances in Jerusalem, knows certainly of one appearance in Galilee. It has indeed been said that the last chapter of the Gospel was added by the writer for the purpose of bringing his work into accord with the early tradition which placed the appearances of the risen Jesus in Galilee. But such a theory proceeds from a presupposition that there were no appearances in Jerusalem, a presupposition which, as I shall now go on to show, is not justified by the so-called earliest tradition.

For where is that tradition to be found? The answer would be: In the Gospel according to Mark. But then it must be borne in mind that the original ending of Mark is missing; and there is nothing in the abrupt ending that we possess to justify us in concluding that there could have been no appearance in Jerusalem. That the conclusion of the Gospel in its original form did go on to tell of an appearance in Galilee I am not prepared to deny. The words of the young man arrayed in white and sitting in the tomb are (ver. 6) "Be not amazed; ye seek Jesus, the Nazarene, which hath been crucified: he is risen; he is not here: behold the place where they laid him! But go, tell his disciples and Peter, He goeth before you into Galilee; there shall ye see him as he said unto you." Now these words have a place in Matthew also, and there it is told that the eleven disciples did go into Galilee, unto the mountain where Jesus had appointed them, and there they saw Jesus, for it is written: "When they saw him they worshipped him, but some doubted." It seems then most probable that Mark also went on to tell of this appearance in Galilee—the account of this being a part of the missing conclusion of that Gospel.

And honesty requires that we should not omit to mention the fact that St. Luke gives a different version of the words of the angel to the women. In St. Luke there is mention of

two angels—or rather two men in dazzling apparel—who say to the women : “ Why seek ye the living among the dead ? He is not here, but is risen. Remember how he spake unto you when he was yet in Galilee, saying that the Son of Man must be delivered up into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and the third day rise again.” Here we have mention of Galilee, but it is in a different connexion. In Mark and Matthew the disciples were told to go to Galilee, where Jesus would come to them, but here in St. Luke it is to words that Jesus had spoken *when in Galilee* that reference is made. St. Luke, it has been said, changed the reference to Galilee to conform with his view that the appearances took place in Jerusalem and not in Galilee. And this change of meaning in the words of the angel has been thought to render unreliable St. Luke’s story of the appearances at Jerusalem. If he could thus twist the reference to Galilee, may he not have twisted the history too ? I am not able to take this view, for I believe that the simplest way of explaining all the documents is to suppose that there were appearances also in Jerusalem. I allow, however, that St. Luke’s version of the words of the angel differs substantially from that in Mark and Matthew.

Returning now to these two Gospels, we see that Matthew does record an appearance in Galilee, and there is every reason to suppose that Mark did so too. But it must be carefully noticed that Matthew expressly records an appearance in Jerusalem too, before that in Galilee, for he tells how, as the women were hastening from the tomb to bring the disciples word, behold, Jesus met them saying, All hail. And they came and took hold of His feet and worshipped Him. Then said Jesus unto them, Fear not : go, tell my brethren that they depart into Galilee, and there shall they see me.

Whether or not a similar account had a place in the missing

verses of Mark we cannot of course say. But here it is plainly said in Matthew that Jesus appeared to the women on their way from the tomb to the city.

It is difficult, however, to reconcile this account of the appearance to the women with the narrative of St. Luke, who puts into the mouth of the two disciples on the road to Emmaus these words (xxiv. 22): "Moreover, certain women of our company amazed us, having been early at the tomb; and when they found not his body, they came saying that they had also seen a vision of angels which said that he was alive. And certain of them that were with us went to the tomb and found it even as the women had said; but him they saw not."

Now this account would certainly seem to imply that the women had not seen Jesus. It is true that the subject of the sentence, 'him they saw not,' refers to those who had gone to the tomb in consequence of the words of the women, and not the women themselves. But the whole context suggests that neither had the women seen him; it was only a vision of angels that they had had.

Are we then to exclude the statement in Matthew that Jesus appeared to the women as unhistorical? But, if so, on what principle? We cannot reject it on the ground of St. Luke's narrative, if at the same time we are not prepared to give credence to him in the rest of his account of these things, and if we are going to accuse him of romancing on the subject of the post-resurrection appearances in transferring them to Jerusalem.

For my own part, I am prepared not exactly to exclude the statement of Matthew about the appearance to the women but to interpret it as a not very exact statement of what actually happened. And this seems to me to be an important distinction which we must make in all these narratives. That is to say, we must distinguish between what is sub-



stantially true, and what is accurately expressed. I consider the statement in Matthew that Jesus appeared to the women to be substantially true because we know from St. John's Gospel that Jesus did appear to one of them, namely, to Mary Magdalene. But I find myself quite unable to put the post-resurrection narrative of Matthew on a level with that of the Fourth Gospel for accuracy of statement, because I believe the Fourth Gospel to be first-hand evidence.

Now the statement in Matthew that Jesus appeared to the women may be compared with another made by the same Evangelist, who says that the two robbers crucified with Jesus joined in the reproaches and revilings directed against Jesus upon the cross, whereas, according to St. Luke, one of the two reproved his companion for so doing. It is substantially true that the robbers did revile Jesus, for they did so in the person of one of them ; but I can see no reason, apart from prejudices of verbal inspiration, not justified by the facts, to suppose, as has been done, that both robbers had at first joined in the taunts, and that the one of them afterwards changed his tone. Had he done so, he could not have rebuked his companion as in St. Luke he does.

While, then, it is substantially true that the robbers reviled Jesus, the fact is not accurately expressed in Matthew. And so it is, I think, with the statement respecting the appearance to the women. This, as it stands, will not agree with St. Luke's narrative, and, if there is one story of the post-resurrection appearances in the Synoptists which carries upon its face the impress of historical truth, it is that of the appearance of Jesus to the two disciples going to Emmaus. It seems to me that we have here not merely substantial truth, but also an accuracy of statement of great historical value. It may be said that this is a purely subjective judgment and needs justification. If any question the judgment,

I should ask for an explanation of the extraordinary particularity of statement in the story. So marked is this that I cannot but believe that the Evangelist had the story from one of the actors in the scene, if not from his lips, then from his pen.

E. H. ASKWITH.

## THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE GOSPELS.

### I.

#### THE PROBLEM AND ITS HISTORY.

ESCHATOLOGY is at the present moment a favourite subject which attracts more and more the interest of large circles. I hope, therefore, that the following four lectures, which were delivered at the Summer School of Theology at Oxford, September 1909, may be welcomed here. I give them, with the exception of some slight alterations, in the original form of lectures.

The subject, as it was formulated by the Committee of the Summer School, is not equivalent to "The eschatology of Jesus"—it includes much more; nor is it so comprehensive as the paper read before the third International Congress for the history of religions, at Oxford, September 1908, on "The Significance of early Christian eschatology."<sup>1</sup> As it is given, the subject places us before the whole gospel-question, reminding us of two most important points which we never should lose sight of in studying the Gospels, two points indeed which make the problem so intricate and difficult: first that all depends on 'the Gospel', i.e. on what Jesus Himself thought and said; and secondly, that we have this only in the form of 'the Gospels,' i.e. in the different forms of tradition. Or, to use Matthew Arnold's words: "All our criticism of the four Evangelists who report Jesus has this for its governing idea: to make out what in their report of Jesus is Jesus, and what is the reporters."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Transactions, ii. 312-320.

<sup>2</sup> *God and the Bible*, 1875, 167.

## I.

Before we attack the problem itself, it will be desirable to say a few words with regard to its history. This, I think, is what a methodical study needs most. It makes the distinction between the reading of a scholar and a dilettante. The latter, when he comes across any question, will at once go into it or through it with his own brains only, and perhaps one or two books with which chance has provided him; while on the other side the scholar will, before starting, find out what the question really is: what has to be said about it when it is taken in connexion with all related problems, and what has been said already by those into whose labours he is entering. Having thus fixed as a well-trained explorer the latitude and the longitude of his own position, he may say confidently: There we are, and it is in this direction that we have to go on further.

1. Now the question laid before us is, we may safely say, as so many other questions, at the same time quite old and quite recent. It is quite old, because there was no time in Church history when Christians were not occupied by the eschatological sayings in the Bible. It is quite recent, because it was only in the last century that the question became a problem in the sense of modern historical investigation. I think it is always very useful, especially for men of our own time, who are so proud of the results of modern research, to be reminded that those problems have been felt ever since the first age, that the same observations have always been made, and that it is only the method of dealing with them, the way by which we try to solve them, which changes. It has been observed from the very beginning that in the holy Scriptures there is plenty of information about the last things, the end of the world and the glorious and happy state of a new age, about judgement and final salvation. It has been



felt always with keen regret that information on these subjects is so scanty, so fragmentary, so very uncertain. Now the old method was to gather all utterances scattered through the whole book and to combine them so as to gain a systematic, self-consistent view. Biblical interpretation, as you know, from the first century down to the eighteenth was dominated by dogmatic and practical presuppositions. People did not ask what Jesus said nor what the apostles meant, but what God had to tell them by the mouth of His prophets and apostles. In this way they dealt with the eschatological utterances as with a collection of divine oracles which were to be fulfilled in their present time, and thus were to be explained by the events which just then were going on. You may read Hippolytus' commentary on the Book of Daniel, or his treatise on the Antichrist, or the fifteenth catechesis of Bishop Cyril of Jerusalem, or whatever patristic commentary of non-Alexandrian type you like : you will find them always explaining New Testament prophecies as coming to fulfilment in the interpreter's own time. What was said about " battles and wars, famines and pestilences, and earthquakes " was always easy to be identified with some events of the time. There were always some heretics able to be stamped as the Antichrist or his prophet. Wyclifites, Hussites, the Reformers recognised the Antichrist sitting in the temple of God in the Pope, whilst, on the other hand, the Jesuits easily found marks of the Antichrist in Luther or Calvin. Later on there was Napoleon as the beast from the abyss, or the railway as the dragon with his tail—in our time it would be the motor cars. At all events it was always something of the interpreter's own time. You had only to open your eyes and to look around you to see that the time was fulfilled and the end at hand.

This form of interpretation, which we may call the

historical adaptation of eschatological prophecy, was the most widely spread. Former times had only two alternatives besides, viz., the spiritualising interpretation of the Alexandrian school, which rather tended to abolish all eschatological ideas, and another one, which one may speak of as a really eschatological interpretation; there were only a few exceptional men who, disregarding the usual view, maintained that the predictions of those marvellous supernatural events which are spoken of in the New Testament were to be taken in a very strict sense, so that it would be impossible to identify them with anything in the ordinary course of history. You have, they declared, to expect them as they are foretold, but we do not know at what time they will happen; it may be in some few years, it may be in some hundred years, because, as has been said already in the second Epistle of St. Peter, "*A thousand years are with the Lord as one day.*"

It is very interesting to see on this point St. Augustine's correspondence with the Bishop of Salona, Hesychius.<sup>1</sup> To speak in general terms, this view, supported first by Irenaeus, found a stronger support only in more recent times. It was the so-called first Tübingen school—not that critical one of F. Chr. Baur, but an earlier one, founded by Storr and represented in Baur's own time by J. T. Beck. Quite evangelical in type, these theologians put themselves against all spiritualising as much as Bishop Nepos or Methodius in the third century, and contradicted the spiritualising interpretation of Origen. We may remark that there had been always a realistic tradition in western interpretation. So Bengel and the Tübingen men laid much stress on the realistic meaning of New Testament eschatology, but they neglected altogether that element of nearness in the prophecies which, taken strictly, would never

<sup>1</sup> Epp. 197, 198, 199 in Migne, PL 33, 899-925.

allow a hundred or thousand years to be put between prediction and fulfilment.

2. With the eighteenth century interpretation became historical, and thus only the question arose: what was the meaning of the men who uttered those predictions? Certainly they did not think about events of the second or fourth, or even the nineteenth century. By saying "what will shortly come to pass" they did not mean to say "shortly" for Hippolytus or for Cyril, nor even for Swedenborg, but "shortly" for themselves. They must have been thinking of the last things as being at hand. But how did they conceive them? Was it really to be understood verbally, exactly as the words used suggest, something almost supernatural, but at the same time visible, and to be touched,—some divine miraculous change of the whole external order of things,—or was it rather to be understood in a spiritual sense of something moral and inward?

There were at first only very few voices who supported the former view, which hardly could be brought into line with modern ideas. The majority of interpreters tried to escape from the difficulty by returning to the allegorising method of Origen. We quite understand that the average of modern theology, influenced as it was by Greek philosophy on one side, and by the predominant ethical ideas of the gospel on the other, could not do otherwise than spiritualise what was said by Christ and His apostles. It was in particular Schleiermacher's school, but also the critical school of Baur, which renewed the old spiritualising allegory. The whole school of *Vermittelungs-theologen*, as we use to call them, as well as the liberals of former times, acknowledged nothing but religious and moral ideas in the teaching of Jesus. The eschatological utterances, interpreted in this way, lost all their significance and became rather a duplicate

of other sayings put into an awkward picturesque form : so—it was argued—we had better neglect them and keep to the clearer utterances of the Fourth Gospel. You may take the Biblical theology of the late Professor Willibald Beyschlag, of Halle, as the average expression of this standpoint in Germany. We find it supported even at the present day by, for instance, Professor Erich Haupt, of Halle,<sup>1</sup> and by Professor Adams Brown, of New York.<sup>2</sup>

But this spiritualising interpretation does too much violence to the actual words of the Gospel. It could not stand the attack of a more realistic feeling in New Testament theology. Professor B. Weiss, of Berlin, simply by collecting all that is to be found in the Gospels, demonstrated clearly that there are many really eschatological ideas. I should mention here a very important English contribution, published for the first time without the author's name in 1878 with the title, *The Parousia, a critical inquiry into the New Testament Doctrine of our Lord's Second Coming*; in a new edition of 1887 the author's name was added—J. S. Russell. I do not know who he was, but at all events he was a very sincere Bible-reader. He made it quite clear that you cannot deal with the New Testament prophecies in the way of former interpreters, taking them as referring to a much later time, nor put them aside by reading something spiritual into them; you have to take them as they are : foretelling some great catastrophe in the lifetime of Jesus' own generation. When he comes to the end of his investigation, he puts the difficulty in the form of the following dilemma : either you have to say with some rationalists, Jesus and His apostles were wrong in their expectation; or, if you believe in the divine truth of the Bible, you must explain it by some event of the apostolic

<sup>1</sup> *Die eschatologischen Aussagen Jesu in den synoptischen Evangelien*, 1895.

<sup>2</sup> *Art. Parousia* in *Hastings DB*, iii. 674–680, 1900.



time, and you will easily find this in the destruction of Jerusalem.

Now, as a matter of fact, this solution of the question is a very old one. It has its Biblical support in the writings of St. Luke, who, as we shall see in our next lecture, colours the eschatological utterances in such a way that they may be understood of the destruction of Jerusalem. It has always had some support by later interpretation.<sup>1</sup> But it will not prove itself to be the final solution of the problem.

3. By modern research we have become acquainted with much apocalyptic literature, produced by later Judaism and highly appreciated in the early Christian Church, but forgotten for many centuries. We owe their discovery and collection to such scholars as Dillmann, Volkmar, Hilgenfeld, Schürer, and to English scholars, in the first rank of whom I should mention Professor R. H. Charles, besides Dr. Taylor, the late Master of St. John's, Cambridge, Rendel Harris and F. C. Conybeare. By reading this apocalyptic literature we became aware of a very important feature, not noted before, viz., that the eschatological ideas, or, as I would rather say, the forms in which they were uttered, were by no means an original product of the Gospel, but are taken over from later Judaism. This means that we have to explain them by an eschatological tradition. There was a certain amount of eschatological views spread in Judaism, being a part of what we call the "Weltanschauung," the general view of the world, prevailing at that time. And even Jesus and His disciples were participators of it; their horizon was not wider in this respect than that of their countrymen.

So a quite new form of interpretation appeared, the utter-

<sup>1</sup> This historical orientation of Jesus' predictions is the main feature in the most recent contribution to our subject by H. B. Sharman, *The Teaching of Jesus about the future according to the Synoptic Gospels*, Chicago, 1909.

ances of the Gospels being explained by Jewish eschatology. It was Joh. Weiss, in his book, *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes* [1892, second edition 1900], who started this new form with a rare success.<sup>1</sup> The current notions of the gospel were all to be taken in the realistic sense of late Judaism; the eschatological prophecies of Jesus were to be understood from his Jewish conceptions, without any regard to their fulfilment. There is a strong tendency now among German interpreters to get rid of their own modern views with the aim of looking at the early Christian writings with early Christian eyes, a tendency which you would call perhaps Romanticism, but is, however, better styled historical sincerity combined with some antiquarian feeling. They enlarge intentionally the difference between early and recent Christian views as much as possible with the purpose of being historical as far as possible.<sup>2</sup> The best example of this one-sided archaism may be found in Kabisch's book on Pauline eschatology (1893). But there are many other contributions of the same style in Germany now. In this way we got used to these rather strange eschatological ideas, so that many of our recent German students will find themselves quite at home in them and will think this form of interpretation to be the usual, the only natural one.

4. This is not all. Quite recently the problem of eschatology has gained yet another aspect. We have learned not only to deal with the notions of Jesus and His disciples, and to explain them by contemporary views, but to ask for the practical significance of these views for those who held them. It is one of the great merits of Professor H.

<sup>1</sup> The influence of J. Weiss may best be seen in the second edition of H. Wendt, *Die Lehre Jesu*, 1901, where we have the most deliberate and circumspect judgement pronounced upon this eschatological view.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the present writer's paper: *Der gegenwärtige Stand der Neutestamentlichen Exegese*, 1906.

J. Holtzmann, formerly of Strassburg,<sup>1</sup> that he showed how to combine both these modes of dealing with the question, not only to collect and explain the single utterances, but to make out their importance as influencing Jesus' whole life. There has been always some tendency in this direction in Strassburg theology. It was T. Colani<sup>2</sup> who first threw light upon the life of Jesus from the point of view of eschatology. From Strassburg started W. Baldensperger, now Professor at Giessen.<sup>3</sup> Professor F. Spitta, of Strassburg, has the great merit of always getting fresh lights upon the story of the Gospels out of those late Jewish apocryphas, going hand in hand with Joh. Weiss in their realistic interpretation. So you will easily understand how it came to pass that one of the most clever junior Strassburg men, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, also well known as an ingenious interpreter of Bach's music, happened to put forth his so-called theory of 'consequent eschatology,' i.e. that Jesus in all His acting is to be understood by nothing else than His eschatological view that He was designed by the Father to bring an end unto all things. Now I wonder how it happened that this theory, put forth in the form of a history, or rather an historical review, of the research on the life of Christ in the last hundred years "from Reimarus to Wrede" [1906], met with much more appreciation in England than in Germany, where even Schweitzer's friends were rather surprised by the one-sidedness of his views and declined to follow him. I need refer only to the criticism made

<sup>1</sup> Besides his *Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie* (1897), I would recommend in connexion with our question especially his masterful little treatise, *Das Messianische Bewusstsein Jesu*, 1907, which gives an accurate summary of the present stand, together with a complete record of recent contributions.

<sup>2</sup> *Jésus Christ et les croyances messianiques de son temps*, 1869.

<sup>3</sup> *Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu in Lichte der messianischen Hoffnungen seiner Zeit*, 1888; second edition 1892, third edition 1903 (part I.).

upon the book by Professor P. Wernle (Basle),<sup>1</sup> by Professor Ad. Jülicher (Marburg),<sup>2</sup> and last, not least, Professor H. J. Holtzmann<sup>3</sup>—while Professor W. Sanday's treatment of the book in his work, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research* [1907], gave Dr. Schweitzer's book a splendid advertisement in this country and, at the Oxford Congress for the history of religions in 1908, Professor F. C. Burkitt<sup>4</sup> made himself champion of this theory of consistent eschatology, which I myself would prefer to call radical eschatology.

Now, without going into the question itself, which will be our task in the next lectures, I may be allowed to say only this: if eschatology is the key to all gospel-questions, then it becomes the problem of problems how Christianity could go on without eschatology through so many centuries. If there was nothing in Jesus but eschatology, then He was a misguided enthusiast, and it would be almost impossible to explain how the name of an eccentric became the symbol for millions and millions of Christians who took from Him not only some vain hopes of the future, but a joyful experience of real salvation and an unexampled amount of moral energy.

The exaggerated "Consistency," however, should not keep back others from following the method in a sounder way—this was rightly maintained by Professor K. Lake at the Congress.<sup>5</sup> We have a very remarkable instance thereof in

<sup>1</sup> In *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1906, N. 18, Sp. 501 ff.

<sup>2</sup> In his lectures *Neue Linien in der Kritik der evangelischen Überlieferung*, 1906, 1-13.

<sup>3</sup> In his reviews *Der gegenwärtige Stand der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1906, N. 38 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See his paper on *The Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen*, Proceedings, II. 321-328, and cp. also his essay *The Eschatological Idea in the Gospel* in Essays on some biblical questions of the day, by members of the University of Cambridge, 1909, 193-213. Unnecessary to say, that Prof. Burkitt does not share all the conclusions of Dr. Schweitzer!

<sup>5</sup> See also the remarkable book of H. Monnier, *La mission historique de Jésus*, 1906.



a recent American contribution by Professor Shailer Matthews : *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament* [1905], a book whose very title, when compared with Dr. Kennedy's well-known book on *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things* [1904],<sup>1</sup> shows how much the view has changed : it is not the material of eschatological notions and doctrines, but it is their living force and influence upon the piety and the whole life of their believers, which is discussed here.

At this point we may stop our historical inquiry into the different ways of dealing with our problem.

## II.

The word eschatology has very different meanings. There was a time, some fifty years ago, and it lasts perhaps till now, when people, talking about eschatology, did not mean to say anything else than what happens after death : "*It is appointed unto men once to die, and after this cometh judgement*" (Heb. ix. 27). Now we know better that eschatology is the doctrine of the last things as understood by late Jewish teaching. And latterly we have come to use the word now to express a certain mode of feeling, not so much the different opinions on some points of eschatology as the whole fashion of mind produced by the belief in a near approach of the end. It is in this last sense that the word is taken here, viz., as signifying some idea which exercised a spiritual influence on the mind of Jesus and His disciples.

To understand this we must bear in mind what the belief of Jewish people in regard to the last things was in former times, and what was the evolution which this belief underwent.

1. The religion of Israel was, as you know, national in a far stricter sense than we can use this word of the religions

<sup>1</sup> Cp. also W. O. E. Oesterley, B.D., *The doctrine of the Last Things, Jewish and Christian*, 1908.

of the Greeks or the Romans or other peoples. It meant not only that every member of the nation by his birth was to be an adherent of this religion, but that the very subject of the religion was the nation, not the individual. Israel as a nation was the chosen people of God; it was in the nation's history that God revealed Himself to mankind, it was to the people that He had given all His promises, the individuals having no right for themselves, but only as members of the nation. It was their happiness to belong to this chosen people of God, and their hope and aim that their children or grandchildren perhaps would participate in the glorious fulfilment of God's promises to His people. To be sure, at a later time, let us say from the time of the Maccabean revival, a more individualistic conception began to spread among the Jewish people: it may have been suggested by the individualistic doctrines of the Persian religion, as some recent scholars maintain, or it may have come out of this very Hellenistic influence, so strong at the time, against which the Maccabean movement was directed. Its deeper source, however, is to be looked for in the Maccabean movement itself: the Jews of this time, prepared as they were by Persian and Hellenistic conceptions, could not think of God as leaving without any personal reward those who gave up even their life for His sake. It appeared to them impossible, incompatible with God's righteousness, that the martyrs should die without any compensation. It was as a benefit on behalf of the martyrs that Jewish religion asked at first for a personal continuation of life after death. But note: it is not a continuation in our sense of the word. Death comes in and separates body and soul. Neither of them is living when separated from the other. They are both in an estate of unconscious existence which you may rightly compare to sleep. The body is in the tomb, the soul in the so called She'ol, which

is not to be identified with Hell, but rather with the Hades of the Greeks, where the souls live their life as shades. This existence—if we may call it existence, being quite unconscious—lasts until that great day when God fulfils His promises to the nation. Then, but only then, those who are to participate in this glorious and happy time of salvation will be awakened, both body and soul will come out of their different receptacles, and will be united, and so the man will be able to enjoy a new life in company with all those who are alive then. So, you see, the old national conception of the last things has not given place to another one of more Hellenistic and individualistic type; it is still the old Jewish notion of the nation as the subject, only enlarged by the idea of a bodily resurrection of some earlier members of the people. There is a splendid sermon of the late Principal John Caird, of Glasgow, in his University sermons, upon Hebrews xi. 39, 40: “And these all having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise, God having provided some better thing for us that they without us should not be made perfect.” Dealing with the idea of “Comparative resurrection” the Principal says some most beautiful and stimulating things of great practical value for the religious life. But he treats the question as a matter of speculation, and not having first gone through these late Jewish conceptions, he misses just the one important point to be noticed from the standpoint of the modern historical method, viz., that we have in those words the Christian adaptation of that Jewish notion: salvation will come for all those who deserve it, but only when it comes for the nation.

This view is quite different from what we are accustomed to, and I would like the reader clearly to understand the great importance of this difference. The Jewish conception, by keeping to the national idea, has always an historical

orientation : it is based upon that notion of two ages, one which is now, and another to come ; the present bad, sinful, full of oppression, the future good, holy, happy. On the other hand, Greek, and later Christian thought, more individualising in its nature, goes rather in the line of a local than of a temporal contrast : happiness is not here, but you can find it elsewhere. Or, to make this a little more clear, one might say that, in the case of the Jews, possibility of salvation, being an expectation and not yet a reality, caused the stress to be laid upon the time *when*, while in the case of the Greeks, possibility of salvation being conceived as a present fact, caused the stress to be laid upon the place *where*. You know the islands of the Hesperides far in the West, where the happy heroes enjoyed a god-like, everlasting life ; you know the two parts in the Hades, one dark and harmful, a real hell for the sinners, the other a bright and happy abode for pious and righteous men. In the latest stage of Greek religion and philosophy it is rather the contrast of above and below, of heaven and earth. And you see that this is what most Christian people think of as the original Christian conception : that after their life on this sorrowful earth has come to an end, they immediately will go to another life, a life of glory and happiness in heaven. This is what they call salvation. Now without entering into the dogmatic question of what will happen to us after death, we may safely say that this is not the original Christian conception of salvation, which was almost in the line of Jewish thought, not perhaps so much national, but collective, historical : a time was to be expected when all who believed and placed their hope in God as the Saviour of His faithful people should see His glorious salvation, not only the quick, but also those who had died before, because they would rise again at that very moment.



2. This salvation might be conceived in many different ways : the mass of Jewish people took it in a political sense, either purely national : viz., that the yoke of heathen tyranny should be broken off, and Israel, free from all oppression, should enjoy his own land, his Holy City with the temple of God, and live a happy life under his God's gracious guidance, God's royalty being identified with the dominion of Israel over all other nations. Or else the conception was rather mixed up with party-morals : the salvation would come for that very part of Israel which remained faithful to the Lord their God, which, humble and poor, had to stand the oppression by that proud, rich company of unrighteous and godless men, who ruled, by their own will, over God's people, so that the salvation was to be seen in a true restoration of the theocracy against the tyranny of the Hasmonean or Sadducean priests or princes like Herod and his sons. Besides these there was a third form of conception, which, compared with the two political ones already mentioned, may be called mythological, as it deals not so much with human powers in opposition to God's kingdom, but with the spiritual powers of the devil and his demons, always in rebellion against God, and trying to make men offend against God's holy will and law with the aim of bringing them under their own pitiless dominion.

There are only a few traces of this last conception in pre-Christian Jewish eschatology, especially in the book of Enoch, where the fallen angels, the so-called Egregores (watchmen), play a great part.

Now we may say that in whatever way salvation was conceived, the very aim of Jewish religion was to get this salvation, not so much to ensure a share in it (because most Jews supposed this to be their natural right), but to get God to bring it. Because it was not to be brought by means of human operation. It was supposed to be a

quite superhuman, supernatural acting by God Himself, sending His salvation to His people. Only that this faithful people may influence His motion by pressing on Him in prayer, fasting and doing His ordinances in the law. As to how God would do it, there was no certainty; either He would come by Himself, breaking open the heaven and descending, or He would send His Messiah, the blessed one, His beloved, His Son, the Son of man, the Son of David. This coming would be preceded by various signs. The heathen power would rise to an almost unheard of level of tyranny, cruelty and abomination, the iniquity of the godless and unrighteous would join with them, so that the apostasy from the one God, the living and true one, and His worship to the idols and all the sins of idolatry would become general; there would be signs in the heaven and on earth, the sun giving no more light, the moon being changed into blood, the stars falling from heaven, earthquakes, famines, pestilences frightening mankind everywhere. Then at the very culmination of horrors the Messiah would appear in a miraculous way, and by His wonderful power He would destroy all His enemies, and by the aid of His angels collect His chosen people from all parts of the world, and reign over them in justice and peace, filled as He was with God's Holy Spirit, the Spirit of righteousness and truth.

3. It is not necessary to go further into detail now, because all this is very well known, especially through the works of Professor Charles. We only repeat, that there was no self-consistent doctrine of eschatology among the Jews of Jesus' time, and that the influence of eschatology was rather restricted to some circles, the life of the people being occupied by the business of the present time and ruled by the heavy yoke of Pharisaic ordinances. It was really something new to the people when John the

Baptist started his preaching in the wilderness of Judaea :  
 “*Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.*”

And whatever may have been the position taken by Jesus in regard to eschatology, there can be no doubt that eschatology was much more important in early Christianity than in late Judaism. It was so, because the messianic hope had found in Jesus its proper object : since Jesus had appeared, people were convinced that His glorious advent (the Parousia) was to be expected at the earliest term. This is the main distinction between early Christian and late Jewish eschatology : all has received a stricter form, many possibilities being excluded by the very fact that it was Jesus, with all His personal characteristics, who was to be expected ; all has been brought nearer, the fact that the Messiah was known, that it was Jesus, and that Jesus had disappeared only for a short time, giving urgency to all expectations. There was—as I tried to show in my paper read before the Oxford Congress in 1908—even an increasing tendency towards eschatological occupation in the second half of the first century, the very time when our Gospels were written. So the problem comes before us, whether the eschatology of the Gospels belongs to the original stock of Jesus-tradition, or is due to this later eschatological inclination of Christianity, which, borrowing from Judaism, transformed the gospel into a rather eschatological teaching. It is lastly the question, how far Jesus can be brought under the law of historical continuity, He Himself being dependent backwards on late Judaism and influencing forwards early Christianity—and how far He must be regarded as an exceptional being outside the operation of this law, unrooted in His nation, and misunderstood by His followers.

E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ.

## THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE PSALTER.

## II. PSALM XLV.

## AN ODE CELEBRATING A ROYAL MARRIAGE.

THE occasion of this Psalm is evidently a royal marriage. The poet—as a modern poet among ourselves might do—puts into tuneful words the feelings of national pride and satisfaction befitting the occasion: he celebrates in glowing terms the graces and felicity of the bridegroom, the splendour of the queen, and anticipates for him a glorious and successful reign. The hopes to which the auspicious occasion gives rise are analogous to those which we find elsewhere in psalms or prophecies relating to the king; they differ only in so far as the occasion which evokes them is a marriage. We do not know either who the poet is, or whose nuptials he celebrates: verse 10<sup>b</sup>, if not verse 12, seems to imply that the bride is a foreigner; and so the marriage of Solomon with Pharaoh's daughter, or of Jehoram of Judah with Athaliah, the daughter of Ahab and Jezebel, have been thought of. Happily we can understand the Psalm without knowing what the specific occasion is which it celebrates. We must only make an effort to transport ourselves from our own days to those of ancient Jerusalem—or, it may be, of Samaria—and picture in one of these ancient capitals of Israel a gala day—the people elated with enthusiasm and excitement, full of joyous anticipations, greeting their king and his bride with bright auguries and warm congratulations.

1 My heart is astir<sup>1</sup> with a goodly matter;  
I will say<sup>2</sup> that which I have written<sup>3</sup> unto the king:  
my tongue is the pen of a ready writer—

<sup>1</sup> *Rāhash* occurs only here in the Old Testament: it does not mean to overflow (R.V.), but to keep moving, be astir (see the *Oxf. Heb. Lex.*, p. 935b, with the references).

<sup>2</sup> Lit. *I am saying*, i.e. *I am about to say* or *will say*; cf. Genesis xix. 13 'we will destroy this place' (lit. *are destroying*); 1 Samuel xii. 16 'which Jehovah will do before your eyes' (lit. *is doing*). See my *Hebrew Tenses*, § 135, 3; or G.-K. § 116p.

<sup>3</sup> Lit. *my work*, i.e. my composition (cf. Engl. *work*, of a book; and *ποίημα*,



and quick, therefore, to express the inspiring thoughts stirring in his heart. Forthwith he proceeds to describe the high qualities of the royal bridegroom—his personal beauty, the winsome smile upon his lips, witnessing to the gracious words that he can speak, and the gracious qualities, befitting a noble-minded monarch, which he possesses; and showing that he deserves, therefore, that God's blessing should rest continuously upon him—

2 Thou art fairer than the children of men :  
 graciousness is shed over thy lips :  
 therefore God hath blessed thee for ever.

He is, moreover, a warrior, ready—as the Israelite kings ever were—to lead his army into battle and bravely wrestle with his foes; so the poet bids him equip himself in martial majesty and state, and use his weapons in the cause of truth and right—

3 Gird thy sword upon thy thigh, O mighty one,<sup>1</sup>  
 (even) thy majesty and thy state.

4<sup>2</sup>And (in) thy state, <sup>2</sup>ride on, press through,<sup>3</sup>  
 on behalf of faithfulness, and humility, (and) righteousness :  
 and may thy right hand teach thee terrible things!

not (P.B.V.) 'because of the *word* of truth,' etc., but '*on behalf of*,' i.e. '*in the cause of* faithfulness,' etc., in defence of virtues which are trampled under foot in evil times and under evil rulers, but which a just ruler would do his utmost to foster and promote. He is 'to protect the faithful as opposed to liars and deceivers, the righteous as opposed to breakers of the law, and the humble as opposed to the proud' (Cheyne). We remember how David and Solomon 'executed judgment and justice' in the land (2 Sam. viii. 15, a 'poem.' In the translation 'my work,' is avoided, as a poor and prosaic expression; and a rendering adapted from the P.B.V. has been adopted.

<sup>1</sup> I.e. *O warrior*, according to the standing meaning of *gibbôr*, 'mighty one,' as in David's 'mighty men' (2 Sam. xxi. 8, etc.).

<sup>2</sup> The repetition of exactly the same word (גָּרַר) that occurs at the end of *v.* 3, and the harshness of the construction in this verse, render the text very suspicious: but no convincing emendation has been proposed.

<sup>3</sup> Or, *prosper* (Jer. xxii. 20).

1 Kings x. 9), how often the defenceless and, especially, the godly poor were oppressed in Israel, and how to do justice and to help and protect the oppressed is mentioned, in both the prophets, and in other Psalms, as an attribute of the ideal ruler (Isa. ix. 7, xvi. 5; Jer. xxiii. 5; Isa. xi. 4, xxxii. 2; Ps. lxxii. 4, 12-14). May his right hand, the poet adds, teach him to do terrible things! i.e., may his courage show him how to do acts of terrible valour in defence of this great cause!

5 Thine arrows are sharpened;  
 peoples fall under thee;  
 (they are) in the heart of the king's enemies.

His arrows are sharp, ready to be aimed with fatal effect: his enemies fall before him, and he rides over their prostrate corpses (cf. Ps. xviii. 38 'I smite them through that they cannot rise: they fall under my feet'); each shaft has penetrated the heart of a foe.

The Psalmist continues—

6 Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever:  
 a sceptre of equity is the sceptre of thy kingdom.

It is evident that the words are addressed to the king whose nobility and prowess the poet is celebrating. The words cannot, as from Hebrews i. 8 onwards has often been supposed, be an affirmation of the divinity of the Messiah, for the simple reason that the king whom the psalmist celebrates, though he is invested with ideal attributes, is not the Messiah—least of all the Christian Messiah, for he marries a queen and has children, who are spoken of in such terms that it would outrage all reasonable exegesis to understand them in any but a literal sense. Nor can we rend the Psalm in two, and apply the rest of the Psalm to the Israelite king, and this one verse to the Messiah. Thus, not upon theological but upon *exegetical* grounds, the current interpretation of the passage cannot be sus-

tained. Gressmann,<sup>1</sup> accepting the correctness of the text, supposes that the use of the term 'God' is a survival from a time when the Israelite king was regarded as divine and addressed as God. But that cannot be said to be probable. The rendering of R.V.m. would remove the difficulty; but it is questionable philologically.<sup>2</sup> If, however, with a very slight change of text, we might suppose, with Mr. Edghill,<sup>3</sup> that a *kaph*, written properly twice, had been transcribed only once, we should at once obtain a suitable sense: 'Thy throne is *as* God'—i.e. by Hebrew idiom, 'as God's throne' (cf. Ps. xviii. 33 'who maketh my feet like hinds,' i.e., of course, not like the hinds themselves, but 'like hinds' feet'; and see G.-K. § 141*e*, note). This appears to be the best suggestion for the explanation of the text that has been made: the textual change is slight, and the sense obtained is in excellent agreement with the context. The king's throne, it is said hyperbolically, is to be as permanent as God's throne: (cf. xxi. 4, where the king is said to have been given 'length of days for ever and ever (עולם ועד),' and lxi. 6, 7 'Days mayest thou add to the days of the king! May his years be as many generations! May he sit (enthroned) before God for ever (עולם)!') And his rule is to be one of equity: 'A sceptre of equity is the sceptre of thy kingdom.' A rule of equity was always one of the first traits which the Israelite drew in his portrait of an ideal king (cf. Isa. xi. 4, 5, Jer. xxiii. 5, Ps. lxxii. 2, and elsewhere). And the poet views the king's present good fortune as the reward of his high moral attributes:—

7 Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest iniquity:  
 therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee  
 with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.

<sup>1</sup> *Ursprung der Isr.-jüdischen Eschatologie* (1905), p. 256 f.

<sup>2</sup> See my *Hebrew Tenses*, § 194 *Obs.*

<sup>3</sup> *An Enquiry into the Evidential Value of Prophecy* (1906), p. 252.

The point in the last clause is not the anointing but the gladness : the anointing and the oil are both meant figuratively, the expression 'oil of gladness,' as in Isaiah lxi. 3, being suggested by the ancient custom of anointing with oil on festal occasions (Ps. civ. 15 ; Am. vi. 6 ; Luke vii. 46) ; the meaning is thus, not that he has been literally anointed, but that he has been made happier than other kings by his present auspicious marriage.

- 8 All thy garments are myrrh, and aloes, (and) cassia ;  
 out of ivory palaces stringed instruments make thee glad.  
 9 Kings' daughters are among thy precious ones :  
 upon thy right hand standeth the consort <sup>1</sup> in gold of Ophir.

V. 8 describes the king as he appears arrayed for the occasion ; his garments are scented with costly perfumes fetched from distant lands ;<sup>2</sup> as he approaches his palace, inlaid, like Ahab's, with ivory, the sounds of music greet him. V. 9, *kings'* daughters—so splendid is his court—are among the inmates of his harem—for that is the meaning of the 'honourable'<sup>3</sup> women of the English versions, Israelite kings being often polygamists ; but one of the wives takes precedence of the others, and occupies, like Bathsheba beside her son Solomon (1 Kings ii. 19), the post of honour at the king's right hand : in 'standeth,' or (R.V.) 'doth stand,'

<sup>1</sup> Not the usual word for *queen*. Elsewhere only Neh. ii. 6, Dan. v. 2, 3, 23 ('wives') ; and read by some scholars conjecturally in Judges v. 30 *end* ('for the neck of the consort').

<sup>2</sup> *Myrrh* was brought from Arabia. *Aloes* (Heb. *āhālōth*) is the Greek *ἀγάλλοχον*, the modern '*eagle-wood*' (from the Malay *agil*), an aromatic wood, exported from India and Ceylon, which, when burnt, yields a fragrant odour. It is quite different from the bitter medicine which we call *aloes* (Gk. *ἀλόη*). The fragrant aloes are mentioned also in Cant. iv. 14, Proverbs vii. 17—in both places joined with 'myrrh.' *Cassia*—here lit. *scrapings* (the word in Exodus xxx. 24, Ezekiel xxvii. 19 is different), used specifically of the scrapings, or powder, of a fragrant bark—is the powdered bark of (probably) a species of cinnamon, indigenous in South India and Malacca (see *Enc. Bibl.*, i. 708).

<sup>3</sup> Lit. *precious, valued* : often of precious stones (2 Sam. xii. 30) ; of the 'sons of Zion,' once comparable to fine gold, but now esteemed only as 'earthen pitchers,' Lam. iv. 2. Cf. the cognate verb, *be precious*, of a life, 2 Kings i. 13, *al*.



the poet is anticipating the future place of the newly-wedded princess.

And now the poet turns to the queen, first (*v.* 10 f.) addressing her, and then (*v.* 12) describing her. She is youthful, we may suppose, and inexperienced: so he offers her some words of fatherly advice and encouragement suited to the occasion; he counsels her to forget her old home, and surrender herself to her new lord—

10 ‘Hearken, O daughter, and see, and incline thine ear;  
forget also thine own people and thy father’s house.

We are reminded here of the Homeric phrase, εἰς εὐνὴν φοιτῶντε, φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας.

11 And when the king desireth thy beauty  
(for he is thy lord), then bow thyself unto him—

viz. in homage (Gen. xxiii. 7; 1 Kings i. 23, etc.): let her pay her husband—here called ‘lord,’ as Sarah calls Abraham ‘lord’ in Genesis xviii. 12—befitting respect and submission. ‘God’ in the P.B.V., is a gloss, derived from the Vulgate, and expressing, in a Christian sense, the current Messianic interpretation of the Psalm. But in the ‘Great Bible’ of Coverdale (1539), from which the P.B.V. is taken, it is shown, like other additions of the same kind (e.g. in Ps. i. 5), to be no part of the Hebrew text, by being placed within parentheses and printed in smaller type than the body of the Psalm. In early P.B. Psalters, and in the ‘Sealed Book’ of 1662, these distinguishing marks are still preserved, but they have since been gradually dropped. Their omission, as Bishop Westcott observes, is ‘very greatly to be regretted.’ See further my *Parallel Psalter*, pp. xix.–xx.

Next the queen is further encouraged, upon entering her new home, with the thought of the deference and respect which she will there receive, and of the eagerness with which gifts will be offered to her to win her favour.

V. 12 is difficult; we must, it seems, adopt one of two

interpretations. We may (1) suppose that a verb has fallen out, and render substantially as is done in A.V. and R.V.—

12 And the daughter of Tyre [shall come] with gifts,<sup>1</sup>  
the richest of the people shall intreat thy favour.

In this case the 'daughter of Tyre' will be the people of Tyre, personified, like the 'daughter of Zion, of Judah,' etc.; and this wealthy commercial nation will be represented as coming to court the favour of the royal bride.

Or (2) we may keep the text as it stands, and render the opening words as a vocative—

12 And, O daughter of Tyre,<sup>2</sup> with gifts  
the richest of the people shall intreat thy favour.

Upon this interpretation, the 'daughter of Tyre' will be the royal bride herself, who will in this case be a Tyrian princess, or at least a princess of Tyrian extraction, like Athaliah.

There follows a description of the queen's splendid bridal attire and of the state procession, in which, accompanied by a long train of attendants, she is escorted from her own apartments to the royal palace—

13 All glorious<sup>3</sup> is the king's daughter within (her chamber);  
her clothing is of chequer-work, inwrought with gold;

'Within'<sup>4</sup> means within a temple, palace, or, presumably, other building; here, apparently (Kirkpatrick), within the

<sup>1</sup> I.e. [במנחה ותבואה]. The existing text cannot be rendered as is done in A.V., R.V.; and the construction of בַּת צַר with a plural verb is an objection to Ewald's rendering of the same text, adopted in the *Parallel Psalter*.

<sup>2</sup> For a vocative introduced by 'and,' without another vocative preceding, see Joel ii. 23. We should expect וְיִתֵּן בַּת צַר as in Joel אַתָּה בְּנֵי יוֹסֵף צִיִּן.

<sup>3</sup> Lit. (if the text is correct) *The whole of gloriousness*, a hyperbole. Cf. xxxix. 5, lit. *the whole of vanity*.

<sup>4</sup> The Hebrew is lit. *face-wards*, i.e. properly, in the inmost part of a hall or presence-chamber, where the throne would be facing those who enter it by the door at the further end (cf. the ἐνώπια παμφανδῶντα of Homer), as of the Tent of Meeting (Lev. x. 18), the Temple (1 Kings vi. 18, 19; 2 Chron. xxix. 16), a palace (2 Kings vii. 11; 2 Chron. xxix. 18). The rendering 'within' (P.B.V., A.V.) suggests naturally 'inwardly,' 'within her own person'; but this is quite alien to the usage of the Hebrew word.

residence in Jerusalem to which she had been brought, and where she now stands, decked in bridal attire, ready to be conducted in state to the king's palace (*vv.* 14, 15). To render with R.V. 'within (the palace)' anticipates unduly *vv.* 14, 15, where the queen is first brought to it. Some modern scholars, however, for פנימה במשבצות read פנינם במשבצות, i.e.

13 All glorious is the king's daughter;  
of pearls in filigree-settings of gold is her clothing.

For the rendering filigree-settings, see note <sup>1</sup> below.

'Chequer work' was some kind of decorative work, probably something of the nature of a 'check,'<sup>1</sup> whether, if of one colour, *quilted work*,<sup>2</sup> or, if of different colours, a *coloured check*: it was the material prescribed for the high priest's tunic (Exod. xxviii. 4, 39): here the fabric of the queen's dress is further decorated by being crossed, or varied in some way, with gold thread; cf. Vergil's *picturatas auri subtemine vestes* (*Aen.* 3. 483).

14 In variegated raiment shall she be escorted unto the king;  
the virgins her companions following her  
shall be brought unto thee.

15 With gladness and rejoicing shall they be escorted;  
they shall enter into the king's palace.

V. 14. *Rikmah* certainly means *variegated* fabric (see Ezek. xvii. 3, where it is used of the plumage of a bird), and probably fabric *embroidered* in colours (see Kennedy, *Enc. Bibl.* iv. 5289). The 'work of the variegator' is prescribed for the screens of the Tent of Meeting and for the sash of the high priest (Exod. xxvi. 36, xxvii. 16, xxviii. 39): see also Judges v. 30; Ezek. xvi. 10, 13, xxvii. 7, 16, 24, *al.*

V. 15. The king meets the procession escorting the bride; and they enter the royal palace together. Cf. 1 Macc.

<sup>1</sup> In Exodus xxviii. 11, 13, 14, 20 the same word is used of the plaited gold settings of gems (A.V., R.V. 'ouches,' a now obsolete word for the frame in which a jewel is set: better, *filigree work*).

<sup>2</sup> See A. R. S. Kennedy's elaborate article, WEAVING, in the *Encycl. Bibl.* iv. 5288.

ix. 37, 39 : 'The children of Jambri were making a great marriage, and were bringing the bride from Nadabath with a great train, a daughter of one of the great nobles of Canaan . . . And the bridegroom came forth, and his friends and his brethren, to meet them with timbrels and minstrels and many weapons.' And the poet closes (*v.* 16) with happy wishes and anticipations for the future, addressed to the royal bridegroom : of the offspring of his marriage he may make princes—as Rehoboam, we are told, stationed his sons in various cities of Judah (2 Chron. xi. 23)—who may represent him in different parts of his realm ; and (*v.* 17) his memory will be perpetuated with undying fame, not in Israel only, but among other nations as well—

16 Instead of thy fathers shall be thy children,

whom thou shalt make princes in all the land.<sup>1</sup>

17 I will make mention of thy name in all generations :

therefore shall the peoples give thanks unto thee for ever and ever.

The Psalm thus celebrates, in a high and noble strain, the nuptials of an Israelite king. It is Messianic, in so far as it portrays an *ideal*. The king, whoever he was, whom the poet addresses is invested by him with ideal attributes : he is the impersonation of high virtues and perfections ; he is fairer than the children of men, graciousness is shed over his lips, therefore he is blessed of God for ever ; he is to carry on a crusade on behalf of the faithful, the humble, and the righteous ; he loves righteousness and hates wickedness, and therefore extraordinary blessings and happiness are showered upon him. The Psalm thus falls into line with other Psalms and prophecies, in which similar thoughts are expressed and similar ideals projected—the 2nd and the 72nd, for instance, and with the 110th. These Psalms

<sup>1</sup> Or, *in all the earth*—for many peoples (cf. *vv.* 6c, 17b) will have been embraced in his domain. The Hebrew is ambiguous, and may bear either meaning.



express promises or hopes not fulfilled by any actual monarch of Israel ; they portray the king, not simply as what he was, but as what he should or might be ; in other words, they portray an *ideal*. They are thus, to use the technical expression, *typically* Messianic. And so, though sound exegesis will not permit *v.* 7 to be quoted, as it was wont to be quoted, as a proof of the Divinity of Christ, the Psalm may still be read with perfect propriety in our Church on Christmas Day, as setting forth a great ideal of kingly virtues and kingly rule, which Christ realised in the transfigured and spiritualised realm of David in which He assumed the throne.

PSALM LXX.

GOOD WISHES FOR A KING.

The poet prays that God will confer upon the king the gifts that will enable him to fulfil the ideal of his office. Thus equipped, may he prove himself the righteous ruler who secures for his subjects justice and peace ; and may he, as the reward of his upright rule, reign from sea to sea, receive the homage of distant nations, and look with satisfaction upon the prosperity of his people.

1 Give the king thy judgements, O God,  
and thy righteousness unto the king's son.

The poet prays God to give the king a store of His 'judgements,' or decisions, that he may appropriate and apply them when cases come before him for judgment ; and His 'righteousness,' that it may in the same way be expressed in the decisions that he gives.

In *vv.* 2-7 the consequences of the king's being thus equipped for his rule are developed : may he judge the poor—those common victims of oppression and injustice under an Oriental government—righteously ; may his people also themselves live righteously, and enjoy the fruits of good government and peace !

- 2 May he judge thy people with righteousness,  
and thy poor with judgement !
- 3 May the mountains bear peace to the people,  
and the hills righteousness !<sup>1</sup>
- 4 May he judge the poor of the people ;  
may he save the children of the needy,  
and crush the oppressor !

V. 2. With *righteousness* and *judgement*, as David did (2 Sam. viii. 15); and in accordance with the ideal, Jer. xxiii. 5.

*Thy poor.* Or *thine afflicted* (or, *humbled ones*), which is what the Hebrew word used properly means. So *vv.* 4, 12. See the article POOR in Hastings' *Dict. of the Bible*, where the usage of the term is more fully explained.

In *v.* 3 the Hebrew has 'through righteousness.' But this greatly mars the parallelism of the verse, and doubtless Duhamel is right in supposing that 'through righteousness' is an error of transcription due to the fact that (in the Hebrew) the same expression (בְּצִדְקָה) occurs in *v.* 2*a.* For the figure of 'bearing' (viz. as *fruit*) cf. Isaiah xlv. 8 ('salvation,' i.e. deliverance, and 'righteousness,' to spring out of the earth). Peace and righteousness (as a civic virtue, among the people), the effects of a righteous rule, are viewed poetically as a fruit or growth of the mountains and hills. For the ideal picture cf. Isaiah xxxii. 15-17: 'Until the spirit be poured upon us from on high . . . Then judgement shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness shall abide in the garden-land; and the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness quietness and confidence for ever.'

- 5 May he prolong (his days)<sup>2</sup> as long as the sun endureth,<sup>3</sup>  
and before the moon, through all generations !

<sup>1</sup> Hebrew text, *through righteousness*. See the note.

<sup>2</sup> Hebrew text, *May they fear thee*. See the note.

<sup>3</sup> Heb. *with the sun*. See the same idiom in Daniel iv. 3 [Heb. iii. 23], lit. 'with generation and generation.'

- 6 May he come down like rain upon the mown grass,  
as showers, (even) drops<sup>1</sup> upon the earth!
- 7 In his days may righteousness<sup>2</sup> flourish;  
and abundance of peace till the moon be no more!

V. 5. *May he prolong* (his days). The Hebrew text has 'May they fear thee,'—words which might possibly be addressed to the king, though more probably, if they are correct, they are to be taken as addressed to God. In either case, however, and especially in the latter, the thought of the verse comes in abruptly, and is alien to the context. LXX read *συνπαράμενει*, i.e. *shall continue with*, reading no doubt אֲרִיךְ for יִרְאִיךְ; and this yields a far better sense: 'May he *prolong* (his days) as long as the sun endureth'; the word, as Deuteronomy xvii. 20 and often; for the ellipse of 'days,' see Ecclesiastes vii. 15. The hyperbolic wish as 1 Kings i. 31; Psalm xxi. 4, lxi. 6, 7. (above p. 117).

V. 6. May his rule be as gentle and beneficent as rain upon a mown meadow, or showers upon the earth. Cf. the similar comparison of the effects of a righteous rule in 2 Samuel xxiii. 3c, d, 4. The figure is carried on in the 'flourish' or 'blossom' of v. 7.

In v. 7 for *righteous*, LXX, Jerome, and the Syriac version have *righteousness*. The sense is not appreciably different: but the abstract term suits the parallel *peace* better, and the change in the Hebrew is only one of vocalisation.

<sup>1</sup> The word (*zarziph*) is peculiar, and occurs in the Old Testament only here. It is cited as occurring once in the Talm. (*Yoma 87a*), of 'drops' scattered in throwing water from a bucket. Very possibly it is here a corruption of some verb meaning *to water* or *moisten*. יִרְיִפוּ, from יָרַף to *flow* (cited once from a late Midrash), does not give the right sense. If we might *infer* a verb יָרַף, not otherwise known in Hebrew, either from Syr. אֲרִיפְתָּא, *a heavy rain*, or Arab. *dharafa*, to *flow* (of tears), we could read יִרְיִפוּ, 'that *make* the earth to *flow*.' Or we could read יִרְעִיפוּ, 'that *make* the earth to *drop*' (cf. Ps. lxxv. 12, R.V.m. [Heb. 13]). The best word, if the *ductus literarum* did not differ too widely from יִרְיִפוּ, would be יִרְיִיפוּ, 'like showers that *water* the earth.' See Isaiah lv. 10; and for the form Psalm xxxvi. 8 [Heb. 9].

<sup>2</sup> Hebrew text, *the righteous*. See the note.

*Vv. 8-12.* May his realm be wider than that of Solomon, may all enemies be subdued before him, may the most distant and famous peoples do him homage!

8 May he have dominion also from sea to sea,  
and from the River unto the ends of the earth!

9 May the desert-dwellers bow before him;  
and his enemies lick the dust!

10 May the kings of Tarshish and of the isles render presents!  
may the kings of Sheba and Seba bring dues!

11 Yea, may all kings fall down to him!  
may all nations serve him!

*V. 8.* A poetical extension of the limits assigned by tradition to the empire of Solomon (1 Kings iv. 21 [Heb. v. 1]), 'And Solomon was ruling over all the kingdoms from the River unto the land of the Philistines, and as far as the border of Egypt'; 24 'For he was having dominion [the same verb as here] over all the country beyond the River [i.e. west of it—viewed from the Babylonian standpoint], from Tiphseh [Thapsacus] as far as Gaza, over all the kings beyond the River.' 'The River,' as always in R.V. (e.g. Exod. xxiii. 31), when the word has a capital letter, is the Euphrates, *the river* *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* to the Hebrews. The greater part of *v. 8* recurs *verbatim* in Zech. ix. 10*b*, in the description of the rule of the ideal king of the future, 'And he shall speak peace unto the nations; and his rule shall be *from sea to sea, and from the River unto the ends of the earth.*'

*V. 9.* The 'desert-dwellers' are the wild Bedouin, the free sons of the desert, who will not readily own any superior. The rendering, though it fits the context excellently, is, however, uncertain, since elsewhere the word always means 'desert-beasts' (Ps. lxxiv. 14; Isa. xiii. 21 *al.*); hence several recent scholars would read *his adversaries* (צריי for ציים).

To *lick the dust* is a figure of abject submission: cf. the same words in Micah vii. 17; and to 'lick the dust of thy feet' in Isaiah xlix. 23. In Assyrian bas-reliefs captives



are often represented as crouching down, with their faces on the ground, at their conqueror's feet.

V. 10. *Tarshish* is Tartessus in Spain (Gen. x. 4, Ezek. xxvii. 12 *al.*; and, as a distant country, as here, Isa. lxvi. 19). The *isles* or *coasts*—for the term used includes both—are in particular the isles and coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. The word is frequent in Deutero-Isaiah.

*Shēbā* is the people known to the classical writers as *Sabæi*, Sabaeans. Their home was in the S.W. of Arabia, where numerous inscriptions, showing that they were a civilised and well-governed nation, have recently been discovered. They are several times mentioned in the Old Testament as a distant and wealthy people, famed for its gold, precious stones, and frankincense (1 Kings x. 1 ff., 10; Jer. vi. 20; Isa. lx. 6; Ezek. xxvii. 22). *Sēbā* (also Gen. x. 7, a 'son' of Cush, and Isa. xliii. 3, xlv. 14, beside Egypt and Cush) was probably Σαβαί, a 'large city' mentioned by Strabo on the west coast of the Red Sea, on the Adulitic Gulf.

The thought of *vv.* 10, 11 is no doubt suggested by 1 Kings iv. 21 [Heb. v. 1], 'they (viz. all kingdoms from the Euphrates to the border of Egypt) were bringing "presents,"<sup>1</sup> and "served" Solomon'; x. 1, 10 (the Queen of Sheba and the gold, spices, and precious stones brought by her); x. 24 f. ('all the earth' were bringing him yearly 'presents'); x. 22 (the navy of 'Tarshish,'—though its voyages were, it is true, not to Tarshish but to Arabia).

*Vv.* 12-14. This far-reaching dominion and the world-wide homage which he will receive are the reward for his just and gracious rule. As before (*v.* 4), the king's special merit is his care for the poor and the oppressed.

<sup>1</sup> The 'present' (Heb. *minhah*) was not an ordinary gift, but an offering intended to conciliate the good-will of a superior,—often more or less expected, or compulsory, and a mark of subjection (cf. 2 Sam. viii. 2, 6); hence in Psalm lxxii. 10 'render' (implying a *due*); so 2 Kings xvii. 3 Heb. (where A.V. *marg.* had 'tribute,' as R.V. *marg.* has here).

- 12 For he will deliver the needy when he crieth,  
the poor also, and him that hath no helper.  
13 He will have pity on the feeble and the needy,  
and the souls of the needy he will save.  
14 He will redeem their soul from oppression and violence;  
and precious will their blood be in his sight.

Their blood being 'precious,' he will take care that it is not unjustly shed.

*Vv.* 15-17. Three closing prayers, for the welfare of the king (*v.* 15), the fertility of the land and prosperity of the people (*v.* 16), and the honourable perpetuation of his name (*v.* 17).

- 15 And may he live, and may there be given unto him of the gold of Sheba!  
may prayer also be made for him continually!  
may he be blessed all the day!  
16 May there be abundance<sup>1</sup> of corn in the land upon the top of the mountains!  
may the fruit thereof shake like Lebanon!  
and may men blossom out of the city like the herb of the earth!  
17 May his name be for ever!  
before the sun may his name have increase:  
may all families of the earth<sup>2</sup> also bless themselves by him!  
may all nations call him happy!

In *v.* 15 'may he live' sounds like an echo of the regular exclamation, *May the king live!* (1 Kings i. 25 *al.*), which in Hebrew, as in French (*Vive le roi!*), is the idiomatic equivalent of our *God save the king*. 'May the people not only greet him with the customary acclamation, and offer him the choicest gifts, but pray for his welfare and bless him, as the source of their happiness and prosperity' (Kirkpatrick). In line 3 of the same verse, the P.B. Version *unto him* is not possible. There is no greater ambiguity in

<sup>1</sup> So with a change of text. The Hebrew word found here is otherwise unknown, and the meanings that have been given to it are purely conjectural.

<sup>2</sup> So LXX; see Genesis xii. 3. The words have probably accidentally fallen out in the Mass. text; the verb 'bless themselves' in the Hebrew lacks a subject, and the addition improves the balance of lines 3 and 4 of *v.* 17.

the sense of the Hebrew *b'ad*, than there is in that of the Greek *ὑπέρ*.

V. 16. The word *תפוח* occurs nowhere else, and no satisfactory explanation of it has ever been given.<sup>1</sup> In the translation Lagarde's conjecture *תפעת*, *abundance* (of water, Job xxii. 11, xxxviii. 34; camels, Isa. lx. 6; horses, Ezek. xxvi. 10; men, 2 Kings ix. 9 twice) has been followed.

*Blossom . . . like the herb of the earth.* Their numbers and their freshness are the *tertium comparationis*: cf. Isaiah xxvii. 6 ('Israel shall blossom and bud'), Job v. 25b ('And thine offspring shall be like the herb of the earth'). May his people both flourish, and increase largely in numbers!

V. 17. *Have increase, or be propagated*, viz. by his descendants. The Hebrew word occurs only here, but *nin*, 'progeny' (Gen. xxi. 23; Job xviii. 19; Isa. xiv. 22: A.V., R.V. *son*) would be cognate. The figure, as applied to a name, is, however, somewhat strange, and perhaps *be established* (*יָבִיחַ* for *יָבִיחַ*) should be read.

*May all families of the earth also bless themselves by him*; i.e. use his name in blessing as a type of happiness, saying, 'God make me (or thee) like this king,' and so 'invoking for themselves the blessings which he enjoys, as the highest and best that they can imagine.' Jacob represents Israel as 'blessing themselves' by his two grandchildren, when he says (Gen. xlviii. 20), 'By thee shall Israel bless, saying, God make thee as Ephraim and as Manasseh.'<sup>2</sup> The same expression occurs in Genesis xxii. 18 and xxvi. 4 (which should be rendered, 'And by thy seed shall all nations of the earth *bless themselves*').<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Handful* (A.V.) comes from a comparison of the Aram. *pas*, the *palm* of the hand (Dan. v. 5, 24); but this sense does not suit the context.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the opposite custom of using a name in cursing (Jer. xxix. 21), 'Jehovah made thee like Zedekiah and like Ahab, whom the king of Babylon roasted in the fire.'

<sup>3</sup> In Genesis xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxviii. 14 the form of the verb is different.

The verses which follow form no part of the Psalm, but are the doxology closing the second Book of the Psalms, added by a compiler—

- 18 Blessed be the Lord God, the God of Israel,  
     who only doeth wondrous things:  
 19 And blessed be his glorious name for ever;  
     and let the whole earth be filled with his glory.  
     Amen, and Amen.

Compare the similar doxologies closing the first, third and fourth Books (xli. 13; lxxxix. 52; cvi. 48).

The Psalm (notice *v.* 1), if it relates to an Israelite king, reads like a prayer on his accession; what king, we do not know, but certainly one of the later ones—perhaps Josiah. This is shown both from the clear and easy style, which is just that of other Psalms which, upon independent grounds, are plainly not early; and also from the allusions in *vv.* 10, 12–14 to the oppression of the poor and needy, which resemble strongly allusions of the same kind in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, and in Psalms of the same and later periods. The hopes and anticipations which the Psalm expresses for the king are suggested partly by reminiscences of Solomon's rule, partly by a sense of what the qualifications of a just ruler should be, in view of the social conditions of the time. The Psalm, if it was originally composed in view of an Israelite king, will be 'typically' Messianic in that it presents him under an *ideal* aspect, attributing to him an ideal rule of perfection and universality, extending to the ends of the earth, and attracting the homage of distant nations: the portrait in its entirety thus transcends that of an actual king, and depicts an *ideal* king, the father and protector of his people, the ruler worthy to command the homage of the world. It is, however, true that there are features in the Psalm that suggest a post-exilic date; in particular the names in *v.* 10 read like reminiscences of such passages as Isa. xlii. 4, 10 ('isles'), xliii. 3, lx. 6, 9;



and, as the Psalms are in their phraseology more usually dependent on the prophets than the prophets on the Psalms, there is a presumption that *v.* 8 is more probably derived from Zechariah ix. 10 than Zechariah ix. 10 from *v.* 8. Hence, as in this period there was no native king to whom *v.* 1 could refer, and a reference to a foreign ruler—such as one of the Ptolemies—is not probable, it is possible, as even Kirkpatrick (p. 417) allows, that it ‘does not refer to any particular king, but is a prayer for the establishment of the Messianic kingdom under a prince of David’s line, according to prophecy,’ a lyrical echo, in fact, of Zechariah ix. 10, and other passages of the prophets. Another possible view is that of Bätthgen, who remarks that *vv.* 12–14 state more naturally the reason for *v.* 7 than for *vv.* 8–11: accordingly he thinks that *vv.* 1–7, 12–17 formed the original Psalm, referring to one of the later kings of Judah, and that *vv.* 8–11 are an insertion made by a post-exilic poet for the purpose of imparting to the Psalm a Messianic character. Dr. Briggs’ view is similar; but he would include *v.* 17*c, d*, with its reminiscences of Genesis xii. 3 and xxii. 18, in the post-exilic additions. Upon either of these views—upon the first in the intention of the original poet, upon the second as accommodated to the conception by a later poet—it will be directly Messianic. We cannot be sure which of these three views of the original application of the Psalm is correct; but whichever be adopted, its general import will remain the same: as we have it, it is the portrait of an ideal ruler, either (1) foreshadowing, or (2 and 3) delineating directly, according to Jewish conceptions, the future ideal king, whom we call the ‘Messiah.’

S. R. DRIVER.

*THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH  
GOSPEL.*

VII. THE RESURRECTION. (2.)

THE story, of which we were speaking at the end of the preceding paper, of the appearance to the two going to Emmaus hangs together with the account of that to the disciples in Jerusalem on the evening of the same day. The two disciples had returned from Emmaus at once to Jerusalem, and had found the eleven gathered together, and them that were with them, who greeted them with the words: "The Lord is risen indeed and hath appeared to Simon." And they two rehearsed the things that happened in the way and how He was known of them in the breaking of the bread. And then, while they were talking of these things, Jesus stood in their midst. There is no mention of a *coming*—the story agrees with the corresponding account in the Fourth Gospel, which tells us that the doors were shut—Jesus stood in the midst.

Now if appearances of the Risen Jesus did take place in and near Jerusalem, the accounts of these things in the Third and Fourth Gospels are explained. If they did not, they are a mystery needing more explanation than has as yet been given. But now the question arises, why it is that in Mark and Matthew stress is laid on Galilee, and I think that perhaps it may help us here to refer to St. Paul's enumeration of appearances in 1 Corinthians xv. There we read as follows:—

"I delivered unto you, first of all, that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried; and that he hath been raised on the third day according to the scriptures; and that he appeared to Cephas; then (*εἶτα*) to the twelve; then (*ἔπειτα*) he appeared to above five hundred brethren at

once, of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep; then (*ἔπειτα*) he appeared to James; then to all the apostles; and last of all, as unto one born out of due time, he appeared to me also."

We have here the earliest written record of the appearances of the risen Lord. St. Paul's statement shows that he regarded the fact of the resurrection as based upon the evidence of those who had seen Jesus after He had risen. He claims himself to have been one of those who had seen Him, so that his witness of an appearance made to himself personally is evidence in the strict sense of the word. His statement of appearances made to others is not evidence in this same sense. It is evidence, however, that St. Paul believed these appearances to have occurred, and as we know that he had been in personal contact with James and Peter and others of the apostles—to say nothing of intercourse he may have had with some of the five hundred brethren to whom Jesus, according to him, appeared at one and the same time—we may say at least that there is a strong presumption that St. Paul had received information on this matter direct from some of those to whom, as he here states, Jesus had appeared.

We have now to ask whether the appearances thus enumerated by St. Paul are in agreement substantially with those given in the Gospels, and to inquire whether the Apostle's words throw any light on the emphasis laid, in the first two Gospels, on an appearance in Galilee.

We observe that St. Paul says nothing about the time and place of these appearances. We know from elsewhere that the appearance to himself took place in the neighbourhood of Damascus, but that detail finds no place here, nor does he locate or date the other appearances which he here enumerates; but his use of the words *εἶτα* and *ἔπειτα* implies that the sequence is a chronological one.

He tells first of an appearance to Cephas or Peter. This agrees with a casual statement made by St. Luke, from whom also we learn of this appearance ; for when the two disciples returned to Jerusalem from Emmaus they were greeted with the words : "The Lord is risen indeed and hath appeared to Simon."

Then to the twelve. This appearance is to be identified with that recorded by St. Luke and St. John as taking place on the evening of the first Easter day—an appearance which, as we learn from St. John, was repeated the following week, when Thomas, who had been absent before, was now present with his fellow-disciples.

It may, of course, be objected that St. Paul says nothing of the appearance to Mary Magdalene, nor yet of that to the two on the way to Emmaus. This does not prove that such appearances did not take place, nor does it show that St. Paul did not know of them. He may be thinking more particularly of those who were to be in a special way witnesses of the resurrection.

Then he appeared to above five hundred brethren at once. Of this appearance we should not have known but for this statement of St. Paul, and it may seem surprising that it should not be mentioned in the Gospels. Ought not this to have been the crowning proof of the resurrection, seeing that the appearance was made not to one, nor to a few, but to so many at once ? And we cannot help asking where this appearance took place. Some may say that it is useless to attempt to decide such a question, as we are not told. But may it not well be that this appearance to more than five hundred brethren at once took place in Galilee ? Is not Galilee, in fact, the most likely scene of the event ? Jesus had many Galilean followers, and it may well be that they had been specially invited to gather themselves together to behold Him. Indeed, I believe that we have here the key



to the emphasis laid upon Galilee in the post-resurrection accounts in Mark and Matthew. The message to *the disciples generally*, as distinguished from the apostles particularly, was to meet in Galilee where they should see the risen Jesus. The place of meeting would be an appointed one, most probably on a mountain (St. Matt. xxviii. 16).

The First Gospel speaks of the *eleven disciples* going into Galilee, "unto the mountain where Jesus had appointed them. And when they saw him, they worshipped him but some doubted." May we not have here again substantial truth but not perfect accuracy of statement? It seems impossible to explain the doubts of the apostles if they had already seen Jesus in Jerusalem, but if those who doubted were some of the large number of brethren to whom Jesus simultaneously appeared, is not the doubting easily explained?

May not then the mountain in Galilee have been the appointed meeting-place of the large body of the Galilean followers of Jesus, who there revealed Himself to them according to a promise already given, a promise which had called them together? This seems to me very likely. I cannot but regard the last chapter of Matthew as very fragmentary; and if we are to reduce the history of these things to a consistent whole, we must fit in the information we have from other sources. That there was a special message sent to the disciples to go to Galilee, where Jesus would meet them, seems clear from Mark and Matthew. The statement of St. Paul that Jesus appeared to above five hundred brethren at once enables us to interpret that message as addressed to the disciples at large. By obedience to it they were brought into the circle of favoured ones to whom this appearance was vouchsafed.

Nor need we assume that there was only one appearance in Galilee, though probably there was only one to the disciples in general. The last chapter of St. John tells of an

appearance to certain of the apostles at the Sea of Galilee, and the story of it is too circumstantially told to be lightly dismissed as unhistorical.

We now return to St. Paul's statement. After the appearance to the more than five hundred brethren he tells of an appearance to James. Of this we learn nothing from the Gospels. But then we must remember that the appearance to Peter is only casually introduced in St. Luke. Then he speaks of an appearance to all the apostles. This may very well have been the last appearance before the Ascension, for we see from the Acts that Jesus made clear to His disciples that they were not to expect to continue to see Him with their bodily eyes. He seems to have parted from them finally by an Ascension—not a simple vanishing—so that they learnt by this acted parable to lift their hearts heavenward, and not to expect a repetition of the appearances which had been granted to them during the forty days.

We may then sum up by saying that there seems to be substantial agreement between the summary given by St. Paul of appearances of the risen Jesus and the accounts contained in the Gospels, if we take account of their record of appearances both in Jerusalem and in Galilee. It is a mistake to suppose that the earliest tradition knew nothing of appearances in Jerusalem but only in Galilee. And it may well be that the special emphasis laid on an appearance in Galilee in Matthew (and presumably in Mark too) is to be explained by the fact that Galilee was the scene of the appearance to the large body of the disciples. Something must have called together those more than five hundred to whom, according to St. Paul, Jesus had appeared at one time. That something might well have been a message from the lips of Jesus that He would appear upon one of the mountains of Galilee.

And the bearing of all this upon our immediate subject,

the historical value of the Fourth Gospel, is this. There is nothing whatever therein contained about the post-resurrection appearances which in any way conflicts with the other Gospels taken in conjunction with St. Paul and interpreted comprehensively. St. John never intended to tell the whole story of all the appearances of the risen Jesus. This he says expressly. I can see no reason to doubt that what he does record is a faithful reproduction of the facts as they would be indelibly impressed on the mind of one who had had his share of experience in these events of such stupendous interest and importance.

And it must be borne in mind that if exception be taken to the contents of the twentieth chapter of St. John on the ground that the appearances there recorded take place in Jerusalem, then the same exception must be taken to St. Luke xxiv. as unhistorical. And this would be a serious conclusion to reach in regard to one whose claims as a historian stand so high.

It has been urged as an objection to our Gospel that the writer represents the bestowal of the Holy Spirit as being made on the first Easter Day, when he records that the risen Jesus breathed on His disciples and said to them: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." But as our Evangelist does not record any events subsequent to the ascension, we cannot conclude from this statement that he meant to imply that there was no further outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost. I fail to see why it should be supposed that the action of Jesus which St. John here notes should exclude the later Pentecostal effusion.

Finally, objection has been taken to the account of the miraculous draught of fishes in the last chapter of the Gospel, it being said that this is simply based on St. Luke's account of a similar occurrence early in the ministry of Jesus. But why may there not have been a repetition of this occurrence ?

We gather from St. Luke's narrative that the miraculous draught which he records was intended to be a speaking parable to the fishermen of Galilee. For he reports the words of Jesus to Simon Peter : " Fear not ; from henceforth thou shalt catch men." Surely there is nothing impossible or even improbable that, now that the time had come for the fulfilment of this promise, the Lord should have repeated the sign, when these disciples had returned to their occupation of fishing in the interval between their return to Galilee after the Passover and their next going up to Jerusalem to observe Pentecost. It has long ago been pointed out that there is a very significant difference between the two cases. On the first occasion we are told that the nets were breaking ; on the second it is expressly said that though the fish were so many the net was not rent. On the first occasion the disciples were being called to be prepared for a work which would at a later time be imposed upon them, but for which they were as yet unready and unfit ; but on the occasion of the second miraculous draught the time of preparation was over ; they were even now to become fishers of men.

While, then, I confess that I am distrustful of the duplication of an event told in a different way by two writers, because I believe that such duplication proceeds too often from an impatience with difference of detail when substantial agreement is all that maybe expected, I am of opinion that in this case the events, recorded by St. Luke and St. John, are not the same, though they have features in common. The whole story told in the last chapter of St. John is altogether too circumstantial and detailed to be interpreted otherwise than as a genuine occurrence. It is all easily explained if the things happened as they are said to have happened, and if St. John is the author of the Gospel. I cannot see that it can be satisfactorily explained otherwise.

E. H. ASKWITH.



THE CHRIST OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

IV.

IN the preceding paper the significance of the 'hour' in the narrative of the marriage of Cana of Galilee was discussed. Another leading passage where the same idea occurs is (2) vii. 1-14.<sup>1</sup> There the brethren of Jesus are represented as urging Him to enter upon a public manifestation at Jerusalem "in order that thy disciples<sup>2</sup> may behold the works which thou doest." The occasion is the Feast of Tabernacles. In His reply (v. 6) Jesus uses the word *καιρός* instead of *ώρα*, and here only in this Gospel. The only possible distinction seems to be that *καιρός* emphasises rather the subjective human side, and *ώρα* the objective divine side of the Providence or Will of God. Again, while the word means, "the time appointed for my going up by God," in the immediate context, it also carries with it the thought of His death. At the same time, whatever wider meaning may lie in the expression,<sup>3</sup> the point here is that Jesus, as always, cannot act except when God has indicated to Him the proper moment for action. "I go not up unto this feast, because my time is not yet fulfilled." (Cf. Abbott, *Johannine Grammar*, 2264). Jesus remains in Galilee, and afterwards goes up to the feast *οὐ φανερώς ἀλλ' ἐν κρυπτῷ*. He does not appear to have taken part in the whole feast.

<sup>1</sup> I am aware that this passage has been much discussed in connexion with recent partition theories of the Gospel, notably by Wellhausen, *Ev. Johannis*, p. 34. The attempt is made to explain the apparent contradictions by editorial interference. Verses 3, 4 are: "Felsblöcken, die einsam aus des Deluvielschicht hervorragen. Sie lassen sich zudem was vorhergeht und nachfolgt in kein Verhältnis bringen" (p. 35).

<sup>2</sup> Considerable difficulty is created by *οἱ μαθηταὶ σου*. The whole point of the request is that there should be a *public* manifestation. Wellhausen here again sees the editorial hand, and suggests that the real subject of *θεωρήσουσιν* is to be supplied from *εἰς τὴν Ἰουδαίαν* (op. cit., p. 34). Cf. *φανερώσον σεαυτὸν τῷ κόσμῳ* in v. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Johannis*, p. 153.

An interesting question is raised in connexion with this incident and that in ii. 1-21. Is Jesus represented as all along intending to perform the act suggested, or does He really alter His resolution? Does He from the first intend to provide wine for the assembled company, or to go up to the feast, or does He wait until some indication of God's will has made it possible for Him to do so, although at first He felt He must not, and therefore would not? It seems possible to save the picture of Jesus from mere artificiality, if not worse, only by adopting the second view. The 'time' for His brethren to act is always ready. They have no higher calling to fulfil, and it is open to them to go up to the feast whenever the day comes round. Not so with Jesus. Outward events do not alone determine His action. He fulfils a higher calling, and must on all occasions wait for God's sign, for "what he sees the Father do." No claim of human affection, however strong, must determine His action. In both instances that is set aside, and the act is performed at the moment indicated by God. In this sense Jesus does alter His resolution. In every act concerning His higher calling He forms no resolution until the Father's will has been made plain to Him. This is one of the human characteristics of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel.

(3) The same feature is met with in the case of the delay before the Raising of Lazarus, and the other circumstances are curiously similar. It is worthy of note that verses 5 and 6 in chapter xi. are connected by *οὕτως*. "Now Jesus loved Martha, and her sisters and Lazarus. Accordingly (*οὕτως*) when he heard that he was sick, then he remained two days in the place where he was." Perhaps *οὕτως* has scarcely its full force of "therefore" here (see Abbott, *Johannine Grammar*, in loc.). Here again we have, set side by side, the strong claim that His affectionate relationship with the family at Bethany made upon Jesus, and the action of One

who could not move save at the bidding of God: "Behold, he whom thou lovest is sick." We are not told explicitly how the will of God is disclosed to Him. No doubt it is meant that the medium was prayer. It is strange how critical prejudice can blind interpreters of the Fourth Gospel to the perfectly naïve account of the mental process of Jesus on this occasion. He is at first represented as regarding the sickness as "not unto death." Lazarus will recover, and His whole action with regard to his illness must be governed by the Divine purpose. The sickness is "for the glory of God, that the Son of God might be glorified thereby" (v. 4). Then after two days' delay, Jesus goes to Jerusalem. The critical nature of the step is reflected in the remonstrance of the disciples (v. 8). Like Jesus Himself, they understand that the journey may end in death, but the Father has indicated His will. Jesus walks 'in the day.' For Him, upon the outward events of life there shines "the light of the world," or the will of God. "If a man walk in the night, he stumbleth, because the light is not in him" (verse 10). Afterwards on the way, as though by some Divine insight, Jesus tells the disciples that Lazarus is dead. The whole narrative, verses 1-16, is a tender, realistic, and very human picture of One whose steps each day are directed by a Light that belongs to a higher world. It is a scene descriptive of the simple and childlike piety of Jesus. Nothing could really be further removed from the influence of dogmatic presupposition, unless it be regarded as such to imply that Jesus is One who is in perfect and sinless accord with the will of God, as it is revealed to Him from hour to hour. There lurks here no mere 'Logos' conception of His Person. "Our Evangelist depicts Jesus from beginning to end frankly as a scholar who is learning all the time in relation to his Life's calling, as the Servant who waits upon the sign of the will of God, and as the Son

who seeks the knowledge of His Father's will in Prayer. He finds nothing to disconcert in the fact that Jesus altered His purposes and resolutions regarding His individual action in accordance with a gradual instruction and direction received from above. Such an alteration takes place in a few moments in ii. 3-8. In the present instance (vii. 1-14) there are days of waiting, on whose expiry Jesus does what formerly He had refused to do. Essentially it is not otherwise with the two days of distant waiting in xi. 6. It is out of place to say that Jesus was in error in any of these instances. We can only say that He did not yet know at the first what God meant Him to do. At the proper moment this ignorance gives place to the requisite knowledge. . . . What failed Him, when He so spoke, was the certainty as to what He ought to do in spite of such knowledge as He had, and how, without such certainty, He could and would do nothing." (Zahn, *Das Evangelium Johannis*, pp. 374-5.)

Enough has perhaps been said to throw light upon the idea that underlies the 'hour' of Jesus in this Gospel. In no sense can Jesus be said to fix His own hour, to control His own destiny. At the same time the Evangelist is always concerned to show that Jesus is never the victim of circumstances. During the "twelve hours" of the day He is entirely free from danger, and entirely free to act, in so far as God makes His will plain to Him. So far from giving us a picture of Jesus aloof from human experience, He is Himself the highest and most perfect example of faith. We have not been concerned with these instances, such as the man at Bethesda, ill for thirty-eight years, where there may be, as even Dr. Sanday admits, "a certain heightening of the effect." No mention has been made of the difficulties connected with the Figure of Jesus as Debater in the dialogue with the Jews. No account has been taken of the extent to which the Discourses, and many of the ideas



about the Person of Jesus they contain, are indebted to the transfiguring faith of a later time. Little consideration has been given to the question, once more coming into prominence in the work of Wellhausen, Bousset and others, of the Partition theories of the Gospel. The aim of these papers has been solely to emphasise an aspect, and that, too, a governing aspect, of the Fourth Gospel, which runs great danger of neglect. It is the aspect of the true humanity that everywhere underlies quite as clearly as in the Synoptics, the portrait of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel.

R. H. STRACHAN.

### STUDIES IN THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT.

#### II. THE "COMPLETION" OF THE LAW.

IN Luke vi. 27 after the Beatitude on those who shall be reproached, and the corresponding deprecation of popularity, the Speaker continues: "But to you that hear I say: Love your enemies, do well to those that hate you, bless those that curse you, pray for those that insult you." In Matthew v. 43, 44 the same maxim occurs, but in the following form: "Ye have heard how it was said: Thou shalt love thy neighbour and mayest hate thine enemy. But I say unto you: Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you."

Thus LS; CS and PS alter the form *thou shalt* or *thou mayest* into the imperative "Love [for] thy neighbour and hate [for] thy enemy." The purpose of this alteration<sup>1</sup> is to substitute a reference to the Peshitta of the Old Testament for one to the LXX. For the first words of the quotation occur in Leviticus xix. 18 Pesh. in the form represented by CS and PS. On the other hand, LS corresponds with the Greek. Further, CS adds after "it was said" the

<sup>1</sup> Unless the alteration is in the other direction; but this seems unlikely.

words "to [or by] the ancients"; and JS, which restores the Greek form of the quotation, adds "unto you."

Under these changes we can read a great deal. The text *thou shalt love thy neighbour and mayest hate thine enemy* occurred nowhere. The first half, however, could be identified from the LXX of Leviticus xix. 18. The question then arose, By whom or when was all this said? CS replies "of old," i.e. by Moses. JS replies "to you," i.e. by the Rabbis of your time.

The quotation, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" is so familiar that it may seem a paradox to say that it occurs nowhere in the Hebrew Old Testament, and belongs to the LXX, where it is a mistranslation;<sup>1</sup> yet this is the fact, and it can further be proved that the Palestinian exegesis knew of no such text. The Hebrew words mean, "Thou shalt love *for thy neighbour* as [for] thyself"<sup>2</sup>; they cannot mean anything else. However, their actual sense is less important to us than their interpretation in Palestine. Ibn Ezra construes them rightly; he, however, was a great scholar. So does his great predecessor of the ninth century, R. Saadyah Gaon.<sup>3</sup> His translation is almost identical with that of the Prophet MOHAMMED, and this is a very great advantage; for, on the one hand, we can produce an independent French translation of the Prophet's words, on the other we can quote the comments of native Arabic scholars so as to show how they understood them. This

<sup>1</sup> In the Syriac version of Eccles. vii. 16 occurs the clause לֹא תִרְחַם נַפְשְׁךָ מִנְּשֵׂא דְעַמְךָ, "love not thyself more than the men that are with thee," or "than the men of thy people." This, however, is merely a mistranslation of the original, correctly rendered in the Greek *μη προσλογίζου σεαυτὸν ἐν πλῆθει ἁμαρτωλῶν*, Heb. אַל תַּחֲחִיב בְּקֹהַל מְרַעִים (made up of Psalms i. 1; xxvi. 5; and Numbers xxiii. 9). The Syriac read either תַּחֲחִיב or תַּחֲחַב. The sense then seemed to be "do not love yourself in the congregation more than friends."

<sup>2</sup> וְאַהֲבַת לְרֵעֶךָ כְּמוֹךָ.

<sup>3</sup> *توب لصا حيك ما توب لنفسك*. So the printed edition; the Bodleian MSS. vary greatly.

is how M. Houdas renders them :<sup>1</sup> *Aucun de vous n'aura vraiment la foi s'il ne désire pour son prochain ce qu'il désire pour lui-même.* The commentator Nawāwī says this means<sup>2</sup> “ he must desire for his brother [or neighbour] such pious acts and such permissible objects as he desires for himself.” Another commentator<sup>3</sup> says, “ loves or desires goods of this world and the next.”

From the Prophet Mohammed we go back to the oral tradition of the Jews. That the ordinary rendering is a mistranslation can be seen by the ghastly results which it produces ; so J. Levy renders a passage of B. *Sanhedrin*, “ Love thy neighbour as thyself : i.e., choose for him a seemly death.”<sup>4</sup> A strange way of exhibiting affection ! What the Rabbi there cited asserts is that “ Love for thy neighbour ” means “ Choose for thy neighbour ”—a very different proposition. If you have to choose between deaths, then choose for some one else as you would in a similar case choose for yourself. In another place the interesting question is discussed whether a son who medically bleeds his father is liable to the death penalty for “ smiting ” his father. The answer is in the negative, on the ground that “ thou shalt love for thy neighbour as for thyself ”<sup>5</sup> ; which Rashi rightly explains as meaning that Israel are only forbidden to do to their neighbours what they would not do to themselves. Substitute “ love thy neighbour ” for “ love for thy neighbour,” and the application will be obscure. There is a salutary counsel to men not to betrothe themselves to women whom they have not

<sup>1</sup> El-Bokhari, i. 13 (*Publications de l'Ecole des langues Orientales vivantes, iv. série, tome 3*). The Arabic words are : حتى يحب لجاره (or اغيه). ما يحب لنفسه

<sup>2</sup> Margin of Kastalani, ed. 6, i. 330.

<sup>3</sup> On Ibn Majah, i. 19.

<sup>4</sup> *Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch*, iii. 109.

<sup>5</sup> B. *Sanhedrin*, 84b.

seen ; “ possibly he may see some flaw in her, and she will be displeasing to him ; and the Scripture says, ‘ Love, etc.’ ” Where J. Levy deals with the word rendered “ displeasing,” he translates it “ seem ugly to him ”<sup>1</sup> ; but where he renders the whole passage, he translates “ be hated by him,” thinking that the application is, “ if you find your fiancée ugly you may hate her ; and you are told to love your neighbour as yourself.” But this is not the application, for, as Maimonides<sup>2</sup> observes, you have the option of *divorcing* her (to which, as Merx has noticed, there is an allusion in Matthew i. 19 : by Jewish law a fiancée can be divorced no less than a wife). If, then, the danger lay in *hating* any woman who was ugly, the only expedient would be to have all women veiled. The application, then, is, “ do as you would be done by ” ; by betrothing yourself to a woman whom you have not seen, you incur the danger of wounding some one’s feelings—hers (or, more probably, her father’s), if, when you see her, you find the marriage cannot take place.

The text was construed in the right way by R. Akiba, who called it, as it is called in the Gospel, “ a Great Principle of the Law,” meaning, “ do not to others what you dislike yourself.”<sup>3</sup> But even in pre-Christian times it was interpreted in the same way by Ben-Sira, whose evidence is all the more conclusive, because he quotes the *first* commandment of the Law in the familiar form, only accommodated as usual to his nine syllables with three beats (vii. 30) ; “ with whole might love thy maker.”<sup>4</sup> But his paraphrase of the *second* commandment of the Law is very different (xxxiv. 15) : “ Guess your neighbour’s tastes by your own ” ; that this is a comment on Leviticus xix. 18 is

<sup>1</sup> *L.c.* i. 347 ; cf. iv. 250. The phrase is תתגנה עליו

<sup>2</sup> *Ishūth*, iii. 19.

<sup>3</sup> *Sifra*, ad loc.

<sup>4</sup> Evidently בכל עו אהב את עושך.



shown by the note in *Sifra* on xix. 34, where the same (Hebrew) idiom occurs: "thou shalt love for him [the stranger] as for thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." This means, says the Halachic commentary, "know what the soul of strangers is like, because ye were strangers yourselves." If the words cited in the note be compared, the justice of this inference will scarcely be doubted.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, it may be observed that if the commandment of love had been recognised as a Great Commandment of the Law, it could not be called a *new commandment*, given first by Christ Himself (John xiii. 34).

It is clear, then, that the commandment to love one's enemies could not have been either a "completion" or an "abrogation" of this text, which is only intelligible if it be cited in full; the person who so applied it must have been no Palestinian. And even had the text been used in Palestine in the sense required, still the inference "you may hate your enemy" could not have been drawn from it; (1) because the Rabbinic logic is after all logic, and the inference which might be drawn is not that you may hate others, but that you need not love them; (2) because the word "neighbour" can scarcely be interpreted of *personal* friends, but refers to Israelites, or at least fellow-tribesmen.

There is, however, a verse in the neighbourhood which will serve the purpose better, xix. 17: "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou mayest reprove thy neighbour." On the latter part of the verse we possess the comments of Ben-Sira (xix. 13, 14); and the question how many times a neighbour may be reprovèd before he is considered incorrigible is discussed in Matthew xviii. 22 as well

<sup>1</sup> *Eccelus. νόει τὰ τοῦ πλησίον ἐκ σεαυτοῦ. Syr. דעו דחברך איך די לך. Sifra, 91a, דעו נפשן של גרים.*

as by the Rabbis. That the variation between "brother" and "neighbour" [a different word from the neighbour of verse 19] attracted attention in early times may well be believed. The suggestion that "brother" meant personal friend is made by Ben-Sira, who quotes the verse (xxxvii. 26) in a context that leaves no doubt on the subject.

Two Rabbinic comments on this text are preserved. The words "thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart" admit of the emphasis being laid on either the *brother* or the *heart*. In the Halachic commentary the second view is taken: "*in thy heart*, otherwise we might have thought it meant 'do not curse, smite, or buffet him.'" The former view is preserved in a discussion on the phrase "the ass of thy hater" in Exodus xxiii. 5<sup>1</sup>: "the *hater* referred to is an Israelite, not a Gentile hater. But is one permitted to *hate* in the former case? Is it not written, 'thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart'?" Clearly, then, some persons inferred that it was lawful to hate one who was not a "brother," whatever sense might be assigned that word.

It was noticed above (p. 48) that there seems to have been some uncertainty whether the word rendered "hate" might not also be rendered "reproach"; and of this there is further evidence.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps in the gloss quoted, where "hate" is said to suggest "curse," there is an allusion to this. This takes us back to verse 21, a passage not found in Luke: "Ye have heard how it was said by [or 'to'] the ancients: *thou shalt not kill, and whosoever killeth shall be answerable to a court.*" This quotation is a combination of Exodus xx. 13 with Numbers xxxv. 12, where we read, "The murderer shall not be slain till he have stood before

<sup>1</sup> B. *Pesahim*, 113b.

<sup>2</sup> See Schleusner, *Lex. Vet. Test.* s.v. ὀνειδίτω. Cp. *Thesaurus Syriacus*, s.v. אִינִי.

the congregation for judgment." The Halachic commentary on Exodus<sup>1</sup> naturally combines the two passages. In Matthew v. 22, 23 it is argued that he who reviles his brother must also be answerable to a court or *assembly* (rightly rendered in the Syriac versions; wrongly in the Greek by *synedrion*). The steps appear to be the following. "He that hateth his brother is a murderer." This precept is quoted by St. John (1 iii. 15), though it is perhaps not found in the Oral Tradition. It is based on the story of Cain,<sup>2</sup> and probably of Joseph and his brethren, and possibly of Absalom. Every murderer is to be tried by a court (Numbers xxxv. 12). The verb "to hate" also means to revile; and this includes such phrases as "Raka" and "Fool." Thus there is a Mishnah which defines what expressions come under the terms "vow" and "oath."

Of all this the same seems to hold good as of the "spurious" beatitudes; the teaching is after the style of that of the Scribes, by reasoning which they would have employed or approved. But the part of the teaching which Luke preserves is not after the style of the Scribes; it is not deduced by logic from Holy Scripture, but is a new principle authoritatively formulated.

We may now turn to the preface to the teaching which Matthew gives. V. 17 (LS): "Think not that I am come to abrogate the Law or the Prophets; I came not to abrogate, but to fill them." (CS, "to abrogate them," etc.; PS, omits "them" in both places.) Merx has an interesting and ingenious discussion on the readings of LS and the other Syriac versions here, but its results appear to be unsound. The verse that follows reads in LS: "For Amen I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass away, not one Jod (letter) shall pass from the Law till all shall be." CS and

<sup>1</sup> *Mechilta*, ed. Weiss, p. 86a.

<sup>2</sup> By כִּנְיָנוֹ reasoning. See Schwarz, *der hermeneutische Syllogismus*.

PS omit "letter" and add "or one stroke" (using different words). JS alters somewhat: "shall pass from the Law or the Prophets till all be done." JS makes it clear that it understands by "fill" *fulfil*; and it lays stress on the *Prophets*, because we think of prophecy being fulfilled in a different sense from that in which a law is fulfilled. The interpretation of LS, etc., is rather that "fill" means *complete*; and since it is the Law which permits of supplement rather than the Prophets, these authorities lay stress on the *Law*. Finally, PS, like the Greek, leaves us our choice between these two widely different interpretations.

Luke has not the first of these verses, but gives the second in a very different context (xvi. 16, 17): "The Law and the Prophets were till John; from that time the Kingdom of God is preached and every one forces himself into it. And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than that a single stroke of the Law should pass away"; so LS and PS; CS fails; HS with the Greek "should fall"; JS fails. The verses in Luke *appear* to involve a contradiction: The Law and the Prophets were until John; consequently they were not *after* or *since* John. Yet it would be easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for the Law to pass away, even the most trifling atom of it! What this proposition means must be something quite different; something that is not even an exaggeration, but a truth that every one must recognise; viz., that a *Law of God* cannot pass away; a law in that sense (a law of nature), whether great or small—supposing it were possible to distinguish—could not be annulled without the whole universe dissolving. Hence we find the Syriac versions rightly hesitate between the Greek and Jewish words for Law. The Jewish word should have been used with the first sentence, the Greek with the second.

This tremendous proposition, which is nothing less than



the substitution of scientific morality for sacred Codes, was clearly too hard for the school represented by Matthew. The absolutely true proposition that the Laws of God must be conterminous with the existence of the universe has to be adapted to the identification of the Law of God with the Torah and the Prophets; and reconciled to the fact that the new legislation dealt ruthlessly with the precepts of the latter. One method of dealing with the difficulty was to identify the new legislation with the practice of the Scribes, who fully believed in the literal inviolability of the Torah, yet perpetually added to it. This process was called—at any rate at a later time—*Gemārā*, or completing. As the example reconstructed shows, it involved no abrogation of any precept, but only interpretation and application. Hence it was deemed desirable to enucleate the great precept “love your enemies” out of precepts of the Torah, and we see part of the process. Some of it must have been done by Palestinians, others by persons who only knew the LXX.

The saying about the eternity of the Law, correctly recorded by Luke, was made to mean that the Law could not be abrogated till it had been completed. Another suggestion was that it could not be abrogated until it had all been fulfilled; and yet a third laid stress on the Prophets, and, supposing that the Law was prophetic also (being a system of types), held that all had to be *realised*, but could not pass away till such realisation had taken place. The trivial alterations of the Syriac texts reflect all these different ideas.

Finally, the variations in the rendering of the “stroke” take us once more into the laboratory. What is meant by “a stroke” of the Law? The smallest letter, replies LS, i.e. the *yod* or “jot.” CS gives us both text and comment—only in inverted order—“one letter *yod* or one stroke”; and finally PS (with the Greek) has “one *yod*

or one stroke." And the Church has puzzled long as to the nature of the stroke to which reference is made.

That Christ abrogated the Jewish Law is a historical fact, unaffected by the question whether He executed every precept, realised every type, or supplemented every gap—supposing that any of these propositions were tenable. Mohammed puts into His mouth the words, "I have come acknowledging the Law which was before Me, and to make lawful for you some of those things which were forbidden you." <sup>1</sup> Mohammed was fabricating when he dictated this, but in a manner which in ancient (and to some extent even in modern) times was regarded as legitimate—putting into words what he genuinely believed to have been his Subject's thoughts. Carlyle does not shrink from doing the same even when he declares that "in all this History one jot or tittle of untruth that we could render true is perhaps not discoverable." Mohammed's view of Christ's work was based on his observation of Christian practice; in the matter of food and sacred days, the Christian of his time was far freer than the Jew. No moral stigma attaches to the person who interpreted that work as "Matthew" interprets it, although it is clear that that interpretation is as erroneous as Mohammed's.

But one other result is of some interest, viz., that between the actual reporters and the Editor of the Gospel many intermediaries must have had a place. For as has been seen, the comment whereby the maxim "Love your enemies" is evolved is applied to a wrong text, by some one familiar with the LXX only. But the application of the maxim to a text at all must be the work of some one acquainted with the Hebrew text and with the Rabbinic logic. And the loss of the right text and substitution of the wrong one probably belong to a reporter intermediate between these.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

<sup>1</sup> Kur'an, iii. 44.

## SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.

### II.

#### SIN AS MORAL TRANSGRESSION—THE PRIMARY CERTAINTIES.

A FIRST aspect in which sin appears to the natural conscience, likewise in Scripture, is as *transgression of moral law*. "Every one that doeth sin," says St. John, "doeth also lawlessness (*ἀνομία*), and sin is lawlessness."<sup>1</sup> "Sin," says St. Paul, "is not imputed where there is no law."<sup>2</sup> Hence the common description of sin as "transgression" (*παράβασις*)—"Where there is no law, neither is there transgression"<sup>3</sup>—"trespass" (*παράπτωμα*),<sup>4</sup> "stumbling,"<sup>5</sup> "going astray."<sup>6</sup> The generic name for sin, *ἁμαρτία*, a missing of the mark, points in the same direction, with special glance at the moral end (cf. Rom. iii. 23).<sup>7</sup>

It was observed in the previous paper that "law," in the Christian sense, cannot be divorced from the idea of God, as, in Lotze's phrase, the "Highest Good Personal." But man, as made in the rational and moral image of God, recognises law in his own conscience: even the heathen, as St. Paul says, "not having the law, are the law unto themselves, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them."<sup>8</sup>

On this subject certain preliminary remarks fall to be made. The question will then have to be faced—Is not

<sup>1</sup> 1 John iii. 4.   <sup>2</sup> Rom. v. 13.   <sup>3</sup> Rom. iv. 15; cf. Jas. ii. 9, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Rom. v. 15, 17, etc.   <sup>5</sup> Jas. ii. 10; iii. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Isa. liii. 6; Jer. l. 6; 2 Pet. ii. 15, etc.

<sup>7</sup> The chief Old Testament terms corresponding to the above are well represented in Ps. xxxii. 1, 2, 5 (cf. Exod. xxxiv. 7)—*חַטָּאת*, transgression; *פְּשָׁע*, coming short of the mark; *יָצָא*, a perversion, a misdeed, iniquity.

<sup>8</sup> Rom. ii. 14, 15.

modern thought in open conflict with the Christian conceptions of moral law, and of man's obligations under it? It may sound strangely to some that such a question should need to be raised, but no one familiar with the literature of the day will doubt that the need is not only there, but is urgent.

On the positive or Christian side, the following positions will probably command general assent :—

1. Moral law implies, as its necessary correlate, the *moral being*. From its nature, the conception of the "ought"—in which morality may be said to centre—can only arise in a rational agent, capable of setting before himself ends, and of contemplating alternatives, distinguished in moral quality, either of which, in the exercise of choice, he can adopt. As elements in the constitution of the moral agent may therefore be recognised—(1) Capability of moral *knowledge*—perception of moral distinctions, of right and wrong, good and evil, with recognition of the *obligation* which the perception of the right imposes on the will; (2) Capacity of moral *affections* and *emotions* (approval and disapproval, etc.); (3) Possession of a measure of *self-determining freedom*. It is not, however, simply in the sphere of conduct (action) that obligation is realised. Even more fundamentally, certain qualities of character are recognised as good or evil—as having moral value.<sup>1</sup> Moral law prescribes to the agent at once what he ought to *be*, and what he ought to *do*; and sin arises from shortcoming or disobedience in either respect.

2. A second consideration is that, as respects content,

<sup>1</sup> Hence the distinction that may be noted in ethical schools—some preferring to speak of moral *law* (e.g., Kant), others of moral *values* (Lotze, Ritschl); some dwelling on the rectitude (conformity to rule) of *actions*, others on the beauty or amiability of virtuous *character*—the "jural" and "aesthetic" standpoints respectively, as they may be called. The moral "ought" includes both the ought to *be* as well as the ought to *do*.



moral law has the implication of *absolute moral values*. While law has relation to God as its Source and Upholder, this in no wise means that it does not embody the idea of an essential right and wrong. God does not create moral values. He Himself is the absolutely Perfect One,<sup>1</sup> in whom the Good has its eternal ground. What God wills is not, as Occam thought, good because He wills it, but He wills it because it is good. This idea of a right and wrong which neither God nor man can make or unmake—which the enlightened conscience is capable of discerning when presented to it—lies at the foundation of a true Christian ethics, and of every Christian view of sin. It is an idea not disproved by anything that can be urged on the gradual growth of moral conceptions, or the aberrations of undisciplined or low-grade minds—a subject to be dealt with afterwards.<sup>2</sup> It is the higher here that must judge the lower, not the lower the higher. The ordinary conscience will confirm the assertion that good and evil are not terms that can be changed at will: that even God could not, e.g., set up falsehood, and treachery, and cruelty, on the throne of the universe, and say, These are the virtues to be extolled and worshipped; or cast down love, and purity, and justice, and say, These are vices to be abhorred and spurned.<sup>3</sup> There is, as Carlyle would say, an everlasting “Yea” which affirms itself in goodness: it is Mephistopheles who boasts: “I am the spirit that evermore denies.”<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Matt. v. 48; Mark x. 18: “None is good save One, even God.”

<sup>2</sup> See the valuable remarks in Dr. Rashdall's *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 63 pp.

<sup>3</sup> David Hume's singular contention: “If nature had so pleased, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annexed to love, and of happiness to hatred” (*Dissertation of Passions*, Works, II. p. 112), is fitly paralleled by the suggestion approved by Mr. J. S. Mill of a conceivable world in which two and two make five! (*Exam. of Hamilton*, p. 69).

<sup>4</sup> “Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint” (Goethe, *Faust*).

Good and evil are thus, in their essential nature, opposites. This does not imply that, in the moral relations in which human beings stand to one another and to God, there may not be *positive* commands as well—injunctions, “statutes,” which it is wrong, in relation to God, sin, to disobey. Such, in certain of their aspects, are civil and political laws. Such are the commands which a parent may and must impose upon his children for the direction of their conduct, in their studies, and in other ways. In the economies of religion there is a stage when the “children,” as minors, are under “rudiments.”<sup>1</sup> Still such commands are presumed to be not arbitrary, but to rest upon a moral basis, and to subserve a moral end.<sup>2</sup> If they contravene the higher—written or “unwritten”<sup>3</sup>—law of true morality, they do not bind the conscience. “We must obey God rather than man.”<sup>4</sup>

3. It is still further to be remarked that, when moral law is spoken of in this connexion with sin, the word “law” is to be taken with all the *spirituality* and *depth* of meaning which Christ’s revelation imparts to it. Only thus is it the *Christian* conception. The law in the natural conscience is much; as developed and illumined by centuries of Christian training, is more. The law in the Old Testament is more still. With all its Jewish limitations, how high does it rise, in its insistence on righteousness, above the standard of ordinary Christian aspiration and attainment even at the present hour! How changed a spectacle, e.g., would society present, if only the Jewish Ten Commandments were honestly and universally obeyed among men! “Thy com-

<sup>1</sup> Gal. iv. 3.

<sup>2</sup> It is a singular merit of Calvin that he perceived so clearly the relatively subordinate position of the ceremonial and political laws of the Jews to the Ten Commandments, in which lay the real bond of their covenant with God. (See his Preface to *Com. on the Last Four Books of Moses.*)

<sup>3</sup> “The unwritten, yet unchangeable laws of the gods.” (ἄγραπτα κασφαλῆ θεῶν νόμινα), Sophocles, *Antigone*, 454–7).

<sup>4</sup> Acts iv. 29; cf. iv. 19.

mandment is exceeding broad," said the Psalmist.<sup>1</sup> St. Paul, speaking from experience, declared : " The law is holy, and the commandment holy, and righteous, and good." <sup>2</sup> It is customary to speak slightingly of the Decalogue—the " Ten Words." " Ten Words " truly ! But look at these " Words " as they are set in the revelation of God's character and grace in the history ; regard them no longer as isolated precepts, but trace them back, as they are traced in the law,<sup>3</sup> and by Christ,<sup>4</sup> to their central principle in love to God and to one's neighbour ; view them as they dilate and expand, and flash in ever-changing lights, in the practical expositions and applications made of them ; learn, as St. Paul did, that the law they embody is not a thing of the letter, but of the spirit, touching every thought in the mind, every word spoken, every action performed—penetrating into motive and regulating affection <sup>5</sup>—and the estimate we form of their breadth and depth may become very different. It is in Christ, however, the Perfect Revealer of the spirituality of the law, and at the same time the Personal Embodiment of its holiness, that we come supremely to comprehend how vast and wide, how profound, how searching, the commandment of God is. " I am not come," said Jesus, " to destroy, but to fulfil." <sup>6</sup> The commandment is " old," but it is also " new," for it has become " true " (realised) in Him and in His people.<sup>7</sup>

These are the positions on the Christian side. What now is to be said of the conflict of modern thought with these Christian ideas ? For conflict, strong and uncompromising, there unquestionably is.

We come back here to the crucial issue—Is this whole conception of a moral law, resting on absolute moral values,

<sup>1</sup> Ps. cxix. 96.      <sup>2</sup> Rom. vii. 12.      <sup>3</sup> Deut. vi. 5 ; Lev. xix. 18.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. xxii. 37-40 ; Mark xii. 29-31.      <sup>5</sup> Rom. vii. 7-13.

<sup>6</sup> Matt. v. 17.      <sup>7</sup> 1 John ii. 7, 8.

on which so much is made to depend, a *valid* one? Is it not a conception disproved, left behind, rendered even ludicrously obsolete, by a sounder—a more truly scientific and philosophical—investigation of the nature and genesis of moral ideas, their connexion with the past in organic and social evolution, their relations and changing character in different races, ages, and environments? Suppose, e.g., the theistic basis of the moral law to be subverted, and the ethical character of the Power manifested in the universe to be denied. Suppose, next, the doctrine of “relativity” to be introduced into moral conceptions, and the absoluteness of moral distinctions to be negated. Suppose, again, that human morality is conceived of as a slow development from non-moral animal instincts and impulses, or is explained as a phase of social convention, changeable in the future, as it has often been changed in the past—if, indeed, it is not the express vocation of the true reformer radically to change it (Nietzsche). Suppose the idea of obligation traced to the action of natural causes (e.g., fear of punishment) which weaken or destroy its binding hold on conscience; while conscience itself is analysed, as it is by Schopenhauer—an extreme case, but hardly too extreme for our age—into such elements as “one-fifth fear of man, one-fifth superstition, one-fifth prejudice, one-fifth vanity, one-fifth custom.”<sup>1</sup> Suppose, yet again, with so many moderns, that free-will is eliminated as an illusion, and a rigorous Determinism reigns in its stead. What, in such a situation, becomes of our moral law, with its supposed sacredness, and unconditional demands? It has vanished, and with it, in current discussions, moral conceptions and traditions are thrown into the melting-pot, there to undergo transformation into one does not well know what.

<sup>1</sup> *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* (1st Edit.), p. 196 (quoted by Calderwood).



Is this description exaggerated? We should not like it to appear so. It truly, as will be shown, represents a deliberate and important trend in the responsible thinking of our age; and though nobler philosophies, and able defences from many sides, are in the field, these are often themselves weakened by a defective theistic basis, or by an element of compromise with naturalistic theories, which largely neutralise their value for an effective vindication of the Christian doctrine of sin.

Let a few of the chief points be regarded more closely.

1. The question of *Theism*, and of the divine *Holiness*, in relation to the fact of sin, is reserved for special consideration in a succeeding paper. It cannot, however, but impress a thoughtful mind how entirely the postulate of a living, holy God has disappeared from current ethical discussions, and how inadequate, where not positively subversive of a sound morality, are the conceptions substituted for it in the name of science and philosophy. One has not in view here a crude Monism—indistinguishable from a materialistic Pantheism—like that of the Jena *savant*, Haeckel, though a very perceptible current from this is found in the popular thinking and writing of the time. Mr. Spencer's agnostic absolutism, also, based on an untenable doctrine of the "unconditioned," borrowed from Hamilton and Mansel, has well-nigh passed its day of influence, or has become merged in the yet more radical absolutism of Mr. Bradley.<sup>1</sup> The elevated idealism of the Oxford Hegelians has, through stress of an inner logic, moved largely in the same direction.<sup>2</sup> The result has been that the idea of the personal God—even of Mr. Green's "Eternal Self-Conscious-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Rashdall (*Phil. and Religion*, p. 52) reproduces Mr. Bradley's epigram that Mr. Herbert Spencer has told us more about the Unknowable than the rashest of theologians has ever ventured to tell us about God.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., e.g., the criticisms in A. E. Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*, chap. ii.; A. J. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*, pt. ii. chap. ii.

ness"—is largely surrendered, and, instead, we have an Absolute—the Ground or Reality of the universe—for which good and evil, in the ordinary sense of the terms, no longer exist.

Only one or two examples need be taken, as Dr. Ellis McTaggart's recent works are a carefully-reasoned argument against the admissibility of the idea of a God in any form. "I have endeavoured to show that all finite selves are eternal, and that the Absolute is not a self."<sup>1</sup> "If the results which I have reached . . . are valid, it would seem that we have no reason to believe in the existence of a god."<sup>2</sup> It is argued that the conception is not needed either for the explanation of the world, or for human happiness.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Bradley goes deeper. For him moral distinctions disappear altogether in the abyss of the Absolute. There is but one Reality, and its being consists in experience.<sup>4</sup> Morality and religion both fall within the sphere of "appearance," and have no absolute truth. To the Absolute there is nothing either good or bad.<sup>5</sup> "Ugliness, error, and evil are all owned by, and all contribute to, the wealth of the Absolute."<sup>6</sup> "'Heaven's design,' if we may speak so, can realise itself as effectively in 'Cataline or Borgia' as in the scrupulous or innocent."<sup>7</sup> Religion, which rests on a relation of man to a God conceived of as personal, is also a self-contradictory idea.<sup>8</sup> "But if so, what, I may be asked, is the result in practice? That, I reply at once, is not my business."<sup>9</sup> Similar to this is the position in Mr. J. E. Taylor's work, *The Problem of Conduct*, which combines with Mr. Bradley's teaching elements from Nietzsche's

<sup>1</sup> *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 261.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, chaps. vii., viii.      <sup>4</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 454.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.      <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 489.      <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.      <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 446-8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450.

doctrine of the "Superman."<sup>1</sup> The closing chapter of the book, imitating Nietzsche, is entitled, "Beyond Good and Bad,"<sup>2</sup> in what sense will immediately be seen. As another example of this phase of the *Zeit-Geist*, it will be enough to allude to Mr. Karl Pearson's *Ethic of Free Thought*. "Religion" to this writer, "is law."<sup>3</sup> "Hence the indifference of the true free-thinker to the question of the existence or non-existence of a personal god. . . . To repeat Buddha's words, 'Trouble yourselves not about the gods. If, like the frogs or the Jews, who would have a king, we insist on having a god, then let us call the universe, with its great system of unchangeable law, god—even as Spinoza.'"<sup>4</sup>

It should be noted that, in the view of all these writers, as of a crowd of others, no ground is left for belief in immortality<sup>5</sup>—of which more anon.

2. The one effective answer to these subversions of the ethical character of the Supreme is in the certainty of the moral Ideal, which, with its unchanging values, points, as already said, to a Source beyond the finite consciousness. It has rightly been esteemed Kant's outstanding merit to have emphasised the unconditional character of the moral "imperative"—the "Thou shalt" of duty; as it was Butler's to have exalted the distinctive "authority" of conscience. But the moral ideal also, no less than the

<sup>1</sup> "This was the great and imperishable service of Nietzsche to ethical philosophy. However far we may be from recognising in Nietzsche's rather unamiable heroes our own ideal human being, we may at least say that ethics seems to have said the last word in the command to live for the 'Overman'" (*Prob. of Conduct*, p. 410).

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Taylor would seem since to have somewhat modified his position. To compare the above really "antinomian" view (cf. p. 480) with St. Paul's doctrine of justification by faith (pp. 432-6, 479), is absurd.

<sup>3</sup> *Ethic of Freethought*, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>5</sup> Dr. McTaggart, while rejecting all ordinary arguments for immortality, holds, as above quoted, that "all finite selves are eternal." This, however, has nothing to do with personal immortality in the usual sense. It is rather endless re-incarnation without memory of former existence (cf. *Heg. Cos.*, pp. 52-4; *Dogmas of Religion*, p. 128).

God who is its eternal Ground, is, with the accompanying conceptions of obligation, authority, good and evil desert, brought into question by the all-challenging spirit of the time.

It can, indeed, be argued, as it is by Dr. McTaggart, that a high moral ideal may exist without belief in God to sustain it,<sup>1</sup> just as a high standard of personal conduct may be maintained in association with naturalistic or other theories which logically would destroy their foundations.<sup>2</sup> Sooner or later, however, theories of this kind may be relied on to work out their natural consequences, and history shows that it is the most perilous of experiments to tamper with moral sanctities, and expect no evil fruits to result. Hence the earnestness with which religion has generally contended against associational, utilitarian, hedonistic, and evolutionary theories of morals, in which no *a priori* (rational, intuitive) principles of judgment were recognised, and has insisted on the universal and unchanging authority of moral law. After all, one is warranted in contending, the right is not simply the expedient; the good is not simply the pleasurable; conduct which springs from the compulsion of fear is distinguishable from conduct voluntarily done from the obligation of duty. Where there is not the recognition of primary and naturally-binding obligations such as are found in all codes, many of them the oldest, worthy of the name—one may refer to the Egyptian Precepts of

<sup>1</sup> *Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 280-4. Cf. the remarks of Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, pp. 15-17 (E.T.).

<sup>2</sup> Mr. A. J. Balfour justly says: "I am not contending that sentiments of the kind referred to may not be, and are not frequently, entertained by persons of all shades of philosophical or theological opinion. My point is, that in the case of those holding the naturalistic creed the sentiments and the creed are antagonistic; and that the more clearly the creed is grasped, the more thoroughly the intellect is saturated with its essential teaching, the more certain are the sentiments thus violently and unnaturally associated with it to languish or to die" (*Found. of Belief*, 8th Edit., p. 18). Cf. Sorley's *Ethics of Naturalism*.



Ptahhotep (5th Dynasty), the Negative Confession in the Book of the Dead, the Code of Hammurabi, Confucian and Buddhist ethics—morality properly cannot be said to exist. The savage, and not he alone, may seem to be indifferent to lying and theft—to have no sense of wrong in connexion with them—but let his neighbour try to deceive or defraud *him*, or behave to him with selfish ingratitude, how speedily does moral condemnation flash out! <sup>1</sup> The untutored mind may not be able to comprehend abstract canons like Kant's or Hegel's, "Respect humanity in your own person," "Be a person, and respect others as persons,"—canons self-evident to those who understand them,—but the reason which expresses itself in such formulas is already working in the obligation the individual spontaneously feels to be self-respecting, controlled, veracious, honourable to comrades, faithful to promises and trusts. Doubtless he may know, and not obey, with the result of darkening of mind and weakening of will <sup>2</sup>; his judgments also may often be mistaken and perverted, partly from moral causes, partly from undeveloped intelligence, partly from ignorance and error in regard to himself, his world, and his relationships; but as he gains the right standpoint, grows in knowledge of his environment, and acquires the will to obey, conscience likewise grows in clearness, in vigour, in power of discrimination.

It is precisely these exceptions, entering, we must hold, into the essence of morality, from which much in our modern thought *removes the ground*. It will be generally granted that this was the effect of many of the older selfish and sensational

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Rom. ii. 1: "Wherefore thou art without excuse, O man, who-soever thou art that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest dost practise the same things." Savage tribes have, as Mr. A. Lang shows in his *Making of Religion and Magic and Religion*, often much higher moral notions than sociologists are wont to ascribe to them. Above all, they have the moral *capacity*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Rom. i. 21 ff.

theories of morals—even of a utilitarian hedonism, unmodified, as J. S. Mill sought to modify it, by the introduction of the idea of “quality” in pleasures.<sup>1</sup> To declare, e.g., with Hobbes, that man is a naturally selfish being, and that rights spring from the sovereign power in the State, defining the limits within which selfishness shall be allowed to operate, is, apart from untruth to the facts, an *immoral* exaltation of absolutism, and ignoring of the demand that even public rights shall rest on a basis of inherent justice. To say, again, with Bentham, that morality is a simple calculation of pleasures and pains (the moralist is an “arithmetician”<sup>2</sup>), and that the word “ought” is one which should be banished from human speech,<sup>3</sup> is to abandon the possibility of a science of duties,<sup>4</sup> while professing to construct one.

Modern thinkers, however, because they dig deeper, remove the foundations only the more effectually. Dr. McTaggart strikes a high note in finding the goal of existence in “love”; but how shall he justify the demand for a “passionate, all-absorbing, all-consuming love,”<sup>5</sup> in a universe the Principle of which neither loves nor can be loved,<sup>6</sup> in which Determinism rules,<sup>7</sup> and in which there is no personal (conscious) immortality? When, besides, love is described as knowing that another “conforms to my highest stan-

<sup>1</sup> A criticism of these theories is given by the present writer in his *David Hume: His Influence on Philosophy and Theology*, chap. ix (“The World’s Epoch-makers”).

<sup>2</sup> *Deontology*, ii., Introd., p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> “If the use of the word be admissible at all, it ‘ought’ to be banished from the vocabulary of morals” (*Ibid.*, i. p. 32). Yet Bentham himself frequently uses it.

<sup>4</sup> “It is, in fact, very idle to talk about duties; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive” (*Ibid.*, p. 10).

<sup>5</sup> *Heg. Cosmol.*, p. 261.

<sup>6</sup> The Gospel command is: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,” etc. (Mark xiii. 29). But on this theory love to God is excluded. “That, of course, must go, if it is believed that the person that was loved never existed” (*Dogmas of Religion*, p. 290; cf. *Heg. Cosmol.*, pp. 288–90).

<sup>7</sup> See below.

dards," and feeling that "through him the end of my own life is realised,"<sup>1</sup> is not this a recognition of values and ends of which, again, no good account is given? The ethical outcome of Mr. Bradley's theory of the absolute has already been indicated; and Mr. Taylor, in his Nietzschean vein, is, if possible, even more sweeping in his conclusions. One passage from the chapter, "Beyond Good and Bad," may indicate the standpoint. "As we advanced toward the final culmination of morality in practical religion we saw the notions of 'guilt,' 'desert,' 'obligation,' and 'free-will,' which ordinary ethics assumes as fundamental, lose both scientific meaning and practical validity. And even the life of practical religion, we have learned, though it dispenses with so many of the uncritical assumptions of mere morality, needs as its basis the assumption for practical purposes of a standpoint which metaphysical criticism must finally reject as self-contradictory and unintelligible."<sup>2</sup>

3. The ethical conceptions, however, are still there, and demand *explanation*; and such explanation, as already hinted, neither naturalism, nor the metaphysical idealism we have been considering, is able to give. "Self-realisation" is ethical only if the self that is realised has the ethical ideal already implicit in it: "self-satisfaction" is but a subtler form of hedonism; "the advantage of society" yields no help, unless society reckons among its highest advantages the possession of excellencies of character, which is to move in a circle. Mr. Taylor is in the peculiar position here of starting with an empirical psychology, and ending with a metaphysical absolutism akin to Mr. Bradley's. Unlike

<sup>1</sup> *Heg. Cosmol.*, p. 261. There are hints, however, that even this is not the ultimate. The conception of virtue, we are told, "reveals its own imperfection [as implying the possibility of sin, of action, of time], and must be transcended and absorbed before we can reach either the absolutely real or the absolutely good" (p. 128; cf. *Dogmas of Religion*, p. 138).

<sup>2</sup> *Prob. of Conduct*, p. 493.

Dr. McTaggart, however, who lays all the stress on eternal personal "selves," Mr. Taylor will not allow to the "self" any proper existence at all; it is a "secondary product" of "the ordinary psychological laws of recognition, assimilation and association"<sup>1</sup> (all of which, in truth, already imply the "self"). It is a natural corollary that there are "no unconditional obligations,"<sup>2</sup> and that the ordinary ethical concepts—obligation, duty, responsibility, free personality—are derivatives from non-ethical roots.<sup>3</sup> The crucial test of such a theory is the account it has to give of such concepts as "obligation," "responsibility," "accountability,"<sup>4</sup> and one has only to watch carefully to perceive that the "genesis" of such ideas on empirical lines can only be effected by surreptitiously introducing into the process, as the argument proceeds, the very ideas it is intended to explain. That others expect or require something from me, and can enforce their demand by punishment, does not suffice to create the feeling of obligation;<sup>5</sup> in order to this the demand must be felt to be a *right* one—to have reason and justice in it.<sup>6</sup> In any case, Mr. Taylor is precluded from furnishing a satisfactory explanation of the notion by his denial (1) of a real personal identity, and (2) of freedom—both essential conditions of a consciousness of accountability.<sup>7</sup>

4. It is striking that it is precisely the three ideas which Kant held to be essential to morality—God, Freedom, Immor-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 78-9. A yet more thorough-going denial of a permanent self may be seen in the newly-published work on *Consciousness*, by Dr. H. R. Marshall. The conclusion logically drawn is that "the notion of erring and sinning is an illusion" (p. 657).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.      <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119 ff.

<sup>4</sup> The most searching analysis of this group of notions is perhaps that in Mr. Bradley's earlier work, *Ethical Studies*, Essay I.

<sup>5</sup> *Prob. of Conduct*, p. 140.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 3. Man must feel that "it is *right* that he should be subject to the moral tribunal; or the moral tribunal has a *right* over him, to call him before it, with reference to all or any of his deeds."

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 7.



tality—which our modern theorists seem most bent on overthrowing. It might seem clear that there can be no moral conduct in the proper sense—that is, conduct for which the agent can justly be held responsible—unless such agent possesses at least a measure of self-determining *Freedom*; and that a thoroughgoing Determinism of the kind advocated in most recent scientific and philosophical works would (if mankind could be got to believe in it, and to act on it, which they never do) be destructive of the very idea of responsibility. To affirm this is not to be blind to the very genuine speculative difficulties involved in the idea of freedom, or to the fallacies in many popular discussions of it. Freedom is not absolute, but is hedged round with many conditions; it is not lawless, but has laws congruous with its own nature. The so-called “liberty of indifference” is an irrationality as incompatible with true freedom as Determinism itself.<sup>1</sup> For every choice a man makes there is at the moment a “why” or “reason,” which leads him to choose as he does rather than otherwise. But that a man guides himself by rational and moral considerations, or *ought* to guide himself by these (for he may yield to influences which override his freedom, and rob him of it),<sup>2</sup> does not alter the fact that his action in the truest sense proceeds from *himself*—is due to his own self-determination. It is not enough even to say that his *character* decides him. Character is itself largely the product of antecedent acts of freedom, so that the question is only shifted back. After the most searching analysis there will probably always be felt to be

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bradley, as above, pp. 8 ff. Erdmann is quoted as saying: “The doctrine of Determinism is a will which *wills* nothing—which lacks the form of will; the doctrine of Indeterminism a will which *wills nothing*, a will with no content” (p. 11). On the rival conceptions of necessity and freedom see Emerson’s Essays on “Fate” and “Power” in his *Conduct of Life*.

<sup>2</sup> From the Christian standpoint, man’s will is in a *spiritual* bondage, through sin, from which only God’s grace can deliver it (cf. Rom. vii.).

a residuary unanalysable element in freedom.<sup>1</sup> But nothing will eradicate the plain man's conviction that his responsibility is bound up with a power of determining himself in a way which makes his acts truly his own.

To the metaphysical, as to the scientific mind, however, there is a fascination in the idea of universal causation—of unbroken law—which almost resistlessly compels it to the rejection of free-will, and the adoption of a *Determinism* as rigorous as that of physical nature. It is not only "miracle" that the modern philosopher rejects, but that *simulacrum* of the miraculous in man—free-agency. Professor W. James is an exception,<sup>2</sup> but he allows that the other view is the prevailing one. Materialistic and Pantheistic systems (Spinoza, Haeckel) are of necessity deterministic.<sup>3</sup> H. Spencer was Determinist. So are most recent philosophical writers.<sup>4</sup> Karl Pearson, e.g., for whom the universe is a logical thought-process, advocates "Free-thought" by preaching absolute Necessity. "Every finite thing in [the universe] is what it is, because *that* is the only possible way in which it could be."<sup>5</sup> Mr. Bradley does not directly discuss the question in his later work, but the implications of his system—the non-reality of self and change, the illusoriness of time, Reality, eternal and unchanging, only in the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Galloway, *Principles of Religious Development*, pp. 327 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See his Essay on "The Dilemma of Determinism" in his *Will to Believe* (pp. 145 ff.). The so-called "Pragmatist" school inclines in this direction (cf. Schiller on "Freedom" in *Studies in Humanism*).

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Blatchford's opinions are of no account philosophically, but it may be noted that he is a determinist of the extremist type, and denies responsibility. "I do seriously mean that no man is under any circumstances to be blamed for anything he may say or do" (*God and My Neighbour*, p. 10; cf. his chapter on "Determinism.")

<sup>4</sup> One wonders more at finding it in a theologian like A. Sabatier. See the Preface to his *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*. "There has never been met with in history a being who was not anteriorly determined" (p. x).

<sup>5</sup> *Ethic of Free Thought*, p. 29.

Absolute<sup>1</sup>—destroy freedom in its very idea. Dr. McTaggart argues elaborately for “complete” Determinism, and seeks to show its compatibility with responsibility and virtue.<sup>2</sup> This is done on the external ground that “rewards and punishments may encourage right volitions and discourage wrong volitions”<sup>3</sup>—surely a poor conception of responsibility. Another line adopted by psychologists is to eliminate the idea of volition (conation) as an independent factor in consciousness altogether. It is resolved into feeling—“kinæsthetic sensations,”—more fully into “sensation, idea, and emotion,” as by Mr. Taylor,<sup>4</sup> to whom the “self” is a “secondary product”; or into “attention,” as by Professor G. F. Stout, who challenges the identification with “feeling.”<sup>5</sup> The result reached by the different roads is the same—that “Free-will,” in any sense that gives it meaning in a moral system, is got rid of.<sup>6</sup> Therewith, as we have sought to show, modern thought comes into conflict

<sup>1</sup> See specially chaps. ix., x., xviii. in *Appearance and Reality*. “We shall find that the self has no power to defend its own reality from moral objections” (p. 103). Volition, as cause, is “illusory” (p. 115). “If time is not unreal, I admit that the Absolute is an illusion” (p. 206).

<sup>2</sup> *Dogmas of Religion*, chap. v.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>4</sup> *Prob. of Conduct*, pp. 170, 172-3. The reader can judge how far the following throws light on the fact of “resolve”—“The state of mind commonly expressed by such phrases as ‘I’ll do it,’ seems to be no more than the change of emotional direction and intensity and the corresponding change in organic sensation, effected by the transition from a state of mental conflict to one of such steady and continuous diminution of emotional tension as we have described in our analysis of the simple forms of impulsive action” (p. 174).

<sup>5</sup> *Analytic Psychology*, i. pp. 118, 130; see the whole chapter, “Feeling and Conation.” “Wherein does this determination itself consist? Is it also a mode of being attentive? We answer this question in the affirmative” (p. 130).

<sup>6</sup> “This doctrine [of Free-will] may in philosophy be considered obsolete, though it will continue to flourish in popular ethics” (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 393). One might think here of certain indefensible theories, but Mr. Bradley’s philosophy compels the extension to *all* theories. “The questions commonly raised about the ‘freedom’ and the ‘autonomy’ of ‘will,’ have, from our point of view, no psychological significance” (Taylor, *Prob. of Conduct*, p. 177).

with irrefragable data of consciousness, and does violence to the august authority of moral law.

5. To sum up on this conflict of modern thought with Christian conceptions, it has been seen that this type of thought removes the theistic basis from moral law ; denies the ethical character of the Power at work in the universe ; denies absolute moral values ; negates free-will, and substitutes for it a rigorous Determinism ; in this way assails the foundations of moral obligation. Were these denials merely theoretic—had they only an academic character—the situation would be serious enough. But this cannot be affirmed regarding them. The change in theory, it is becoming apparent, involves a radical *change in ethical standards*—this of a kind which cannot be viewed with complacency by any Christian mind. Older writers, whatever their intellectual basis, generally kept tolerably close to the Christian virtues.<sup>1</sup> A bolder, more revolutionary spirit now prevails. Why should conventions be respected, when the supernatural sanctions which supported them have been completely swept away, and thinkers are hard at work breaking down the natural sanctions ? It is difficult to read without grave concern the chapters in advocacy of far-reaching changes in the ideas of sex-relations in such a book as Karl Pearson's *Ethic of Freethought*,<sup>2</sup> or even the more cautious, but highly casuistical treatment of the same subject, with leaning to liberty, in Mr. Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*.<sup>3</sup> The outstand-

<sup>1</sup> Dr. McTaggart notes that "Hegel's judgments as to what conduct was virtuous, and what conduct was vicious, would on the whole agree with the judgments that would be made under the influence of Christianity" (*Heg. Cosmol.*, p. 239). Mr. Spencer writes with some disappointment (Pref. to Parts v. and vi. of his *Ethics*): "The doctrine of evolution has not furnished guidance to the extent I had hoped. Most of the conclusions, drawn empirically, are such as right feelings, enlightened by cultivated intelligences, have already sufficed to establish."

<sup>2</sup> Specially Essays xiii. and xv.

<sup>3</sup> Pp. 206-18. Mr. H. Bolee, in his art. in the *American Cosmopolitan* (May, 1909) formerly referred to, gives extraordinary examples of "the



ing representative of this spirit of revolt in recent times is F. Nietzsche. It is not suggested that the opinions of this writer, taken in their entirety, are anything but a mad extreme. But one observes traces of a Nietzsche cult which is of no good omen, and certainly many of his ideas are "in the air." Nietzsche's ethics—if one may dignify them with this name—are avowedly antichristian. The last work completed by himself, which bears the name, *The Antichrist*, breathes a passionate hate of Christianity and all its works. With this rôle of Antichrist, as Riehl says,<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche, without doubt, identified himself. A sentence or two from admiring expounders will illustrate his positions. "In morality," we are told, "Nietzsche starts out by adopting the position of the relativist. He says, there are no absolute values 'good' or 'evil': these are mere names adopted by all in order to acquire power to maintain their place in the world, or to become supreme. . . . Concepts of good and evil are, therefore, in their origin, merely a means to an end, they are expedients for acquiring power."<sup>2</sup> His "transvaluation of all values" means the inversion of every Christian standard. "Voluptuousness, thirst of power, and selfishness—the three forces in humanity which Christianity has done most to garble and besmirch—Nietzsche endeavours to reinstate in their former places of honour."<sup>3</sup> "Life is something essentially immoral," Nietzsche tells us. . . . "Life is *essentially* appropriation, injury, conquest of the strong and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of its own forms, incorporation and at least, putting it mildest,

remarkable doctrines regarding morality, marriage, divorce, plural marriages, the home, religion," put forth by teachers of repute in colleges and universities in that country.

<sup>1</sup> *F. Nietzsche, der Künstler und der Denker* (3rd Edit.), p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> A. M. Ludovici, in Appendix to *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (E.T.), pp. 408-9.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 430.

exploitation.”<sup>1</sup> “ Instead of advocating ‘ equal and inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ ” Nietzsche advocates “ unequal rights, and inequality in advantages generally, approximately proportionate to deserts : consequently, therefore, a genuinely superior ruling class at one end of the social scale, and an actually inferior ruled class, with slavery at its basis, at the opposite social extreme.”<sup>2</sup>

The picture may be left to speak for itself. One use at least Nietzsche serves—that of showing what morality without God, in a man of real genius, may come to.

JAMES ORR.

*HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST  
EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.*

XXI. THE WORDS OF THE FAITH AND OF THE SOUND  
DOCTRINE.

AN expression like this brings us face to face with the difficulty which weighs, probably more seriously, than anything else with most of those who doubt or deny the Pauline authorship of this and the other Pastoral Epistles. The writer of these letters uses the word “ Faith ” in a different way from the writer of the earlier Pauline Epistles. That is admitted. Does it follow that different persons wrote the two series of letters ? Is it necessary that, in the case of an idea so wide and comprehensive as Faith, a writer must always, in all circumstances and to all correspondents, throughout his life restrict himself to the same side and aspect of its connotation ? No one can, I imagine, maintain that Paul must necessarily restrict himself to one use of the term, unless he is also prepared to maintain that Paul was unable to conceive any other aspect of the

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 434.

<sup>2</sup> T. Common (translator), *Introd. to Beyond Good and Evil*, p. x.

idea. It is quite common for a man of educated and thoughtful character to use sometimes in one aspect, sometimes in another, a word which expresses a wide and many-sided idea ; and it would be mere trifling to maintain that Paul, though quite conscious of the wide range of the word Faith, always restricted himself to one aspect and use of the term.

We have, therefore, to ask whether there is any probability that Paul was unconscious of the wide possibilities of the term "Faith." Can we suppose that he talked to other leaders, such as Philip at Cæsareia, and James at Jerusalem, and remained ignorant or unconscious of the different aspect which the idea assumed to them ? Even to his devoted follower Luke, as Professor Harnack <sup>1</sup> points out, Faith wears a different aspect from what it wears to Paul.

Can we believe that he was able to think out his philosophy of religion, and not realise for himself that Faith was a many-sided idea ? It seems to me sufficient to put these questions plainly in order to recognise what answer is necessary. Paul was fully conscious that Faith wore various aspects to different persons ; and it is quite possible and probable that he should have used the word in different ways at different times.

In writing to converts from paganism it is highly improbable that any man would use this term with exactly the same force as he would in writing to Jews. The latter stood on a totally different moral and religious plane of thought ; and the higher ideas of philosophic religion could never appear to them in the same way as to those who had been brought up in the colder and denser atmosphere of paganism. In his Epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians and Romans Paul had to rouse first of

<sup>1</sup> I have not been able to find the passage.

all in his readers a sense of personal religion, and of the direct relation of the individual to God, which is lacking in paganism and contradictory to its very essence; and he had to rouse and strengthen in the pagan converts an appreciation of the nature and meaning of sin and a desire for righteousness, of which previously even the germ did not exist in their minds. The Jew had already derived from his education in the Old Testament a keen desire for righteousness, a sense of the meaning of sin, and a certain strong abhorrence (more or less strong in different individuals) for sin, though he might often be proud and self-righteous. He was indeed often utterly blind to the sin in himself, but he was keenly alive at any rate to the sin of others.

The conscience and the consciousness of the pagan and the Jew were therefore absolutely different in these respects. Yet both required to have a deeper and stronger desire for salvation and consciousness of the need of salvation; and in both the motive power had to be sought in Faith. The Faith which must be stirred to life in the Jew wore a different aspect from the Faith which must be put into the mind of the pagan.

That the term Faith is used in the Epistle to the Hebrews with a different significance from that which it bears in the Pauline letters is therefore quite natural, and would not constitute by itself (so far as I can judge) any argument against Pauline authorship, if the Epistle were written in the style of Paul. It is, however, written in the style of another man.

The Pastoral Epistles are written in the style of Paul; but the word Faith often wears a different aspect from his earlier letters, though in some cases it approximates closely to the same old sense. This may be a perfectly natural transition. Paul was now writing to the superintendent



of a group of Churches which were comparatively mature, but which consisted mainly of converted pagans ; and the Faith to which he appeals is sometimes the same force as of old, sometimes the externalised result of the working of that force in their society and assembly.

It is not the case that this more externalised conception of Faith is absolutely new in the Pastoral Epistles. The transition, or rather the development, towards it can be observed in such passages as Ephesians iv. 4, "There is one body and one spirit, . . . one Lord, one Faith, one baptism, one God" ; iv. 13, "Till we all attain unto the unity of the Faith" ; Philemon 6, "The fellowship of thy Faith." These expressions would be quite natural in the Pastoral Epistles, and would there be taken by most readers without hesitation as implying a more objective meaning of the word than it bears in Galatians, etc. ; but they are also quite closely akin to the earlier thought of Paul. In a word, they form the transition, and show how the usage of the Pastoral Epistles grew out of Paul's earlier usage ; and in those Epistles, even without taking into account the intermediate group of letters, the varying sense of the word, sometimes more objective and externalised, sometimes more closely approximating to the earlier usage, is so apparent, that Riegenbach denies the existence of the former meaning, and maintains that Faith in the Pastoral Epistles always retains its old Pauline subjective sense. To do this he has to strain the interpretation of some passages in them just as much as several scholars force the natural significance of other passages when they contend that Faith in the Pastoral Epistles always bears the objective meaning.

All these attempts to force a single uniform sense on the word do violence to the thought and manner of Paul. It is not a rational method to assume that he must always

have used a wide idea like Faith in exactly the same shade of meaning. Faith has many sides and many aspects, and Paul was as fully conscious of its manifold nature as any modern commentator.

Moreover, it has been argued that Faith in the Pastoral Epistles has lost the unique and prominent position which it occupies in the early letters, and appears merely as one of the excellences of human character. This also is an exaggerated way of putting the case. Faith is emphasised in the earlier letters in a special degree, because it was so necessary in forming the basis of a religious sense among the recent pagan converts (as has been pointed out in the beginning of this Section); but even in First Corinthians occurs the sentence (xiii. 13): "But now abideth Faith, Hope, Love, these three; and the greatest of these is Love." At no time in his career did Paul think that Faith alone can be made the sufficing solitary basis of the Christian life. When he is urging the supreme necessity of Faith, he may be misunderstood as maintaining that Faith stands unique and alone, but when he comes to speak of Love, he places it even above Faith as a needed power in the heart and life of man.

Similarly, in writing to the Greek Churches of the Aegean world, after they had attained a certain stage of development, Paul found it needful to insist that the Christian life must bear witness to itself in works and in godliness. He had never thought or implied that Faith was sufficient which bore no fruit in life and in act. He had always understood Faith to be an intense overmastering fervour which necessarily worked itself out in character and conduct. But he could not do everything at one time for his new pagan converts. He must advance step by step. He must first get the motive power of Faith implanted in the pagan mind, and then in the next stage he proceeded to require the further proof and fruit of good works.

So far as the evidence of the Acts goes, Paul did not insist in the same way on the supreme necessity of Faith, when he was addressing a Jewish audience even in a synagogue of a Greek city. He spoke to the Jews more about the remission of sins : they were conscious of the nature of sin, and they desired righteousness. Both Jews and Greeks needed Faith ; both needed the remission of sins ; but it would be as idle and useless to talk to pagans about the remission of sins before they had begun to realise properly what sin is and what was the relation of each individual to God, as it was to talk to the Athenians about Resurrection, which they took for the name of a new Goddess. Faith alone could supply the force which might raise the pagan mind to a higher level of thought.

The conception of Faith expressed in those early letters to the pagan Churches implies an appeal to the individual alone. Each member of the Church is conceived as coming into direct relation for himself with God ; and this idea is so strongly present in Paul's mind that the other relations of life hardly come into his conscious thought. Even marriage comes before him in chapter vii. only as it affects the individual. The advice there given implies that each person, man or woman, is to regard the question whether he or she should marry from the individual point of view : does he or she gain more from being married or from remaining unmarried ? That this advice may justly be called too hard and too narrow is beyond doubt : that it does not represent Paul's whole mind seems also beyond doubt. The question of marriage is a wider one. It concerns the family and the Church. It is not restricted to a calculation of individual advantage, nor did Paul ever think so ; but he thought that it was necessary to lay strong emphasis on one aspect of the question on this occasion. He did not attempt to treat, or to lay down any principles about

the family, when he was writing to the Corinthians. He was championing the freedom of the individual man or woman. Yet he was not blind to the importance of the family in the organised Church ; and it is in the Pastoral Epistles that this side of his religious thought comes into prominence. Without those Epistles we might take a maimed view of Paul's character and philosophy. They show in what way he regarded the family ; and we now turn to this subject.

#### XXII. THE FAMILY AS THE BASIS OF THE ORGANISED CHURCH.

One of the most noteworthy features of the Epistle to Timothy, and in a less marked degree of all the Pastoral Epistles, is the emphasis which it lays on the family, as compared with the almost complete silence of the Apostle on this subject in his other Epistles. So far as I am aware, no one has mentioned this difference as a reason for denying the Pauline origin of the Pastoral Letters ; and yet it is probably in this respect that difference of personality might most plausibly be found.

In the first place, we must observe the signs of this difference, and in the second place we can inquire whether the same person at different stages of his career could have varied so much in his outlook on life, on human nature and on society.

It has been already pointed out in Section XIII<sup>1</sup> that in the Pastoral Epistles, and nowhere else in his letters, Paul shows an appreciation of the maternal feeling and of the tie that binds together mother and child, and finds in the maternal instinct the Divine force and motive power through which the salvation of the woman is wrought out, "if she continue in faith and love and thanksgiving with sober-mindedness."

<sup>1</sup> EXPOSITOR, October, 1909, p. 343 ff.



All that was said in that Section may be assumed here as lying at the basis of our inquiry. The writer who ignores the fact of motherhood has not a broad or a deep conception of the importance of family life; whereas the writer who lays emphasis on the maternal instinct as the central fact and the strongest force in woman's nature is in the way of learning that society must be founded on the family, and not on separate single individuals, if it is to be a well compacted structure.

It is evident in the description of a Bishop's or a Deacon's qualifications that his position as the head and guide of a family constituted a most important element in his personal authority. Not merely should Timothy in selecting bishops look for "the husband of one wife";<sup>1</sup> the Bishop (or the Deacon) must be "one that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity." No one can properly "take care of the Church of God," unless he knows how to guide his own family rightly. Here is almost an explicit recognition of the fact that the Church rests on the family, and is the family "writ large." The Church is the family of God,<sup>2</sup> and its members are His children. The latter expression, that the individual Christian is the child of God, may be used without implying in the writer much regard for the importance of the family, for he may be one of those who hold that children ought to be the charge of the community. But no one can logically think of the Church as the family of God, unless he has a very strong sense of the importance of the family as the unit in the composition of the Church.

"Forbidding to marry" is mentioned as a doctrine of

<sup>1</sup> In the translation "man of one woman" the sacredness of the family tie is emphasised equally strongly, though from a different point of view.

<sup>2</sup> Hence the Christian was called *οικέτης θεοῦ* in Lycaonia: this phrase implies that the Church was the *οἶκος θεοῦ*: see *Luke the Physician and other Studies*, p. 408.

the most detestable character and a "falling away from the faith." A true conception of marriage implies the realisation of the importance of the family as the foundation on which the Church rests.

On the other hand a totally different theory is assumed, when Paul wrote to the Corinthians "Art thou unconnected with a wife? seek not a wife: but and if thou marry, thou hast not sinned" (vii. 27 f.), and when he goes on to describe the mutual relation of a married pair as tending to distract their attention from pleasing God, and to make them "careful for the things of the world, how they may please" one another. He had then in his mind no thought of marriage and family life as the basis and the essential factor in the constitution of the Church. He who rather depreciates the married state as only the second best, and as a concession to the weakness and imperfection of human nature, has an essentially different conception of the nature of the family from that which animates the Epistle to Timothy. In this Epistle the family duty is the most binding and sacred. To learn and to practise that duty is the first lesson that children must learn (v. 4). He who neglects that duty "hath denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever" (v. 8).

So convinced is the writer of this Epistle of the rightness of marriage, that he expresses the desire that the younger widows should marry, and devote themselves to the family life. Only after they are sixty should they be admitted to consecrate themselves to prayer and works of charity, to living the Divine life apart from the work of "ruling their own household" (1 Tim. v. 14),<sup>1</sup> and the special duties

<sup>1</sup> *οικοδεσποτείν*. In an unpublished inscription of Derbe, which I copied in 1901, a woman is called *ἡ καλὴ οἰκοδεσποτὶς*. This is probably an allusion to the phrase of First Timothy. The word is not elsewhere used by Paul; but that is natural, since the importance of the family in the Christian life never forms a topic in any of the earlier letters.

of their divine life are "that they may train the young women to love their husbands, to love their children" (Tit. ii. 5). In other and weaker but more modern words, the woman's separate career, the occasion when she is free "to live her own life" (according to the favourite phrase of the present day), begins in the later years of her life in the world. The earlier part of her life is to be passed in the duties of the family: "she shall be saved through the fact and the spirit and the force of motherhood."<sup>1</sup>

Is this Pastoral ideal of Christian life irredeemably opposed to the theory and idea that is expressed in First Corinthians? That they are opposed to and inconsistent with one another, so that the same person could not at the same time express them in two letters, must be admitted. But they are not inconsistent in the sense that a philosophic thinker on religion and society could not develop from the "Corinthian" to the "Timothean" point of view; and I think both that the development can be observed in Paul's own writings, and that the traces of the earlier spirit and temper can be detected in the Pastoral Epistles.

In the first place, however, we must always remember that in First Corinthians Paul was emphasising individual liberty against the despotic and arbitrary suggestions of the Corinthian Church.<sup>2</sup> He regarded their suggestions, too, as a slight on himself, both on his authority and on his life; and there is a touch of personal feeling running through great part of the letter which leads him to emphasise strongly what he has to say in correction of their ideas. Now when a person is speaking very emphatically he almost

<sup>1</sup> Taking this idea in the wide sense described in Section XIII., which includes as part of its scope the narrower and more literal sense of the term *τεκνογονία*.

<sup>2</sup> In this place I can only assume what is said in Sections XXV., XXVI., of Historical Commentary on First Corinthians in the EXPOSITOR, Oct. 1900.

inevitably omits to take sufficient account of the opposite point of view, and his expression is apt to become a little hard in tone. That Paul himself was aware of this as he proceeded in his letter, is evident from the noble and exquisite panegyric on love, which he introduces in the latter part of the Epistle, and which seems unquestionably intended to soften and correct the slight hardness which is perceptible in some of the earlier chapters.

A somewhat similar consideration must be applied in the case of First Timothy. If, in writing to the Corinthians, Paul had to champion the right of personal freedom against a tendency to despotic regulation of the individual life after the fashion of the Roman Emperors, who thought and provided for their people, in the Pastoral Epistles he has to plead on behalf of law and general principles of order against the Greek tendency to assume too much liberty for individual caprice. Those Epistles lay down the general principles on which alone good administration of the Greek Churches could be conducted. They legislate for the average man and woman. But would it be safe to assume that the writer had forgotten about the exceptional man and woman? that he had no thought for the Divine inspiration which moves the individual occasionally, and which in his earlier letters Paul regards as a supreme law for the person on whom it falls? The Pastoral Epistles omit practically this whole side of Church life; but it does not follow that the writer was careless or incredulous of its reality and power. When the inspiration comes, it manifests itself in power; and when it is true, it is not lawless. Although it constitutes and sanctions exceptional cases, it does not override the law; it is in addition to the law and supreme in itself.

In the second place, Paul in writing to the Ephesians regards marriage in a wider view. He compares the relation



of husband and wife to the union of soul and body, of Christ and the Church. Such comparisons leave no room for the idea that marriage is merely the poorer way of life, to which a man or a woman falls back who is not strong enough for the higher life. They imply that the union of marriage is the divine life and the true harmony of human nature. Soul is not without body, Christ is in the world through the Church, husband and wife are one existence on earth. In this view the married pair and not the individual must be the unit in the constitution of the Church; and thus emerges the conception which guides the thought of the Pastoral Epistles, that the Church is made up of families and that the family forms the basis on which the Church is organised.

Yet in this orderly development of idea from Corinthians through Ephesians to Timothy the unity of individual opinion is clearly evident. We have not here an idea developed by a succession of writers: we have the growth of an idea in one writer's mind. The features of the same individual remain in the several stages. The writer of First Corinthians had a certain consciousness of the wider idea which he afterwards declared to the Ephesians, as appears from xi. 11, "Howbeit, neither is the man without the woman, nor the woman without the man, in the Lord." We must read these words in the light of the later Epistles; and in the same connexion we must take Galatians iii. 28.<sup>1</sup>

Again, in the later and in the earlier Epistles alike we recognise the same strong personality, filled with the prejudice of his early education in Tarsus (where the strictest seclusion and veiling of women, in an Oriental and not a Greek fashion, was practised) and expressing it in words

<sup>1</sup> Neither Jew *nor* Greek, neither bond *nor* free, no male *and* female. In Section XL. of my *Historical Commentary on Galatians*, p. 385 ff., the bearing of this verse is treated at length.

so strong as to be almost repellent to the modern and Western mind, that the woman was created for the man, that the head of the woman is the man, that the wife shall fear her husband, that she learn in quietness with all subjection.<sup>1</sup> And even in the instructions regarding widows in First Timothy there appears in v. 11 a trace of the early opinion that marriage is a mere concession to weakness and less honourable than the life of individual service to the Church.

There is, therefore, a fundamental uniformity, amid divergences, in the Pauline view of marriage as it is expressed in all the Epistles; and there is no serious difficulty in reconciling the language of all, and no reason to infer difference of authorship from the divergences. The two who marry agree to live one life, and not to lead their separate lives, to work with and for each other, to make the family unity and harmony the object—not merely an important object, but the decisive and guiding principle—of their lives. They agree not to pursue separate and inconsistent aims, but to merge their work in the union of the family. This unity and harmony, Paul in all stages of his thought proposes to attain through the absolute subjection of the woman to the man, and not through the mutual harmonising and common development towards a higher ideal on the part of both alike, though there are occasionally found in him some slight traces of the latter idea, which is more in accordance with our modern view. The unity which is attained by subjection of one partner to the other is not so noble an ideal as that which is sought through the growing harmoniousness of two equal partners; but it is easier to attain, and it was in accordance with the facts of ancient society, pagan and Jewish alike.

In the Pastoral Epistles Paul hardly alludes to the voluntary consecration of his whole life by the individual, separate

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xi. 39; Eph. v. 23, 33; 1 Tim. ii. 11.

and single, to the work of the Church—except in the case of widows over sixty years of age. Yet in writing to the Corinthians he had laid strong emphasis on this single life as the best and noblest of all. Are we to infer that he had abandoned entirely his earlier opinion, and that he had now in his later years been brought by the experience of life to hold the view (which, as I believe, the Corinthians had expressed in their letter to him) that it was right and expedient to prescribe marriage as the universal rule of the Christian life? That would be a change of attitude too complete to be reasonably explained as the natural development of thought in the case of a man like Paul; and, if it were necessary to put this interpretation on the Pastoral Epistles, I should find it impossible to regard Paul as their author.

There is, however, no reason to regard the Pastoral Epistles as containing a complete statement of Paul's views on the Christian life, or to conclude that any principle which is not laid down in them was rejected by him. They set forth the main and guiding principles of Church organisation in respect of the average and general mass of cases. They do not legislate for the exceptional cases. Even in writing to the Corinthians Paul admits that the choice of solitary self-consecration to the Divine work must, in the nature of mankind, be a rare and exceptional thing. Such cases form and declare a rule for themselves. Paul's opinion, and the practice of the Church (as in the case of the four unmarried daughters of Philip, the prophetesses), were well known; and therefore it was unnecessary (and perhaps, in the Hellenic congregations, inexpedient) to weaken the declaration of the general rule by devoting attention to the exceptions. The Greek spirit was of itself too prone to look to the exception and neglect the rule.

It is an interesting illustration of this subject to note how many of the words peculiar to the Pastoral Epistles

(either as used nowhere else in the New Testament or as not used by Paul except in these Epistles) belong to the relationship and duties of the family. Paul had no reason and little opportunity for using them in his other letters, since they are taken from a circle of ideas which the other letters hardly touch upon. If we include also terms that belong to the kindred sphere of household economy and sanitation, we have such words as <sup>1</sup> grandchild, grandmother, to rule-the-household, to have-dominion-over a man, maternity, bear children, suitable-for-old-wives (is not here used in direct relation to family), youth (is not used here in direct relation to family), parents (includes grandparents v. 4), bring-up-children, use-hospitality-to-strangers (refers to the household economy), give-charity (refers to the household economy v. 10), wax-wanton-against (the antithesis of the true family instinct), idle, tattlers, busybodies three vices of the household life), to be-a-drinker-of-water, stomach, master (of household), to do-good and ready-to-distribute and willing-to-share (three words describing a generous and charitable household life), lay-up-in-store, gangrene (is not here used in direct relation to the household), silly-women, lovers-of-pleasure, conduct (is not here used in relation to the family life), parchments, cloak, self-willed, soon-angry, brawler (and other faults of life),<sup>2</sup> aged-women.

This list is a fair example of the causes which largely explain the difference of vocabulary between the Pastoral and the earlier Epistles. Some of these words express ideas which are expressed by different terms in the other

<sup>1</sup> ἔκγονον, μάμμη, οἰκοδεσποτεῖν, αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός, τεκνογονία and τεκνογονέω, γραῶδης, νεότης, πρόγονοι, τεκνοτροφέω, ξενοδοχέω, ἐπαρκέω, καταστηρητιάω, ὑδροποτεῖν, στρμαχος, δεσπότης, ἀγαθοεργεῖν, εὐμετάδοτος, κοινωνικός, θησαυρίζω, γαγγραινα, γυναικάρια, φιλήδονοι, ἀγωγή, μεμβράναι, φελὸνη, αυθάδης, δργιλος, πάροις, πρεφβῦτις.

<sup>2</sup> There is opportunity in the lists of vices in other letters to introduce words of this class; but the vocabulary of vituperation is rich.



Epistles; but the majority are the names of things or the statement of acts which do not appear in Paul's older writings. It is absurd to quote such words as grandchild, grandmother, parents or grandparents (one single term), as in any way bolstering up a presumption against the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles. Where could these words occur in the earlier letters? Every Epistle has its own special terms. Paul had a rich vocabulary, and often varies his way of naming the same ideas or actions or things.

W. M. RAMSAY.

### THE INDISPENSABLENESS OF JESUS.

“Whosoever goeth onward and abideth not in the teaching of Christ, hath not God: he that abideth in the teaching, the same hath both the Father and the Son.”—*John* ii. 9.

ONE knows not whether the more to envy or to pity the rising generation in the matter of the presentation to them of the claims of Jesus Christ. On the one hand, they have the advantage that He is presented to them in modern language, and disentangled from the elaborate theological systems which helped to hide Him from an earlier time. On the other hand, our young people are confronted with the immense responsibility of choosing between two competing interpretations of Jesus—one representing Him as, to all intents and purposes, God—the other, representing Him as an august but not necessarily final religious teacher and personality.

The debate between these two interpretations is not new: and to Christian people the end need not perhaps be too much an anxiety. But meanwhile the debate has brought prominently into view some features of the popular attitude to religion which it is impossible to consider without misgiving. For example, one is anxious about the vague and so largely futile *admiration* of Jesus widely current in our time. Of a great deal of the attention paid to our Lord,

it is to be feared that the precipitate is rather praise than worship, an approval, sometimes no doubt respectful, but sometimes hard to distinguish from patronage, of Him who is our judge. Now mere admiration of any character, however exalted, will not only inevitably pall (and the more distant the character is the sooner will enthusiasm suffer fatigue), but it utterly fails to perform the functions of religion. Religion is not admiration, but moral surrender ; and the substitution of even ardent approbation for the bowed will means a weakening of reverence and loss of moral force. Further, the maintenance of a devotion to Jesus which verges on worship while just failing to accord to Him the unreserved surrender due to a God, may be a very real menace to our monotheism. There is widespread to-day a cultus of Jesus, which is rather sentiment than worship—an adoration like the cultus of Mary, beautiful, soothing and elevating, but carrying in it no tremendous moral imperatives, and failing to bear the soul into the sin-scorching presence of the Supreme. No one who has at heart the best interests of religion among our people can fail to be anxious about the issues of this dilution of our monotheism.

One has grave fears, too, in connexion with the growingly popular habit of thinking of personal religion as something for the maintenance of which Jesus is not continuously indispensable—as a relationship to God which we may now sustain without reference to Jesus. This position is defended on the ground of its simplicity, over against more complicated statements of the Christian faith. “Is not religion,” men say, “after all simply a childlike relation to God—the realising of the Divine Fatherhood and the acknowledgment of the bond that makes us brethren? This relation to God Jesus Himself beautifully illustrated, and we are grateful to Him and to all other teachers who have pointed the way to this simple but sublime result. But it

is absurd and mischievous now to complicate religion by reference to some supposed mediatorial position occupied by Jesus. The truth is we see now for ourselves the final terms to which personal religion is meant to be reduced : our interest in Jesus is historical." I think that is a true report of the thoughts behind an attitude to-day extremely common, and, unless I greatly err, extremely perilous. It is the attitude of men who freely acknowledge their debt to Jesus, but now sweep past Him with a deferential bow. They may leave His discipleship behind, they think ; for they have now found for themselves the ultimate God and the ultimate Religion to which He pointed.

Now is not this precisely the pseudo-progressive spirit which St. John had in view when he wrote the words placed at the head of this paper ? May I not freely translate them in modern language thus :

" Whosoever, in the name of progress, affects to leave behind him the discipleship of Christ, *does not retain his hold on God* ; but he who abides within the discipleship retains his hold both on the Father and the Son."

If I understand this saying aright, it warns us that to attempt to leave Christ behind is to imperil our grasp of, and, *à fortiori*, our right thoughts of God : and that without Jesus there cannot be the truly filial note and experience in religion. It may be worth our while to look steadily at each of these warnings.

#### 1. *Jesus and our hold on God.*

One does not wish for a moment to undervalue the knowledge of God secured before Christ's time and beyond where He is known, whether in Hebrew prophecy or in ethnic wisdom. But have we ever asked ourselves how that knowledge of God would by this time have fared, in view of the increased knowledge of nature and of life, *if Christ had not come* ? Even the splendid faith of the Hebrew prophets was held by men who, as compared with the modern man,

had only the very narrowest experience of life and only the most elementary knowledge of nature. Has the study of nature's laws, and the development of nature's resources, has civilisation, with its luxury and its acute and tragic suffering, made belief in God easier? Let the materialism which until yesterday, and the agnosticism which until to-day has prevailed among scientific men, and the saddened ignoring of religion among many serious students of life be the dreary answer. Who believes in God to-day, with a belief likely to stand the shock of advancing discoveries, and of the increasing complications of our modern life? The man who clings to Jesus, he and no other: the man who sees in the character of Jesus the outlines of the character of a credible God: who sees in the career of Jesus a continuous Sacrament of God, confirmation of the truth of man's ancient dream of a God who would carry us as His burden: and who sees especially in the death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus that which ministers to a vivid hope that after all there is a reasonable God who reigns. For at the back of everything, what makes it hard to believe in God is death, and all that makes for death: and if Jesus remain to this day dead, no sane man can believe—no sane man ought to believe—in God: for despite all our fancies and hopes and strivings, we are still ringed round by a belt of darkness which even holiness has not availed to break. But if Jesus is risen, the firstfruits of them that slept—if God has really begun to replenish a larger world with the best moral garnerage of this—once more we may begin to believe in a God who cares for the life of men and rules in the interest of goodness.

There are not a few indications in our time that, as thought advances, the question "who and what is God?" will more and more occupy men's minds, that traditional conceptions of God will be closely scrutinised, and even the thoughts of Him which men have found most precious will



be weighed in the balances, and that Jesus will be the one really determining factor on the side of faith in a God righteous, pitiful and the solicitous Father and Saviour of men.

2. *Jesus and the Filial Note in Religion.*

Any man whose eyes are open can see that all other conceptions of God are going down before Jesus' God : in the end the question will be, Jesus' God or none. Now Jesus' name for God is Father ; but His thought is of a Fatherhood defined and safeguarded in a special way. And it is in Jesus' own character and attitude to God that we have the key to that definition and to those safeguards. Forget Jesus, leave Him behind, out of sight, and one by one these safeguards are lost, and with them the true " Fatherhood " in God ; and you have relapsed ere you know it into a kindly but nerveless pre-Christian paganism. Between God the Father and Jupiter Benevolens there stands—just Jesus : the difference lies in what He stands for. And as with the conception of Fatherhood, so with the experience of the filial life. There is nowhere in the world any parallel to the vivid experience of sonship to God to which Jesus has introduced men, nowhere anything like the tender and reverent intimacy with the Supreme, the release of the spirit of prayer, the freedom in obedience and service which He has rendered possible. And yet there is nothing more easily counterfeited than all this ; no region in which presumption may more easily take the place of holy confidence. It has always been so. " Fatherhood " as applied to God has never been a term in stable equilibrium. Even in the first century it had been abused, was being lightly treated, and the need of Jesus as regulator of its interpretation was in part forgotten. Otherwise, St. Peter would not have felt it necessary to issue his memorable warning : " If you call on Him as Father who without respect of persons judgeth according to every man's work, pass the time of your sojourning here in holy awe : knowing that ye were redeemed not with

corruptible things, with silver or gold, from your vain manner of life handed down from your fathers, but with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ ; who was foreknown indeed from the foundation of the world, but was manifested at the end of the times, for your sake, who through Him are believers in God, which raised Him from the dead and gave Him glory, so that your faith and hope might be in God.”

*Through Him ye are believers in God*: it is true still. No man cometh unto the Father but by Christ : that is not simply an account of one religious crisis, it is the law of the Christian’s whole devotional life. No man either enters *or sustains* the life of sonship, except in conscious present debtorship to Jesus as Mediator. We have surely forgotten ourselves when we have allowed ourselves in such familiarities as ‘The Comrade Christ.’ For our life as sons of God, we need the services of an High Priest, who shall be *separate* from sinners, quite as much as we need one made like unto His brethren. For precisely the mystery and the glory of the new relationship to God into which Jesus has introduced men is this : that it blends the tender freedom and accessibility of a human friendship with the educating awe of the worship due to the Supreme. It is this mystery that has made Christian devotion : when the mystery passes, Christian devotion passes too.

We stand, then, to-day as men stood twenty centuries ago, without a rule to direct us in our thoughts of God and attitude to God, unless the Son Himself be with us. God no man at any time has seen : an only-begotten God, He who is ever in the bosom of the Father, He has translated Him. *Who-soever, therefore, in the name of progress affects to leave behind him the discipleship of Christ, does not retain his hold on God ; while he who abides in the school of Jesus retains his hold both on the Father and the Son.*

G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS.

## THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE GOSPELS.

### II.

#### VARIOUS TENDENCIES IN THE TRANSMISSION OF THE GOSPEL.

##### THE ESCHATOLOGICAL STOCK OF JESUS-TRADITION.

HAVING defined the problem as it stands to-day in our first lecture, we now go on to try to settle first what is the Gospel-tradition about eschatology, and what measure of certainty we have to make out our Lord's own words and meaning.

#### I.

There is not only some vague possibility of alterations brought into the Gospel in the course of its transmission, but there is plenty of evidence that sayings of Jesus were coloured afterwards, and this at first [A] by eschatological additions and changes. We may confine our investigation to three instances :—

1. The saying against those who say " Lord, Lord " is given by Matthew vii. 21 and Luke vi. 46, both passages belonging to the sermon on the mount. In Matthew vii. 22, 23 herewith is combined another saying, which is found in Luke xiii. 25-27 in quite a different context. We are not concerned here with this second saying—we may remark by the way that Luke has evidently the original form, not only in the shape of the parable, but also in the features claimed by the unfortunate people outdoors, which are with Luke rather ordinary experiences of Jesus' lifetime while Matthew puts in extraordinary experiences of the apostolic age ;—at all events, this second word is eschatological in its substance : it deals with the last judgment. Not so the first saying ; as it runs in

Luke, "*And why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?*" there is nothing in it, which tends towards eschatology. Now there can be hardly any doubt that Luke has the original form of this saying, and that the Matthaean form, "*Not every one that says unto me, Lord, Lord, SHALL ENTER INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN, but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven,*" with its unmistakable eschatological colouring, strengthened by the introduction of "*in that day*" in the next sentence, is due to the combination with that other saying. It is a well-known feature in the composition of our First Gospel—and we shall see other instances of the same immediately—that words are brought into a closer connexion by conforming them one to the other.

The priority of the non-eschatological form of this saying is supported (1) by the parable which follows immediately in Luke and only a few verses later on in Matthew as well in quite the same form, so that we may trace it back to Q, the parable, I mean, of the house built on the rock or upon the sand, a parable which is not likely to be taken in an eschatological sense; and (2) by the comparison of another saying which has much affinity to it, Jesus' saying about His relations: "*For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother*" (Mark iii. 35; cp. Matt. xii. 50, Luke viii. 21). It is not said: I will, at the day of judgment, declare him to be my brother, etc., but "*he is.*" So it is a purely moral statement without the peculiar taste of eschatology. And this is all the more remarkable as it is found in the Marcan tradition.

2. The next instance of this kind of transformation I find in the parables of the tares and of the net, forming originally a couple of parables as so many others, now separated in Matthew xiii. 24-30 (with an additional interpretation in v. 36-43) and xiii. 47-50. The evangelist sees in both parables a description of the last judgement, when "*the*



*Son of Man shall send forth his angels and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that cause stumbling, and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire, there shall be the weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father.*” “*The harvest is the end of the world,*” xiii. 39, this is the main point of Matthew’s interpretation, from which all the parable is to be explained. But take the parables by themselves, and you will see that there is no necessity for this interpretation. Jesus is not describing a single act but something which occurs to men at any time. As sowing and harvest are repeated annually and the gathering and sifting of fishes is the fisherman’s daily work, so it is some rule for daily life which Jesus put into His disciples’ mind by telling them these parables. Many interpreters since the time of Tertullian have found here some rule of ecclesiastical conduct: the Church as a *corpus mixtum* has to contain sinners as well as saints until the day of God’s judgement. But this is neither the meaning of the evangelist, who in his allegorical interpretation makes the field signify the world, not the Church, and neglects the servants of the householder altogether, the problem Matthew is interested in being not the composition of the Christian Church and the conduct of its leaders on account of bad members, but the situation of Christianity in the midst of the world of unbelievers, a close parallel to John xvii. 11, 14: “*These are in the world,*” “*not of the world.*” Nor is it the original meaning of the parable, this giving merely the general moral rule: “Do not put in your hands before things are ready; everything will, at the proper time, be revealed for what it is; leave it to God’s care—the same rule as we have it in the famous counsel of Gamaliel, Acts v. 35 ff.

3. The main instance of this intrusion of eschatology into the Gospel-tradition is the great eschatological sermon

found in Mark xiii., Matthew xxiv. and Luke xxi. It was in the year 1864 that Colani and Weizsäcker, one independent of the other, came to the conclusion that this is not the report of an original sermon of Jesus, but a composite work, mixing original sayings of Christ with parts of a little apocalypse, as to the origin of which there was and is still some difference of opinion, some scholars maintaining with Weizsäcker, that it was a Jewish document, while the majority agrees in acknowledging the Christian character and is inclined to identify this little apocalyptic fly-leaf with the revelation spoken of by Eusebius, *H.E.* iii. v. 3, as having caused the Christians to move from the Holy City before its fall. As reconstructions of this little apocalypse are easily accessible, e.g., in Professor Charles' book on Eschatology, I may confine myself to a few remarks: (1) As we have only Mark (Matthew borrowing from Mark<sup>1</sup> and Luke colouring Mark's narrative), it is impossible to reconstruct the actual words of Mark's source; it contained probably verses 7, 8, 14-20, 24-27; but it is uncertain if some words, such as verses 15 and 18, are perhaps additions by Mark, and, on the other hand, if we have to add verses 21-23 and perhaps also verse 30. (2) We find described only a few remarkable features: in the first part, the beginnings of horrors, a general motion and revolution among the peoples and all kinds of frightful events; in the second part, the culmination of horrors, something mysterious, Mark using the same words as Daniel, but contrary to the Greek gender as a masculine, showing thereby that he thinks of an individual, some Antichrist. With the notion of supreme horror are combined two different ideas of getting out of them: a *local* one—flying into the mountains, and this is the pet point of the little apocalypse,

<sup>1</sup> I do not think that two or three instances, given by B. Weiss and others, are enough to prove that Matthew had independent knowledge of that apocalypse.

marked by calling the attention of the reader (you see it is not a sermon of Jesus); and on the other hand a *temporal* one—shortening of the time by the powerful interfering of the Lord (you see again, it is not Jesus who is speaking here); and in the third part, through a terrible motion of all the elements, the glorious advent of the Messiah. There is in all this, not even in the last part, nothing of peculiar Christian notions which we ought to trace back to Jesus Himself. They are common apocalyptic ideas. And yet, all is so short, so brief in this little apocalypse, nothing unnecessary, only main points. This is, I believe, the proof-mark of early Christian in comparison with late Jewish literature, according to Wellhausen's well-known remark regarding the Gospel and rabbinic literature: that all that is in the Gospel is to be found there too, yes, all, and much more. It is especially the lack of all national and political elements in this much-condensed little apocalypse which makes it quite clear—as far as I may be able to pronounce judgement—that the conception is an early Christian one, using the materials of late Jewish eschatology in its own way. (3) The very fact that Mark could give this little apocalypse as a sermon of Jesus, taken together with this other fact, that several words of the apocalypse have parallels in well-attested sayings of Jesus<sup>1</sup> and that the sayings combined with the apocalypse in Mark xiii. bear nearly the same stamp,<sup>2</sup> proves that the main ideas of this little fly-leaf are not far removed from Jesus' own opinions. But the fact remains, that it is an eschatological addition to the original Jesus-tradition.

These three instances of alteration by intrusion of eschatology could easily be multiplied. But if one were to conclude

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Mark xiii. 15, 16 with Luke xvii. 31; Mark xiii. 21–23 with Luke xvii. 23; Matt. xxiv. 26; especially Mark xiii. 26 with viii. 38 and xiv. 62.

<sup>2</sup> So Mark xiii. 6 is nearly identical with xiii. 21 f.=Luke xvii. 23.

that all eschatological material found actually in the Gospel was but later addition or transformation, one would be wide of the mark. False generalisation is the worst of all faults in method. Plenty of eschatological sayings remain, which must come from original tradition.

Before starting, however, our proper investigation, let us turn to another form of alteration [*B*], eschatological utterances of Jesus being transfigured into historical predictions—especially by Luke.

1. There is, e.g., Christ's saying in regard to Jerusalem, taken evidently from Q, both in Matthew xxiii. 37-39 and Luke xiii. 34-35. The closing words: "*And I say unto you, Ye shall not see me, until ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord,*" are capable of a twofold interpretation, either eschatological or—as they recur at Jesus' entrance into Jerusalem—historical. Now Luke placing the saying long before this entrance, understood probably, and liked his readers to understand, in the latter sense: an historical prediction of the Messianic entrance: whereas Matthew, recording the word only after this entrance, took it evidently in an eschatological sense. And he was right in his understanding, as far as I can see.

2. A similar instance of transformation is given in Luke's reproduction of Mark xiii., the already mentioned synoptic apocalypse: "*The abomination of desolation,*" spoken of by Mark and Matthew as *standing where HE ought not* (or *in the holy place*, Matthew) is paraphrased by Luke xxi. 20 in the following way: "*But when ye see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that her DESOLATION is at hand.*" It is the same word *ἐρήμωσις*, used here instead of some more usual expressions for destruction, as *καταστροφή, καθάρσεις, καταβολή, ἀνατροπή*, which betrays Luke borrowing from the Danielic formula in Mark and taking the mysterious



expression in the sense of some prophetic utterances.<sup>1</sup> In this way he substitutes definite historical prediction for an obscure eschatological prophecy.<sup>2</sup>

If this be granted we have to reckon with the possibility that the number of eschatological sayings found in the earliest tradition has undergone diminution as well as enrichment by later alterations.

## II.

We now proceed to ask how much there is of assured eschatological matter in the sayings of our Lord.

1. To begin with the main object of His preaching; the Kingdom of God is in its origin undoubtedly an entirely eschatological notion. It is not God's government over the world, not His ruling His people, as usually in the Psalter, when there is said, "God rules," "God is King," but it is a peculiar estate of things when God is reigning without any opposition, neither by man, nor by the evil spirits. Now as John the Baptist (Matt. iii. 2) preaches that this Kingdom of God is at hand,<sup>3</sup> so the preaching of Jesus begins with the very same announcement: *the time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand* (Mark i. 15; cp. Matt. iv. 17). We have perhaps a

<sup>1</sup> ἐρήμωσις is found in LXX=תַּבְּרוּךְ in Jer. vii. 34, xxii. 5, xxxii. 18, li. 6, 22, but connected with γῆ, in connexion with Jerusalem in Daniel ix. 2. Josephus uses ἄλωσις B. J. I. i. 4 (10); VI. x, 1 (441), sometimes κατασκαφή; ibid. VI. x. 1 (440). For other equivalents see *Corpus glossariorum latinorum* ed. Loewe et Goetz, vi. 333, s.v. *destructio*.

<sup>2</sup> Another view has been proposed recently by my friend, Prof. F. Spitta; in a suggestive study, "Die grosse eschatologische Rede Jesu" in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1909, 348-401; retracting his own former hypothesis of a Jewish apocalypse inserted in Matt. xxiv., Spitta maintains that Luke gives the original form of Jesus' answer to His disciples, the genuine prediction of the destruction of the temple being changed in Caligula's time into the apocalyptic notion known from Daniel.

<sup>3</sup> We may perhaps be not allowed to take these words as a genuine rendering of John's message, because in Mark i. 4, 8 and Luke iii. 3, 7 ff. as well as in Matt. iii. 7 ff. he is represented rather as announcing an almost severe judgement. But this has to be taken only as the beginning or rather the means of making way for the kingdom of God.

still better instance of this in the Lord's prayer : if Jesus makes His disciples pray : "*Thy kingdom come,*" then it is not to be taken as already come but as to be hoped and prayed for. The next petition, given only by Matthew, "*Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth,*" makes it clear what the kingdom of God was understood to be : a moral estate of mankind wherein God's will was done without exception, without any opposition by personal sin or by contrary forces in society. The Kingdom of God, as it would be conceived by those people who heard Jesus preaching, was to be something most desirable, an estate of complete happiness, something that was worthy the hardest efforts and even the greatest loss ; you ought to give everything for it, even your own life. But at the same time people would understand that it was something to be looked for which you cannot make by your own efforts, but you have to wait for it until God brings it about.

2. Now the main question is for us as it was for the men of that time : What was the relation of Jesus to this Kingdom of God ? Except two or three passages which we are to consider later on, He never says that He is bringing it into being, but He speaks of Himself as of the Son of Man, a title which, as we know already, had a Messianic content ; He never says directly that He is the Messiah ; He even declines to be called the Son of David. And yet His whole appearance, the way He manifests Himself and the authoritative tone which He adopts show that He is the very kind of man to proclaim Himself the Messiah. And at last, when He is set before the High Court of the people and asked in the most solemn way by the High Priest upon His claim : "*Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed ?*" then He said : "*I am, and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming with the clouds of heaven* (Mark xiv. 61, 62). This is an unmistakable expression of His claim for Messiahship. And even if we would prefer the form in

which Matthew xxvi. 64 puts the words: "*Thou hast said; nevertheless I say unto you, henceforth ye shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming on the clouds of heaven,*" we ought to say that it is a form of restrained assertion which we may paraphrase: Yes, but it is not I who have used the actual word, but thou hast used it.

Now it seems to me to be impossible to maintain, as some scholars do, that Jesus denies His Messiahship altogether (so Dalman, Merx), or that He makes a distinction between Himself and the Messiah to be expected according to the words of Psalm cx. 1 and Daniel vii. 13. With more probability it has been said that He claims Messiahship not as His present state, but only for a future time. He is not the Messiah, but He will be the Messiah. This notion of a Messiah to come, first put forth, so far as I know, by Joh. Weiss, has met with an almost unusual degree of assent. It has been accepted by H. Holtzmann, A. Harnack,<sup>1</sup> H. Monnier<sup>2</sup> and many others. Indeed, there are some difficulties in the life of Jesus which would find the easiest explanation by assuming that Jesus, persuaded as He was that He was the Son of God, the chosen one to bring salvation, nevertheless, conceived Himself not to be the Messiah, but only to be destined to be the Messiah in a later time: *Messias destinatus, Messias futurus*. His appearance, resembling rather a rabbi or at most a prophet, was so far from the popular notion of the Messiah, who should be a glorious and mighty king, destroying all his enemies by means of his power, that we easily could imagine Him taking His present appearance only as a preparatory one, His office being to prepare the people for His coming in glory as the Messiah. So He would have been His own forerunner, His own John the Baptist. But this was not His view, neither was it the opinion of His

<sup>1</sup> *Sprüche und Reden Jesu* (= Beiträge II.), 1907, 169.

<sup>2</sup> *La mission historique de Jésus*, 1906, 64.

judges. The question laid before Him by the High Priest was, "*Art thou the Christ the Son of the Blessed?*" And Jesus answered, "*I am.*" He did not tell them: Not yet, but if you will bring Me to death, then I shall be it. He simply replied, "*I am, and you will see.*" The condemnation by the High Council as well as the accusation brought before the Roman Governor gives, I think, sufficient evidence that His claim on Messiahship was understood not as that of a Messiah *destinatus*, but as that of a present Messiah. It is just the contrast between this claim and the very appearance of this humble prisoner brought before him which puzzles Pilate so that he would have refused to execute the sentence, except for fear of the Jews, who frightened him by the Emperor's wrath. The title on the Cross is by itself a convincing argument against this modern theory of a Messiahship of the future.

3. It is quite certain, I should think, that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah. But it is equally certain that He speaks of His coming again in glory and power. If one would reject the testimony of Mark xiv. 62 pleading that there was none of the disciples present at the trial, one must accept the combined testimony of other utterances. When speaking about the necessity of confession he says: "*For whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, the Son of Man also shall be ashamed of him, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels*" (Mark viii. 38; cf. Matt. xvi. 27; Luke ix. 26). When asked by James and John to give them the places of honour on His right and on His left *in His glory*, as Mark x. 37, or *in His kingdom*, as Matthew xx. 21 puts the question, He does not reject this notion, but only makes a very hard condition, and refers the right of bestowing those places to the Father (Mark x. 35-40; Matt. xx. 20-23).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This has a remarkable parallel in the promise given to the twelve that they shall take part in the messianic judgement sitting on twelve thrones (Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 29, 30 [Q?]).



The warnings against false Messiahs (cf. Mark xiii. 6, 21, and Luke xvii. 23, 24, Matt. xxiv. 23-28) presuppose the idea of His own coming again.

There are many parables, dealing with the unexpected returning of the Lord, or the sudden coming of some one: Mark xiii. 33-37 gives only short extracts, which, however, show he knew a much larger tradition, which one may try to reconstruct by the help of the First and the Third Gospels.

So far we have gathered mainly from the Marcan tradition. Mark, it has been said, is the strongest supporter of eschatological views; and, in fact, there are some passages where the other main sources have a less eschatological colouring: not only Luke, who reproduces Jesus' answer to the High Priest without the closing sentence (*coming*, etc.), allowing, thereby, for a more spiritual interpretation of the rest (*sitting at the right hand*), and so weakening the eschatological impression, but also Q, of equal value with Mark in regard to the certainty of tradition; so instead of the words quoted above from Mark viii. 38, "*The Son of Man also shall be ashamed of him, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels*," we read in Q (Luke xii. 9 and Matt. x. 33) "*He that denieth me in the presence of men shall be denied in the presence of the angels of God*" (or according to Matthew, *before my Father which is in heaven*), a phrase which, intended to be understood in an eschatological sense, is capable, however, of a more spiritual interpretation not showing that peculiar note of time characteristic of Jewish eschatology.

But we must not generalise this fact and draw the conclusion that eschatology supported only or mostly by Mark is his own addition, and therefore not to be taken as a genuine part of Jesus' teaching. Neither Q nor the other non-Markan sources of our Gospel-tradition are bare of eschatology; on the contrary, they support it strongly.

We have mentioned already the promise made to the

disciples (Matt. xix. 28; Luke xxii. 29-30); Jesus' woe over Jerusalem (Matt. xxiii. 39; Luke xiii. 35), with its final sentences: "*Ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say: Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord.*"

The admonition for readiness gains strength from the argument: "*For in an hour that ye think not the Son of Man cometh*" (Matt. xxiv. 44; cp. Luke xii. 40).

The coming of the Son of Man is said to be like a lightning (Matt. xxiv. 27; cp. Luke xvii. 24).

The want of vigilance and the carelessness of mankind before the coming of the Son of Man is compared with the state of mind in the days of Noah (Matt. xxiv. 37; cp. Luke xvii. 26).

All this shows that the notion of the coming of the Son of Man as something still to be expected is a commonplace in Gospel-tradition and has to be traced back to Jesus Himself.

4. There is another remark to be made in connexion with these utterances. It is hardly said anywhere how the coming of the Son of Man will be, except that it will be suddenly, surprising. Sometimes we find used the words of Daniel: "*on or with the clouds of heaven.*" Sometimes *angels* are spoken of as following Him. His *glory* is mentioned. If the single phrase is capable of a spiritualising interpretation, the impression made by the whole set of passages will be that it is some miraculous, supernatural, but at the same time external and visible event in history, or better still, some catastrophe at the very end of history; in one word, some really eschatological fact, which is meant.

It is important to settle this before we go on, because the spiritualising tendency of modern theology has tried to escape from this conclusion by dealing with every passage by itself. So making one after the other say what they were wanted to say, the interpreter was able to declare, that there is no eschatology at all.

Take, e.g., Jesus' answer before the High Priest : "*Ye shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming with the clouds of heaven.*" Professor Haupt says : How can they see Him sitting at the right hand of power ? this can be meant only in a spiritual way : they shall see His influence in the wonderful propagation of His gospel ; and so the next sentence, and coming, etc., is but another illustration of the same idea ; they will see His influence in the judgement passed upon their own people for having rejected Him. This seems quite probable. But taken together with all the other utterances we have just considered, this explanation will hardly satisfy any one. If these words are spoken by Jesus—and I see no reason for denying this—they must be taken as they stand, as an expression for some really eschatological event.

5. A further point of no less importance is the following : Jesus says : "*Ye shall see.*" In connexion with a spiritual interpretation this may well be explained as comprehending not so much the judges themselves as their children and grandchildren and all other generations to follow. Taken together with our realistic interpretation it can only mean : you by yourselves, not men of a later time. The present generation is the latest. It is destined to live to see the end of all history.

This interpretation is confirmed by a set of sayings dealing with the notion of the present generation : We read in Mark xiii. 30, and in the parallel passages Matthew xxiv. 34, Luke xxi. 32, "*Verily I say unto you : This generation shall not pass away, until all these things be accomplished.*" As this saying is found in the eschatological chapter some writers maintain that it is a part of that fly-leaf which we found to be a later Christian apocalypse. This is possible, but I think it is equally possible and even more probable that it belongs to the genuine stock of sayings of Jesus, which were

mixed up with that little apocalypse. At any rate, it is quite in the same line with those other words of Jesus, "*Ye shall see,*" etc.

It seems to be contradicted, however, by another saying. When asked by the Pharisees to give a sign from heaven, Jesus sighed deeply in His spirit and said, "*Why doth this generation seek a sign? Verily, I say unto you: There shall no sign be given unto this generation.*" So Mark viii. 12. We are accustomed to another form of this answer, adding "*but the sign of Jonah.*" So we read in Matthew xvi. 4, the parallel passage to Mark viii. 12, as well as in Matthew xii. 39 and Luke xi. 29, two parallel passages taken probably from Q. Now as Matthew usually conforms the sayings he borrows from different sources, the testimony of Matthew xvi. 4 is of no value. We have in reality only Mark against Q, Q giving the additional words, Mark omitting them. Which form is genuine? Against the vast majority of writers I think Wellhausen is right here in maintaining the superiority of the Marcan tradition. Nobody until this day has succeeded in giving a fair explanation of what the sign of Jonah might mean. It is, I dare say, commonly acknowledged to-day that the interpretation given already by Matthew xii. 40 as pointing to the three days and three nights which Jonah spent in the whale's belly and Jesus likewise in the tomb or in Hell, is wrong. The preaching of Jonah, which caused the people of Nineveh to repent, can hardly be called a sign. Now, as our saying is combined in Q with another saying dealing with the repentance of the people of Nineveh at the preaching of Jonah, it seems to me highly probable that this other saying gave rise to the addition in the former saying, and that therefore Mark has preserved its original form. Jesus does not promise any sign, but He denies to the present generation the sign which they ask for, viz., the Messianic sign, which is, of course, to be distinguished from His powerful acts of mercy,



these in the oldest tradition never being called σημεῖον sign. So Jesus by this answer denies that this generation will see the coming of the Messiah.

The contradiction between this saying and the other two sayings mentioned before, exists, I think, only in appearance. The solution is to be found in another saying, recorded by Mark ix. i (cp. Matt. xvi. 28 and Luke ix. 27): "*Verily I say unto you: There be some here of them that stand by which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the Kingdom of God come with power.*" This is not to be taken in a spiritual sense; it refers to the real Parousia. This will be in the lifetime of the present generation. But, this is the main point to be remarked here: Jesus does not say that all who stand around will be still alive. He solemnly declares: there will be some still alive when it happens to come. This looks rather like a later restriction made at a time when most of them who had been with Jesus had gone already without having seen his Parousia. But taken together with those other sayings it will prove to be the original conception of Jesus, explaining what He meant by generation, when He said: "*no sign to this generation,*" and "*this generation shall not pass*" on the other side. We find a similar instance in the Old Testament—and we may suppose Jesus bearing this in mind—viz., that of all the generation which went out from Egypt only two, Joshua son of Nun, and Caleb son of Jephunneh, were able to enter the land of promise (Num. xiv. 30, 38, cp. 1 Cor. x. 5). This parallel makes it quite clear that "*this generation*" is not to be taken in the sense of this nation (as some interpreters ventured to explain), but in the chronological sense of the word: the men just now living. This generation got the advantage of seeing God's highest revelation, compared with which even the time of the patriarchs and of Solomon counted for nothing; but having proved unworthy of such grace, this generation was to be

called an evil and adulterous one. So it resulted that, while *the blood of all prophets would be required of this generation* (Luke xi. 51), or [in other words] *all these things would come upon this generation* (Matt. xxiii. 36), only few of them would be worthy to live to see the establishment of salvation, the coming of the Son of Man. It is indeed, as we said before, in Jesus' opinion, the last generation destined to see the Kingdom of God.

This, I think, is not in contradiction with other sayings of Jesus : as, e.g., His saying Mark xiii. 32 (cp. Matt. xxiv. 36) : "*Of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father,*"<sup>1</sup> because in putting the date at the end of His generation He gives no real date ; nor by those two sayings dealing with the spread of the Gospel, viz., Matt. x. 23, "*Ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel, till the Son of Man be come*" ; and on the other side, Mark xiii. 10 (cp. Matt. xxiv. 14) : "*The gospel must first be preached unto all nations,*" two statements contradicting one another and showing neither of them the genuine teaching of Jesus but the later views of Jewish and Gentile Christianity. Jesus' statement about the Coming of the Kingdom in the lifetime of His own generation is in full accordance with the general tenor of His admonitions. When He says, "*Watch therefore : for ye know not when the Lord of the house cometh*" (Mark xiii. 35 ; cp. Matt. xxiv. 42), He addresses, undoubtedly, the men of His own time, this and other parables having no effect if the Parousia was not supposed to occur in the lifetime of these men.

As a matter of fact He announces the death of some of His disciples, e.g., the sons of Zebedee (Mark x. 39 ; Matt.

<sup>1</sup> It is an open question whether the words "*neither the Son*" are to be omitted in the text of Matt. or not. At all events they are genuine in Mark. And so the question can be only whether the omission is due to Matthew himself or to a later copyist, the motive being in both cases that the words seemed to be derogatory to the divinity of Christ.

xx. 23) as well as He foretells His own death—I see no reason for treating this with Ed. Schwartz as an *ex eventu* prophecy—but this comes out rather as an exception, the disciples not being deprived by their martyrdom of the benefit of partaking in the glorious kingdom, no less than Jesus Himself, who firmly believed in getting through death to life, patronising in this department Pharisaic doctrine against Sadducean unbelief, or rather protecting by His own assent what was of real value in the progress of Jewish religious thought, at the same time improving it by putting out from it all sensuousness, all elements of worldly, chiliasitic happiness: “*For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven*” (Mark xii. 25 and par.)

In the same way, when Jesus speaks of a meal where the sons of the kingdom will be gathered with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, we may conclude that this is meant eschatologically, but not in a chiliastic sense as a big dinner, where—as it is represented sometimes in late Jewish literature, the Leviathan will be given as fish and the Behemoth as meat, and the cups will be filled with wine without end. As a matter of fact we find Jesus using the very words of being at table, eating bread and drinking the fruit of the vine in the kingdom of God (Matt. viii. 11; Luke xiii. 29, xiv. 15; Mark xiv. 25 c. par.); but here realistic interpretation is out of place; it is the popular way of expressing supreme happiness, which Jesus is using for something which is far beyond the literal sense of the words. Nobody I trust would imagine Jesus foretelling to His disciples the pleasures of a dinner in the Messianic kingdom, even when he takes the most realistic view of Jesus' eschatology.

E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ.

*STUDIES IN THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT.*

III. THE COMPOSITION OF A GOSPEL.

It has been more than once suggested—most recently by Professor Gwatkin in his valuable *Early Church History*—that something may be learned about the labours of those who composed our Gospels by studying the ways of the Moslem Traditionalists. These persons had not much to do with the text of their Sacred Book, which was written and fixed ; still they had to find out the occasions on which texts were revealed, as their theory put it. Otherwise it was their business to obtain as full and accurate knowledge as possible of what their master had said and done, since either counted as a source of law. And those who took their profession seriously travelled from country to country and from city to city, to hear the best authorities, and find out what chains of evidence were trustworthy. The author who acquired most fame in this line worked for sixteen years in this way, and is said to have rejected as unauthentic far more than nine-tenths of the matter which he had collected.

In the Preface to the Third Gospel the work done by previous writers as well as by the author is described as *re-arranging* the matter handed down by the original eye-witnesses and servants (preservers and translators) of the Word, and the writer declares that he has strictly traced every statement, in order that his reader (the typical Christian) might know the truth about what he had already been made to commit to memory. *Rearrangement* implies that the previous arrangement had been faulty. Probably this was due to the original teachers relating only words which they had actually heard, or scenes at which they had actually been present. The matter would then have



a tendency to assume what is technically called a *musnad* arrangement, i.e. in the order of the names of the original authorities. Rearrangement might then be either in order of subjects, or chronological order; and for the latter purpose the study of the occasion of delivery (*asbāb al-nuzūl*) would be required.

A Gospel-writer who did his work conscientiously (as we have every reason for believing that the author of the Third Gospel did) would then feel that each year that passed lessened the chance of his getting at the truth. His only way of obtaining it would be to travel to all the Churches where traditions were recited and committed to memory, and question all persons of authority as to the source of their information; imploring them to strain their powers of memory to the very utmost, to recollect the exact words in which they first heard the tradition which they handed on, whether in Hebrew, Aramaic, or Greek. And in the course of the work, if diligently accomplished, the student would formulate a variety of criteria. He would dismiss all traditions traceable to particular names as unsound; while of the accuracy and faithfulness of certain others he would become convinced. In some cases he would require two witnesses, or even three, before he accepted a narrative as authentic. Probably he would be no freer than some of ourselves from bias, and so introduce criteria which others might not find convincing. Yet on the whole it is a true saying that what is sought is likely to be found. The writer who within three generations of the events pursued his inquiry regardless of time or cost, would certainly discover the truth in numerous places where those who rearranged it on *a priori* principles would have missed it.

When such a writer gives the world his authorities, they contain a partial record of the labour which he has spent; but even so the world knows nothing therefrom of the labour

which has produced only negative results ; and this may have been ten or twenty times as much as the other. Let us suppose, e.g., that " Luke " has been at pains to inquire into the authority on which the narrative of the Magi and the slaughter of the Innocents rested, and discovered it to be inadequate and untrustworthy ; such an inquiry might require distant travels, including consultation with Jewish historians (such as Josephus) as to visits of Magi to Jerusalem being recorded, or this particular atrocity being remembered among the many which blackened Herod's fame ; and if no confirmation could be found and the narratives in consequence were omitted from the final work, there would be no trace in the latter of all the trouble that had been taken. For the most conscientious historian may think that the best way of ending up a groundless assertion is not to repeat it even with the view of refutation.

Cases certainly may occur in which the less critical historian will be more helpful to posterity than the more careful. The latter will put nothing down which conveys no satisfactory meaning, while the former does not regard this as his concern. An illustration may be found in the treatment by our Evangelists of the saying (Matt. v. 15), " Neither do men light a candle and put it under the bushel, but upon the stand." Has every house then its *bushel*, i.e. its bushel measure, just as it has its lampstand ? Matthew does not help us any further ; Mark has a suggestion, (iv. 21), " under the bushel or under the bed "—the inconvenience of which is that the bed known to the Gospels is the sort which a man can take up and carry (i.e. some pieces of material spread on the ground) under which a lamp could not be put without being at once extinguished. Luke gives this saying twice : viii. 16, " covers it with a vessel, or puts it under a bed " ; xi. 33, " puts it in a crypt or under the bushel." In one of these versions the difficulty is solved by the inference that the

“bushel” meant some sort of hollow vessel; in the other we have an intelligible phrase, followed by what would by a modern writer be put in a note (*literally* “under the bushel”). It would appear then that Luke heard this tradition in some places *with* the article, in others *without* it; and this small matter would alter the sense. Without the article, it need not imply that every house had its “bushel” measure—the illustration would be merely drawn from *a* hollow vessel, capable of covering it. With the article, it implies that every house has this utensil, and the suggestion is that “under the bushel”—which might reasonably be expected to be erect, and filled with grain—was a proverbial phrase meaning “in the cellar.”

To the modern critic it is apparent that *the bushel* is a mistranslation of something, and that all the varieties which Mark and Luke exhibit are attempts at dealing with the difficulty noticed—viz., that a cornchandler would have a *bushel* in the sense of a vessel capable of holding a bushel, but no one else. Yet the mistranslation is easy to detect; the Syriac, *sata*, “bushel,” also means *mortar*, as Bar Bahlūl informs us; and it is identical with the Jewish Aramaic *āsīthā*. Even in the wilderness the Israelites had *mortars* with which they could grind the manna (Num. xi. 8). And every family or household “has one of these large stone mortars,” says Thomson, speaking of Syria.<sup>1</sup> There were also mortars of metal, e.g. iron, and one of them could be turned upside down to provide a standing-place for a speaker.<sup>2</sup>

LS has this word, which may mean “bushel” or “mortar”; CS alters it into the Greek word for “bushel”; PS restores the ambiguous word. In LS it may go back to the original tradition of the Gospel.

It is evident that the Evangelists had great difficulty in

<sup>1</sup> *The Land and the Book* (1879), p. 84.

<sup>2</sup> Levy, s.v. סת'סס.

finding the occasion of this saying. And, as such a saying might well have been uttered many times, Luke needs no apology for repeating it.

In Matthew it occupies a place beside another aphorism—that about salt—which Mark and Luke also recorded; but in both cases Matthew only attaches the aphorisms to a description of the disciples as “the light of the world” and “the salt of the earth”—which we are surprised that the other records do not preserve—if indeed reference be to the disciples. For that they should be given so glorious a title before they had received any commission to preach, seems extraordinary. It may be then that this is not Matthew’s intention; for the theory that the Jews in general were the light of the world meets us in Midrashes, e.g. the Book of Wisdom xviii. 4, where the darkness of Egypt is said to be an appropriate punishment to those “who had kept thy sons locked up, through whom the incorruptible light of the law was to be given to the world.” The Targum of Isaiah xlix. 6 implies the theory that the nation rather than one member of it were to be the “Light of the Gentiles.”

In 15 there is a slight difference in the Syriac texts, which may prove to be of some importance. For “a city that is set on a hill” the older versions have “that is built on a hill, which is first accommodated to the Greek in SH. These two renderings represent rather different ways of interpreting the passage. “A city built on a hill” implies an assumption that the community to which reference is made are in that condition; they from their situation cannot escape notice, and are commanded to *shine*. “A city set on a hill,” on the other hand, implies that the setting corresponds with the setting of the light to which reference is made in the next verse, and brings the position on a hill-top within the sphere of the precept. We should, however, in this case expect the mention of a *beacon* rather than of a



*city*, which cannot be transferred from one situation to another without time and effort.

The rendering "built" then makes an assumption, whereas the rendering "set" implies a precept. The assumption that Israel was "a city built on a hill" might be based on various passages of the Old Testament, e.g. Psalm xlvi.

Once more, then, the First Gospel brings the saying about putting a light where it can be seen into relation with texts of the Old Testament, which the compiler of the Gospel assumes to have been the basis of the maxims, as would doubtless have been the case with the maxims of the Rabbis. The other Evangelists avoid this canon, and connect the saying with others on the subject of the eye, or of the tendency of what is hidden to come to light.

No less difficulty was clearly found in *rearranging* the saying about the salt which has lost its savour, which happens to be preserved in the Jewish Oral Tradition, though not quite correctly. For it seems clear that the original for "hath lost its savour" is the Mishnic word for "to be without salt"<sup>1</sup> as opposed to "being salted," which occurs first in Job vi. 6, where it clearly has this sense, while in Job i. 22 it means moral tastelessness, i.e. "folly," which is the representation of it in the Greek of Matthew and Luke. CS, as so often, gives a double rendering. In the Jewish Oral Tradition it is quoted as an example of the impossible; the reply to the question With what can it be seasoned? is: With something that is no more to be found in nature than savourless salt. Although the context in Matthew ("a city set on a hill cannot," etc.) might seem to favour this interpretation, what follows in both Matthew and Luke (xiv. 35) excludes it: for we are told in both cases what is done with salt of the kind; it is not then regarded as an unknown event that it should become tasteless. The

<sup>1</sup> תפל.

words of Luke, "it is neither fit for the land, nor yet for the dunghill," are so difficult that it is not surprising that they disappear in the Matthaean recension; the words are not however, quite unintelligible, as the practice of sowing with salt, in order to sterilize, is alluded to in the Old Testament, and its use as a disinfectant seems to be recorded.

The context in which we should have expected this saying to appear would be where the case of the eye, which is the light of the body, becoming darkness, is considered (Matt. vi. 22, Luke xi. 34). In the case of Matthew we see that the subject is suggested otherwise by the context, and that it was perhaps regarded as a comment on Job vi. 6, the wording of which bears some resemblance to that in Matthew.<sup>1</sup> In Mark it is attached to a saying about salting, which naturally furnishes a context. Mark accommodates the wording to Greek usage by substituting "unsalted" for "turn foolish", which is the old idiom. He further introduces the saying with the aphorism "salt is good". In the case of Luke the saying is clearly not placed on *a priori* grounds, for the context does not suggest it. Apparently actual research of the kind described convinced him that Mark's introduction was genuine, and procured for him the valuable supplement to the saying which even Matthew abridges. How many journeys and consultations may have been involved by this slight piece of "rearrangement" is wholly unknown. But the underlying process appears to be scientific enough.

The written rearrangement must ultimately oust the Oral *musnad*, but the latter has a tendency to survive with some tenacity. The intentional as well as the casual alteration is more likely to occur in the latter than in the former, because what the memory reproduces is the personal or subjective interpretation of a saying rather than the saying itself.

<sup>1</sup> אֲסֹלָה. Compare *σχημα*.

Utilisation of written documents, while the oral tradition still exists, is very different from their utilisation after it has ceased. In the former case the written composition has no authority, as it is the business of the critic to get behind it, and test the basis whereon it rests ; for him the narratives still count as traditions remembered in certain areas and attributed to certain authorities ; their rearrangement is largely hypothetical. But when the written arrangement has ousted the oral tradition, criticism is apt to be silenced, because it cannot claim to go behind the material before it ; it can only harmonise or discredit, but cannot ascertain the point at which a discrepancy came in, or fix on the person responsible for a particular statement. We admire the modesty and self-sacrifice of those who, instead of flaunting their industry, allow a sentence to represent the work of a year ; yet a later age would often be grateful if they had not only published the result, but added something about the means by which it had been procured.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

### *THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE PSALTER.*

#### III. PSALM CX.

THE Psalm, as is evident from the terms used, is written of some Israelite king. Like the other Psalms of the same type—the 2nd or the 72nd, for instance—it depicts, under a particular aspect, the ideal glory of the theocratic king. It represents him as marching out with his people against his foes, as victorious, with Yahweh's help, against them, and, what is especially remarkable, as not king only, but priest.

1 'Tis Yahweh's oracle to my lord :  
 ' Sit thou at my right hand,  
 until I make thine enemies thy footstool.'

(*Tis*) *Yahweh's oracle* (or *whisper*) is the expression used so constantly by the prophets: in the English versions rendered, 'saith the LORD,' and so not distinguished from the ordinary Hebrew for 'saith the LORD.' The root of *ne'um*, 'oracle,' means in Arabic *to utter a low sound*: hence the word in Hebrew probably denoted properly a *whispered utterance*, of a revelation heard quietly by the mental ear. The expression 'my lord' is one which recurs often in the books of Samuel and Kings (1 Sam. xxii. 12, 2 Sam. xiv. 20; more commonly followed by 'the king'); and it is the usual title by which the Israelite king is addressed by his courtiers. It is a prophet who here speaks; and he represents Jehovah as addressing the king, probably at his accession, with a solemn promise, conferring upon him the highest position of honour next himself ('on the right hand,' as 1 Kings ii. 19; Ps. xlv. 9; Matt. x. 21), and assuring him of his protection until his foes are effectually subjugated. The 'footstool' is a truly Oriental figure: we see the conqueror with his feet on his vanquished foes, and we remember how Joshua (Josh. x. 24) bids his captains, after his defeat of the five kings, place their feet upon their necks (cf. 1 Kings v. 3 'Till Yahweh put them under the soles of Solomon's feet'). We have two pictorial illustrations of the passage, one, from Assyria, of a king planting his foot on the necks of prostrate captives; the other, from Egypt, of a king whose footstool is supported by nine heads of crouching captives, in two rows, one above the other, of five and four respectively. 'Until' is naturally not exclusive of the period which follows: it is used to mark a turning-point with which a new epoch begins (cf. cxii. 8).

In what follows the poet expands this oracle, dwelling on the manner in which the promise will be fulfilled:—

2 Yahweh stretch out from Zion the sceptre of thy strength (, saving),  
 'Rule thou in the midst of thine enemies.'



His palace on Zion is the centre of his dominion; and thence will Yahweh Himself stretch out His sceptre, the symbol of His authority, bidding him rule unopposed, while his enemies are submissive and passive about him.

The poet next describes his success, in an ideal battle-scene. He pictures him advancing to the combat, surrounded by his warriors, all equipped, and eager for the fray. We must discard here the now familiar rendering of the P.B. Version ('offer thee free-will offerings with an holy worship'); for it yields a completely false sense.

3 Thy people offer themselves willingly in the day of thy host:  
 in holy adornments,<sup>1</sup> from the womb of the dawn,  
 thine is the dew of thy young men.

Professor Cheyne's beautiful paraphrase may be quoted: 'Martial Israelites stream to the royal banner (comp. Jud. v. 2, 9, where the Hebrew for 'offer themselves freely' is cognate). It is an early morning muster; and suddenly (cf. 2 Sam. xvii. 11, 12) as the

dewdrops which the sun  
 Impearls on every leaf and flower

(Milton's figure for the angel-hosts), and not less past counting than these, there seems to start up on all sides a youthful army, brimming over with that freshness and vigour of which "dew" in the prophets (Hos. xiv. 5, Isa. xxvi. 19) is the symbol.' In the expression 'from the womb of the morning,' the morning is poetically thought of as the mother of the dew. The 'holy adornments,' if correct, allude probably to the warriors' gleaming weapons, called 'holy' because used in the service of Yahweh (comp. the common Hebrew expression, to 'consecrate' a war, or warriors, Joel iii. 9; Jer. xxii. 7 *al.*). But the plural (in the Hebrew) is strange: and very probably, with the

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Symm., Jer., with a very slight change (הררי for הררי), upon the holy mountains.

smallest possible change in the Hebrew text (הררי for הררי), we should read, with Symmachus and Jerome, 'on the holy *mountains*' (viz. of Palestine).

An unexpected trait is next introduced :—

4 Jehovah hath sworn, and will not repent ;  
 'Thou art a priest for ever  
 after the manner of Melchizedek.'

The ruler addressed is not to be only king : he is to be solemnly inaugurated as priest, after the manner—the word does not mean 'order,' as we speak of an 'order' of priesthood<sup>1</sup>—after the manner, not of the Levitical or Aaronic priests, familiar at the time, but of *Melchizedek*, who, in the old primitive fashion, combined the offices of king and priest in his own person. Melchizedek, it seems, is referred to as a type of priest-king, consecrated by old tradition (Gen. xiv.), to which the ideal Israelite king, ruling at the same spot, must conform : Melchizedek united the two offices, and the ideal king must do the same. The name, suggesting 'King of righteousness,' might also be taken as prefiguring the character which the ideal king would bear. 'For ever,' we must remember, need not mean more than for the king's lifetime ; comp. 'a slave for ever' (Deut. xv. 17 ; Job xl. 28), or 'shall serve him for ever' (Exod. xxi. 6).

Vv. 5-7 continue the strain begun in vv. 2-3, and describe the victory which the poet pictures the king as gaining over his foes.

5 The Lord upon thy right hand  
 shattereth kings in the day of his anger.

<sup>1</sup> דברה—a rare word, properly a *statement*, and so *plea, case* (Job v. 8),—acquires also meanings similar to those of דבר, properly *word*, then *thing, reason, case*, etc. So, as על דבר means often 'on account of' (cf. 'for the sake of,' where 'sake' is the Germ. *Sache, thing, matter, case*, etc.), על דברת means 'on account of,' Eccles. iii. 18, viii. 2, and 'for the reason that,' vii. 14 ; and as דבר means *case, reason, manner* (Deut. xv. 2, xix. 4 ; Jos. v. 4 ; 1 Kings ix. 15, xi. 27 ; Esth. i. 13), so דברה here has the force of *manner*.

6 He judgeth among the nations ;  
 he filleth (the places) with dead bodies ;  
 he shattereth the heads in pieces over a wide country.

Jehovah, standing at the king's right hand in his chariot, to assist and support him, will shatter kings in the day of His anger—His ' anger ' against His foes (ii. 5, 12, xxi. 9), or heathen nations, often announced by the prophets : he will ' judge among the nations, fill (the places) with dead bodies, and shatter the heads in pieces over a wide country ' ; we see the enemy in flight, like the Canaanites before Barak, and the plains, far and near, are covered with the heads and corpses of the slain. The Psalm closes with a scene from the pursuit—

7 He drinketh of the wādy<sup>1</sup> by the way :  
 therefore doth he lift up the head.

The king, exhausted in his course, like Jonathan, when he tasted the honey (1 Sam. xiv. 27, where ' his eyes were enlightened ' means that they brightened after faintness, i.e. he revived), is seen refreshing himself at a wādy flowing by ; revived and invigorated by the draught, with head erect, he will continue the pursuit till his triumph is complete.

The Psalm thus depicts a king, assured of the high favour and support of Yahweh, going forth to battle, surrounded by his warriors, and scattering his foes. The picture, it is plain, is an *ideal* one, based upon the experiences of the Israelite kings. We are reminded of David in his conflicts with Syrians or Edomites, Jehoshaphat victorious against the Moabites, or Uzziah subduing Philistines and Arabians. The date of the Psalm it is hardly possible to fix, except within relatively broad limits. But it will scarcely be an early one : it presupposes a time when the position and

<sup>1</sup> Heb. *nahal*, corresponding to the Arabic *wādy*, often met with in books of travel in Palestine. We have no suitable English equivalent : ' brook ' expresses too little ; ' torrent ' too much ; ' stream ' is too colourless ; ' river ' is incorrect.

character of the king had been long reflected on, and had given occasion to ideal delineations. The word rendered *manner* occurs besides only in Job (v. 8) and the very late book, Ecclesiastes (iii. 18, vii. 14, viii. 2). The position of the Psalm in the Psalter, also, does not suggest an early date. It is in the Fifth Book, and it is preceded and followed by Psalms certainly not earlier than the exile, and to all appearance later : cvii., cviii. (a composite Psalm), cix., cxi. ff. If pre-exilic, it will have been spoken of one of the later kings.

Several recent commentators<sup>1</sup> have thought one of the Maccabaeian princes to be referred to. Jonathan, brother of Judas, who was chosen 'prince and leader' of the patriotic party after Judas' death in 161 B.C. (1 Macc. ix. 30 f.), was made by Alexander Balas, son of Antiochus Epiphanes, the 'King's Friend,' appointed by him high priest, and authorised to wear a purple robe and a crown of gold, the insignia of royalty (1 Macc. x. 18-20); he assumed the high-priestly vestments at the Feast of Booths, B.C. 153 (*ib.* v. 21). And Simon, Jonathan's brother, after Jonathan's death (B.C. 143), was made by a decree of the people 'leader and high priest for ever, till there should arise a faithful prophet' (1 Macc. xiv. 41; cf. xiii. 42), capable of deciding doubtful points, like Elijah; he was also to be 'captain,' with supreme charge of all affairs of state (1 Macc. xiv. 42), and was authorised to wear purple and a buckle of gold (*ib.* v. 44). During his seven years' rule (B.C. 143-136) Simon gained many successes, restored the defences of his country, freed it from the yoke of the Syrian (1 Macc. xiii. 41, xiv. 26), and in particular, in 142, drove out of the Akra at Jerusalem the Syrian garrison which had occupied

<sup>1</sup> See Cheyne, *Origin of the Psalter* (1891), pp. 22-29; and cf. Edghill, *Evidential Value of Prophecy*, p. 350 f.; Burney, *Interpreter*, Oct. 1909, p. 60; T. Witton Davies in the *Century Bible*, on Ps. cx., p. 223.



it for twenty-six years (1 Macc. xiii. 51; see i. 33 f.), and entered it 'with praise and palm-branches, and with harps, and cymbals, and viols, and with hymns and songs.' Simon's rule of peace and prosperity is depicted by the author of 1 Maccabees in Messianic colours (1 Macc. xiv. 4-15): the people 'tilled their land in peace, and the land gave her increase, and the trees of the plains their fruit: the old men sat in the streets, they talked all of them together of the good things, and the young men put on glorious and warlike apparel. . . . They sat each man under his vine and his fig-tree, and there was none to make them afraid. . . . And he strengthened all those of his people that were brought low: the law he searched out, and every lawless and wicked person he took away.' The poet of Psalm ex. might well have interpreted the decree of the people making Simon high-priest as embodying the purpose of Jehovah; and Simon's many military successes might well have suggested to him the picture of a victorious campaign.

As Bâthgen says, the view is attractive: but it is not free from objection. In the Psalm one who is already a king is promised a priesthood; but the Maccabees were themselves (1 Macc. ii. 1) of priestly descent, of the family of Joarib (1 Chron. xxiv. 7), though not of the high-priestly line; Jonathan and Simon only became princes or kings on account of the prestige gained by their victories. They would thus have usurped the place of the legitimate high-priest. One wonders whether, under these circumstances, either Jonathan or Simon would have been addressed by a poet-prophet quite in the terms here used. It is also an objection to the same view that the Psalmist, to judge from the words, 'Tis Yahweh's whisper' (see above), speaks as a *prophet*, whereas in 1 Macc. the absence of a prophet is more than once deplored.<sup>1</sup> It is Bâthgen's

<sup>1</sup> iv. 46 and ix. 27, as well as xiv. 41.

view that the Psalm is a late one, and apparently that it is a Maccabaeian one ; but he supposes it to relate not to an actual king, but to the Messiah as he was pictured by the later Jews on the basis of the representations of the earlier prophets. The use of ' my lord,' which seems to suggest an actual king rather than one only pictured as present by the imagination, is some objection to this view, but not perhaps a fatal one ; we may remember how vividly the author of Zechariah ix. 9 (probably c. 300 B.C.) pictures the Messianic king victoriously entering his capital. How the Jews thought of the Messiah in the late post-exilic age may be seen from an extract from Ps. xvii. of the so-called ' Psalms of Solomon,'<sup>1</sup> written probably shortly after Pompey's capture of Jerusalem in B.C. 70—

- 23 Behold, O Lord, and raise up unto them their king,  
the son of David, in the time which *thou* knowest, O God,  
that he may reign over Israel, thy servant.
- 24 And gird him with strength,  
that he may break in pieces unjust rulers.
- 25 Cleanse Jerusalem from the heathen that trample her down to  
destroy her,  
with wisdom, (and) with righteousness ;
- 26 To thrust out sinners from the inheritance,  
to utterly destroy the haughtiness of sinners,  
and as a potter's vessels with a sceptre of iron to break in pieces  
all their substance ;
- 27 To destroy ungodly nations with the word of his mouth,  
that at his rebuke nations may flee before him,  
and to convict sinners for the word of their heart.
- 28 And he shall gather together a holy people, whom he shall  
lead in righteousness,  
and he shall judge the tribes of the people that hath been sancti-  
fied by the Lord his God.
- 29 And he shall not suffer injustice to lodge in their midst ;  
and none that knoweth wickedness shall dwell with them.

The poetry is obviously inferior to that of the Book of

<sup>1</sup> See Ryle and James, *Psalms of the Pharisees, commonly called the Psalms of Solomon*, 1891, p. 137 ff.

Psalms, and the entire description (which is continued to *v.* 51, and resumed in xviii. 6–10) is formed largely of phrases adapted from Psalm lxxii. and other passages of the Old Testament; <sup>1</sup> but the representation of the Messiah as a conqueror dispersing his foes is common to both this ‘Psalm of Solomon’ and our Psalm ii. and cx. In the interpretation of Psalm cx., however, it does not make any real difference whether it portrays an actual king delineated with ideal features, or an ideal king delineated on the model of the actual king. But if the latter view be correct, and the Psalm refers primarily to the Messianic king, it cannot be an early one; for it presupposes the development of the figure of the Messiah effected on the basis of the representations of the prophets.

In either case, however, the Psalm resembles in principle the Psalms which we have already considered. It depicts a king, transcending the historical reality, invested with an ideal dignity, and ideal powers. The king depicted receives a twofold solemn promise, of an exalted and secure position beside Yahweh, ensuring him success against his foes, and of a perpetual priesthood. David and Solomon, and perhaps other kings, though not regular priests, exercised priestly functions in offering sacrifice and blessing the people (2 Sam. vi. 17; 1 Kings iii. 5, viii. 14); Melchizedek, the ancient king of Salem, was said to have been both king and priest: and the same privilege is here solemnly bestowed on the ideal king. Jeremiah (xxx. 21) also speaks of the future ideal ruler as enjoying the right of priestly access to God: ‘and its [the people’s] noble shall be from itself, and its ruler shall proceed from its midst [i.e. their ruler will be a native prince, not a foreigner]; and I will cause him to draw near, and he shall approach unto me [i.e. he will have the right of access to the altar, and enjoy

<sup>1</sup> See for particulars Ryle and James pp. lii.–lviii.

priestly privileges ; comp. the same two words in Num. xvi. 5 ; Lev. xxi. 21, 23 ; Ezek. xlv. 13], saith Yahweh.’

Our Lord, however, speaks of the Psalm as written by David (Matt. xxii. 43=Mark xii. 36=Luke xx. 42). We must, however, remember that our Lord was not pronouncing a judgement on a point of literary criticism, but arguing against the Pharisees. The question of the authorship of the Psalm was not one with which He was dealing. Nor can we expect our Lord to pronounce judgement upon matters which lay outside the scope of His ministry, and opened questions which His hearers would not comprehend, or be ready to consider. Our Lord takes His opponents upon their own ground, and does not complicate the question by raising an issue irrelevant to His main contention. The real issue was not, Who wrote the Psalm ? but, What does the Psalm say ? The figure depicted by the Psalmist is invested by him with such august attributes that the Jews recognised in it the Messiah : must they not, therefore, look for a Messiah who was more than a mere human descendant of David, especially at a time when David’s family was stripped of its dignity and reduced to insignificance ? and ought they, therefore, to stumble at His claims ?<sup>1</sup>

In the Israelite monarchy was foreshadowed the sovereignty to be exercised in the future by David’s son. Elevated, extended, and spiritualised, the aims and objects of the monarchy of David are the aims and objects of the Kingdom of Christ. Like other prophecies, the prophecy of this Psalm starts from the present and looks out into the future. We see an earthly monarch, engaging in a struggle of flesh and blood, and fighting bloody battles with his enemies : ‘ He filleth (the places) with dead bodies ; he shattereth the heads in pieces over a wide country.’

<sup>1</sup> See further on this subject Kirkpatrick’s note in the *Cambridge Bible*, p. 662 f. ; Edghill, *Evidential Value of Prophecy*, pp. 421 ff., 498 f.



Here is the starting-point in the Psalmist's own present. We see again traits which pass beyond the literal reality, and lend themselves to an ideal picture: 'Sit thou on my right hand until I make thine enemies thy footstool'; 'Thou art a priest for ever after the manner of Melchizedek.' It is in virtue of such traits as these that the Psalm is Messianic, prefiguring one in whom they are truly realised. The language of *v. 1a* became in early Christian thought the natural expression for the exaltation of our Lord after His Ascension; it is so applied on several occasions by the Apostles,<sup>1</sup> it was incorporated at an early date in the Christian Creed, where it is familiar to us still. Not, indeed, that in reciting the words, 'And sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty,' we mean to affirm that either the right hand or the left can be predicated of a spiritual Being; but we adopt the language originally applied to the ideal Israelite king as an apt *symbolical* expression for the unique dignity reserved for his Divine Son.<sup>2</sup> And in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is shown how the promise of a priesthood, superior to that of Aaron, solemnly inaugurated, and unchangeably constituted, pointed to the abrogation of the Levitical priesthood, and received its fulfilment in the person and office of Christ.

S. R. DRIVER.

<sup>1</sup> Eph. i. 20; Col. iii. 1; Heb. i. 3, viii. 1, x. 12, xii. 2; 1 Pet. iii. 22; Rev. iii. 21. Cf. also the use of the phraseology of Ps. cx. 1b ('Until I make,' etc.), in 1 Cor. xv. 25, Heb. x. 13; and the quotations of the entire verse in Acts ii. 34, 35, Heb. i. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Edghill, p. 556 f.

*THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH  
GOSPEL.*

VIII. THE CLEANSING OF THE TEMPLE, THE FEEDING  
OF THE FIVE THOUSAND, AND THE WALKING ON THE  
SEA.

THERE are five events, other than those we have already considered, which are recorded both by the Synoptists and St. John. These we must now proceed to examine. They are the cleansing of the temple, the feeding of the five thousand, the walking on the sea, the triumphal entry into Jerusalem and the Last Supper. We shall consider the first three of these in the present paper.

Each of the three Synoptists records how Jesus, after His triumphal entry into Jerusalem, went to the temple and cast out them that bought and sold there, protesting against its sacred precincts being turned into a den of robbers. These three accounts are in reality one; the first and third Evangelists have doubtless here borrowed from Mark. St. Luke's account is the shortest; that in Mark, which is copied almost verbatim in Matthew, is the longest. In both Mark and Matthew it is said that Jesus entered into the temple and cast out them that sold and bought there, and overthrew the tables of the money-changers, and the seats of them that sold doves, and Mark adds that He would not suffer that any man should carry a vessel through the temple.

St. John, however, says nothing about this cleansing of the temple after the triumphal entry, but he records a similar occurrence as taking place at an early stage in the ministry when Jesus went up to Jerusalem for the passover. We will quote his account: "And the passover of the Jews was at hand, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem.

And he found in the temple those that sold oxen and sheep and doves, and the changers of money sitting: and he made a scourge of cords, and cast all out of the temple, both the sheep and the oxen; and he poured out the changers' money and overthrew their tables; and to them that sold the doves he said, Take these things hence; make not my Father's house a house of merchandise. His disciples remembered that it was written, The zeal of thine house shall eat me up."

Further in both cases the Evangelists represent that Jesus was challenged by the authorities for His action. In the Synoptic account the question is put to Him: "By what authority doest thou these things? or who gave thee this authority?" To these questions Jesus gave no direct reply, but put to his questioners a counter question, "The baptism of John, was it from heaven or from men?" and promised an answer to their question in return for their answer to His. They found themselves in a dilemma, and could not answer, and so received no answer to the question they had put.

In St. John also Jesus is challenged by the Jews and the question asked Him is: "What sign showest thou unto us, seeing that thou doest these things?" And Jesus answered: "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." The Evangelist then goes on to record the answer of the Jews: "Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou raise it up in three days?" He then adds: "But he spake of the temple of his body. When therefore he was raised from the dead, his disciples remembered that he spake this; and they believed the Scripture and the word which Jesus had said."

Now before we pass on to compare and contrast these accounts, and to decide whether both the Synoptic and Johannine accounts are to be considered historical or,

if not, to which of the two the preference is to be given, let us notice a significant feature in the account of the Fourth Gospel, namely the reference to the disciples. "His disciples remembered that it was written, The zeal of thine house shall eat me up." And again: "When he was risen from the dead his disciples remembered that he spake this." These statements are at once explicable and justified if the Evangelist was himself a disciple. None but disciples themselves could appropriately say that they remembered, unless indeed he had the information from them, or unless there were something in their conduct which showed it (see for example Matt. xxvi. 75, Luke xxiv. 8). If then our Evangelist be not himself a disciple, he here makes himself appear so to be, and that in a most subtle way.

It must be allowed, I think, that there is nothing at all in the account of the cleansing of the temple in the Fourth Gospel which is *a priori* historically improbable. The only exception that can be taken to it is that it too closely resembles the Synoptic account to be considered as the record of a separate historical event. But it is important to notice that a very casual statement in Mark respecting the false witness brought against Jesus at His trial before the high priest shows that some such words as those attributed to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel on this occasion must have been uttered by Him. St. John puts into the mouth of Jesus the words, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." In Mark it is said that at the trial there stood up certain and bare false witness against Him, saying, We heard Him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands. This witness was false because it distorted the words which Jesus had spoken. He had not said "I will destroy this temple," but "Destroy



ye this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." Exception has been taken to the explanation given by the Fourth Evangelist that Jesus spoke these words of the temple of His body. But we may in passing remark that the statement of the false witnesses in Mark respecting a temple made without hands shows that Jesus used the word temple in a metaphorical sense, and why therefore may He not have intended His body? And I think that it must be admitted that if Jesus did ever speak these words—as even Mark gives us reason to think that He did—the occasion of their utterance in the Fourth Gospel is peculiarly appropriate. And we may remark in conclusion on this point that the account in Mark of the false witness at the trial points to the words not having been recently spoken. It is an argument in favour of them having been uttered at an early stage of the ministry, as in our Gospel they are said to have been.

Again, the account of the cleansing of the temple in the Fourth Gospel is minute and circumstantial. The oxen and the sheep are not mentioned in the Synoptists, but only here. The scourge of cords is peculiar to this Gospel, and the manner of dealing with the various articles of commerce is very exact. The oxen and sheep are driven out; the changers' money is poured out, and their tables overthrown; and the doves are got rid of by a command to those that sold them to take them away. Contrast with this exactness of statement the account in Mark: "He began to cast out them that sold and them that bought in the temple, and overthrew the tables of the money-changers, and the seats of them that sold the doves." Apart from prejudices against the Fourth Gospel on other grounds, would not its account of the cleansing of the temple deserve to be preferred to the Synoptic account, supposing that a choice had to be made between the two?

But here is just the question which we must face, namely, whether a choice has to be made, or the incident was repeated in actual fact. And we may ask, Why should there not have been a second occurrence? If it were the case, as the Fourth Gospel states, that Jesus protested against the profanation of the temple at the beginning of His ministry, why, if He found the same profanation going on at a later stage, may He not have repeated His protest? It is true that the Fourth Gospel says nothing about such a repetition. But then neither does it say anything about a good many other incidents that took place at Jerusalem after the triumphal entry. What it says rather supplements the Synoptists than repeats what they had already written.

Further, the difference between the challenge put to Jesus on the two occasions and His answer to it militates against the theory that we have to do with only one event and not two. Supposing that the Synoptists and the Fourth Evangelist recorded the cleansing of the temple as taking place *at the same time* but with a difference of detail in regard to it, then I allow that it would be a mark of a very weak case to explain the differences of detail by duplicating the event. But this is not the case with which we have to deal here. There is a difference of detail, and the occasion is also different. Therefore the two events may well be distinct. Both may have taken place.

The position has been taken up by some scholars that the event only occurred once and that the Fourth Gospel has given it its right place in point of time, the Synoptists only finding it necessary to place it where they do because they have given no record of any previous visit of Jesus to Jerusalem during His ministry. This position I find myself unable to adopt. I should be disposed to adopt it if I were persuaded that a choice had to be made between

the two, but I am of opinion that the repetition of the occurrence is the simplest and most natural explanation of the contents of the documents. I certainly find myself unable to believe that the story as given by the Fourth Evangelist is an embellishment of that of the Synoptists. If it were, we should have to pronounce it an extraordinarily clever one, because of the superior picturesqueness of its details. This is more easily explained by the supposition that the writer was an eye-witness of the things which he relates.

We now come to the story of the feeding of the five thousand. They are probably not far wrong who consider that the interest of the Fourth Evangelist in regard to this lies not so much in the miracle itself as in the discourse which he places after it. The miracle forms the text of a sermon.

At this point, then, I hope I may be pardoned if I state the opinion that if the discourse in Capernaum on the Bread of Life had been found in our Gospel following upon the miracle of the feeding of the five thousand, and *if that miracle had had no place in the Synoptists*, there would have been critics who would have said that the miracle never took place at all, just as they tell us that the raising of Lazarus is a pure invention of the Evangelist, a story to illustrate the text, I am the Resurrection and the Life. But as the miracle of the feeding of the five thousand is recorded by the Synoptists, they are unable to take up this position, but they tell us that the discourse is an invention. Well, we are not now concerned with the discourse, though we shall have something to say about it later on. It finds no place in the Synoptists, and at present we are concerned with such things as are related both by them and the Fourth Evangelist. It is the miracle with which we have to do. We must ask whether the account given of it in our Gospel

is such as to justify the belief that he who records it was a disciple and an eye-witness of what he relates ; for this he was, on the theory of the Johannine authorship of the Gospel.

Substantially the account of the miracle is the same as that given by the Synoptists. Nobody could doubt for a moment that the Evangelist is recording the same event as that which they relate. But a very cursory reading of our Evangelist's account and comparison of it with the Synoptic account shew us that it is marked by greater particularity, so that either the Evangelist is writing from personal experience, or he had knowledge of details beyond those known to the Synoptists, or he embellished the Synoptic narrative with details for some purpose or other. We must first examine the account and see what these details are.

According to our Evangelist the feeding of the multitude was first suggested by Jesus Himself. The Synoptic account represents the disciples as coming to Jesus and asking Him to send the multitudes away that they might buy something to eat. But Jesus replied, Give ye them to eat. And they answered, Shall we go and buy two hundred pennyworth of bread and give them to eat ? And He saith unto them, How many loaves have ye ? go and see. And when they knew they say, Five and two fishes. Then He made the people sit down, and distribution was made of the loaves and fishes, so that the whole multitude was satisfied. At the conclusion of the meal twelve basketfuls of the fragments were taken up. This is in substance the Synoptic account.

In the Fourth Gospel it was Jesus who first broached the subject of food for the multitude. "Seeing that a great company cometh unto Him, He saith to Philip, Whence are we to buy bread, that these may eat ?" Why



was the question addressed to Philip in particular? Was it that he was an inhabitant of the nearest town? We cannot tell. But we cannot but be struck by the fuller detail of our Evangelist beyond that of the Synoptists, who mention no disciples by name. The narrative goes on to say that Jesus only asked this question to prove Philip, for He Himself knew what He would do. Exception has been taken to this statement as exhibiting the tendency of the Evangelist to emphasise the foreknowledge of Jesus. But the question is whether the subsequent conduct and action of Jesus justify the statement. And most people would allow that they do. The statement of the Evangelist is of course not a statement of fact cognised by the senses. It is a justifiable conclusion based on the facts of the case.

Then comes Philip's answer: "Two hundred pennyworth of bread is not sufficient for them that every one may take a little." This has to be compared with the question of the disciples, in the Synoptic narrative, whether they should go and buy two hundred pennyworth of bread. There is no real discrepancy between the two accounts. For if Jesus had, as our Evangelist represents, asked the question, Whence are we to buy bread that these may eat? the subsequent statement of Philip that two hundred pennyworth of bread would not suffice might well be converted into a kind of surprised question such as we find in the Synoptists: Shall we go and buy two hundred pennyworth of bread and give them to eat?

It is not improbable, as the Synoptists state, that Jesus at this point asked the disciples how many loaves they had, nor is it improbable that the answer came, as according to our Evangelist it must have done, from Andrew: There is a lad here, which hath five barley loaves and two fishes; but, he asks, what are they among so many? Here again we have a particularity of statement in the mention of

Andrew by name, which it is difficult to account for unless things really happened as here stated. One who was present would know and might well remember these details. If, however, the details are merely invented to make it appear that the writer was an eye-witness of the event, does it not seem strange that he nowhere asserts his own presence on the occasion? It can be inferred but it is never obtruded.

There are two other points in the account given by our Evangelist which indicate first-hand evidence. The one is the statement made by him that there was much grass in the place, and the other is the command of Jesus to gather up the broken pieces remaining over that nothing might be lost. The Synoptic account does indeed tell of the gathering up of the fragments, but it says nothing of this act proceeding from a command of the Master. The probability seems to me to be in favour of such an order having been given.

The miracle of the feeding of the five thousand is followed in our Gospel as in the first two by an account of the walking upon the water. This forms a natural transition to the great discourse on the Bread of Life delivered in the synagogue at Capernaum. We may suppose, then, that it was on this account that St. John gave it a place in his narrative.

There are certain points of difference in regard to this incident between the Synoptists and St. John which must now be touched on. We observe first of all that St. John alone has something to say of the effect upon the people of the miracle of the feeding of the five thousand. He tells us that they said: "This is of a truth the prophet that cometh into the world." He then goes on to say that Jesus perceived that they were about to come and take Him by force and to make Him a king, and that for this reason

He withdrew again into the mountain Himself alone. Then, apparently in the absence of the Master, when the evening came, the disciples went down to the sea and entered into a boat, and were going over the sea to Capernaum. The Evangelist adds that it had become dark and Jesus had not yet come to them.

But according to the Synoptic account it was Jesus Himself who had constrained (*ἠνάγκασεν*) the disciples to enter into the boat and to go before Him to the other side—to Bethsaida according to Mark—while He sent the multitude away. Then, after He had taken leave of the multitude, He went into the mountain to pray. St. John, however, represents some, at any rate, of the multitude as being the next morning still in the same spot where the miracle had taken place (vi. 22).

Now as regards the effect produced upon the multitude by the miracle of the feeding, there seems to be nothing improbable in this as it is described by our Evangelist. It was indeed a stupendous miracle that they had witnessed, and the conclusion to which they came seems perfectly natural under the circumstances. Moreover it would be difficult to see what motive the Evangelist could have had in making this statement unless what he says did really take place. It is true that the intention to seize Jesus to make Him king is only said to have been perceived by Jesus, and no outward signs of the intention are mentioned. But we need not assume that the Evangelist had nothing to go upon in making this statement. Moreover the haste shown and the compulsion exercised by Jesus, according to the Synoptists, in sending away the disciples, things which are unexplained in the Synoptic narrative, may perhaps be accounted for if the story of this event in the Fourth Gospel is historical. For it might well be that Jesus desired to remove His disciples at once from the

dangerous enthusiasm of the crowd, against which they might have been powerless to stand. There is certainly, then, no disagreement with the Synoptists on the part of our Evangelist when he describes the effect produced by the miracle upon the crowd. He is merely recording what they are silent about.

There does, however, appear to be a disagreement in regard to the other two points, namely, the sending away of the multitude and the departure of the disciples. But as to the first of these two it must be observed that our Evangelist really is silent on the matter, and it must not be supposed that what he says of the crowd the next morning in verse 22 implies that all the five thousand were still there. He speaks of *ὁ ὄχλος ὁ ἐστηκὼς πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης*. The presence of the article before the participle seems to make it impossible to understand that by *ὁ ὄχλος* is meant the whole multitude of the day before. And indeed the following verses shew that there were only so many as could cross the lake in the boats which came over to the place from Tiberias, and which were driven in possibly by the storm during the night. Some dispersal of the crowd the day before was well nigh imperative in order to frustrate their purpose, and it is not difficult to fit in the statement of the Synoptists, that Jesus sent the multitude away, with the narrative of the Fourth Gospel, though this does not mention the fact explicitly.

The more difficult point is the departure of the disciples; but perhaps we may get help from the mention of Bethsaida in Mark. Matthew omits the words *πρὸς Βηθσαιδάν*, possibly because the writer found it difficult to interpret them, Bethsaida being situated at the north end of the lake and not close to its banks. Indeed some have thought that the words in Mark imply that there was a second place called Bethsaida on the western shore of the lake, but



this is mere hypothesis and has nothing to support it. Mark says that Jesus immediately compelled His disciples to enter into the boat and to go before to the other side (*προάγειν εἰς τὸ πέραν*)—to Bethsaida (*πρὸς Βηθσαιδάν*), so our English translation runs. What is meant by these words? Did Jesus send His disciples across to the western shore of the lake? The words *πρὸς Βηθσαιδάν* seem to exclude this, though the expression *εἰς τὸ πέραν* at first suggests it. May it not then be that Jesus told His disciples to go across to a point on the shore of the lake in the direction of Bethsaida, or over against Bethsaida, it being understood that He would follow them on foot? This interpretation would give a perfectly natural meaning to the words *πρὸς Βηθσαιδάν*. And if the interpretation be correct, then the narrative of St. John will fit in quite well with it. For the disciples would wait at this spot for Jesus; and only when it had grown dark, and Jesus had not yet come, did they start to cross to the western shore of the lake, to Capernaum as St. John says.

Further, I am of opinion that not only is this interpretation of the words *πρὸς Βηθσαιδάν* a possible one, but it is necessary. If Bethsaida had been the goal, the fact would have been expressed by the use of the preposition *εἰς*, not by *πρὸς*. To a place is always in the New Testament rendered by *εἰς*. The only apparent exception to this that I can find is St. Luke xxiv. 50, where we have *ἕως πρὸς Βηθανίαν*, which is translated in the Authorised Version "as far as to Bethany." But this is probably incorrect; and we note that the Revisers have rendered it "until they were over against Bethany."

It does not seem to me, then, that there is anything in the account of this incident in the Fourth Gospel which is out of agreement with the Synoptic account. Indeed the purpose of the multitude to declare Jesus king, which

our Evangelist alone mentions, seems to throw light on what Mark and Matthew tell us. For it helps us to understand the desire of Jesus to separate His disciples from the dangerous enthusiasm of the crowd and His conduct in dispersing the multitude, before He rejoined the disciples. According to the Johannine account the disciples did not start to cross to the western shore of the lake until it had become dark and Jesus had not yet rejoined them. Their goal was Capernaum (*ἤρχοντο πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης εἰς Καφαρναούμ*). The Evangelist gives a graphic though very brief description of the difficulty encountered in the crossing when he says that the sea was rising by reason of a great wind that blew. He tells us that they had rowed some twenty or thirty furlongs when they beheld Jesus walking on the sea, and drawing nigh unto the boat; and they were afraid. When they were assured that it was Jesus they were ready to receive Him into the boat; and straightway, he concludes, the boat was at the land whither they were going. He does not state that they landed at Capernaum itself, though his language implies that they were somewhere near it, but this they might be if it was the land of Gennesaret, as Mark calls it. And there would be plenty of time for the incidents recorded in Mark vi. 54, 55 to happen before those of the multitude who came over from the eastern shore arrived in Capernaum later in the day (St. John vi. 24).

It is true that the Evangelist says nothing of Peter's attempt to walk on the sea to Jesus, an incident recorded only in Matthew. Of course if this incident really took place and the Evangelist did not know of it, he could not have been an eye-witness. But we cannot draw any conclusion from his silence on the point.

Exception has been taken to the statement made in our Evangelist's account that the boat was *immediately* at

the land whither they were going, whereas it would appear that the disciples were well out in the middle of the lake when Jesus came to them. Mark, followed by Matthew, says that the wind ceased, and implies a continuation of the voyage. But if the last part of the voyage was smooth and quickly over, we need not be hypercritical in judging of the manner in which our Evangelist expresses the fact. The verb he uses is *γίνομαι*, the same word which he employs two verses before when he speaks of Jesus drawing near to the boat (*ἐγγύς τοῦ πλοίου γινόμενον*). It is true that it is the aorist *ἐγένετο* which occurs in the verse we are considering, yet still the verb itself denotes a process and not merely a state. They were not at once at the land, but they quickly got to it.

Returning once again to the narrative of Mark, we may point out how improbable it is that "the other side" to which Jesus at once compelled His disciples to go was the western shore of the lake. For the Evangelist distinctly says that the disciples were to go *before*, while Jesus sent the multitude away. The clear implication is that He would follow them, and on foot, for there is no suggestion that there was any other boat there than the one. The place to which they were directed to go was then not very far distant, as indeed it would not be if Bethsaida here means Bethsaida Julias to the north of the lake, not far from which town the miracle of the feeding had taken place.

Further, it seems clear that the incident of the walking on the water could not have taken place in this neighbourhood, for Mark speaks of it as happening in the fourth watch of the night. The disciples must then have been on the lake for a considerable time and have advanced some way. It is highly improbable that they were still near to the place from which they had started.

E. H. ASKWITH.

*GALATIANS THE EARLIEST OF THE PAULINE  
EPISTLES.*

THIS article is only meant for those who accept the "South Galatian" theory, and believe that "the Churches of Galatia" to whom St. Paul wrote were the Churches of Antioch, Iconium, etc., founded on his first missionary journey. The arguments in support of this view are best found in Sir W. Ramsay's well-known books, and need not be repeated here. Those who are still unconvinced, if they think it worth while to read what follows, will presumably do so only in order to amuse themselves with yet another of the extravagancies to which that theory leads its adherents.

Further, our argument will rest on the view that the visit to Jerusalem of Galatians ii. is *not* that for the council in Acts xv. A few words must be said in support of this position. If the identification is insisted on, the account either of St. Paul or of St. Luke must be abandoned as unhistorical. With all due respect for the ingenious pleading of Lightfoot and others, there is no escape from this conclusion; and presumably it is Luke's credit that must suffer, since he cannot in this connexion be considered an eye-witness. This means that the whole of Acts xv. must be thrown to the wolves as a comparatively late fiction intended to reconcile the two sections of the Church. It is hardly necessary to labour the point that such a view seriously discredits the credibility of the rest of the Acts, a result which will hardly be readily acquiesced in at a time when the current of critical opinion, under Harnack's influence, is setting so strongly in its favour. But the conclusion can only be disputed with success, if the premiss is abandoned. Let us then look at the premiss a little



more closely. There are two cogent reasons why Galatians ii. and Acts xv. should not be regarded as referring to the same event. (1) If they are identified, St. Paul ignores the visit of Acts xi. As we shall see, this visit was probably by no means so unimportant as is sometimes maintained. Even if it were, it was surely impossible for Paul to ignore it, and so quite gratuitously give an occasion to his opponents of which they would readily avail themselves. If it *was* of no consequence for his argument, it only needed a parenthesis of a few words to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding—and Paul is not afraid of parentheses. (2) The accounts in the two chapters simply do not tally. To talk about the private personal view as opposed to the public official account is not to the point. No one could imagine for a moment that Galatians ii. referred to a formal council of the Church at which the very point for which Paul was contending had been definitely and deliberately conceded. If this was the case, why in the world did he not say so clearly? Of this more later on; for the argument carries us further than the mere refusal to identify Galatians ii. and Acts xv. But at least as against that identification, it is surely sufficient and decisive.

Critics have, of course, suggested various solutions of these difficulties, such as the rejection of the visit of Acts xi. as unhistorical, or the elaborate reconstruction of the whole chronology of St. Paul's life which is associated with the name of Clemen. We need not stop to discuss these views; they are destructive of the credit of Acts, and become superfluous, if we can adopt the obvious solution, which is to identify the visits of Galatians ii. and Acts xi. It will probably be generally admitted that Ramsay has disposed of the chronological objection to this view. A glance at the varying tables of dates drawn up by scholars for the life of St. Paul shows at once how uncertain they

are. But at any rate there is no great difficulty in finding room for the "fourteen years" which our theory requires between the conversion of the Apostle and his second visit to Jerusalem. It will hardly be denied that the theory itself is natural enough. As we read the Epistle our first impression is that the writer is in fact describing his *second* visit to Jerusalem. A study of the context deepens the impression that if he has omitted any visit, however unimportant, he has been guilty of a most unfortunate error of judgment, if of nothing worse. When, however, we turn to Acts xi. we find good grounds for maintaining that the visit there related was by no means "unimportant" in its bearing on the future work of the Apostle of the Gentiles. The circumstances which led up to it were these. Unofficial missionaries had begun to convert "Greeks" <sup>1</sup> at Antioch (Acts xi. 20). Barnabas is at once despatched by the Jerusalem Church as a man of tact and sympathy to deal with a delicate situation, and presumably in due course to report to the Mother Church on this very question of the relations between Jews and Gentiles. During his stay at Antioch, he fetches Saul, and on the occasion of the famine the two return to Jerusalem ("by revelation," Gal. ii. 2, in consequence of the prophecy of Agabus, Acts xi. 27).<sup>2</sup> It was inevitable that the representatives of the Apostles (it is of course a pure hypothesis

<sup>1</sup> There is of course the important variant 'Ἑλληνιστάς ("Grecians"), which is adopted by W.H. and R.V.m. Ramsay (*St. Paul*, p. 24) mentions this as one of the two cases in Acts where it is impossible to follow W.H.; and curiously enough Mr. Valentine-Richards, in *Camb. Biblical Essays*, p. 532, also instances it as one of their mistakes. 'Ἑλληνάς is adopted by Tisch., Treg., Blass, Harnack, etc., and is absolutely required by the context. After Acts vi., to say nothing of other passages, it is impossible that preaching to *Hellenists* could have been mentioned as a new and significant departure.

<sup>2</sup> Titus is not mentioned either in Acts xi. or xv., or indeed anywhere in the book; therefore the omission of his name in Acts xi., as compared with Gal. ii., raises no *special* difficulty.

of the harmonizers of Acts xv. and Galatians ii. that there were none at Jerusalem at this time) should seize the opportunity of discussing the new departure at Antioch. Barnabas was their commissioner, and they were awaiting his report; Paul is now associated with him in his work. It is quite in Luke's manner to leave it to his reader to assume that such a report was made, and we turn to Galatians for the details of the interview. The question of the admission of Gentiles is, as we have seen, already to the fore; the Apostles admit the principle, though no conditions are laid down, except the continuance of assistance to the poor of the mother Church, "which very thing," says Paul, "I was also zealous to do"; it was of course one main reason of this very visit to Jerusalem. Returning to the narrative of Acts, we understand at once on this view the events of xii. 25 and xiii., which follow immediately after the parenthesis of chapter xii. The first missionary journey may be regarded from one point of view as due to a revelation vouchsafed to the Church at Antioch; from another, it is the direct result of a policy already sanctioned by the Apostles.

It is surely one of the curiosities of Biblical exegesis that orthodox scholars should have created an entirely unnecessary difficulty by continuing to reject this identification. Even before the reign of the "South Galatian theory" it was open to them to make it, as e.g. Calvin made it. But the purpose of this article is to suggest that while this view solves some of the difficulties connected with the Epistle, it does not go far enough. It does not explain why the Council is not referred to in Galatians, assuming that the letter was written after it had taken place. It is quite true that no mention of it may have been necessary for the purposes of the autobiographical sketch with which the Epistle opens, but some reference to its decisions was

absolutely called for by the argument of the remaining chapters. On what grounds can it possibly have been passed over? It has been suggested that its conclusions were of the nature of a compromise and uncongenial to Paul. Even if this may have been true of the prohibitions, it was not true of the main conclusions. And if it had been, it did not in the least relieve him of the necessity of dealing with them. For if *ex hypothesi* Paul could not quote them on his side, his opponents must have been quoting them on their's (they could not have been ignored by *both* parties), and he was bound to reply to their arguments unless he was prepared to throw over the authority of the Jerusalem Church. If, on the other hand, as is far more probable, the decisions were in St. Paul's favour, why should he neglect so strong a support? To say that they were local and temporary is only partially true and completely irrelevant. They were *local*—intended for the very places in which the trouble had recently arisen; and *temporary*—applying to the very period at which Paul was writing. The suggestion may explain why they are not applicable to England in the twentieth century; it does not in the least explain why they should not have been applicable to Galatia in the middle of the first; Acts xvi. 4 is decisive on the point. And after all the main outcome of the Council lay in the recognition of the fact that circumcision was no longer necessary. This was neither local nor temporary, but a principle of permanent importance, and what is more, the very principle for which Paul was contending in the Epistle.

Let us realise the situation. Galatians is not like Romans, a more or less academic treatise, justifying an already existing state of affairs, and working out its implications; it is a religious pamphlet, issued red-hot in the midst of a burning controversy, and in view of a pressing danger.



The Judaisers are active with their pestilential teaching ; the infection is spreading rapidly in the newly-founded Churches, and must be checked by every possible means. Paul would intervene in person if he could, but he cannot, and has to content himself with a letter. He is bound under the circumstances to use every legitimate argument he can think of. Is it conceivable that if he can point to a formal decision of the Church conceding that circumcision is unnecessary for Gentiles he should refrain from doing so ? We need not further labour the point that his account of the private arrangement between himself and the Apostles is not an adequate representation of such a formal decision.

We may easily suppose a parallel case. Let us assume that the use of the Athanasian Creed in the services of the Anglican Church has at length been abolished. A Bishop writes to an Incumbent urging its discontinuance. He brings forward the familiar arguments against the creed, and forgets to remind his correspondent that Parliament and Convocation have now sanctioned its disuse, and that the law of the Church is now on his side. He would be omitting what for practical purposes is the crux of the matter.

The usual solution of the difficulty is to say that after the Council the Jewish party still held that circumcision was necessary to a *perfect* Christianity. An uncircumcised man might be a Christian "in a sense," but he only became a full Christian when he had submitted to circumcision, much as in later times the monk or religious was supposed to follow Christ in a higher sense than the Christian who remained in the world. The position after the Council may or may not have taken this form ; the unfortunate thing is that there is not a hint of it in Galatians. If the argument of the Judaisers had been " We admit circumcision

is not necessary, but it makes a man a better Christian," this must have come out clearly in St. Paul's reply. What he in fact deals with is the necessity of circumcision *per se*, and he never once refers to the perfectly clear official pronouncement on the subject, which is supposed to have been made in his presence at his own instigation a year or two before. In such a case, the "argument from silence" is valid and conclusive. No such pronouncement can yet have been made.

Accordingly we maintain that the Epistle to the Galatians must have been written before the events of Acts xv. 3. There is no difficulty in finding a place for it. It obviously belongs to the period covered by Acts xv. 1, 2. Judaisers claiming the sanction of James (v. 24, Gal. ii. 12) have visited Antioch; it is more probable than not that they should have extended their propaganda to the recently founded Churches of S. Galatia.<sup>1</sup> Remembering the strong Jewish element in Pisidian Antioch and Iconium, we see at once that the soil would be congenial. Paul hears of this at Antioch, but he cannot revisit the Churches, since he is needed where he is, and must soon go to Jerusalem. He writes the letter, bringing forward the arguments which he is using in person at Antioch, and will shortly use at Jerusalem. Peter's defection (Gal. ii. 11 ff.) belongs to the same time. Paul in dealing with it is not raking up a matter of ancient history; he is bound to discuss it since it is an element in the situation, which is no doubt being worked by the Jewish party for all it is worth. And we may note that Peter's change of attitude is at once far more intelligible and less discreditable, if it follows the merely informal interchange of views which took place at Paul's second visit, than if it has to be placed after the formal settlement of the question at the Council.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the "so quickly" of Gal. i. 6.

How far, it may be asked, does this view harmonise with the rest of the *data* of Acts xv. ? At first sight there is a difficulty in the fact that the letter embodying the Council's decision is addressed to the Churches of Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia ; why not Galatia too, if the trouble had already broken out there ? But the omission is equally strange on any view. The Churches of South Galatia are obviously the centre of Paul's narrative in verse 12 ; the Council unquestionably had them in mind, and whether they had been already "troubled" or not, the settlement was undoubtedly meant to apply to them, at least in its dispensing with the necessity for circumcision (cf. xvi. 4). Presumably the controversy is regarded as primarily one between Jerusalem and Antioch ; the Churches named are those which looked to Antioch as their centre. In any case the omission cannot be regarded as fatal to the early date of Galatians ; it is only part of the difficulty that Luke entirely ignores the Galatian defection, a difficulty which is not peculiar to any particular theory of the place of the Epistle. When we pass to the events which followed the Council, we at once have an explanation of the second missionary journey. When the news of the Galatian defection first reached St. Paul, the pressure of circumstances prevented an immediate visit, as we have already seen ; now the way is clear. It is quite true that xv. 33-36 seems at first sight to imply a delay which would be a little inconsistent with this view ; surely St. Paul would have paid his visit at the earliest possible moment ? Well, perhaps he did ; a certain stay at the important centre of Antioch (v. 33) was probably quite inevitable, and the expressions used in verses 35, 36<sup>1</sup> do not imply any long delay, but are intentionally vague, after Luke's manner. We must remember, too, that we do not know the results

<sup>1</sup> On these, see Harnack, *Apostelgeschichte*, pp. 37-41.

of the Epistle ; Paul may have heard that the plague had been already stayed. The words of xvi. 4 are at any rate significant ; the position he had taken up in his letter has been triumphantly vindicated, and the settlement of the controversy makes for the strengthening of the Churches.

And may we not on our view find a certain significance in other features of the second journey ? We know both from Acts and 1 Thessalonians that St. Paul was eager to return to Thessalonica after his enforced departure. He was learning from the experience of his first journey. Then he had been eager to open up fresh territory as quickly as possible, but he realises now that he must not leave a newly-founded Church to its own devices too soon ; there must not be a repetition in Macedonia of the sort of thing that has happened in Galatia. It is true that circumstances are too strong for him, and in the letters to Thessalonica we see the unspeakable relief in the mind of the Apostle that his converts had in fact remained steadfast, and the exhortations to continue firm recur again and again. Of course these features are perfectly explicable on the ordinary view, but it will not be denied that they are doubly significant if the memory of the Galatian defection lies behind them.

The view then that Galatians is the earliest of the Pauline Epistles harmonises so completely with many of the data both of the Epistles themselves and of Acts that it can only be rejected for serious and weighty reasons. It should be noticed that it stood first in Marcion's list, a point which may prove to be of the greatest importance, though I must leave it to others to develop its significance. But, as we know, the early date has not been widely adopted,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It has been taken by Weber, Bartlet, and others, but I have preferred in this paper to work out the arguments afresh from the facts themselves.



and we shall naturally expect to find the objections to it strong and almost invincible. The curious thing is that they are apparently very weak, and it is really a mystery why critics who have taken the comparatively difficult steps involved in the South Galatian theory, and the identification of the visits in Galatians ii. and Acts xi., should have refused the far easier step of assigning an early date to the Epistle.

1. Perhaps the main reason is to be found in the apparent connexion between Galatians and Romans. The current division of the Pauline Epistles into four groups is fascinating and convenient, and gives an intelligible picture of the development of the Apostle's thought. We are naturally disinclined to upset this arrangement by placing Galatians before the Thessalonian Epistles. However, for certain purposes the grouping will survive the transposition, and in any case such a theory must follow the facts. It is quite true that there is a fairly close connexion in thought and language between Galatians and Romans, but this is explained by the similarity of subject matter, and does not in the least imply that they were written at the same time. There is no reason why they should not be separated by the five or six years which is all our theory requires. The one is the sketch hastily drawn up in view of the urgent requirements of the moment; the other is the more considered philosophical development of the same theme. It is "the ripened fruit of the thoughts and struggles of the eventful years by which it had been preceded," and "belongs to the later reflective stage of the controversy."<sup>1</sup> It deals with the intellectual difficulties involved in the apparent rejection of the Jews, rather than with the practical question of whether Christians ought in fact to be circumcised. And to maintain that St. Paul's thought could not

<sup>1</sup> Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, p. xxiii.

have been sufficiently developed by the close of the first journey to write the Epistle to the Galatians is quite unreasonable. There had been, let us say, nineteen years of meditation and practical work since his conversion, and the relation between Jew and Gentile must have often come before him. He did not deal with the point in the Thessalonian Epistles because there was no need to do so. On any view the controversies of the Council had already been raised before they were written, and the fact that they do not refer to them does not in the least imply that the writer may not have already done so in another letter to another Church.

2. A further difficulty is found in the two visits, implied in the *τὸ πρότερον* of Galatians iv. 13. To this it may be replied that we have the high authority of Blass for the view that *τὸ πρότερον* here means "formerly." Or if this solution is rejected, and we prefer to retain the ordinary translation ("the first time"), we can easily find the two visits in the journeys out and back of Acts xiv. The second visit lasted long enough to organise the Churches, and, especially in the case of Antioch and Iconium, could easily be distinguished from the first visit. There unquestionably were two visits on the first journey, and nothing more need be said.

A few words must be added in conclusion on a closely related point. How far is our position affected by the view we take of the text of the Decree in Acts xv. ? Harnack<sup>1</sup> has lately declared his adherence to the "Western" reading, which omits "and from things strangled." These words are omitted in Dd., Iren., Tert., Cypr., etc., and there are converging lines of evidence which tend to prove they were not in the original text. Their omission carries with it weighty consequences; the Decree no longer deals with

<sup>1</sup> *Apostelgeschichte*, pp. 188-198.

ceremonial questions, as is usually supposed, but with moral questions, idolatry, murder, and fornication, the three offences mentioned together in Revelation xxii. 15. It would take us too far afield to state the arguments in support of this view; they are convincingly stated in Harnack's pages. If we accept it, as we probably should, several serious difficulties of New Testament criticism vanish at once. We understand, for example, why the Decree is not directly referred to in the Epistles, and particularly in 1 Corinthians, where the eating of things offered to idols is discussed; it was not *ad rem*, since it dealt with the moral offence of idolatry, not with the ceremonial point which troubled the Corinthians. But it does not in the least, as Harnack seems to suggest, solve the difficulties associated with the ordinary view of Galatians. It rather accentuates them. For, as we have seen, the problem is not to explain why St. Paul does not discuss the prohibitions of the Decree, whether moral or ceremonial, but why he does not emphasise the great concession, the dispensing with circumcision. If, in fact, the whole Decree was concerned with moral questions and contained no concessions made to Jewish prejudices, as is commonly supposed, it becomes a sweeping victory for the Pauline and Gentile party. The silence about it in Galatians becomes more inexplicable than ever; the revised form of the Decree demands the early date for the Epistle, since the mere quotation of it must have been sufficient to silence the Judaisers.

I am glad, however, to have been able to refer to this corrected version of the Decree, since, although it does not solve the particular difficulty we are considering, it is most valuable in other respects. The problems which centre round Galatians and Acts xv. have long been a crux of New Testament criticism. Their complete solution requires four hypotheses, (1) the "South Galatian" theory,

(2) the identification of the visits of Galatians ii. and Acts xi., (3) the placing of Galatians before the "Council," (4) the "Western" version of the Decree. Of these the fourth stands on a somewhat different footing to the rest. The first three are not the desperate resort of "harmonisers," twisting or ignoring facts in order to force an agreement which is not there. They are the *prima facie* natural interpretation of the facts; the *onus probandi* surely lies on those who reject them. Accept them, and each piece of the puzzle falls into its place easily and satisfactorily. The resultant picture does no discredit either to the Apostle or to the historian of Acts.

CYRIL W. EMMET.

*ST. PAUL'S BELIEFS : SOME RECONCILIATIONS.*

WE are familiar with comments on differences, sometimes amounting to oppositions, between the views of St. Paul and those of other teachers. St. Paul's championship of faith—to quote the primary example of such criticisms—has been contrasted with St. James's championship of works. But I wonder that it has not been thought simpler to exhibit St. Paul as contradicting himself.

When a serious teacher is found making assertions which verbally contradict each other, we are warned to look for some conviction which may perhaps express itself naturally, according to circumstances, in both the contradictory statements. It is a not uncommon habit of those who think most deeply to speak paradoxically, and to express themselves in judgments or precepts which need to be interpreted and applied with respectful intelligence. This is eminently true of our Lord's words; and similar thoughtful treatment is demanded by the writings of St. Paul. I propose to consider in this spirit the Apostle's doctrine



concerning (1) Faith and Works, (2) the Law, and (3) the Goodness of non-Christians ; and (4) then to compare the teaching of St. Paul with that of his Master.

We can best understand St. Paul by assuring ourselves what his deepest faith must have been. His nature, it is evident, was an extraordinarily tender and sensitive one. In Renan's phrase, he had a great *retractile* soul. How he could shrink and be hurt, by what emotions of pain and of joy he could be carried away, is best seen in the second Epistle to the Corinthians. In his pre-Christian days, as an ardent disciple of Rabbinical Judaism, he was indignant at the monstrous disloyalty of the people who were holding that Jesus, who had been put to death as a ridiculous pretender to royalty, was the heavenly King whom the Jews were expecting to appear. The behaviour and the words of Stephen at his martyrdom must have affected him most unpleasantly. His Jewish zeal carried him on, and he had occasion to see other instances of the dignity and joyfulness with which the believers in Jesus could suffer, and he learned nothing of their lives but what was good and winning. He perceived that they steadily beheld the crucified Jesus at the right hand of God. But how was it possible that a man treated as Jesus had been could be the heavenly King ? The question lodged itself in him, and gave him no peace. And then it occurred to his keenly inquiring intelligence that a King reigning at the right hand of God could not be the Christ of the Jews only, but must be Lord of the world. The thought of this Jesus reigning in heaven over all the Gentiles made the belief of his provoking adherents still more preposterous. But they did believe, and their belief made their lives and their deaths beautiful. They urged that what was so strange in the history of Jesus as the Christ proved to them the infinite and amazing compassion of their God ; that nothing else imaginable could

have brought home to their hearts the sympathy with which God was caring for His human children as the crucifixion of Jesus did. And they could certainly appeal to mysterious voices of the Hebrew prophets which associated the manifestation of the Messiah with suffering and humiliation preceding His glory. Such questionings must have agitated the soul of St. Paul whilst he was forcing himself to persecute the Christians, until the inward tumult was quelled by the momentous vision in which the crucified Jesus finally conquered him and made him His slave.

(1) I recall this experience of his in order to lay stress on the nature of the Apostle's faith. He had been brought to believe that Jesus the Crucified was actually the Son of God, and that both God and men and the relation of men to God were to be known through Him. From the time of his conversion he was continually learning more and more of God, more and more of men, by studying the Man who was reigning over Jews and Gentiles. What did he learn about human life? He saw that men, declared to be children of such a Father as was revealed in Christ, were intended to live as God's children. The filial life towards God could only be a life of the profoundest admiration and gratitude. The description of the Christian calling in Ephesians i., ii., iii., is both in spirit and in form eucharistic. A human son of the heavenly Father was evidently bound to give himself up in thankful trust to God, and to desire that the will of his Father would move and rule and use all his energies. Whilst he was seeing this in Christ, St. Paul was aware of men who regarded themselves as believers in the true God holding themselves apart, as it were at arm's length, from God, and setting themselves to negotiate with Him. They admitted that God had claims upon them, and they were ready to do certain things which they hoped would satisfy Him and make them safe with Him. The

most scrupulous of them busied themselves with observing precepts handed down to them in a Divine Law, and they regarded it as meritorious to push the precepts to extremes, beyond what was necessarily implied in them. This way of thinking and acting St. Paul described as seeking to be justified by works. It assumed that a man was an independent being who might deal with God and satisfy God's reasonable demands. But what a false notion this was in the eyes of one who saw God and men in Christ, and how it was stultified by experience! Man could *not* stand by himself and satisfy God; he was not made for such independence, and it was disastrous that he should claim it. Against this mistaken reliance on works St. Paul set the joyful submission of faith. To one who knew God through Christ, the only action for a man was to surrender himself with thankful reverence to the grace and will of God, so that he might be what God would have him be and do what God would have him do. It was a matter of course that such an aim would issue in right conduct. A man's conduct would show how far he had faith; how far—though at the best it would be most imperfectly—he was yielding himself to the Divine impulse and forbearing to claim independence and merit for himself. He could only be justified by faith; that is to say, to fulfil his appointed righteousness he had to accept the relation of son to God, and in a spirit of dependence and self-surrender to seek and do the will of God. In thus resolving he was right and would act rightly, and might count on being accepted and approved by the heavenly Father, and receiving suitable rewards. And the way to cherish such filial submission was to look on Jesus Christ, crucified, risen, exalted; to see God in Him, and man in Him. So the revelation which St. Paul had received exhibited “works” to him under two aspects: as the plausible payment to a Divine Lawgiver which was to secure a man in

self-righteous independence, and as the conduct of one who threw self over, and made it his aim to obey and to please his heavenly Father. And in what he teaches concerning faith and works, St. Paul is quite consistent with himself and with St. James.

(2) It is sometimes assumed that St. Paul was converted from Judaism to Christianity, and that he says hard things of the Judaism that he had abandoned, giving it the name of "the Law." Many hard things he does certainly say of the Law ; but, on the other hand, we find him doing honour to the Law, as when he pronounces it to be "holy and just and good." The contradiction is explained by the Apostle's use of the word "Law," without the article. He says to his fellow-believers, "Ye are not under law, but under grace." It was one thing to know God only as a Lawgiver, another to know Him as the Father revealed in Jesus Christ. To be under law was to live under the sound of commands, "Thou shalt do this, Thou shalt not do that"; and of the threat, "If thou disobeyest a command, thou shalt be condignly punished." St. Paul had known in his own experience what it was to be thus under law, and he had found the condition to be an unhappy one. He could not keep the law as he knew it ought to be kept ; and he became aware of a perverse tendency in human nature which was provoked by a peremptory and threatening command into disobedience. Law had as its representative to him and his fellow-countrymen the traditional Jewish Law. When God was known in Christ, He was seen to be a Father offering forgiveness to weak and erring children, drawing them into a life of filial trust, and giving them a spirit which would help their weakness. To accept these Divine offers and gifts was to be under grace. And St. Paul had no patience with teachers who, whilst they professed to believe in Jesus as the Christ, ignored what was revealed



of God in Jesus Christ, and assumed that the Christians were still under law. Law thus *substituted for grace* had a killing power on the anxious soul, and a true bearer of the Gospel had to treat the Law as an enemy. But as an instruction in the will of God the law was to be honoured and valued. Children of God, rejoicing in forgiveness and reconciliation, were still bound to observe the law. The Jewish generations which had handed down the law of Moses had not been necessarily "under law," as St. Paul understood the phrase. Their God Jehovah had from the first been a God of promise, encouraging, helping, delivering, forgiving, as well as commanding and threatening and punishing. The godly sons of Abraham had not crouched before a Being whom they only knew as a God to be feared, nor had they attempted to walk in self-righteous independence; but they were men of faith, looking up to a righteous God in Whom they hoped, on Whom they depended, to whom they could appeal for pardon, whose Law they loved because they so gratefully revered Him who gave it for their guidance. And under the Gospel the Father of Jesus Christ still gives commands, is still to be feared; but His children can always flee out of hopeless fear into the home-atmosphere for which their Maker designs them.

(3) Again, St. Paul seems to make acceptance with God, and really good and acceptable conduct, depend on faith in Jesus Christ. It is often, if not generally, assumed that this is his doctrine; that he holds that it is only by believing in the Son of God who died and was raised again that a man can be justified; that is, that he can be right with God and do righteous deeds. But how, then, does he regard the good men who have not heard of Jesus Christ, or have not believed in Him when they have heard of Him? This question may be answered out of the same doctrinal Letter

in which he most dogmatically affirms and expounds justification by faith. He tells his readers in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Romans that all men are justified by their works, the Gentiles as well as the Jews ; that there is no respect of the person—that is, of the nominal religion—with God, and that God is not the God of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles also. “ When Gentiles which have no law do by nature the things of the law,” he says, “ these, having no law, are a law unto themselves, in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts.” To St. Paul, to be justified by works might mean the same thing as to be justified by faith ; the two phrases had the same meaning when the works sprang from a living faith, and the faith was a filial life towards God. Evidently St. Paul saw faith in all good Gentiles, whatever they professed in the way of religion ; and the faith was essentially the same as that of those who “ believed in Him who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead.” What was the virtue of believing in Jesus ? It lay in the believer being drawn to the God revealed in Jesus. So far as a man was drawn without Jesus to Him whom Jesus manifested, he had faith, and was justified by it. And the true living God was not one who could only be known by a name written in letters ; He was light, He was love, He was the source of all the order, spiritual and material, of the universe. St. Paul saw in every good man a submission of himself to a Righteousness and a Love which were above him. It must have been difficult to see this in the typical Stoic, who looks so supremely self-righteous. St. Paul would have held, so I cannot but think, that in the case of his being fundamentally self-righteous, a Stoic was not a good man ; but that it was one of the spiritual paradoxes which we are constrained to accept as true, that a man might think himself to be self-righteous when he was really looking up with reverence to a Righteousness which

had authority over him and to which he was surrendering himself. St. Paul gives us the impression that he held justification by faith to its furthest extreme, but that he rejoiced to see goodness and would fearlessly acknowledge it in a man of any religion or of no religion, being sure that there was for all goodness some root of essential faith.

(4) I conclude with contending that there is not the least want of harmony between the teaching of St. Paul and that of our Lord. To give an instance of what is sometimes alleged as to such disagreement, I may mention an observation once made to me by a friend who was warmly interested in religious questions. There was an excellent religion, he said, promulgated by Jesus of Nazareth, which had a good chance of spreading over the world ; but then came Paul with his bastard Platonism, and spoiled the good promise. No doubt St. Paul drew what may be called doctrinal inferences from what he held to have been revealed to him ; but I repeat that his essential faith was in Jesus the crucified, reigning at the right hand of God, and in what could be seen in Him of the nature and purposes of God. All his theology was what he held to be strictly deducible from his vision of Jesus Christ. He saw God as a living Father, offering forgiveness to erring and wayward children, and inviting them to live with Him as His reconciled and trustful children. Jesus was to him the way to the Father, and that was what our Lord Himself said He was. He spoke thus in the hearing of those whom He was sending forth : " O righteous Father, the world knew Thee not, but I knew Thee ; and these knew that Thou didst send me ; and I made known unto them Thy name, and will make it known." When we look at what is preserved of His teaching in the Gospels, we find Him continually naming the Father and the Kingdom. The coming Kingdom, He never tired of explaining, was a spiritual one ; it was the Kingdom of the heavenly

Father, who sees in secret. He bade His disciples pray to their Father in heaven that His Kingdom might come. As regards conduct of all kinds, His persistent lesson was that men were to allow themselves to be drawn into the presence of the heavenly Father, and were to seek to please Him. His theology was identical with that of St. Paul ; “ He that beholdeth me beholdeth Him that sent me ” ; and His morality was, like St. Paul's, deduced from His theology. It was a special view of St. Paul's, entirely in harmony with the teaching of Him who prescribed “ Walk in light,” that men were to learn in detail how they ought to walk by looking and seeing and *trying*, and that it was often through experience and the discerning faculty cultivated by experience that they would come to know what the will of their Lord was. For the world was God's world, to be understood by the light proceeding from Jesus the Son of God ; and God was teaching men how to walk in His world by what they could see in it under that light as to His ways and purposes. A singularly high value is thus given to the observation of consequences and to the principle of progress. The Lord Jesus was indignant with those whom He trained for apostleship when they let their intelligence sleep and judged by appearance. His teaching and that of St. Paul equally left room in the practical life of the world for much accommodation. The spiritual perfection of the child of God looking up to the Father through Christ was never to lose its supremacy or to be left out of sight ; but there was a sphere for such practical law as should recognise “ the hardness of men's hearts,” and there were things of Caesar to be rendered to Caesar, and the ruler did not bear the sword in vain. The Christians of the first days were taught by the Lord and His Apostles to see in the governing work of the Romans a ministry of God, and to deal respectfully for Christ's sake with customs—like



slavery, for example—which the Light of Christ was in time to convict and to abolish. And both by the words and by the actions of those to whom our deepest reverence is due, we are warned that the faith which justifies is in greater danger from religion and ecclesiastical rule than from the common righteousness of the world.

J. LLEWELYN DAVIES.

### SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.

#### III. SIN AND THE DIVINE HOLINESS—THE MORAL END.

HOLINESS, as Christianity understands it, is a name for the undimmed lustre of God's ethical Perfection. God is "the Holy One"—the alone "Good" in the absolute sense,<sup>1</sup>—and it is only when sin is lifted up into the light of this moral glory of God's character that its full enormity and hatefulness are disclosed. The divine Holiness is a postulate of the Christian doctrine of sin.

1. It is not necessary to spend time on philological discussions as to the *primitive meaning* of the word "holy,"<sup>2</sup> or as to the *stages* of the growth of the idea in the Old and New Testaments. It is more important to deal with the essential elements in the idea, as these come out in the result. On the former point—the origin and growth of the idea—many questionable things are often said. "To us," Dr. W. R. Smith observes truly, "holiness is an ethical

<sup>1</sup> Mark x. 18.

<sup>2</sup> In Old Testament, קְדוּשָׁה, holiness; קָדוֹשׁ, holy. In New Testament, ἅγιος. The root-meaning of the Old Testament word is obscure. Some (Gesenius, Dillmann, etc.), find the root-idea in "pure," "clear," "bright," or similar notion; others (Baudissin, etc.) find the idea in "separation." The latter is the view at present more generally favoured. Dr. Robertson Smith apparently begins with holy places and things (*Rel. of Semites*, Lects. iii.-iv.), but in Israel, at least, it was not so. "The probability is," as Dr. A. B. Davidson says, "that the application of the term 'holy' to things is secondary" (*Theol. of Old Testament*), p. 152; cf. p. 145).

idea. God, the perfect being, is the type of holiness; men are holy in proportion as their lives and character are Godlike; places and things can be called holy only by a figure, on account of their association with spiritual things." "This conception of holiness," he adds, "goes back to the Hebrew prophets, especially to Isaiah; but it is not the ordinary conception of antique religion, nor does it correspond to the original sense of the Semitic words that we translate by 'holy'."<sup>1</sup> The assertion, accordingly, is common that ethical quality did not enter into the original conception of Jehovah as holy.<sup>2</sup> We hold, on the contrary, with Dillmann,<sup>3</sup> that the ethical is an element entering into the idea of God's Holiness in the Biblical revelation from the beginning. The word "holy" is not, indeed, found in Genesis—as, however, we should expect it to be, if it was, as some think, a simple synonym for deity; but in Genesis the *thing* denoted by the word is present. God is the Judge of all the earth.<sup>4</sup> He requires men to walk before Him, and be perfect.<sup>5</sup> He accepts and saves the righteous.<sup>6</sup> He overwhelms a sinful world, and sinful cities,<sup>8</sup> with His judgments. Joseph must not do wickedness, and sin before God.<sup>9</sup> Even were it granted, as Dr. Davidson holds, that "holy," as applied to Jehovah, was "a general term expressing Godhead,"<sup>10</sup> the case is not

<sup>1</sup> *Rel. of Semites*, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> Thus e.g., Budde, *Stade (Bib. Theol. des A.T., pp. 87-8)*. Cf. Ritschl on "Holiness" in his *Recht. und Ver.* ii. pp. 89 ff., 154.

<sup>3</sup> Dillmann finds the "principle," "the fundamental thought," "the characteristic mark," of the Old Testament religion not simply in its Monotheism, or (with Hegel) in its "sublimity" (*Erhabenheit*, exaltation of God above the creature), but in the idea of God as "Holy," with inclusion of the ethical element,—"the turning away from all evil and sinfulness, goodness and ethical perfection." He rejects the view that the demands for ethical holiness are "first late (prophetic or even post-prophetic) demands" (*Altest. Theol.*, pp. 25 ff.; 252 ff.).

<sup>4</sup> Gen. xviii. 25. <sup>5</sup> Gen. xvii. 1; xviii. 19. <sup>6</sup> Abel, Enoch, Noah, etc.

<sup>7</sup> The Deluge. <sup>8</sup> Sodom and Gomorrah. <sup>9</sup> Gen. xxxix. 9.

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

essentially altered. For it is allowed that "Godhead was never a mere abstract conception," and that "holiness" had its meaning filled out from the attributes ascribed to God.<sup>1</sup> But among these attributes were the ethical.<sup>2</sup>

2. As essential elements entering into the idea of the divine Holiness in Scripture, we seem justified, with Dillmann, Martensen, and others,<sup>3</sup> in distinguishing these two. The term "holy" denotes God (1) in *His distinction from*, and *infinite exaltation above*, everything that is creaturely and finite; and (2) in *His separation from all moral impurity*, or, positively, in the *splendour of His moral perfection*. In the first aspect, which brings into view the awfulness, unapproachableness, majesty of God, "Holiness" does little more than express, as the writers above referred to contend, the idea of "Godhead"—hence even the heathen can speak of "the holy gods."<sup>4</sup> In the second aspect, "Holiness" is something peculiar to the God of Israel. Even on the side on which it expresses the exalted-

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 145-6.

<sup>2</sup> We take it, therefore, to rest on erroneous theory when it is affirmed: "In early [Biblical ?] times, at least, the holiness of the gods had no definite meaning apart from the holiness of their physical surroundings" (Hastings' *D. B.*, ii. p. 397; cf. Smith, *Rel. of Semites*, p. 141). It seems equally unwarranted to declare that in Ezekiel "the divine holiness appears to denote no other attribute than that of majesty, exhibited in the exercise of irresistible power" (*Ibid.*; cf. Davidson, *Intro. to Com. on Ezekiel*). This would, indeed, be an extraordinary descent from earlier prophetic teaching; but facts do not bear it out. Ezekiel had the intensest convictions of the divine righteousness (e.g., chap. xviii.; cf. Davidson, *in loc.*); this must have been included in his conception of holiness. He was, besides, a man whose mind was saturated with the ideas of the ritual law ["It appears to me that the Book of Ezekiel shows that before his day the ritual was almost the same as it became after the Restoration," Davidson, *Theol. of Old Testament*, p. 19], especially with the ideas and language of the so-called "Law of Holiness," in which, unquestionably, the word "holy" has a strong ethical, as well as ceremonial, connotation (Lev. xix. 2 ff., xx. 7, 8, etc.). It was by their *sins* the people had profaned the holy name of Jehovah (Ezek. xxxvi. 21-27).

<sup>3</sup> Dillmann, as above; Martensen, *Dogmatics*, pp. 99-100 (E.T.). Oehler, *Theol. of Old Testament*, i. pp. 154 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Daniel iv. 8, 19, etc.; the inscription of Eshmunazar (Phœnician).

ness and majesty of God, however, it is important to notice that "Holiness" is not a mere natural attribute, but involves an ethical element. God is not "holy" simply through the fact of His majesty; the word expresses rather a determination of His will, through which He maintains Himself in His distinction from the creature, and cannot permit any derogation from His honour.<sup>1</sup> Just as, on the other side, the moral character of God is raised by its connexion with His absoluteness to a height of sanctity which inspires the profoundest awe, dread, and reverence in the worshipper.<sup>2</sup> It is this awful moral purity of God,—this light of Holiness in presence of which evil cannot stand,—which, in the Old Testament, is God's chief glory; in the New Testament its sublimity, while as fully recognised,<sup>3</sup> is softened by the gentler radiance of love. Only as Holiness is morally conceived, has the command, "Be ye holy, for I am holy,"<sup>4</sup> any meaning. In Isaiah's vision, only the ethical could call forth the prophet's confession of uncleanness.<sup>5</sup> In the New Testament it is the ethical aspect of Holiness which is the prominent one in both God and man.

3. The two aspects of Holiness here signalised are one in the nature of God, but become known to man through the fact of God's *self-revelation*. It is not as man grows in moral conceptions that he gradually creates for himself the image of a God of stainless perfection; it is, conversely,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Martensen, *op. cit.*, p. 99. Oehler says: "It follows that the divine holiness, even if, as absolute perfection of life, it involves the negation of all bounds of creature finitude, is nevertheless mainly seclusion from the impurity and sinfulness of the creature, or, expressed positively, the clearness and purity of the divine nature, which excludes all communion with what is wicked" (*op. cit.*, i. p. 160).

<sup>2</sup> Isa. vi. 1-5; cf. 1 Peter i. 16, 17, iii. 15. The connexion between the holy majesty and ethical character of Jehovah is seen in such passages as 1 Sam. ii. 2, 3; Hab. i. 12, 13.

<sup>3</sup> John xvii. 11; cf. xii. 41; Heb. x. 31, xii. 18-29; Rev. xv. 4, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Lev. xi. 44, xix. 2; 1 Peter i. 16, 17. <sup>5</sup> Isa. vi. 5.



in the light of the revelation of God's Holiness that man comes to know himself as sinful, and has set before him an ideal of Holiness to which he aspires. Philosophy pleads for autonomy in ethics.<sup>1</sup> But there is one word to which philosophical ethics cannot give its proper meaning—this word "Holiness." Religion gives the word its significance by interpreting it to mean ethical purity like to God's. It is much of itself to have the obligations to which conscience naturally testifies united with the idea of a divine Being, whose will they represent, and with whose character they correspond. As thus lifted up, obligation is magnified and strengthened. It acquires an awfulness and solemnity it could not otherwise possess. A sense of responsibility of peculiar sacredness is developed. The very elevation to which duty is now raised—the consciousness of new duties to God, the call to love, trust, and worship—exalt the moral ideal, while they deepen the sense of personal unworthiness. Vastly greater are the effects produced, when to the quickening of natural conscience is added the disclosure of God's own character as holy and gracious in the words and deeds of his special revelation: when, as in Israel, Holiness is seen manifesting itself in works of power and mercy, in judging and punishing transgression, in fidelity to promise and covenant, in righteous laws, in demands for faith and obedience, in the uniting of blessing with ethical conditions.<sup>2</sup> The supreme revelation of God's Holiness, however, as of everything else in God, is again that given in Christ—the holy and incarnate Son. Be

<sup>1</sup> "While religion without morality cannot, in our day, count on many advocates, morality without religion finds no lack of such" (Martensen, *op. cit.*, p. 15).

<sup>2</sup> Ceremonial ordinances take a lower, if still necessary, place in this process of education. In the Bible they are truly part of a divine economy—"shadows of the good things to come," as the Epistle to the Hebrews represents them (chaps. ix., x.).

the process of development what one will, the result is indubitable: God is conceived of in Christianity as the absolutely ethically perfect Being—the Holy God, if also the God of Fatherly Love,<sup>1</sup> to whom moral impurity in every form and degree is abhorrent.<sup>2</sup>

4. For the rest, it may be sufficient to say that, if “Holiness” be the most comprehensive name for the divine moral perfection, the lustre of this perfection, in the separation of its rays, yields what we designate as the *special moral attributes*. These are grouped, perhaps, most conveniently under “righteousness” (truth, faithfulness, justice, zeal, etc.), and “love” (goodness, pity, mercy, longsuffering, etc.), though in reality all are but expressions of the one undivided life. It is plain, further, that, if Holiness has been rightly described, it cannot be regarded as simply a *passive* perfection of the divine Being—a “glory” or “beauty” of character—but must be thought of as an intensely active principle, a living energy, asserting itself in the upholding of the good, and the condemnation and judgment of the bad. Against sin, from eternity to eternity, the holy God cannot but declare Himself. “Wrath” is not extraneous to His nature, but is a vital element in His perfection. “Our God is a consuming fire.”<sup>3</sup> But judgment is no delight to Him, and the ultimate end which Holiness strives after is, not the destruction of the sinner,

<sup>1</sup> 1 Peter i. 16, 17.

<sup>2</sup> B. Stade, whose views on the development are radical enough, says that the view of God in the revelation of Jesus is not related to that of the Old Testament as its opposite, but as its completion and perfecting. It includes the following “weighty and characteristic” features, received from Judaism: “that God is supramundane Spirit, World-Creator and World-Preserver, therefore eternal, all-powerful, all-knowing, and ethically holy, i.e., acting according to the most perfect standards, and that His creation and preservation of the world stand in the service of a plan of salvation for mankind, and have for their end a Kingdom into which all men are called” (*Bib. Theol. des A.T.*, p. 79).

<sup>3</sup> Heb. xii. 29.

but the restoration of the divine image, and the union of all beings in love.<sup>1</sup>

It must now be apparent how deeply the idea of the divine Holiness enters into the Christian conception of sin. Where this idea is absent, or where "holy" is only an unethical predicate of the gods viewed as removed from men, there may still, from the promptings of the natural conscience, be a sense of sin and guilt, moving to penitential utterances, and to acts for the removal of that guilt. There can never, however, be the same sense of sin's awful evil, and of its hatefulness in the sight of God, as where, in the light of revelation, God is truly known, and the impression of His Holiness is deeply felt. It is, indeed, singular how sensitive the natural conscience sometimes is, even in heathenism, to wrongdoing as sin, and how unerringly, often, it pierces the grossest veils of polytheism in its conviction of a Power that judges righteously, and punishes the evil-doer.<sup>2</sup> Tertullian makes effective use of this spontaneous testimony of the soul to the true God<sup>3</sup>—the "soul naturally Christian," as he calls it in his *Apology*; <sup>4</sup> and heathen literature of all ages abounds in illustrations of the same thing. In the Egyptian Precepts of Ptah-hotep,<sup>5</sup> e.g.,

<sup>1</sup> Ezek. xviii. 32, xxxiii. 11; Eph. iv. 13-17; Col. iii. 10).

<sup>2</sup> Mr. A. Lang does service in collecting the evidence, much of it recent, to the higher religious conceptions and the connexion of religion and morality among low savages, where the existence of such ideas had been denied. (See his *Making of Religion*, chaps. ix., xiii.) Livingstone testified of the Bakwains: "Nothing we indicate as sin ever appeared to them as otherwise"—polygamy excepted (*Miss. Travels*, pp. 158; in Lang).

<sup>3</sup> *De Test. Animi*, c. 2. "Thou affirmest Him to be God alone to whom thou givest no other name than God. . . . Nor is the nature of the God we declare unknown to thee: 'God is good,' 'God does good,' thou art wont to say. . . . So thou art always ready, O soul, from thine own knowledge, nobody casting scorn upon thee, and no one preventing, to exclaim, 'God sees all,' and 'I commend thee to God,' and 'May God repay,' and 'God shall judge between us.' How happens this, since thou art not Christian?"

<sup>4</sup> "*Anima naturaliter Christiana*," *Apol.* c. 17.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Renouf, Hibb. Lects. on *The Rel. of Ancient Egypt*, pp. 99-103;

and in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi,<sup>1</sup> God is appealed to as directly and simply as in the Book of Genesis. But the darkening polytheism and immoral mythology are *there* in these religions ; and even the noblest of Babylonian or Vedic penitential hymns fall immeasurably short of the ethical intensity of the Hebrew Psalms, just because the idea of a perfect Holiness in God is wanting. The Babylonian penitent reiterates : “ O my God, seven times seven are my transgressions ; forgive my sins ! O my goddess, seven times seven are my transgressions ; forgive my sins ! O God, whom I know and whom I know not, seven times seven are my transgressions ; forgive my sins ! ”<sup>2</sup> But the sins confessed are chiefly ritual offences ( “ The cursed thing that I ate I knew not. The cursed thing that I trampled on I knew not ” ). In the Rig-Veda Varuna is piteously appealed to for mercy ; but sin is conceived of as infatuation. “ It was not our own doing, O Varuna, it was necessity, an intoxicating draught, passion, dice, thoughtlessness. ”<sup>3</sup> How profound, in comparison, the language of the Psalmist : “ Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned, and done that which is evil in Thy sight. . . . Create in me a clean heart, O God ; and renew a right spirit within me ! ”<sup>4</sup>

and B. G. Gunn's translation of the book. There are several similar collections and fragments (Renouf, pp. 75-6 ; 101-2 ; Gunn). Mr. Gunn translates “ the God,” where Renouf renders “ God ” ; “ a Power without a name or any mythological characteristic, constantly referred to in the singular number ” (p. 100). But Mr. Gunn also says : “ There is nothing said as to duties to the Gods . . . So simply and purely does Ptah-hotop speak of the God that the modern reader can, without the least degradation of his ideals, consider the author as referring to the Deity of Monotheism ” (pp. 33, 36). The qualities attributed to God are ethical. He rewards diligence and punishes sin, is the giver of good things, observes men's actions, loves His creation, etc.

<sup>1</sup> C. H. W. Johns, *Oldest Code of Laws*, pp. 18, 19, 24, 25, 50, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Sayce, Hibb. Lects., *Rel. of Ancient Babylonians*, pp. 350-1.

<sup>3</sup> *Rig-Veda*, vii. 86, 89 (Müller's *Anc. Sanskrit Lit.*).

<sup>4</sup> Ps. li. 4, 10.



Thus then the case stands as regards revelation. In Habakkuk's words, speaking of Jehovah, his "Holy One": "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on perverseness."<sup>1</sup> Reverting now to the question which mainly occupies us, we have to ask how the *thought and speculation* of the day stand related to this *postulate of a Divine Holiness*, in the light of which, in Christianity, sin appears so infinitely hateful and condemnable.

If what has been said is correct, it follows that any teaching which negates God's existence, or denies or weakens the truth of the Holiness of God, must, in the degree in which it does so, weaken or subvert the Christian conception of sin. In last paper, however, it was seen that, both as a general question of Theism, and as a special question of ethical character in God, it is precisely this Christian postulate of a Holy God which, at the present hour, is being, from many sides, vehemently assailed. The bearings of these assaults must now be looked at more narrowly. The point to be regarded is—their effect on the idea of sin.

1. *Atheistic and materialistic* views of the world, such as have sometimes prevailed, may be set aside at once as incompatible with any serious view of sin. Here the negation of God is absolute: of necessity, also, the negation of the spiritual nature of man, and of inherent moral distinctions. "Man is what he eats" (Feuerbach) affords no basis for ethics. By the last century materialists, Feuerbach, Büchner, Vogt, Moleschott, the consequences were remorselessly drawn out.<sup>2</sup> There is no sin, free-will, accountability. "Ethics," in words of Luthardt, "are transformed into a bill of fare."<sup>3</sup> Such crass doctrine,

<sup>1</sup> Heb. i. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the writer's *Christian View of God* (11th Edit., pp. 402-3).

<sup>3</sup> *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, p. 131 (E.T.). Abundant quotations are given by Luthardt and others. E.g., "Sin is that which is unnatural, and not the choosing to do evil" (Moleschott). "In fact, there

though popular for the time—Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* ("Force and Matter") went in twenty years through fourteen editions, and was translated into almost every language in Europe—could not survive. There came a reaction on the part of leading thinkers.<sup>1</sup> The monistic, agnostic, and materialistic-idealistic<sup>2</sup> theories (Haeckel, Spencer, Huxley, etc.) which took its place can hardly be described as an improvement, since, even where distinction is made between mental and physical facts, it is held that Science can deal with the former only when interpreted in terms of matter.<sup>3</sup> Freedom is denied. Man becomes an automaton.<sup>4</sup> Material law rules the whole domain of human life.<sup>5</sup> What place is left for sin?

2. Dillmann justly says that "Holiness" contains the notion "of a living, intelligent, free *Personality*, for only of an I, of a free *Personality*, can Holiness in the full sense

is no such thing as sin, and therefore no justice in punishment." [So to-day, Mr. Blatchford.] Vogt says: "There is no such thing as free-will, and, consequently, such things as the responsibility and accountability which ethics and penal law, and God knows what else, would still impose upon us." The outcome is as in 1 Cor. xv. 32. Luthardt quotes from one of many epitaphs on ancient monuments: "Friends, I advise you, mix a goblet of wine and drink it, with your heads crowned with flowers; earth destroys what is left after death" (p. 381).

<sup>1</sup> Haeckel, in his *Riddle of the Universe*, bemoans that most of the leading thinkers, as Virchow, Du Bois-Reymond, Wundt, who had at first adopted a materialistic standpoint, later abandoned it, and came over to a spiritualistic view.

<sup>2</sup> "It follows that what I term legitimate Materialism . . . is neither more nor less than a shorthand Idealism" (Huxley, "On Descartes," *Lay Sermons*, pp. 157, 374).

<sup>3</sup> "With a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred" ("On Physical Basis of Life," *Lay Sermons*, p. 160). "Thought is as much a function of matter as motion is" ("On Descartes," *Ibid.*, p. 370; cf. on "Science and Morals" in *Collected Essays*, ix. p. 135).

<sup>4</sup> Thus Huxley, Shadworth Hodgson.

<sup>5</sup> "As surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future extend the realm of matter and law, till it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action" ("On Physical Basis," *Ibid.*, p. 156).

be predicated.”<sup>1</sup> It results that all *Pantheistic* systems, with *theories of idealism* which exclude, or inadequately affirm, the divine Personality, are hostile to Christian views of sin. History, again, shows this to be everywhere the case. Spinoza, whose system had such a fascination for later minds, declared repentance to be a weakness.<sup>2</sup> God is the sole cause. Sin has no reality.<sup>3</sup> Schleiermacher, owing to the Pantheistic basis of his thinking, seriously weakened the idea of sin. God’s is the one causality in the universe. Sin is the form of growth ordained for us by God with a view to the redemption in Christ. The guilt-consciousness (a subjective experience) is a spur to lead us to seek that redemption.<sup>4</sup> Absolutist systems generally reject “Personality” in its application to God as an anthropomorphic and inadmissible conception. It is a moot question whether Hegel, who claimed to change Spinoza’s “Substance” into “Subject” (Spirit, Reason, Idea), in any sense attributed Personality to God. The whole genius of his system seems to forbid it,<sup>5</sup> and expositors and critics like Professor Pringle-Pattison<sup>6</sup> and Dr. Ellis McTaggart<sup>7</sup> are certain he did not. The effects on his views of sin are thus summed up by Dr. McTaggart :

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 28. If we are to keep the name of God at all, or any equivalent term, says Prof. Pringle-Pattison, “an existence of God for Himself, analogous to our own personal existence, though doubtless transcending it infinitely in innumerable ways, is an essential element in the conception” (*Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 222). Dr. McTaggart says: “It is better not to call an impersonal Absolute by the name of God” (*Heg. Cos.*, pp. xi. 93).

<sup>2</sup> “Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched and infirm” (*Ethics*, pt. iv., prop. 54).

<sup>3</sup> “Good and evil, or sin, are only modes of thought, and by no means things, or anything that has reality” (cf. his “Short Treatise,” Wolf’s *Spinoza*, pp. 51, 60, etc.).

<sup>4</sup> *Der christ. Glaube*, Sects. 51. 1; 80, 81.

<sup>5</sup> A defence can only be made by regarding time-development as illusory (see below on Green); even then the idea of Personality is not that in Christianity.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 222.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 59, 93, 205 ff.

“ Defects, error, sin, are for Hegel only imperfectly real. . . . All sin is for Hegel relatively good . . . Christianity habitually attaches enormous importance to the idea of sin. . . . This idea is entirely alien to Hegel. I do not wish to insist so much on his belief that all sin, like all other evil, is, from the deepest point of view, unreal, and that *sub specie æternitatis* all reality is perfect. . . . The real difficulty lies in Hegel’s treatment of sin as something relatively good. . . . There is no trace in Hegel of any feeling of absolute humility and contrition of man before God. . . . Sin is a mere appearance. Like all appearance, it is based on reality. But the reality it is based on is not sin. Like all reality, it is perfectly good. The sinfulness is part of the appearance.”<sup>1</sup> Is it not a similar effect that is seen to-day in the belittling of sin in “ The New Theology ” ?

3. The outlook may seem more promising when we come to the distinguished thinkers of the Oxford *Neo-Hegelian* school, headed so ably by the late Mr. T. H. Green. Here, at least, we have the recognition of, in Mr. Green’s phrase, an “ Eternal Self-Consciousness ” at the basis of the universe ; therefore, it may be thought, of something like Personality. Mr. Green’s own profound religious feeling, as well as his ideological views of Christianity, are well brought out in Mr. Nettleship’s “ Memoir,” and in his various writings on religion. God, to him, was a conscious Being who is in eternal perfection all that man has it in him to come to be—“ a Being of perfect understanding and perfect love ”—an infinite Spirit, towards whom “ the attitude of man at his highest and completest could still only be that which we have described as self-abasement before an ideal of holiness.”<sup>2</sup> So Dr. Edward Caird

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 218, 239, 243. See the whole discussion.

<sup>2</sup> “ Memoir,” in *Green’s Works*, iii. pp. 92, 142.



speaks of "the divine principle of all things" as "a living God, the inspiring source and eternal realisation of the moral ideal of man"<sup>1</sup>—"an intelligent or self-conscious being."<sup>2</sup> Both Mr. Green and Dr. Caird, however, would shrink from applying the term "personal" to God—Dr. Caird argues against it<sup>3</sup>—and with too good reason in the metaphysical implications of their system. For what, after all, is this "Eternal Self-Consciousness" of Mr. Green's *Prolegomena*? In strictness, only the ideal unity of the system of thought-relations we call the universe—its central point or focus—the still pool, if we may call it so, in which the system of relations eternally reflects itself. Time falls away from this Consciousness, and from the relations it sustains, for it is "a consciousness for which the relations of fact that form the object of our gradually-acquired knowledge already and eternally exist."<sup>4</sup> Freedom does not belong to it, for the relations are what they are by eternal logical necessity. The Consciousness has no contents but these relations which constitute the world—no being in and for itself. It is Kant's "Synthetic Unity of Apperception" deified. God and the universe are, in short, on this view, but two sides—the inner and outer—of one and the same fact: individual selves are but "the Eternal Consciousness itself, making the animal organism its vehicle, and subject to certain limitations in so doing."<sup>5</sup>

Despite language, therefore, about a "realised moral ideal," it is very obvious that we have not here a view of God fitted to sustain a Christian doctrine of sin. God's

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution of Religion*, ii. p. 67.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82. Cf. Mr. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, pp. 290, 304-5.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>4</sup> *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 75. Time-development is here in principle denied. Process in nature is not a matter simply of "gradually-acquired knowledge," but a reality of the objective system.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72-3.

life being merged in that of the universe, sin, so far as it is real, is taken up into God's own life. But sin, in truth, is not real. Sin belongs, as in Hegel, to the realm of appearance, and for God, the unity of the whole, simply does not exist. As Mr. Nettleship interprets: "The imperfection which in man is never wholly overcome, but remains a positive and final fact separating him from God, exists in God, not as sin, but as an element in the divine perfection, in which its finality, and therefore its sinfulness, is done away."<sup>1</sup> So to Dr. E. Caird sin is a necessary step in the dialectic movement of spirit which conducts to goodness. "The turpidity of the waters only proves that the angel has come down to trouble them, and the important thing is that, when so disturbed, they have a healing virtue."<sup>2</sup> It begins to be apparent that the "realised perfection" of this theory is something very different from the divine Holiness of the Christian gospel. It is only what might be looked for, therefore, to find the type of thought the theory represents, so replete with contradictions, developing, in the hands of Mr. Bradley, who emphasises these, into the doctrine of an Absolute for whom good and evil wholly disappear, and, under Dr. McTaggart's unsparing logic, into a doing away with the "Eternal Self-Consciousness" altogether.

4. Enough was perhaps said in last paper in illustration of Mr. Bradley's general standpoint in his work, *Appearance and Reality*. The consciousness in which Mr. Green sought the key to the meaning of the universe Mr. Bradley finds to be involved in insoluble contradictions, which show that it works in a region of "appearance"—one may say,

<sup>1</sup> "Memoir," p. 94.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, i. p. 231. St. Paul is criticised for not adequately seeing the unity of the negative and positive sides of this process (ii. pp. 207, 211-13). It is instructive to notice that the words "Sin" and "Evil" do not occur in Dr. Caird's Index.

illusion. The appearances are held to imply an absolute Reality of which we can assert little more than that it is the sum of them, but is, in some unknown way, self-consistent and harmonious.<sup>1</sup> [How this last proposition is established is not clear.] Neither thought, nor will, nor Personality, nor morality, can be affirmed of the Absolute. To it there is nothing good or bad.<sup>2</sup> It may only be noticed now how this final product of the hyper-acute dialectic of the Neo-Hegelian school lands us in a species of semi-pessimistic Spinozism, very different from the buoyant confidence with which the school set out. "Is there," asks Mr. Bradley towards the close, "in the end, and on the whole, any progress in the universe? Is the Absolute either better or worse at one time than another? It is, clear that we must answer in the negative, since progress and decay are alike incompatible with perfection. There is, of course, progress in the world, and there is also retrogression, but we cannot think that the whole either moves on or backwards."<sup>3</sup> The Christian ideal of a Kingdom of God finds little support here. It need not be said that the hope of immortality is rejected.<sup>4</sup>

5. If Dr. McTaggart, in his *Some Dogmas of Religion*, is as hyper-subtle as Mr. Bradley, he attacks the problems in his own way, and arrives at different, if equally negative, conclusions. His polemic is directed against the ordinary doctrines of God, Freedom and Immortality, all of which, he is satisfied, must go, when brought to the bar of reason. By God is meant "a Being who is personal, supreme, and good."<sup>5</sup> The usual arguments to prove the existence

<sup>1</sup> *Appear. and Reality*, pp. 242, 457.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 411.

<sup>3</sup> We do not seem to get much beyond the doctrine of Celsus, whom Origen combated. "There neither has been, in former times, nor is there now, nor ever shall be, an increase or diminution of evil. The nature of the universe is ever identical, and the production of evil is not a variable quantity" (*Contra Celsum*, bk. iii. 62).

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 501-10.

<sup>5</sup> *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 186.

of such a Being are weighed and found wanting. A chief reason for challenging the omnipotence and goodness of God is the existence of evil in the world.<sup>1</sup> A non-omnipotent God is declared to be no solution of the difficulty ; besides, there is no evidence for His existence either. The case for Theism thus falls. Obviously it is needless to talk of a divine Holiness, and of a doctrine of sin built on it, when the very existence of a personal and supreme Deity is negated. It may safely be replied, however, that in his ingenious reasonings on these subjects, Dr. McTaggart overreaches himself by his cleverness. The problem of evil in its relation to Theodicy belongs to a different part of the argument, but a few words may be said on the general issue. The question of Theism, on its intellectual side, resolves itself, in a sentence, very much into this, Is there a rationally-constituted universe ? On its moral side, into this, Is there an essential distinction between right and wrong ? For if the universe is rationally constituted—and who will say it is not ?—it seems but the other side of the same proposition to affirm that there must be Reason behind it—that it has a rational mind for its Cause. Hypotheses which postulate Thought without a Thinker may be left, for the majority of human beings, to look after themselves. Some of the objections offered by Dr. McTaggart on the theoretic side are extraordinary. E.g., How can God be omnipotent, if He is bound by the laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle ?<sup>2</sup> If He cannot, at will, make  $A = \text{not-}A$  ! or, say, make 2 and  $2 = 5$  ! Again, in his argument—here following Hume—that, given sufficient time, “ chance,” in its innumerable combinations, is capable of producing all the appearances of

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 208 ff., 224.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 203-6, 230, etc.



design in the universe.<sup>1</sup> Not by such reasonings will the pillars of a rational belief in God be shaken.

It is on the ethical side, however, that the weight of the objection presses, and here the question of the divine Holiness is most nearly touched. On this the reply may be made that, however, in theory, the validity of moral distinctions may be challenged, there is hardly a writer who does not, in practice, admit that it is impossible to believe in a God who is *less* than the *realised ideal of moral perfection*. Either *such* a God, even the Agnostic will say, or no God. Mr. Bradley would be the first to scout the possibility of believing in a God who was capricious, cruel, or vindictive, in His dealings with His creatures. This much, at least, Christianity has done for serious thinking. An illustration is afforded in Mr. J. S. Mill's famous outburst, endorsed by Dr. McTaggart,<sup>2</sup> in denunciation of what he took to be the kind of Deity depicted by Mr. Mansel. "If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being in whom all the excellencies which the highest mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. . . . Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do; he shall not compel me to worship him. I will

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 243-5, 259. Cf Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Nat. Rel.*, pt. viii. : "It must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times." It is overlooked that there are some combinations that *never* would arise under fortuity, even in an eternity—those, viz., due to an ordering intelligence (a "Hamlet," for instance).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures" [the closing part of the passage we may omit].<sup>1</sup> Here is assertion enough of absolute moral values. On whatever grounds we believe in a supreme, ruling Power in the universe, even the perplexity of evil in the world cannot shake our faith that this Power must be ethically good.<sup>2</sup>

6. It is possible, however, to go a step further. Allusion has been made to the tempting plea of philosophical writers—of Dr. McTaggart among the rest—for an autonomous morality, a morality which shall be independent of religion. In the interest of both morality and religion—indirectly, of a doctrine of sin—it may be claimed that, with the recognition of absolute moral standards, this plea cannot be sustained. It is not merely, as formerly urged, that morality needs imperatively to be vitalised from a higher source, and only when taken up into a higher relation, that of religion, obtains the power needed to sustain it, to give it the breadth adequate to man's need, and to make it a living reality in men's hearts. The deeper truth is that the ethical ideal, with its unconditional claim on man's obedience, has for its necessary implication an Ethical Power at the basis of the universe. The ideal in conscience is not its own explanation. It drives us back on the Power

<sup>1</sup> *Exam. of Hamilton*, p. 103. Mr. Mansel's reply may be seen in his *Philosophy of the Conditioned*, pp. 168 ff. The words quoted do honour to Mr. Mill's heart: whether he was justified in using them by his philosophy is another matter. It is to be granted that, while endorsing Mill's words, Dr. McTaggart in other places seems to take a different view. "It is not impossible that the director of the universe should be worse than the worst man. . . . I cannot see, therefore, that any reason has been given for supposing a director of the universe to be good rather than bad" (*op. cit.*, pp. 255-6). But, paradoxes apart, Dr. McTaggart would object to worship such a being. He would judge him by the moral ideal, and condemn him.

<sup>2</sup> Matthew Arnold's "Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness" is a testimony in the same direction, but fails in not explicitly recognising that such a Power must be personal.

on which our whole being depends, and is itself one of the surest grounds of our faith that this Power is personal, and ethically perfect. It discovers to us that man, as a moral being, is not a self-sufficing unit, capable of living for himself and to himself, but is intended to live his life in dependence on God, drawing daily his supplies of grace and strength from Him.<sup>1</sup> His sin is, fundamentally, that he does not so live, but seeks to realise a false independence.

The idea of the divine Holiness, in union with Personality and Freedom—God's "Thou" answering to the "I" in man—is thus one profoundly in accordance with reason and the highest dictates of morality. Yet it is to be repeated that the full meaning of Holiness, final certainty in regard to it, and the irresistible impression of its power, are only to be obtained through God's historical self-revelations, and above all through His personal revelation in Jesus Christ. "The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared [ἐξηγήσατο, interpreted, given the 'exegesis' of] Him."<sup>2</sup> In Christ we have, as Herrmann would say, the overpowering impression (*Eindruck*) of the grace and truth, but not less of the holy purity, of the Power, "greater than all things" that rules the world.<sup>3</sup> The Gospel parallel to Isaiah's confession, "Woe is me! because I am a man of unclean lips,"<sup>4</sup> is St. Peter's cry in the boat, "Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord."<sup>5</sup> In his recognition of "the inviolable justice of God's moral order,"<sup>6</sup> which Jesus reveals, and at the same time vindicates, Herrmann goes beyond Ritschl, who, in exalting love to the exclusion of everything judicial and punitive in God's character, weakens the ideas of both sin and guilt, resolving the former largely

<sup>1</sup> Thus Augustine rightly conceived of man.

<sup>2</sup> John i. 18. <sup>3</sup> *Communion with God*, pp. 78 ff., 107-10 (E. T.).

<sup>4</sup> Is. vi. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Luke v. 8.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

into "ignorance," and the latter into an alienation and distrust which better knowledge of God removes.<sup>1</sup> It is, in truth, the revelation of God's Holiness in the gospel which gives grace all its value. Resentment against sin, as Professor Seeley in *Ecce Homo* teaches, is the background of mercy.<sup>2</sup> In Christ the flame of anger at wilful transgression is ever accompanied by pity for the weak and erring.

God, then, is Holy. One corollary from this truth, of no small importance for the doctrine of sin, is the right determination of *the moral end*. Moral life, in the true idea of it, as philosophy has recognised from the time of Socrates, is life directed to an end. What is that end? Religion alone, in its doctrine of the Holy God, holds the answer to that question. If God be holy, embracing in His divine perfection righteousness and love, it follows without further argument that His final end in the universe must be a moral and personal one. Kant, Lotze, Ritschl, most theologians of rank, agree here. From it they deduce, in harmony with Christianity, that God's final end in His universe must be a "Kingdom of God," or Kingdom of the Good.<sup>3</sup> Dorner in his *Ethics* has a fruitful discussion of the question, What is the relation of the ethical nature of God to the other determinations we ascribe to Him? And he reaches the conclusion that "the non-ethical distinctions in the nature of God [the natural attributes] are related to the ethical as means to an end; but the absolute end can only lie in morality, for it alone is of absolute worth."<sup>4</sup>

This conception of the end of God yields the true standard

<sup>1</sup> *Justif. and Recon.*, pp. 376-84 (E. T.).

<sup>2</sup> *Ecce Homo*, chap. xxi.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kant, *Religion within the Limits of True Reason*, bk. iii.; Lotze, *Phil. of Rel.*, p. 137 (E. T.); Ritschl, *Justif. and Recon.*, pp. 279-80 (E.T.).

<sup>4</sup> *Christian Ethics*, p. 65 (E. T.).



for the *end of man*. The older theology, mounting to the highest point, defined the last end for both God and man as "the glory of God." And truly all things are created and exist ultimately for the glory of God.<sup>1</sup> Man's sin is that he comes short of that glory.<sup>2</sup> But the question needs nearer determination; for obviously each created being glorifies God only as it fulfils the end for which it was itself created. What then is the end of man's creation? Kant, again, is right in saying that it can only be the moral; that the end is wrongly conceived if sought in anything outside morality—in pleasure, happiness, self-satisfaction, in anything to which morality is related merely as a means. It is not relation to the end that creates morality, but morality that imposes the necessity that the end must be a moral one. The end may include both virtue and blessedness; but the virtue must determine the blessedness, not *vice versa*.

But this is not the whole. From the *religious* standpoint, which is the ultimate one, man does not exist for himself. His end, therefore, cannot lie within himself, but must lie in his making *God's* end his own. The powers derived from God are to be used for God's ends, not for his own; are to be used, as was said, for God's glory.<sup>3</sup> That is, in the view taken of God's end, they are to be used for the ends of His Kingdom. Here, in the Christian conception, is man's chief end—his chief duty and chief good—to live for God's Kingdom; to seek first the Kingdom of God and its righteousness.<sup>4</sup> That Kingdom, begun on earth, perfected in eternity—established through Christ in redemption from sin—is to be the goal of all endeavour, the object of all hope.

<sup>1</sup> Pss. xix. 1, cxlv. 10-12; Rev. iv. 11, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. i. 21, iii. 21.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. x. 31; 1 Pet. iv. 11. Cf. Rom. vi. 13, 22.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. vi. 33.

How entirely every such conception of the end, whether of man or of the universe, is swept away by the theories above commented upon, will be obvious to every one who reflects on their denials of God, of Freedom, and of Immortality, and on the views which are substituted of the grounds of moral conduct, and the aims of human existence. Illustrations will appear in later parts of the discussion.

JAMES ORR.

LEXICAL NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.\*

XVII.

*νηφάλιος*.—In *Syll.* 631<sup>24</sup> (iv/B.C.), *νηφάλιοι τρεῖς βωμοί* may refer either to altars at which only wineless offerings were made, or perhaps to cakes made in the form of an altar, free from all infusion of wine: see Dittenberger's note. The verb is found along with *ἀγνεύω* to mark the proper state of intending worshippers, *Syll.* 790<sup>41</sup> (i/A.D.), *ἀγνεύοντες καὶ νήφοντες*: cf. *ibid.* 564<sup>1</sup>, *ἀπ' οἴνου μὴ προσιέναι*, and the metaphorical application in 1 Peter iv. 7, *νήψατε εἰς προσευχάς*.

*νίκη*.—An interesting example of this word occurs in the letter of the Emperor Claudius incorporated in the diploma of membership of The Worshipful Gymnastic Society of Nomads, in which he thanks the club for the golden crown which it had sent to him on the occasion of his victorious campaign in Britain in A.D. 43—*ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ Βρετάννων νείκῃ*, BM III. p. 216<sup>12</sup>. For the later form *νίκος*, as in 1 Esdr. iii. 9, 1 Cor. xv. 55, 57, cf. BU 1002<sup>14</sup> (B.C. 55).

*νοέω*.—The phrase *νοῶν καὶ φρονῶν* is common in wills, both of the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, the testator

\* For abbreviations see the February and March (1908) *Εκποσίτων*, pp. 170, 262.

thus certifying himself as "being sane and in his right mind," cf. PP I. *passim*, OP 491<sup>2</sup> (A.D. 126).

*νομικός*.—Without entering into the discussion as to whether this term when applied to Zenas in Tit. iii. 13 implies in his case a knowledge of Roman or Hebrew law, it may be noted that examples of the former sense can be readily produced from the papyri and inscriptions: see e.g. BU 326<sup>ii. 22</sup> (ii/A.D.) where a certain Gaius Lucius Geminianus *νομικὸς Ῥωμαϊκός* certifies that he has examined the copy of a will, and finds that it corresponds with the original; and *Magn.* 191 (ii/A.D.) an inscription honouring *Ζώβιον Διοσκουρίδου νομικὸν ζήσαντα κοσμίως*. Cf. also the Phrygian inscription of imperial times *Α. Μαλίῳ Μαξίμῳ νομικῷ*, quoted by Hatch in *J. B. L.* xxvii. 2 from the *Proceedings of the American School at Athens*, ii. p. 137.

*νόμος*.—For the use of *νόμος* c. gen. obj. to denote a particular ordinance as in Rom. vii. 2, *ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός* ("from that section of the statute-book which is headed 'The Husband,' the section which lays down his rights and duties" *SH*) cf. *Syll.* 828<sup>14</sup>, *κατὰ τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐ[ρανισ]τῶν*. Thieme (p. 30) illustrates the quasi-personification of *ὁ νόμος* in John vii. 51, Rom. iii. 19 by the Magnesian inscription 92a<sup>10</sup> (ii/B.C.), *πάντων συντελεσθέντων, ὧ[ν ὁ νόμος] συντάσσει*, cf. b<sup>16</sup> *πάντων συντελεσθέντων ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀγορεύει*.

*νοσφίζω*.—The absolute use of this verb in Tit. ii. 10 is illustrated by PP III. 56(b)<sup>10, 12</sup> where an official swears *οὔτε αὐτὸς νοσφειοῦμαι*, "I will neither peculate myself," and if I find any one else *νοσφιζόμενον*, "peculating," I will report him; cf. *ibid.* (c)<sup>2</sup> where *νοσφίσασθαι* occurs in a similar context.

*νουμηνία*.—Cf. BU 1053<sup>i. 20</sup> (B.C. 13), *ἀπὸ νουμηνίας*, and for the uncontracted form *νεομηνία*, which W.H. prefer in

Col. ii. 16, see TbP 318<sup>12</sup> (A.D. 166) *νεομηνία*, BU 1021<sup>1</sup> (iii/A.D.) *νεομηνίας*.

*νῦν*. The classical phrase *τὰ νῦν* = "now," which in the N.T. is confined to Acts, is found in an Oxyrhynchus letter of B.C. 2, where the writer states with reference to a certain Damas—*καὶ τὰ νῦν ἐπειπέπομφα αὐτὸν πάντα συνλέξαι*, "And now I have despatched him to collect them all (i.e., rents)," OP 743<sup>30</sup>. The evidence of the papyri, so far as we have remarked it, confirms the equivalence of *νυνί* to *νῦν* in the N.T. (as Grimm); cf. e.g., PP III. 42 H (8) f 4<sup>f</sup> (iii/B.C. = Witk. 12), *νυνὶ [δὲ ἐν φόβῳ] ἐμὶ οὐ μετρίῳ*, TbP 292<sup>26</sup> (ii/A.D.), *Κρονίων . . . νυνεὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τυγχάνων*.

*νωθρός*.—The sense of "remissness," "slackness" attaching to this adj. in Heb. vi. 12, *ἴνα μὴ νωθροὶ γένησθε*, appears in the use of the subst. in AP 78<sup>12</sup> (A.D. 184), *ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ [καὶ ἐ]ν νωθρία μου γενομένου*, where the Editors translate, "moreover as I neglected my rights." The corresponding verb is used of "sickness" in TbP 421<sup>5</sup> (iii/A.D.), *ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀδελφή σου νωθρεύεται*, cf. 422<sup>5</sup>.

*νωτός*.—The compound *νωτόφοροι*, as in 2 Chron. ii. 18, *καὶ ἐποίησεν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἑβδομήκοντα χιλιάδας νωτοφόρων*, is found in PP III. 46 (2)<sup>3</sup>, a contract for the supply and carriage of bricks.

*ξενία*.—The vernacular use of *ξενία* = "hospitality" in such passages as OP 118<sup>17</sup> (late iii/A.D.), *εἰδὼς δὲ ὅποια ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ ξενία*, ib. 931<sup>7f</sup>. (ii/A.D.), *εἰς τὴν ξενίαν τῆι μεικρᾷ*, along with the almost technical sense of *τὰ ξένια* for the "gifts" provided on the occasion of the visit of a king or other high official to a district (cf. PP II. 10 (1), GH 14 (b) (both iii/B.C.) and see *Ostr.* i. p. 389 f.), seem to make it practically certain that the word is to be understood in the same sense in Acts xxviii. 23, Philem. 22, rather than of a *place* of lodging. For this later sense cf. the diminutive *ξενίδιον* in TbP 335<sup>17f</sup>. (iii/A.D.), *ξενίδιον μεμ[ισθωμένον]*



μοι εἰς οἴκησιν, “ a guest-house leased me for living in.”

ξηραίνω.—With Matt. xxi. 19 ἐξηράνθη παραχρήμα ἡ συκῆ may be compared the interesting report regarding a persea tree addressed to the logistes of Oxyrhynchus. The president of the guild of carpenters who had been commissioned to examine the tree states that he had found it ἄκαρπον οὖσαν πολλῶν ἐτῶν διόλου ξηραντίσαν καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐντεῦθε[ν καρ]ποὺς ἀποδιδόναι, “ barren for many years, quite dried up, and unable to produce fruit any longer ” (OP 53<sup>9</sup>ff., A.D. 316). On the value and associations of the persea tree see Wilcken, *Archiv* i. p. 127.

ξύλον.—For the Hellenistic usage of ξ. to denote a (living) tree, as in Luke xxiii. 31, see the Ptolemaic ordinance TbP 5<sup>205f.</sup> (B.C. 118) remitting penalties on those τοὺς κεκοφύτας τῶν ἰδίων ξύλα παρὰ <τὰ> ἐκ<κ>είμενα προστάγματα, “ who have cut down trees on their own property in contravention of the published decrees.” The Editors find in this regulation a proof that “ the king controlled the timber of the country, though whether in the form of a tax upon cutting down trees or of a monopoly is uncertain ”; but see Wilcken, *Archiv* ii. p. 489. Land planted with trees is called ξυλίτις in LIP 5<sup>58</sup> (iii/B.C.)—it had just been cleared and sown. For the more general sense of ξύλα, as in Matt. xxvi. 47, cf. TbP 304<sup>10</sup> (ii/A.D.), μετὰ ξύλων ἰσπηδῆσαι, “ to rush in with staves.” The adj. occurs in an inventory of property, TbP 406<sup>19</sup> (iii/A.D.), κράβα{κ}τος ξύλινος τέλειος, “ a wooden bedstead in good order ”; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 20, σκεύη . . . ξύλινα.

ὄδε.—With the N.T. phrase τάδε λέγει, Acts xxi. 11, etc., cf. τάδε διέθετο, the regular formula in wills for introducing the testator's dispositions, e.g. PP I. 16(1)<sup>12</sup> (B.C. 230), τάδε διέθετο νοῶν καὶ φρονῶν Μένιππος κ.τ.λ. In P. Passalacqua<sup>14</sup> (= Witk., p. 35), ἀπεδόθη τὰδ' αὐτῶι, τὰδ' = ἥδε ἢ ἐπιστολή.

ὀδοποιέω.—With Mark ii. 23, ἤρξαντο ὁδὸν ποιεῖν [ὀδοποιεῖν BGH] τίλλοντες τοὺς στάχους, cf. the use of the subst. in a

letter announcing the preparations for the visit of an official, GH 14 (b)<sup>6</sup> (B.C. 264 or 227), *γινόμεθα δὲ πρὸς τῆν ὁδοποίαι*. "Οδία or provisions for his consumption on the journey have also been got ready, amounting to no less than *χῆνες πενήκοντα, ὄρνιθες διακόσιαι, περιστριδεῖς ἑκατόν.*

*ὀθόνιον*.—Wilcken, *Ostr.* i. p. 266 ff., has shown that by *ὀ.* in Egypt we must understand fine linen stuff, both in its manufactured and unmanufactured state. Its manufacture was a government monopoly; cf. TbP 5<sup>63</sup> (B.C. 118), *τὰς προστιμή[σεις τῶν] ὀθονίων* with the Editor's note. For the use of *ὀ.* in John xix. 40 see especially such a passage as ParP 53<sup>8</sup>, *ὀθόνιον ἐγκοιμήτρην (=ιον)*. The word itself is of Semitic origin [𐤓𐤕𐤍, "yarn"]: Mayser, *Gramm.*, p. 42, Thumb, *Hellen.* p. 111.

*οἰκία, οἶκος*.—For the distinction between these words see *Notes* ii. The former is common in the phrase *κατ' οἰκίαν*, as *ἡ κατ' οἰκίαν ἀπογραφή*, "the house-to-house census." As illustrating the N.T. conception of the *οἶκος πνευματικός* and the *οἶκος τοῦ θεοῦ* Thieme (p. 31) refers not only to the place which "the house of God" had in Jewish religion, but also to the "holy houses" of Greek antiquity, as when in *Magn.* 94<sup>3</sup> (ii/B.C.) a certain *Εὐφημος Πανσανίου νεωκόρος* is praised for his liberality *εἰς τὸ[ν οἶκ]ον τ[ὸν ἱερὸν] καὶ εἰς τὸν δῆμον*: cf. also *Syll.* 571<sup>3, 25</sup> for an *οἶκος τεμένιος ἱερός* in Chios.

*οἰκοδεσπότης*.—For *οἰκοδεσπότης*, Matt. x. 25, etc., we may cite the Isaurian inscription *υἱὸς τοὺς οἰκοδεσπ[ότας]* from the *Proc. of the Amer. School at Athens*, iii. 150 (see Hatch in *J.B.L.* xxvii. 142).

JAMES HOPE MOULTON.  
GEORGE MILLIGAN.

*HORT'S POSTHUMOUS COMMENTARY ON ST.  
JAMES.*<sup>1</sup>

DR. J. O. F. MURRAY, who has had the charge of bringing out this long looked for commentary, tells us that the part which treats of the first chapter was already finished in 1871, when Hort returned from the Vicarage of St. Ippolyts, as a newly elected Fellow of Emmanuel College. The remainder (i.e. the commentary on chapters ii.-iv. ver. 7, together with the Additional Notes) formed the subject of three courses of his Hulsean lectures delivered in 1880 and 1881. When he "returned to the Epistle in the summer term of 1889, he dealt mainly with questions of Introduction." "No further progress was made with the commentary."

If we compare this account with what we are told of Hort's two other fragmentary commentaries, that on the First Epistle of St. Peter, which was brought out in 1898 by the present Bishop of Ely, with a preface by Dr. Westcott, and that on the First Three Chapters of the Apocalypse, brought out by the Rev. P. H. L. Brereton in 1908, with a preface by Professor Sanday, we learn that the foundation of the commentary on St. Peter was laid in the Hulsean lectures delivered in 1882, 3, 4, 5, 7, and in the last course of lectures delivered by Hort as Lady Margaret Professor in the Easter term of 1892; while the latter volume "represents notes of lectures delivered first in Emmanuel College in 1879 and then revised for a course of Professor's lectures in the May term of 1889."

<sup>1</sup> *The Epistle of St. James with Introduction, Commentary as far as ch. iv. v. 7, and additional notes, by the late F. J. A. Hort, D.D., D.C.L., LL.D., 1909.*

From the above dates we should gather that Hort brought to his work upon St. Peter the fruits of a deeper study and riper scholarship than it had been possible for him to devote to St. James ; and, if I am not mistaken, this inference is, to a certain extent, confirmed by a comparison of the notes on parallel passages in the two Epistles.

The words used by Professor Sanday in his preface to the Apocalyptic fragment seem to me still to hold good, where he says that " In positive value for the student I should be inclined to place first of all (i.e. of all Hort's posthumous publications) the fragment on 1 St. Peter." I should myself be inclined to add that it stands first, not only in the list of Hort's posthumous works, but first, at any rate for the English reader, among all modern commentaries known to me. And this is very much what Professor Sanday affirms in p. ii. of the same preface :—

" It is the working student to whom Dr. Hort specially appealed, as the very *princeps* of his order. What he owes to him is not only an immense mass of really trustworthy data for his own studies, but a model—an unsurpassed model—for the method in which his own studies ought to be conducted. Dr. Hort was an ' expert,' if ever there was one. . . . He had Lightfoot's clearness and soundness of knowledge, with a subtly penetrating quality to which Lightfoot could hardly lay claim ; and if Westcott had something of the subtlety, he had not the sharp precision and critical grip. In the case of Dr. Hort, each bit of evidence, as he comes to it, seems to have a life and an atmosphere of its own ; and this life and atmosphere is compelled to yield up its secret just as much as the material evidence. In addition to this Dr. Hort had a powerful judgement ; but I am not quite sure that the judgement was equal in degree to this particular faculty of which I have been speaking ; it was perhaps biased a little in the opposite direction to that in which most of us have our judgement biased, against the obvious and commonplace. Just this last reason made it of special value as corrective and educative."

To this generous and well-weighed appreciation of the Oxford professor, I add the judgment of Hort's old friend



and fellow-worker, Bishop Westcott, as given in the Preface to the *St. Peter*, p. x. :—

“The first characteristic of Dr. Hort, as an interpreter, which will strike his readers is, I think, his remarkable power of setting aside all traditional opinion in examining the text before him. He takes nothing for granted. He regards no traditional view as valid through long acceptance. He approaches each record, each phrase, as if it came to him directly from its author. He asks, ‘What did the words mean to him who wrote them and to those who first received them?’ In this there was no disparagement of the results of Christian life and thought. . . . But he felt that, if we are to comprehend truly the message which the New Testament enshrines, we must go back and dismiss as far as possible all the associations which have gathered round familiar phrases. The result is a singular freshness and originality of treatment, which conveys to the student a vivid sense of the reality of the record. (2) Closely connected with this independent directness of interpretation is the keen historical insight with which Dr. Hort marks the characteristic lessons of minute details.’ . . . (3) Unwearied thoroughness was a necessary condition of this type of study. In enumerating the questions which required to be dealt with as preparatory to the proposed commentary on the New Testament (which was to have been divided between Hort, Lightfoot and Westcott) Dr. Hort set down ‘The principles of New Testament lexicography, especially the deduction of theological terms from Old Testament usage, usually through the medium of the LXX.,’ and ‘generally the principle that the New Testament is written in terms of the Old Testament.’ In correspondence with these theses, the notes are a treasury of historical philology. Almost every page gives examples of the gradual fashioning of some word for its use in the New Testament, and records both parallelisms with the LXX and differences from it, guarding alike the independence of the Apostolic writers and their obligations to an earlier generation. (4) ‘Independence, insight, thoroughness, were all subsidiary to the endeavour to show through Apostolic teaching the coherence of all revelation and all life. It was not enough, as Dr. Hort felt, to realize most clearly and to express most freely what the Gospel was to the first disciples. This was not a result to rest in, but the necessary preparation for determining the universal meaning of a message given under local and temporary conditions.’ (5) ‘The dominant interest of Dr. Hort in interpretation was, in a word, not philological or historical, but theological. . . . The main question always was how the truths with which each Apostolic writer dealt, entered into his own soul

and life, and so how we can represent them in terms of our own age and how they affect us.'

"When I endeavour to characterize Dr. Hort as an interpreter of the New Testament, I am not thinking only of this fragment of his work, but much more of the experiences of an uninterrupted friendship of more than forty years. . . . In the course of our work problems of every kind necessarily came before us. Principles and the application of principles were keenly discussed. It could not but happen that we finally differed in some of our conclusions ; but I can say without reserve that I always found Dr. Hort's suggestions, even when at first sight they seemed to be strange and almost paradoxical, fertile in materials for serious consideration. . . . The fulness of the truth was the one aim which he pursued, in the certain conviction that the most absolute fairness in intellectual inquiry is a condition of obtaining the deepest spiritual lessons."

The characteristic features of Hort's work as a commentator, which are so well depicted in the preceding quotations, will all be found in the newly published fragment, though perhaps, as I have already hinted, not attaining quite to the level of his later productions. But there is the same careful tracing back of the Greek terms used in the New Testament to their equivalents in the LXX and in the original Hebrew of the Old Testament. Conspicuous specimens will be found in the notes on *διασπορά* p. 3, *πειρασμός* pp. 4, 21 f., *δοκίμιον* p. 5, *τέλειος* p. 5 f., *ἄνθος χόρτου* p. 15, *καύσων* p. 16 f., *ἔξέπεσεν* p. 17, *ἡ εὐπρέπεια τοῦ προσώπου* p. 17 f., *στέφανος* p. 19 f., *τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων* pp. 29 f., *τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως* p. 39, *κόσμος* pp. 44, 71, 92 f., *προσωποληψία* p. 46, *δόξα* p. 47 f., *συναγωγή* p. 48 f., *ἔλεος* p. 56 f., *ἐδικαιώθη* p. 63, *ὁμοίωσις* pp. 77 f., *καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης* p. 86, *ὑποτάγητε* p. 97. There are also many specimens of notes on words unconnected with the Hebrew, which may be described in Westcott's language as containing "a treasury of historical philology," such as those on the rare words *ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ* pp. 10 f., on *ἀπλῶς* pp. 7 f., *δίψυχος* pp. 12 f., *παρακύπτω* pp. 40 f., *σπαταλάω* pp. 107 f., *ῦλη* pp. 70 f., 104 f. There

are notes containing excellent definitions of terms, such as those on *γιγνώσκω* p. 5, *βούλομαι* pp. 32 f., 69 f., *ὑπάρχω* p. 58, *θρησκός* and *θρησκεία* pp. 42 and 43. Sometimes the notes deal with points of syntax, sometimes with the general argument of a passage, often leading to discussion which touches on large questions, historical, philosophical or religious. Sometimes I have the satisfaction of finding a view, which I had maintained against the majority of commentators, confirmed by Hort, as, for instance, in regard to the meaning of *δοῦλος* p. 2, where his note is: "It is misleading to call *δοῦλος* 'slave,' as many do, for it lays the whole stress on a subordinate point. It expresses in the widest way the personal relation of servant to master, not the mere absence of wages or of right to depart." So in p. 14 Hort understands the word *ἀδελφός* of i. 9 to belong equally to *ὁ ταπεινός* and to *ὁ πλούσιος*, in opposition to the view supported by B. Weiss, Beyschlag and others, that the rich are always treated by St. James as outsiders. In like manner we are both agreed that St. James wrote and spoke in Greek, and that this language was generally understood in Palestine, especially in Galilee, among his contemporaries. Hort even detects signs of a special Palestinian dialect (see his notes on *προσωπολημφίαις* and *ψυχική*).

Where we differ, I have sometimes been led to accept Hort's conclusions instead of my own, sometimes I am doubtful, sometimes I still prefer my own view; and I propose to consider, in this and the following article, the grounds which appear to me to favour one or the other conclusion. I should have done this in my new edition of St. James, were it not that the greater part of this has been already stereotyped at the desire of the publishers. The main difference, however, between our two editions is not anything which involves contradiction or retractation: it

consists in that *lux splendidior*, that inner light, of which all Hort's friends were conscious in their intercourse with him, and which I ventured to predict as the characteristic feature of his long-promised edition, when I dedicated my own edition to him in the year 1892.

All scholars will agree that, whether or not we accept Hort's views on isolated points, it is impossible to overrate the help to the understanding of this difficult Epistle, which accrues from the entrance into the discussion of a mind like Hort's, so fresh, so free, so utterly unbiassed, so full of the best knowledge of the past, and yet so scintillating with new life and thought. As regards myself, I can truly say that, though I have for more than fifty years endeavoured to read all that could throw light upon St. James, I have found something still to learn and to think over in almost every line of this, his last-published commentary. None would have been more ready than Hort to acclaim Professor Grote's fine paraphrase of the adage, *Humanum est errare* : "It is man's prerogative to mistake. . . . He may learn anything, but to balance this, he has got to learn each thing by speculation and trial, at the hazard of much mistake. If the human race were too much afraid of mistake, it would learn nothing." And the words which follow shortly afterwards seem to me to express the very mind of Hort : "My most earnest wish as to what I have done myself is that it may stimulate thought in others ; to *lead* the thought of others is a thing to which I feel very little disposition. It is a cardinal maxim of mine that every one's thought should be his own. I should wish to think rightly myself and to help, if I can, others to do so in their own way." <sup>1</sup>

It is possible that some students may have been deterred from making use of Hort's fragmentary commentaries from the very fact that they are fragmentary. If there are such,

<sup>1</sup> *Exploratio Philosophica*, Part I. p. xlvi.



perhaps the easiest way of making clear to them Hort's method of exegesis and the great value of that method will be (1) to give a selection of his notes on a continuous passage; (2) to quote a specimen of his investigation of the meaning of a word, which might well be taken as a model for all similar investigation; (3) to quote a similar note, where his investigation has thrown much light on the meaning of a word, but where his final conclusion seems to me erroneous on the grounds which I state. Of the first I will take iii. 12, 13 as an example: μήτι ἡ πηγὴ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀπῆς βρῦει τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν; μὴ δύναται, ἀδελφοί μου, συκῆ ἐλαίας ποιῆσαι ἢ ἄμπελος σῦκα; οὔτε ἀλυκὸν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδ<sup>ρ</sup>.

Notes.—“ ἡ πηγὴ, the fountain]. The force of the article is not obvious: συκῆ has none, and a fountain, as such, has no particular title to be spoken of generically. The true reason probably is that St. James is thinking of what the fountain stands for, the heart. The reference to ἡ πηγὴ in itself proves that the tongue was to him merely the organ of a power within. Doubtless he remembered (Matt. xii. 34) ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ περισσεύματος (the overflow) τῆς καρδίας τὸ στόμα λαλεῖ . . . ὀπῆς, crevice] ὀπή is properly a chink in a wall for looking through. It then comes to be applied to holes and burrows in the ground, as those of ants and of hibernating animals, or somewhat larger clefts in the rock (Heb. xi. 38). Here too it is probably the crevice in the face of a rock through which a stream bursts forth. . . . On the springs of Palestine see Stanley, *Sinai and Palestine*. . . . τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρὸν, that which is sweet and that which is bitter]. . . . If we supply nothing, and understand merely ‘that which is sweet,’ etc., the articles are quite justified, and on the whole this is best, the most general abstract opposites being used here in the first instance, and then ἀλυκὸν afterwards substituted. . . . St. James would be familiar with bitter springs from those of Tiberias (see Reland, *Palestine*, 301 ff., Robinson, *Bibl. Res.* ii. 384). Ver. 12. Not only a new image comes in here, but a new point of view, prepared for by part of v. 11. In 9–11 St. James has dwelt on the inconsistency of the two kinds of speech as coming forth from the same tongue, as though bitter and sweet came alike from the same spring. But ἡ πηγὴ has carried us back from the mouth to the heart; and so now a comparison between the heart and its utterance, rather than between two utterances, comes

into view. The image is formed by examples of our Lord's words (Luke vi. 44), 'Each tree is known by its own fruit.' Wishing to treat them gently, he keeps within the limits of that single sentence of Christ, as though it were only one kind of fruit against another, all three being good and useful. But doubtless he intended them to apply the associated words, which spoke of 'corrupt trees' and of 'thorns and thistles' (Luke vi. 43 f. 11; Matt. vii. 16-20). In so doing he was indirectly implying that the curses uttered by their tongues expressed the contents of their hearts more truly than the blessings, which he assumes to be unreal words. The same comes out more clearly in the next image. ἀλυκόν, simply 'salt' as an adjective: doubtless ὕδωρ, kept to the end, goes with both ἀλ. and γλ. Ποιῆσαι is borrowed 'from above, being used of natural producing. As applied to ὕδωρ it means to 'rain,' and this is a rare use. Doubtless St. James purposely retained the same word as an image in the sense 'Out of a reservoir of salt-water springs forth no fountain of sweet water.' Thus he distinctly implies, though he still leaves the rebuke to implication, that not the verbal blessing of God but the cursing of man was a true index of what lay within. . . . Thus this sentence is no mere repetition of v. 11, but goes far beyond it."

I take now the comment on ἐριθίαν in iii. 14 (p. 81).

"Combined with ξηλος likewise in Gal. v. 20. A curious word with an obscure history; see Fritzsche, *Rom.* xiv. 3-8, the best account, but very imperfect. Ἐριθος (derivation doubtful) in Homer's time is a hired labourer,<sup>1</sup> apparently an agricultural labourer (*Etym. Mag.* κυρίως δὲ ὁ τὴν γῆν ἐργαζόμενος ἐργάτης ἐπὶ μισθῷ); and a gloss of Hesychius (ἐριθεύει εἰκῆ, ἐργάζει μάτην) seems to show that labour or work was the main idea. The same is *always* the force of the somewhat commoner compound συνέριθος. The fundamental passage is *Od.* vi. 32, where Athene tells Nausicaa that she will accompany her, καὶ τοι ἐγὼ συνέριθος ἅμ' ἔψομαι, when she goes with the housemaidens to wash the linen. This one passage apparently gave rise to many others, one in *Arist. Pax* 785,<sup>2</sup> and many in late poets; also in *Plato (Rep.* vii. 533 d; *Legg.* x. 889 d) of the arts co-operative, co-ancillary with philosophy, whence also *Orig. Ep. ad Greg.* 1.<sup>3</sup> Afterwards<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Il.* xviii. 550: ἐριθοὶ ἡμῶν ὄξελαι δρεπάνας ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες.

<sup>2</sup> μήτ' ἔλθῃς συνέριθος αὐτοῖς, an appeal to the Muse.

<sup>3</sup> *Orig. Lomm.* vol. xvii. 49 f. Philosophers speak of geometry, music, astronomy and other arts and sciences as συνέριθοι of philosophy; in like manner philosophy is συνέριθος πρὸς Χριστιανισμὸν.

<sup>4</sup> We find, however, the word ἐριθος used of a special kind of employment for women by Demosthenes in the speech *Πρὸς Εὐβουλίδην*, p. 1313, πολλὰ καὶ τιτθαὶ καὶ ἐριθοὶ καὶ τρυγητρίαι γεγόνασιν, ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους συμφορῶν, ἀστὰι γυναικες, and apparently of weaving, in the *LXX*

probably from wrong etymology it was used of women servants spinning wool. But in Aristotle, *Politics* v. 2, 3, we find *ἐριθεία*,—*θείομαι* in a quite different sense. Speaking of changes of political constitution, some, he says, take place from arrogance, some from fear, some from pre-eminence, some from contempt, and so on : and then some δι' ἐριθείαν, explained in the next chapter : 'Constitutions change without sedition, also διὰ τὰς ἐριθείας, as at Heraea, ἐξ αἰρετῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρωτάς, ὅτι ἠροῦντο τοὺς ἐριθειομένους,' i.e. apparently they changed the mode of appointment to offices from election to lot, because they chose τοὺς ἐριθειομένους : this may mean either candidates who bribed or who courted and gained a following in other ways. Suidas says ἐριθεία ἢ διὰ λόγων φιλονεκία, λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ μισθαρία. More definitely speaking of δεκάζεσθαι (bribery), he says ὁμοιον καὶ τὸ ἐριθειέσθαι τῷ δεκάζεσθαι ἔστιν, καὶ ἡ ἐριθεία εἴρηται ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ μισθοῦ δόσεως (cf. *Etyim. Mag.*, 254). This points to the gaining of followers and adherents by gifts. It might, however, be by arts as well as gifts ; see Ezek. xxiii. 5, 12, καὶ ἠριθεύσατο (Sym.). But apparently the word came to be used not merely of the manner of winning followers, but of the seeking of followers itself. Thus Hesych. ἠριθειμένων περιφλοτιμημένων, ἠριθειέτο ἐφιλονεύκει : hence to be ambitious, indulge in ambitious rivalry. The schol. on Soph. *Ajax* 833, ὁ δὲ Σοφοκλῆς ἐριθεύσαι μὲν τι ὡς προσβυτέρῳ (sc. Aeschylus) μὴ βουληθείς, οὐ μὴν παραλιπεῖν αὐτὸ δοκιμάζων, ψιλῶς φησιν κ.τ.λ. ; Polyb. x. 25, 9. οἱ δὲ τῆς στρατηγίας ὀρεγόμενοι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξεριθεύονται τοὺς νέους, καὶ παρασκευάζουσιν εὐνοῦς συναγωνιστάς εἰς τὸ μέλλον. It is likewise implicitly coupled with φιλοτιμία in Philo. *Leg. ad Caium* 10 (ii. 355) ἡγεμονία δ' ἀφιλόνεικος καὶ ἀνεριθειτος ὀρθῆ μονή. (The passages in Eust. *Opusc.* ap. Steph. suit either 'ambition' or 'faction.' Cf. C.I.G. 2671. 46, ἀνεριθειτοι.) What sense the earlier Greek Fathers attached to it in St. Paul does not appear. Chrys. on *Rom.* ii. 8 seems to identify it with φιλονεικίας τινὸς καὶ ῥαθυμίας, as if he had ἐρις in mind : in the four other places we learn nothing, nor do we from Theodore : Didymus on 2 Cor. has ἐριδὰς τε καὶ ἐριθείας. Theodoret on *Rom.* is strange and obscure." Hort then treats of the Latin renderings, most of which he says : "suggest the erroneous connexion with ἐρις." He then goes on, "Some of the New Testament places are ambiguous ; but wherever the context has a defining force, it is in favour of the sense found in Polyb., etc. The difficult *Rom.* ii. 8 must be taken with Phil. i. 17, which seems to point to the Judaizing leaders, who intrigued against St. Paul. In 2 Cor. xii. 20 it is separated from ἐρις by ζῆλος and θυμοί, and precedes καταλαλαίαι, so also in Gal., though followed by διχοστασίαι. In of Isaiah xxxviii. 12, ἐρίθον ἐγγιζούσης ἔκτεμειν. So Tobit ii. 12 (the date of which is considered by Westcott to be about 250 B.C.) ἡ γυνή μου ἠριθειέτο ("did spin," R.V.) ἐν τοῖς γυναικείοις, καὶ ἀπέστειλε τοῖς κυρίοις καὶ ἀπέδωκαν αὐτῇ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν μισθόν,



Phil. ii. 3 it is coupled with *κενοδοξία* and contrasted with *ταπεινοφροσύνη*: so here with *ξήλος*. Thus all points to the personal ambition of rival leaderships. There is no real evidence for 'party spirit,' 'faction,' etc., i.e. for the vice of the followers of a party: *ἐριθία* really means the vice of the leader of a party created for his own pride: it is partly ambition, partly rivalry."<sup>1</sup>

The next note which I will take for consideration is that upon iii. 4 *ἰδοὺ ἡλίκον πῦρ ἡλίκεν ὕλην ἀνάπτει*, in which I follow the usual translation "How small a fire kindles how large a forest." Hort, however, maintains that *ὕλη* "is used either of dead wood or living, and either will make sense here. But it never means *a* wood, *a* forest. As applied to living wood it is either woodland, as opposed to mountains and cultivated plains, specially the rough bushy skirts of the hills, or brushwood." The use of *ὕλη* for timber, and then (metaphorically) for "material" of any sort, and consequently for "subject-matter" in a literary, or "matter" in the philosophical sense, is undisputed: examples will be found in the LXX see *Wisdom*, xi. 17, xv. 13, 2; *Macc.* ii. 24, 4; *Macc.* i. 28, 29. I was not, however, aware of its use for brushwood, till Hort's note impelled me to examine the LXX rendering, where our English version has "forest" or "wood," and this I found to be in almost every case *δρυμός*. Aquila, it is true, has *ὕλη* in 1 Sam. xxiii. 15, 16, 19 of the wood in the wilderness of Ziph and in the hill of Hachilah. Otherwise it is only found in Job xxxviii. 40, where the R.V. has "the young lions couch in their dens and abide in the covert to lie in wait" (*κάθηνται ἐν ὕλαις ἐνεδρεύοντες*), and Isa. x. 17, "The light of Israel shall be for a fire . . . and it shall burn and destroy his thorns and his briars in one day" (*φάγεται ὡσεὶ χόρτον τὴν ὕλην*). In both these cases Hort's "brushwood"

<sup>1</sup> There can be no doubt that this is the true meaning of the word. In my note I followed Lightfoot on Gal. v. 20 and Phil. i. 17, where he translates it "caballings," "partisanship," "factiousness."



seems the right translation. He also quotes passages from Plato in which ὕλη is distinguished from δένδρα; there is a more striking example in Xen. *Anab.* i. 5, 1 ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τόπῳ ἦν μὲν ἡ γῆ πεδῖον ἅπαν ὀμαλόν, ἀψινθίου δὲ πλήρες· εἰ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐνῆν ὕλης ἢ καλάμου ἅπαντα ἦσαν εὐωδῆ· δένδρον δ' οὐδὲν ἐνῆν (the country was a plain, and full of worm-wood: if any other kinds of shrubs or reeds grew there, they had all an aromatic smell, but there were no trees). But of course the fact that ὕλη sometimes stands for brush-wood is no more inconsistent with its use for a forest than Virgil's use of *silva* in G. i. 152 (*subit aspera silva, lappaeque tribulique*) is with the commoner use of the word. Hort therefore endeavours to show against Dr. Scott (L. and S.) that no passage can be found in the whole of Greek literature in which the sense "a forest," as opposed to the descriptive "woodland," or to brushwood, is required. I will quote in chronological order a selection from his examples as given in the Additional Note on p. 104, adding a translation and a few other examples of my own.

*Il.* ii. 455 ἡὔτε πῦρ ἀΐδηλον ἐπιφλέγει ἄσπετον ὕλην οὐρεος ἐν κορυφῆς ἕκαθεν δέ τε φαίνεται ἀυγή. "As the fire lays hold of a mighty forest on the mountain summits and its light is seen from afar." Here, as often, we have ὕλη and ὄρος joined, in opposition to Hort's statement above. *Il.* xi. 155, ὡς δ' ὅτε πῦρ ἀΐδηλον ἐν ἀξύλῳ ἐμπέσῃ ὕλη, πάντῃ τ' εἰλυφόων ἄνεμος φέρει, οἱ δέ τε θάμνοι πρόρριζοι πίπτουσιν ἐπειγόμενοι πυρὸς ὄρμῃ, "As when the destroying flame falls on a virgin<sup>1</sup> forest, and the wind bears it along in volumes, and the shrubs are levelled to the ground, through the force of the hurrying flame." Here and in some other of his examples Hort allows that

<sup>1</sup> ἀξύλος, meaning disputed. I think Ebeling is right in following the scholiast, ἀξύλος: ἀφ' ἧς οὐδεὶς ἐξυλίστατο. Paley translates it "timberless, where there is only scrub or brushwood."

the translation 'a wood' is equally pertinent with 'wood,' but he seems to assume that where the latter is possible, we are bound to give it the preference. On the contrary it seems to me that in the great majority of instances the more natural, as well as the more poetical, way of taking the word is that which flashes on the mind a single great impression, that of the forest with all its weird and romantic associations, rather than that of so many logs of wood or acres of plantation, where the forest is lost in the trees. *Il.* xvi. 765. As when opposing winds strive οὐρεος ἐν βήσσης βαθὲν πελεμιζομεν ὕλην, φηγόν τε μελίην τε. *Il.* xx. 490 ὡς δ' ἀναμαιμάει βαθέ' ἄγκρα θεσπιδαῆς πῦρ οὐρεος ἀζαλέοιο, βαθεῖα δὲ καίεται ὕλη, πάντη τε κλονέων ἄνεμος φλόγα εἰλυφάζει, "As the heaven-sent fire rages athwart the deep hollows of the parched hillside and the forest burns to its depths, and the furious wind rolls the flame in volumes on every side." *Od.* v. 63 (the description of Calypso's grotto) ὕλη δὲ σπέος ἀμφὶ πεφύκεν τηλεθώσα, κλήθρη τ' αἰγειρός τε καὶ εὐώδης κυπάρισσος, which Worsley translates, "And round the cave a leafy wood there lay, where green trees waved o'er many a shady dell, alder and poplar black, and cypress sweet of smell," which we naturally take to be a description of the sacred grove, with its tall trees, surrounding the abode of the nymph.<sup>1</sup> In Hes. *Op.* 506 we read of lofty oaks and stout pines as making up the ὕλη, whether we translate it "forest" or "woodland." But we come to a more decisive example in Thuc. ii. 77, where the attempt of the Lacedaemonians to set Plataea on fire is described, καὶ ἐγένετο φλόξ τσαύτη, ὅσῃν οὐδεὶς πω ἔς γε ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον χειροποίητον εἶδεν· ἥδη γὰρ ἐν ὄρεσιν ὕλη τριφθεῖσα ὑπ' ἀνεμων πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου πῦρ . . . ἀνήκε, where

<sup>1</sup> Hort's note on this passage seems as if it were expressly intended to deny any sense of the *religio luci*: "luxuriant tree-age" (like *herbage*) about the cave.'

Arnold translates, "Such a fire produced by the power of man had never been witnessed : for, if we speak of natural conflagrations, they have been known to consume a whole mountain-forest, catching fire and bursting into a blaze of itself, from the mere attrition of its boughs owing to high winds." Hort thinks that, as mention had been made just before of fuel under this term (*φοροῦντες ὕλης φακέλλους*, and *ἐμβάλοντες πῦρ ξὺν θείῳ καὶ πίσσῃ ἠΨαν τὴν ὕλην*), it cannot be used here of a forest. In any case fuel or cut wood cannot catch fire from the attrition of boughs, nor can there be any reference to brushwood, for the supposed spontaneous ignition could only be regarded as possible in the case of heavy branches of withered trees, which are continually colliding and so playing the part of gigantic fire-sticks. It seems to me that the comparison becomes far more striking, if we conceive of ὕλη as a great unit, which is wiped out by the fire, rather than as so many yards of timber ; and Thucydides himself seems to press this point on the reader, when he contrasts the greatest of man-made fires with a conflagration produced by the forces of nature. We have another reference to a forest fire in Thuc. iv. 29, where he describes how the wood, which covered the island of Sphacteria, prevented the Athenians from judging of the number and position of the Spartans, until it was burnt down by accident. In iii. 98 we read of the disastrous defeat of the Athenians in Aetolia owing to their ignorance of the roads and their getting lost in the forest. In Thuc. ii. 75 and iv. 69 ὕλη is used of the timber brought from Cithaeron as opposed to δένδρα, fruit trees, taken from the suburbs.<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> The *Bacchae* of Euripides is full of allusions to Cithaeron and its ὕλη, e.g. 1045 foll. *λέπας Κιθαιρώνειον εἰσεβάλλομεν . . . ἦν δ' ἄγκος ἀμφίκρινον ὕδασι διάβροχον, πεύκαισι συσκιάζον*. It is the abode of Pan and the Nymphs (951) where the fawn rejoices *βροτῶν ἐρημίαις σκιαροκόμου τ' ἐν ἔρνεσιν ὕλας* (874), and where the hapless Pentheus is torn to pieces by the *Maenads ὕλης ἐν βαθυξύλω φόβῃ* (1137).

only passages in which it seems to me that ὕλη is used in what Hort calls a "collective sense" are those which suggest the ground-plan of an estate, where one portion is marked as forest, another as marsh, others as arable or pasture. Such seems to be the case in some of Hort's quotations from Plato and Aristotle, but I do not think this holds good in Theocr. xxii. 36 παντοίην δ' ἐν ὄρει θεγύμενοι ἄγριον ὕλην, where παντοίην is said to favour the same use. But surely the context is much opposed to this. Castor and Pollux are described as wandering away from their companions to explore the forest, where they find a fountain of pure water welling out from the rock, encircled by tall pines and white poplars and planes and cypresses. I think παντοίην is merely meant to suggest the beauty and variety of the forest which made it worth exploring. Lucian supplies several examples of the same use, cf. *Var. Hist.* 15 πᾶσα ἡ ὕλη resounds under the force of the wind; *ib.* 22 ἐπλανῶντο περὶ τὴν ὕλην, *ib.* 42 εἶδομεν ὕλην μεγίστην πιτύων καὶ κυπαρίττων; *Prom.* 12 The whole earth was originally ὕλαις ἀνημέροις λάσιος; *Sacrif.* 10 ὕλας ἀπετέμοντο καὶ ὄρη ἀνέθεσαν, "men set apart groves and consecrated mountains."

The use of ὕλη in Xenophon's *Cynegetica* is peculiar, but not, I think, to be explained from Aristotle, as Hort suggests. I should be inclined to understand it as a technical term for a tree used as a post to which the hounds are to be tied, while waiting till the scent is found. If so, it would seem to have rather an individualistic than a collective force, but I am far from certain. In any case the use is too exceptional to be of any help in determining the meaning of ὕλη in St. James. The translations are taken from Dakyns' edition. Hort's instances are vi. 12 and ix. 2, δήσαντα δ' ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τὰς κύνας; and ix. 19, where the process of catching deer by a trap (ποδοστράβη) is described, "Should the deer have been caught by the hind leg, the clog trailing



along must much impede its movement. Sometimes, too, it will come in contact with the forked branches of some tree" (ἐνίοτε καὶ εἰς δικρόας τῆς ὕλης ἐμπίπτει). x. 7 (of boar hunting) When the huntsman approaches the lair he places "the nooses on any forked branches of wood to hand (ἐπὶ ἀποσχαλιδώματα τῆς ὕλης δικρᾶ) . . . The string round the top of the net must be attached to some stout tree and not any mere shrub (καὶ τὸν περιδρομον ἐξάπτειν ἀπὸ δένδρου ἰσχυροῦ καὶ μὴ ἐκ ῥάκου). All about each net it will be well to stop with timber even difficult places (ὑπὲρ ἐκάστης ἐμφράττειν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τὰ δύσορμα)."

Of course I am not denying that St. James might have taken his illustration from a funeral pyre, as Philo has done (I. p. 455) σπινθῆρ γὰρ ὁ βραχύτατος ἐντυφόμενος, ὅταν καταπνευσθεὶς ζωπυρηθῆ, μεγάλην ἐξάπτει πυράν, but St. James was a poet, and the form of his sentence shows that he desired to emphasise to the utmost the contrast between the smallness of the spark and the greatness of the conflagration. There is no comparison between the burning of weeds, or the cremation of the dead, or the combustion of so many stacks of wood, or even a prairie fire, and the terror of the forest fire described in such vivid terms by Bruncken in his *North American Forests*, pp. 99 foll. "One popular writer repeats after the other the story that forest-fires have been caused by two dry branches being rubbed against each other by the wind. No experienced woodman will believe in such a tale." (p. 98) "It is sometimes said lightning causes forest fires. This may be possible, but, as far as I know, no case of such origin has been actually observed and recorded." The cause of the forest-fire is almost always the neglect of fire kindled by the hand of man. Under ordinary circumstances this dies out of itself, but it is different "when, during a long drought, a wind fans the smouldering fire into active leaping flames." (p. 104) "Small

fires multiply everywhere, for every day new ones start, and there is no rain to put out the old ones. The smoke becomes denser and denser, . . . the heat is horrible, although no ray of sunshine penetrates the heavy pall of smoke. In the distance a rumbling, rushing sound is heard. It is the fire roaring in the treetops on the hillsides, several miles from town. Fiercer and fiercer blows the wind generated by the fire itself, louder and louder the crackling of the branches, as the flames seize one after the other, leaping from crown to crown, rising high above the treetops in whirling wreaths of fire. . . . As the heated air rises higher and higher, rushing along with a sound like that of a thousand foaming torrents, burning brands are carried along . . . bearing the fire miles away from its origin, then falling among the dry brush-heaps and starting another fire to burn as fiercely as the first." (p. 109) "There is something horrible in the steady relentless approach of a top-fire. . . . You can fight a ground fire by trying to beat it out with brush or throwing earth upon it. You cannot fight a fire that seizes treetop after treetop far above your reach, and showers down upon the pigmy mortals, who attempt to oppose it, an avalanche of burning branches, driving them away to escape the torture and death that threaten them."

Since the above was written, Mr. Dakyns has sent me a still more striking description of a forest fire by Stevenson, which he thinks might well have had for its motto, *ΗΑΙΚΟΝ ΠΥΡ ΗΑΙΚΗΝ ΤΑΗΝ ΑΝΑΠΤΕΙ*. It is taken from his book entitled *Across the Plains*, No. II., on "The Old Pacific Capital." It is too long to quote as a whole. I select one or two sentences which may serve to illustrate both Homer and St. James. "The fire passes through the underbrush at a run (compare Homer's *θάμνοι πρόρριζοι πίπτουσιν*). . . . After the squiblike conflagration of the dry moss and twigs there remains a

deep-rooted and consuming fire in the very entrails of the tree. The resin of the pitch-pine is principally condensed at the base of the bole and in its spreading roots. . . . Underground to their most extended fibres the roots are being eaten out by fire and the smoke is rising through the fissures to the surface. . . . Without a word of warning the huge pine-tree snaps off short across the ground and falls prostrate with a crash. . . . Long afterwards, if you pass by, you will find the earth pierced with radiating galleries, and preserving the design of all these subterraneous spurs, as though it were the mould of a new tree, instead of the print of an old one." He then describes how near he himself came to lynching on one occasion when in a mad fit of curiosity he struck a match and applied it to one of the tassels of dry moss hanging from a huge pine-tree, which had so far escaped the flame. "The tree went off simply like a rocket: in three seconds it was a roaring pillar of flame. Close by, I could hear the shouts of those who were at work combating the original conflagration. . . . Had any one observed the result of my experiment, my neck was literally not worth a pinch of snuff."

I see no reason why St. James may not have had such a picture in his mind, when he wrote the words we are considering. Lebanon with its cedars was the type of the glory of Israel; it was the symbol of life and beauty, as in Hos. xiv. 5, "Israel shall blossom as the lily, and cast forth his roots as Lebanon"; yet the prophet Zechariah (xi. 1-3) foretells the destruction of Lebanon by fire, "Open thy gates, O Lebanon, that the fire may devour thy cedars. Howl, O fir tree, for the cedar is fallen, for the glory is laid waste. Howl, ye oaks of Bashan, for the inaccessible forest is laid low" (Delitzsch's trans.). When we remember that Lebanon was the great storehouse for the building of houses and ships, that Anti-

gonus employed 8,000 men in felling its cedars in order to provide himself with a navy, that Herod used it in building the Temple, we need not ask where St. James borrowed his figure. Fires smaller or greater must have been of constant occurrence.<sup>1</sup>

We have still to ask what should have led Hort to depart from what we may call the natural interpretation of ὕλη. It is never safe to assume that the considerations which have influenced oneself were unknown to Hort. He must certainly have been aware, though he has not mentioned it, of the use of the word in the LXX, and this would have inclined him to understand the saying of St. James in the same sense. He must also have noticed that in Aristotle the philosophical use, and in Xenophon, what I may call the prosaic use, quite eclipsed the poetical use, which still held its ground in ordinary writers owing to its Homeric associations.<sup>2</sup> It is curious, however, that in turning over my Greek books during the last few days, I have failed to come across such a phrase as the following, which I think would have satisfied Hort, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς ὕλην τινὰ παμμεγέθη ἤλθομεν τριταῖοι.

J. B. MAYOR.

<sup>1</sup> Such fires are referred to in Ps. lxxxiii. 14, Isa. ix. 18, x. 17-19. The Rev. F. J. Taylor, formerly a missionary to the Telugus, mentions in his *Exposition of the Epistle of St. James* (p. 63) that, in the Deccan, forest-fires occur regularly every year. "When the season comes round the hill-sides are lighted nightly by them. At a distance of sixteen miles the flames can be seen leaping from one side of a ravine to the other."

<sup>2</sup> δρυμός is only found in Homer in the irregular plural δρυμά, generally in the phrase ἀνὰ δρυμὰ πυκνὰ καὶ ὕλην. It does not occur at all in Thucydides. Polybius uses it of oak groves in ii. 15, 2, xii. 4-13, possibly in the more general sense in iii. 40, 12, ἐν τισὶ δρυμοῖς ἐτοιμάσαντες ἐνέδρας. Strabo regularly uses ὁ Ἑρκύνιος δρυμός for the Hercynian forest vii. 1, 3 and 5, but adds ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὕλη μεγάλη Γαβρῆτα.



*DR. FORSYTH ON THE ATONEMENT.*<sup>1</sup>

A REALLY adequate and constructive work on the Atonement has long been overdue. The situation in Theology has for the last twenty years been both anomalous and painful. Our leading thinkers have been obliged to abandon for the time the doctrinal aspects of the Faith, owing to the pressure of the attack on its philosophic postulates and its historic origins. The Higher Criticism has apparently worked havoc in the latter region ; and in the former the breakdown of every current school of philosophy has made confusion worse confounded. It has thus been impossible for any competent thinker to attempt a calm survey, much less a confident reconstruction of Christian doctrine in view of the new conditions. Many a tentative effort has been made to rehabilitate the doctrine of the Incarnation, with partial success in a few cases, but with complete success in none ; and the many studies of the Atonement that have issued from the press have either been insufficiently freed from the tyranny of outworn views of the Universe, or they have been too obsessed by the newer views to give adequate expression to the essential and abiding elements of truth in the historic theories of the Cross. Meanwhile on every Christian preacher and writer has weighed the urgent sense that to expound the Christian Faith without a clear, confident and whole-hearted presentation of its central doctrine, is to be doomed to ineffectiveness, and often to be suspected of insincerity. The result has been a deep sense of inadequacy in the work of the pulpit, and a disquieting, nay a disastrous feeling of unsatisfied spiritual hunger in the pew. The note of conviction and confidence that rang so clearly in the preaching

<sup>1</sup>*The Person and Place of Jesus Christ.* The Congregational Union Lecture for 1909. By P. T. Forsyth, M.A., D.D.

of the Evangelical pulpit two generations ago, and which exercised such profound influence on the life of the country, has almost disappeared ; the emphasis in preaching has moved from the centre to the circumference of the circle of Christian doctrine ; and theology has fallen for the time into temporary disrepute. The recent developments in religious thought, with its bickerings and recriminations ; and still more, the lamentable waning of the power of the pulpit to hold the worshipping public, have been but outward symptoms of a trouble that has penetrated into the heart of the Church, and which has sapped its vitality to an alarming extent. That trouble is this—we have not known how to integrate the truth of the Cross into our deeper thought, and so have lost the sense of its power and joy. Therefore is it high time that we should have an exposition of this all-important subject, which, while conserving its undying message, shall expound it so that it may once more take its radiant and immovable place at the core of a happy and consentient faith.

### I.

Dr. Forsyth has many qualifications for the handling of this supreme subject. He has proved himself to be a writer of broad and varied culture. He has studied in many schools of thought. He has passed through many eventful phases of thought on his own account. His religious development has been an interesting and even tragic pilgrimage after the truth ; and he was long ere he “ found ” himself. Even since his rediscovery of the Faith in which (like all good Scotchmen) he was brought up, he has been slow to assimilate his material or to clarify his vision. As he himself expresses it in the first of these remarkable books, he was not freeborn in this faith : “ with a great

<sup>1</sup> *The Cruciality of the Cross.* By P. T. Forsyth, M.A., D.D., Principal of Hackney College, Hampstead.

price have I procured this freedom.”<sup>1</sup> There are marks of this travail of spirit, and of the keen joy in which it has issued, on every page of his books ; and this will account for a certain vivid impatience which marks his attitude towards the contented and self-complacent sciolism of the *dilettanti* of theology. He knows the barrenness of the way and the sorrow of the quest too well to feel kindly to those who accept easy solutions to the Great Enigma, and who blandly dismiss as “ out of date ” the historic witness of the travailing Church of the Redeemer. Were not his pen dipped into his own heart’s blood, some of the phrases with which he stigmatises the shallow utterances of these easy writers might be suspected of uncharity. As it is, it would be impossible for him to speak otherwise. The man who has once faced lions in the arena cannot suffer fools gladly when they speak glibly of that which has been a matter of life and death to his soul.

This intense personal experience constitutes the highest possible qualification for a writer on the Atonement, and marks the utterances of all the great historic thinkers on the subject from Dr. Dale back to St. Paul himself. Its absence is a final bar to any fruitful thought. The Liberals stigmatised by Hermann as lacking this note of urgency, this “ sense that a personal life bears down on them out of every page of Scripture, and, full and warm, conquers them for his own ” . . . “ cannot do the work of theology,” and it is vain to look to them for help or guidance.<sup>2</sup> It would be well for the reading public to recognise this elementary fact, and turn for help to those who after passing through the deep

<sup>1</sup> *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 235.

<sup>2</sup> “ Only the saved have the real secret of the Saviour. That is the religion of the matter, which carries its theology. The Godhead that became incarnate in Jesus Christ did so, not to convince, but to save. . . . The work of Christ realised in the Church’s experience through faith becomes the avenue and the key to the person of Christ ” (*Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 220).

darkness have been saved as by fire, and know Him whom they have believed.

## II.

These two books must be read and judged together ; it would, indeed, have been well, but for exigencies of bulk, if they had been published in one volume, for they are really one work, being together the organic development of one great central theme. It has always been a moot question in theology whether the Person or the Work of Christ should come first ; and writers have answered it differently according to the emphasis they would lay on the one or the other. The Greek fathers found the solution of their problem mainly in the Incarnation ; the Western and the Reformed mainly in the Atonement. Among modern thinkers, Dr. Dale and Dr. Denney give priority to the Cross ; Dr. Fairbairn and Bishop Westcott are mainly in sympathy with the Greek fathers. At root the antithesis is a false one ; the Person of Christ finds its solution as well as its consummation in His work, and His work has no meaning or efficacy except as the final expression of His Person. With Dr. Forsyth there is no hesitation as to which is the constitutive element in Christian theology : “ the reconciling and redeeming work of Christ is the grand avenue to his person in its fulness, though it does not exhaust it.”<sup>1</sup> The Person has supreme interest for him because it expressed, realised, and attained its final and saving value in the great redeeming act, without which it would lack its very *raison d'être*, and by means of which it put forth its saving power, and attained to final victory over sin and death. “ The doctrine of the Incarnation,” he writes, “ did not create the Church ; it grew up (very quickly) in the Church out of the Doctrine of the Cross, which did create it. . . . The doctrine of the Incarnation grew

<sup>1</sup> *Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 280.



upon the Church out of the experience of the Atonement. The Church was forced on the deity of Christ to account for its redeemed existence in Christ. We can experience the redemption as we cannot the incarnation. The soterology sprang from the soteriology, the creed of the Person grew up in the Church which had been created by the experience of his salvation.”<sup>1</sup> This, indeed, is scarcely accurate in point of history, for the earliest preaching as summarised in the early chapters of the Acts was Christological rather than soteriological, and there is no mention made of atonement in the later sense of the word. True, however, is it that the deity of our Lord did not fully dawn on believers till the Church had had deep and valid experience of His redemption, and it is as true to-day as it was then that it is as Saviour that the ultimate significance of His Person is borne in experimentally on redeemed souls; what He does *for* us and *in* us determines our concept of what He is *to* us. And Dr. Forsyth boldly gives it as his conviction that it was the Cross that solved for Jesus Himself the mystery of His own nature and mission. “He Himself learned (if I may say so under shelter of the Hebrews) to construe all His life from the death whose divine necessity grew upon Him, and for whose accomplishment He was straitened in all else. In His death He found Himself fully. And His expiring groan was also the relieved sigh of self-realisation.”<sup>2</sup> Holding such views, it is natural for the writer to place almost exclusive emphasis on the atoning work of Jesus, and to subordinate not merely His earthly life, but almost every aspect of His super-historic Person to the supreme act in which in time He revealed the timeless and eternal God in His redeeming grace. One hesitates to justify this tremendous obsession

<sup>1</sup> *Cruciality of the Cross*, pp. 98, 99 (footnote).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

exercised by the Cross on the writer's view. There are other aspects of the rich revelation of the Son of God than this ; and some noble believers, whose experience of the Christian salvation is full and true, would find it hard to assent to such an exclusive doctrine. None the less is Dr. Forsyth right in saying that the central fact of the Christian Faith is the atoning act of the Redeemer ; the Cross is the keystone of the arch of His perfect Life, the burning focus of all the light that radiates from His Divine Person.

### III.

Turning to Dr. Forsyth's treatment of the Christological problem, what comes first to the mind of the reader of this brilliant and suggestive book is the completeness and thoroughness of its survey of its inexhaustible subject. The work contains searching criticism, but its main note is constructive throughout. There is much repetition and reiteration of central thoughts at various stages in the argument, which is like a river returning on itself as though loth to leave the scenery through which it passes ; but there is always something fresh and stimulating to see and to hear. Any attempt like a summary of the work in such an article as this would, of course, be futile as well as out of place. A few hints are all that is possible as to the line of thought.

Briefly then, in his Congregational Lecture, Dr. Forsyth seeks to expound for the men of to-day the significance for us of the great Personality who is at once the source and the embodiment of our Faith. In substance Dr. Forsyth's view of Christ is that of the historic Church, as expressed by the great thinkers ; and his purpose is mainly to show the utter inadequacy of the views of the Liberal theologians and amateur thinkers who, for the time, bulk so largely in the public eye. In a passage of great incisiveness, he

points out that our present Protestantism is historically composed of the union of two streams, which take their rise in different sources, and which, like the waters of the Arve and the Rhone below Geneva, have not yet coalesced; these are the Reformation and the Illumination. They may be called the Old Protestantism and the New—a distinction far more radical than the old antithesis of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy; they do not so much issue in two theologies as in two religions. The focal centre of the one is in a Divine intervention, and it rests on the objectivity of a given revelation; the other builds on the subjectivity of human nature or thought; the one is predominantly transcendent in its philosophic and theological emphasis, the other almost exclusively immanent; for the one Redemption is an interference, for the other it is an evolution. Each movement has its relative justification, and a full synthesis of thought must give due place to both. The crucial point comes here—which is to be regulative for faith, and which ancillary? The “modern mind” has chosen the immanental view of religion (as of the world and of man), and has made theology secondary to philosophy, and as a consequence is fast wandering into mere spiritual subjectivity. Dr. Forsyth, with ever-deepening emphasis, insists throughout his treatment of the Christological problem on the validity of the historic attitude of the Christian Church, in its instinctive clinging to the transcendent view of religion, and pre-eminently of the Faith once delivered to the saints. Christ for him is no mere perfect flower of the immanental order; He is the *incarnate* holiness of the transcendent God; He is not God as immanent, realising and “fulfilling” Himself “through all the spires of form” till He comes to a perfect self-expression, but the inrush into our nature of the fulness of the Godhead bodily for the purpose of a great ethical redemption for

the race.<sup>1</sup> The Incarnation was the solution in fact of the great antinomy of religious thought—how God can be infinite and finite, relative and absolute, immeasurably removed from us, and yet unspeakably near to us. According to our author Jesus was as divine as the Father, and as human as ourselves. This is the quintessence of the creeds, the sum of Christian orthodoxy—“all that Athanasius ever meant, and all that Faith ever realised.”

It is thus clear why Dr. Forsyth throws out a perpetual challenge to both wings of the “advanced” school of modern theological thought—the “Liberal” Protestant wing, which for the moment draws such attention in this country, and the “Modernist” Catholic wing, which is so threatening a feature of present-day Romanism. He discards the former as being confessedly anti-dogmatic, the latter as being tacitly anti-historical in the sense that it makes dogma practically independent of its foundation in the historic personality of Jesus—the one being subjective in its exclusions, the other in its inclusions. In the interests of the evangelic Gospel, he affirms the super-historic content of the historic person of Christ, and, in the interests of a true theology, the validity of the Church’s exposition of the significance of that content for faith. “Jesus is not only faith’s object, but faith’s world.”<sup>2</sup> “We know Him by faith to be much more than He is to our experience. . . . My contact with Him by faith is continually deepening my experience of Him. And as my experience deepens it brings home a Christ objective in history, and creative in experience, and the life and the deeds of a whole vast Church, meant, and moving, to subdue mankind not to itself but to the faith of the Gospel.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> “Jesus was for the Apostles and their Churches not the consummation of a God-consciousness, labouring up through creation, but the invasive source of forgiveness, new creation and eternal life” (*Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 58).

<sup>2</sup> *Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 56.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 203.



We must, however, give due place to the critical movement in correcting the *naïve* attitude of former ages to the sources of our knowledge of Jesus, and to the historic conditions of the Incarnation. Dr. Forsyth makes large allowances for the service done here by criticism. Some who have drunk pretty deeply of this cleansing fountain will possibly think that in his presentation of the case, faith concedes both to culture and to dogma more than may ultimately be found justified. His picture of the human life of our Lord and its significance for faith is also, in our judgment, relegated too much into the background of the picture, and lacks something of the pulse and glow of the reality. It is viewed so exclusively in relation to its consummation in the great act of sacrifice on the Cross, that it almost appears as though it had no other value or meaning. *Christus Consummator* overshadows *Christus Revelator et Exemplar*; the Incarnation and its earthly expression in the sinless life are almost lost in the blaze of the Atonement in which its inner meaning was finally expressed. We would repeat that to many this will seriously impair the value of this book, for it almost ignores the evangelic record of that life, thus tacitly depreciating the imperishable and inexhaustible value of the teaching, the deeds, and the personal atmosphere and outgoing influence of that gracious and holy Person who lived our life as well as died more than our death; and whose life, and words, and teaching are more than a mere background for its final self-expression in the Cross. Say what we will of the profound truth of the Pauline presentation of the significance of the *work of Christ*, we should have been little helped by the Epistles were we not in possession of the Gospels, whose substance always lay behind the apostolic teaching, and for the adequate understanding of which teaching they are as necessary as are the Epistles for the final explication of the Gospels.

It may also be legitimately urged whether, considering the rich content of the religious sense, both in the spiritual psychology of man and in his manifold religious history, it is permissible to reduce the creative aspect of any religion to one single principle. This is the criticism which Loisy rightly passes on Harnack's reduction of the essence of the Gospel to the one doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. Religion is as many-sided as is man's capacity for receiving the impress of the Divine Spirit, and of responding to His appeal. Atonement and the sense of forgiveness represent one side (objective and subjective) of the Christian Faith, and they are central. None the less are there other, equally vital, aspects of the same manifold reality; and it would seem that we are to some extent robbing these of their fruitfulness for the life of the soul if we make them depend entirely on a more or less complete realisation of the atoning work of Christ, vital as that is to a full and joyful spiritual life.

#### IV.

These, however, are blemishes due to over-emphasis rather than vital defects in the presentation of our author's subject, and we pass gladly to the positive and distinctive contribution of these books to the great problem of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Dr. Forsyth's message is, in a word, the transmutation of the ontological aspects of both into the ethical. The Person and the Cross of Christ are reinstated as the final court of moral appeal for the human conscience. This is precisely where recent theology, equally with modern culture, has gone astray. The loss of power in the doctrine of Atonement has been due to a loss of the sense of its ethical finality. By a false anti-thesis between the concepts of God and man, by a thoroughly unethical theory of substitution as the means whereby our

redemption was effected, by a doctrine of kenosis which had no bearing on practical thought and life, the subject had become largely lost in a fog of unreality ; indeed the whole idea of atonement has frequently been boldly denounced as an immoral doctrine. It is the inestimable value of this fresh presentation of the case that, for those at least who will take the trouble to penetrate into the heart of these volumes, the lost ground has been largely recovered.<sup>1</sup> According to Dr. Forsyth, the "moralising of dogma" in all its bearing, Divine and human, on the objective side, and the re-sensitising of the Christian conscience as the subjective response, is the supreme need of the day, both in religion and theology. In this is to be found the key to the problem of authority in religion, which is to be found not in the Church, which is too human, nor in the Scriptures, which are the fruit rather than the seat of that authority, but in the Gospel itself, which is the creative source and final norm of the religious life. This Gospel is expressed in the supreme fact and act of holy love on the Cross in history. That fact was the temporal manifestation of an eternal act in the Godhead, realised through the Incarnation, consummated in the Cross, ratified in the Resurrection and exaltation of the Redeemer, discovered by faith in the experience of salvation in the Church, and explicated in the Epistles as their authoritative expression and reflex in human thought. This passionately ethical keynote is shown to run through the whole gamut of Christian doctrine in all directions. The omnipotence of God, the absoluteness (finality) of Christ, His pre-existence, kenosis, and plerosis (or exalta-

<sup>1</sup> "A redemptive work is moral or nothing. A metaphysical Incarnation cannot lead to a moral atonement. If it was the mere possession of a divine nature and rank worthy to atone gave Jesus Christ this saving power, if it was not the moral quality of His action in the doing of it (either on earth or in Heaven before coming to earth), then His work as a moral atonement is bound to reduce the value of its practical effect if it do not turn it into an unreality" (*Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, p. 235).

tion) are all viewed in the light of this illuminating principle. The self-consciousness of Christ, the apostolic witness, the testimony of the distinctive experience of believers both in the soul and the Church are all examined with a view to the illustration of the same principle, with a subtlety of insight and a breadth of treatment that are amazing in their thoroughness. In the second volume, the problem is handled with reference to the attitude of the "modern mind," both in its negative and sympathetic aspects, towards the Cross of Christ. The closing chapter gathers up the discussion into a more personal form, and is a fine expression of the writer's own faith. Holiness, judgment, and redemption are shown to be the keywords of the Christian Atonement; a holiness expressing itself in wrath against sin, in love for the sinner, in a sacrifice that at once brands sin in judgment and rescues the sinner in the grasp of a love that "will not let him go."

This thorough and synthetic treatment of the central doctrine of the Christian faith has its defects, partly arising from temperamental sources, and partly from a tantalising literary style, which, while brilliant in its occasional aptness of phrase, at times becomes obscure through the condensation of its thought, and is generally lacking in steady consecutive movement. These volumes are thus hard to read, and it is at times irritatingly difficult to follow a clear line of thought from page to page. The reader who perseveres will, however, be amply rewarded for his pains. For he comes here into intimate contact with a thinker who has his own way of expressing himself because he is not so much explicating an abstract subject as expressing a faith which has been enriched from many sources, but chiefly by its own intense experience of the truth he would communicate. There are books which are the outcome of a wide erudition and little more; there are others which are the



issue of long meditation and of independent thought ; there are others that are the literary expression of a man's own passion and agony and spiritual deliverance. In these volumes we have the fruit of all these three impulses ; and their best quality is that they are the work of a mind which, while sensitive to all the delicate currents of modern life, has found its final resting-place where " beyond these voices there is peace." They are therefore books not only to read, but to master and to assimilate. If to these two books is added a careful study of Dr. Denney's great work on *Jesus and the Gospels*, the exegetical and dogmatic aspects of the Person and work of Christ will be mastered in such a way that will leave little to be desired in the equipment of the young preacher for his work.

E. GRIFFITH-JONES.

*HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST  
EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.*

XXIII. ADVICE TO TIMOTHY ON THE CONDUCT AND SPIRIT  
OF HIS WORK.

THIS letter contains not merely much advice to Timothy as to what he should do and what sort of teaching he should give, but also counsel as to the manner and spirit in which he should perform his duties in the Church of Ephesus. The second kind of advice is quite as important as the first, and it is never far away from Paul's mind as he writes. It lurks in, or is at points quite plain in, almost every paragraph ; but in iv. 6-16 it is specially clear. To do his work is for Timothy not merely the way of usefulness, but also the way of salvation. He must have the knowledge of what is right to teach ; education, insight, some philosophic aptitude, are good, and in a certain degree indispensable for one in such a position, who had to meet those

clever false teachers ; but these more purely intellectual qualities will have little practical effect without that emotional force which imparts power to the employment of the knowledge. It is characteristic of Paul, and shows the same point of view as appears in the earlier letters, that this driving power, this emotional force, is found by him in the desire for salvation. Timothy is to work to save others in order that he may save himself : “ To this end we labour and strive because we have our hope set on the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe ” (iv. 10).

In the last two Sections we saw that the mind of Paul, while he was writing the Pastoral Epistles, was strongly possessed with the importance of the family in the Church as a working organisation, and that he was not at the moment thinking so much about the individuals who made up the congregation, but rather of the families as the units out of which the Church was built up ; whereas in the earlier Epistles he had in mind more the individuals to whom he addressed himself, and his aim was to awaken in each person, taken singly and alone as an individual, the idea of his own personal relation to God, and the consciousness of sin, and so to stimulate in each an intense desire for his personal salvation and a hope of attaining it. In our study of the development of Paul's thought it seemed natural, and in a sense necessary, that his earlier view should be completed by a clearer realisation, expressed in the Epistles to Timothy, of the relation in which individuals stand to one another in the family and in the congregation.<sup>1</sup>

Now we see that even in the Pastoral Epistles, where Paul is stating so strongly the duty of the individual to

<sup>1</sup> I do not mean, of course, that this is absent from the earlier Epistles, but it is not emphasised so strongly, though it is apparent in them, e.g., in Ephesians.

the family, he never loses hold on his old idea of what was fundamental : the individual Christian stands in direct relation to God, and must work out his own salvation as the prime purpose which God intends him to achieve. He attains this purpose through full recognition of and respect to his position in the family and the congregation. Nothing can atone for neglect of the duty which each individual owes to the family : there is nothing which is more binding on the individual. With regard to the woman that is to Paul self-evident : she shall be saved through her relation to the family, for the strongest force in her nature runs in this channel.<sup>1</sup> But equally in respect of the man, he who subordinates his family duty to any other "hath denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever."

"Continue in these things ; for in doing this thou shalt save both thyself and them that hear thee." Such is the conclusion of the paragraph : Timothy shall attain salvation through the diligent and whole-heartedly enthusiastic discharge of his duties (iv. 15) as teacher, and worker in the congregation (iv. 13), as prophet and guide of the people (iv. 14), provided that his words and actions show him to the Faithful as an example of love and faith and purity (iv. 12) and hope (iv. 10). Here we have the "three things that abide, faith, hope, love" (1 Cor. xiii. 13) ; and with them is ranked purity : the addition is in perfect accord with the character and teaching of the New Testament generally.

This passage must at once recall to the reader the statement about women in ii. 15 : they shall attain salvation through the force of motherhood, if they continue in faith and love and sanctification with sobriety. The parallelism is evident, and must be intentional. The difference of career which Paul marks out for men and for women is

<sup>1</sup> Section XIII., EXPOSITOR, October, 1909, p. 343 ff.

in accordance with his whole view of life. The care of the family is to absorb the energy of women until the age of sixty. Thereafter she is free to give herself to public work for the Church. A man like Timothy (not of course every one of the Brethren), is to give all his time and energy and thought to reading, to exhortation, to teaching; so that all may observe how much progress in them he makes, and see the way in which his powers and gifts develop in the course of his career. Now development proceeds rapidly and easily only when the individual has found his true line of work.

The true life of the individual, therefore, is the service of the family and of the congregation. There is no inconsistency between the more individual tone of the earlier Epistles and the more congregational and family tone of the Pastorals. In serving others we save ourselves. Yet, according to Paul, the starting-point of the true life is found in the consciousness of sin and the intense desire for salvation. From the beginning of his career to the end that conviction is shown in his actions and is expressed in his writings.

We now come to the details stated in this paragraph regarding the conduct and spirit which should be shown in Timothy's work.

He should never neglect the *charisma*, the gift which has been bestowed on him, viz., the power of hearing the Divine voice and catching the Divine inspiration. Here is one of the rare references in the Pastoral Epistles to the gift of inspiration and prophecy; and this gift is alluded to as being so important that no one ought for even a moment to imagine that the paucity of references to it implies any weakening of Paul's earlier belief in its power and immense value. The importance of this gift, and the fact that it is granted to individuals by direct action



of God, are assumed in the Pastoral Epistles as familiar and fundamental matters, which do not need to be emphasised.

It has, however, been inferred from this and the companion passage, 2 Timothy i. 6, that the gift of prophecy appears in the Pastorals only to embrace a qualification for the work of teaching. Now it is of course true that both these passages refer to Timothy and that Timothy was a teacher; but this gives no justification for the inference that the author of the Pastoral Epistles regarded prophecy as confined to teachers and as merely a qualification for the teacher's duty. In 1 Timothy i. 18 "the prophecies that went before on thee" are much more likely to have been made in the open congregation and to be of the same general type that are alluded to in 1 Corinthians. Even if that passage did not occur, and if the two about Timothy stood alone, it would be absolutely irrational to draw such a sweeping negative inference from the silence of the Epistles. It would be equally absurd if some one were to argue that the writer of the Pastorals set no store by the Eucharist and regarded it as a worthless and useless ceremony, because he never alludes to it as part of the Church ritual.

In truth, there is no reason to think that the writer of the Pastoral Epistles differed a whit in regard to either prophecy or the Eucharist from the views stated in the earlier letters of Paul.

Discrepancy has been found between 1 Timothy iv. 14 and 2 Timothy i. 6, because in the latter the gift of the Spirit is described as being in Timothy "through the laying on of my hands," while in the former it was given him "by prophecy with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." The variation might more reasonably be used as a proof that in both cases the laying on of hands is

regarded by Paul as a mere accompaniment, and not the cause, of the communication of the Spirit to Timothy : the cause was the Divine power alone, but the occasion was on a solemn assembly of the congregation when the presbyters and Paul laid their hands on him. That he sometimes thought and spoke only of the presbyters' hands, sometimes only of his own hands, is in full agreement with many similar variations, where sometimes one detail or aspect of a scene, sometimes another, is emphasised. The situation is similar to that described in Acts xiii. 2-4, when Barnabas and Saul were sent forth from Antioch (1) by prophecy, (2) at the orders and through the action of the Holy Spirit, (3) with the laying on of hands of the officers representing the whole congregation.<sup>1</sup>

This passage of Acts shows, further, what is the meaning of the expression "by prophecy" in 1 Timothy iv. 14. The appointment of Timothy was preceded and marked out by prophecies, as in fact Paul expressly states in 1 Timothy i. 18. Then followed the solemn meeting in which the action and command of the Spirit, declared through prophecy, was brought into effect and recognition through the laying on of hands by Paul and the presbyters.

The question has also been discussed whether this occasion was at Lystra, when Timothy was first chosen as Paul's companion and coadjutor, or at Ephesus, when Timothy was appointed to superintend that Church, or whether both times are referred to. There is no improbability in the supposition that in both cases, at Lystra and at Ephesus, the same events and a similar ceremony took place in the congregation. The context of 2 Timothy i. 6, however, seems to show clearly that Paul there was thinking of the scene at Lystra : the reference to the faith of Timothy's mother and grandmother is decisive. In the passages of

<sup>1</sup> Such seems to be the meaning of Acts xiii. 3 : *St. Paul the Trav.*, p. 65.

I Timothy i. 18, iv. 14, there is more temptation to understand that the appointment at Ephesus is referred to, yet even in them I am rather disposed to accept the view of Dr. Hort<sup>1</sup> that the reference is to the original choice of Timothy at Lystra.

It may be asked whether this view is consistent with the account in Acts xvi. 1-4, where no reference is made to any action except report by the Brethren and selection by Paul. But consideration shows beyond all question that that passage gives a very much abbreviated narrative of the facts. It is impossible to suppose either that Timothy's appointment and mission was unaccompanied by religious ceremonies, or that Luke could have imagined that there was no ceremony of consecration and ratification by the local Church. The truth is that we must here apply the principle of judging which has been used consistently and frequently in *St. Paul the Traveller*: it was Luke's method, after once describing the procedure in a situation, to assume that the same is understood by the reader in similar situations that follow. There was much that could be assumed as familiar to the audience which he addressed, though now it is unfamiliar to us and has to be slowly recovered from comparison and analogy. We understand, therefore, that the choice of Timothy by Paul was the result of a long process, prophecies designating him, inquiry, testimony, and the final ceremony of appointment by the laying on of hands. This is sometimes spoken of by Paul, as it is by Luke, as the act of Paul alone; at other times participation on the part of the congregation or elders is mentioned.

The meaning of the command in iv. 14 is much the same as in 1 Thessalonians v. 19 f., "Quench not the Spirit; despise not prophesyings": except that there the Apostle makes

<sup>1</sup> *Ecclesia*, p. 184.

more explicit the fault of belittling and thus discouraging the manifestations of Divine inspiration in others, while here he refers to the fault of allowing the gift to grow weak in oneself by want of attention to it. It is a power which is strengthened by cultivation and practice, and is lost if not used.

Those who set so much store on verbal variations and differences between the Pastoral and the earlier Epistles may find some cause for suspecting difference of authorship in the fact that the word in the earlier Epistle is "make light of," whereas that used to Timothy is "pay no heed to,"<sup>1</sup> although the meaning is practically the same. But no one who has any literary feeling will object to Paul for possessing a rich vocabulary, and for being sensitive to delicate shades of meaning. In the earlier case he censures those who make light of and depreciate with censorious criticism the prophecies uttered by others in the congregation: in the later cases he warns Timothy against failing to cultivate with due care the power of prophecy in himself.

Again, Timothy is advised to show a proper sense of the dignity of his office, and is not to permit over-familiarity or any want of respect towards himself from any member of the Ephesian Church. Yet this self-respect is not to be exaggerated into over-estimation of his office. In the opening of the next paragraph v. 1-3, we find the counsel that Timothy should show due respect to those who are older than himself. The elder men he is to exhort as fathers, elder women as mothers. One who has been familiar with the ordinary Greek usage in modern times can feel no doubt that these verses imply that Timothy should actually address men and women distinctly older than himself by the titles "father" and "mother"; while he was advised to salute those who were approximately of

<sup>1</sup> ἐξουθενέω and ἀμελέω.



the same age with himself as "brother," and "sister." It is evident how far this usage is from the Roman Catholic custom that the priest is saluted as "father" even by those who are older than himself, and regards all members of the laity as his children.

Evidently, Timothy is ranked in this Epistle as among the younger, not among the elderly, members of the congregation; that appears both in iv. 10 and in v. 1-3. What this implies must be considered in a separate Section.

#### XXIV. THE AGE OF TIMOTHY.

In the classification of the citizens of a Greek city there were usually two divisions, the "young men" and the "old men": the most common terms for these two classes are νεοί or νεώτεροι and γέροντες or πρεσβύτεροι. These two divisions of the full-grown citizens were united in separate associations or colleges. The associations of young men were closely connected with the gymnasiums, and their amusements were athletic; they had officials, elected by themselves, managing the common funds and the common business; they voted statues to deserving persons, such especially as had given service or brought honour to the Neoi; they passed decrees, and sometimes imitated the constitution of the city by having their own Senate and Ecclesia. The Neoi evidently did not correspond to what we call young men: they were full-grown men of military age; and as they grew beyond the military age, they passed direct into the category of the elderly men,<sup>1</sup> Presbyteroi or Gerontes, who also had their own club, their own amusements suitable for advancing age, with their own funds and officials. The association of

<sup>1</sup> There are some examples of an intermediate class of ἀνδρες between the Neoi and the Gerontes; but this is rare and exceptional. Generally, we find the double, not the triple classification of the full-grown men. On this subject many authorities have written: references may be found in *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, i. p. 110 ff.

Gerontes or Presbyteroi were by far the most influential, and apparently the most wealthy. A society which united in its membership all the men of most experience, and most of those who had held the higher magistracies, naturally exercised great influence in a city.

Those whom we should call "young men" were called by the Greeks Epheboi. They were regarded as being still in the stage of education in classes<sup>1</sup> under teachers for purposes of physical, moral and intellectual training. The Epheboi also had their special organisation, their Senate and their Ecclesia, in which evidently they practised themselves with a view to their subsequent life as citizens. They elected their officials, awarded honours and passed decrees. As they grew they passed about the age of twenty into the class of the Neoi.

Timothy was reckoned by Paul to be among the Neoi, or Neoteroi, the men of active age, who should address a Presbyteros by the title "father." Hence the advice, "let no one despise thy youth." This expression has given rise to much discussion, and unnecessary difficulty, as if it were strange that Paul should about A.D. 65 consider Timothy among the Neoteroi. We have only to ask the question, Could Paul by any possibility have regarded him as one of the elderly men or Presbyteroi? The answer must obviously be in the negative; and the inevitable inference is that he was one of the Neoi.

The arguments against the Pauline authorship of the Pastorals, based on the "youth" of Timothy, are the emptiest and most ignorant in the whole series of reasoning on that side. The view of Paul was inevitable according to ancient standards of judgment; and it appears not simply in one place (which has been pictured by imaginative

<sup>1</sup> For example, at Chios the Epheboi are divided into three classes, νεώτεροι, μέσοι and πρεσβύτεροι: C.I.G. 2214.

commentators as an ignorant imitation of 1 Corinthians by the forger of the Pastorals), but consistently in the advice about conduct in v. 1-3. Paul thought and spoke of him as a Neos, placed in the rather difficult position of exercising authority over Presbyteroi.

It is probable that Timothy was very young when Paul first chose him in A.D. 50. Until Paul took him he was under the care of his mother and his grandmother, as is evident from the comparison of Acts xvi. 2 with 2 Timothy i. 5, 1 Timothy iv. 6. Paul wished to have the moulding of his character, and therefore selected one who was little more than a boy. He may have been only eighteen at the time, and it is highly improbable that he was more than twenty.

On the other hand, when Paul left him in charge at Ephesus, we may assume confidently that he was above thirty years old. Not even a companion of long standing could very well be selected for such responsibility as head over Presbyters and elderly men at an earlier age.

That appointment was probably made in A.D. 65, and if he was about twenty in A.D. 50, he must have been about thirty-five in A.D. 65. That was an early age for one who had to undertake such duties as Timothy had to perform. He had to exercise some superintendence over the teachers (1 Tim. i. 3). He had to exhort the elders, both men and women (but he was forbidden to rebuke them, as being too young to take such a tone to them); the younger men and women he addressed and exhorted as brethren and sisters (1 Tim. v. 1-3). He was even expected to reprove the sinful publicly. We, who are accustomed to entrust such duties to boys fresh from college, hardly realise how serious a matter it was in that age and country, when the respect paid to age and experience was so much greater than it is among us. We admit peers to the House of Lords

at twenty-one, if their fathers have died, and entrust them at that age with the supreme duties of the legislature, without any sense of incongruity on the ground of youth. Such a thing was impossible to ancient feeling, which regarded seniority as a necessary qualification for a place on such a body.

The very word *νεότης*, used about Timothy's not yet advanced age, has been counted among the words used only here and never elsewhere by Paul in his letters. But the circumstances prove that, if Paul was speaking so much about the classification by age, there was every reason why he should have occasion to use the noun to designate the position of Timothy among the *Neoi*, as he uses it in Acts xxvi. 4 to designate his own early position in Jerusalem.

Titus, like Timothy, was warned to maintain the dignity of his office, which was similar in Crete to that which Timothy filled in Asia. But how different in character are the words in which the warning was conveyed!

Throughout Titus ii. it is evident that the person addressed must rank among the *Presbyteroi*, for he is conceived as entitled to address both the elderly and the younger men and women in the same tone, and not like Timothy, who as a younger man was expected to use a different style to the elderly from what he used to those of vigorous age. It was only the man of mature age who was justified by ancient manners in addressing both the mature and those of vigorous age in the same tone and fashion. Slaves are classed in this chapter of Titus alongside of the classes of free citizens, and no difference in the tone of address to them is prescribed. Then Paul sums up in the concluding sentence: "These things speak and exhort and reprove with all authority. Let no man despise thee." The conclusion is in perfect agreement with the spirit of the whole



chapter. Any possible disrespect to Titus would not arise from his being one of the Neoi, but from some other cause; it is not merely younger men that fail to make themselves sufficiently respected; men of mature age and assured standing often prove unfit to adapt themselves to a position of authority, and unable to catch that tone of dignity and self-respect, combined with respect for others, which impresses all, and is well received, yet never admits too much familiarity on the part of any (except those who are lost to shame).

Now compare this with the tone in the corresponding passage of 1 Timothy; and one must be struck with the difference amid similarity. The summing up comes first. "These things charge<sup>1</sup> and teach. Let no man despise thy youth; but be thou an ensample to them that believe in word, in manner of life, in love, in faith, in purity." It is well worthy of careful observation how this slight difference in the position of Timothy and of Titus affects the expression throughout the Epistles. The difference apparently was due solely to difference of age, for, if there was any advantage on either side, Timothy seems to have possessed more rather than less authority in other ways, owing to his long and intimate association with Paul: certainly he plays a far more conspicuous part both in the Acts of the Apostles and in the letters of Paul. The words *παραγγέλλω*, *παραγγελία*, referring to the delivery of a message or the announcement of some teaching, are regularly used about Timothy's action, while *ἐπιταγή* (used also of God), *ἐλέγχω*, *παρακαλέω* express the style of teaching and preaching that Titus is to assume. The word *ἐλέγχω*

<sup>1</sup> The translation "command" in R. V. is too strong: *παραγγέλλω* is rather to announce, to charge, than to command: cp. 1 Tim. i. 5, *τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς παραγγελίας ἐστὶν ἀγάπη*. Compare also i. 3, v. 7, vi. 17; the same verb is suited to Timothy; but in the case of Titus *ἐπιταγή* (a much stronger term 1 Tim. i. 1) is used, never *παραγγέλλω*, *παραγγελία*.

is a strong one : it is once used of Timothy, where the occasion shall demand a specially strong exercise of his authority,<sup>1</sup> but it is three times used to describe the fashion of teaching recommended for Titus (i. 9, 13, ii. 15). The neutral term *παρακαλέω* is used, as might be expected, about both, twice about Timothy, three times about Titus. As the latter's epistle is much shorter, this implies that, if any difference exists, the word was felt to be more suitable for Titus. *Διδασκαλία* and *διδάσκω* are often used of Timothy, never of Titus ; a young man may teach an old man, or *vice versa* ; but although Paul speaks of the true and salutary teaching (*διδασκαλία*) which Titus is to enjoin, he avoids the verb and except once (Tit. ii. 7) even the noun about Titus's work, and favours them regarding Timothy. He uses *λαλεῖν*, to preach, twice about Titus, but not about Timothy.

This examination might be carried further, but enough has been said to prove that in an almost perfect identity of subject and instruction the writer of 1 Timothy and Titus (which we may safely take to be almost exactly contemporary) varies the language to suit the varying relation of the two men to those over whom they were to be in authority. Such delicate variations, carried out consistently through two Epistles and differentiating so clearly yet with such slight touches the two persons addressed, afford the most conclusive proof that these are real letters addressed by one man to two known persons ; and that they cannot be mere compositions of scraps or pure forgeries addressed to names taken out of past history.

I have taken no account of 2 Timothy in the comparison, as it belongs to a different moment, later in Paul's life, when the [feeling and the circumstances had changed. The comparison would, therefore, have to reckon with more com-

<sup>1</sup> 1 Tim. v. 20 : " them that sin reprove in the sight of all."

plicated factors, if 2 Timothy were contrasted with Titus.

Some variations in terms, wholly devoid of significance, occur in these sections of the two letters. The younger class is called in 1 Timothy *νεώτερος* and *νεώτερας*, in Titus *νεώτερος* and *νεύς*. The old women are called *πρεσβυτέρας* to Timothy, and *πρεσβύτιδας* to Titus. Such variations show how the same person may change his terminology from moment to moment.

W. M. RAMSAY.

### THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE GOSPELS.

#### III.

#### TWO MORE FEATURES IN THE GENUINE JESUS-TRADITION.

BY collecting and sifting the evidence afforded by our first three Gospels, we found that notwithstanding a marked tendency towards bringing in eschatological views there was a large enough genuine stock of eschatological sayings of Jesus to prove that He Himself believed in a change of all things which would come quickly, and not later than the end of His own generation; the kingdom of God would then be established in its full glory and happiness by His own coming in power and glory; all His believers, or rather, all pious and good men, heathen as well as members of the chosen people, participating in its happy life. We do not see Jesus interested in the details of eschatology like most of the apocalyptic writers of late Judaism and early Christianity. For Jesus eschatology has only a twofold significance: (1) it is a help for Him to understand and make men understand His own position: being the Messiah, the culmination in God's revelation to His people, final in all that He does and says, He brings about the Kingdom of God; and (2) it is a motive in His admonitions: be ready, be watchful, because the kingdom of God is at hand.

## I.

But beside these clearly eschatological utterances there is another set of sayings dealing likewise with the notions of the kingdom and of His Messiahship, but showing quite a different aspect of them: the kingdom is present, and Jesus, humble and meek as He is, is the Messiah, because He fulfils the expectation in its true form and brings salvation in its deepest sense.

A. 1. When attacked on account of His casting out devils, Jesus argues—according to Mark iii. 24–27—by two parables: a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand, and a man cannot enter into a strong man's house and spoil his goods except he first binds the strong man. Q, represented by Luke xi. 19, 20 and Matthew xii. 27, 28, gives two more arguments used on the same occasion by Jesus. He refers to the casting out of devils by the rabbis and their pupils, so defending His own practice *per analogiam*; then He goes on to say: “*But if I by the finger (or, according to Matthew, by the spirit) of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come upon you.*” This “*is come*” (ἐφθασε) must mean something more than the usual “*is at hand*” (ἤγγικεν); it is the solemn declaration that the kingdom is present in Jesus' acting; His casting out of devils proves that the powers of the kingdom are at work. Some interpreters take pleasure in urging the discrepancy between these two arguments. When Jesus' casting out of devils, they say, is nothing else than what was done by the rabbis, how can it be taken as a sign of the kingdom of God being present? Perhaps this is logically correct; it is hardly true psychologically; you can easily compare one thing with another without admitting that both are on the same level. That the casting out of devils by Jesus was far beyond the usual exorcism of the rabbis is admitted by His opponents by their very attack. If, then, the kingdom of God is proved to be present



by the casting out of devils by Jesus, we have here a peculiar notion of the kingdom. There was, as we have seen before, beside the political notions of the kingdom of God, another idea in Jewish eschatology, a mythological one, taking the kingdom of God in contrast to the power of Satan and his evil spirits. This we have here; but the difference is that Jesus by His deeds realises the idea. He Himself is "the stronger," spoken of in that other parable connected with our saying both in Mark and Q, who, having first bound the strong man, spoils his goods. The individual act of casting out a devil is only the consequence of what Jesus has done before, overcoming Satan. So we read in Luke x. 18 that when the seventy returned with joy exulting that even the devils were subject to them in Jesus' name, Jesus answered them: "*I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven.*" I am not prepared to accept this as a parallel to Revelation xii. 9, where the dragon is cast out from heaven and comes down to the earth in order to persecute the children of the Church.<sup>1</sup> I understand it as an allegory of Satan's power being broken, so that it is easy work now to cast out his evil spirits. For the disciples it is no matter of glorifying themselves on account of their exorcising power; they had rather enjoy their own salvation.

2. A second saying to be studied in this connexion is found in Luke xvii. 20-21 only: "*And being asked by the Pharisees, when the kingdom of God cometh, he answered them and said: the kingdom of God cometh not with observation, neither shall they say, Lo, here! or, There! for Lo, the kingdom of God is within you.*" So ἐντὸς ὑμῶν is translated both by the A.V. and the R.V., while some interpreters prefer to translate *in the midst of you*.<sup>2</sup> The discussion as to the true meaning

<sup>1</sup> F. Spitta, "Satan als Blitz" in Preuschen's *ZNTW*, ix., 1908, 160.

<sup>2</sup> The Latin *intra vos* seems to patronize this later view: *unter euch, among you*: on Old Syriac *bainathchon* (*among you*) and Pešitta *begaw menchon* (*in the midst of you*) and Diatessaron *within your heart*, see F. C.

of this ἐντός goes through the whole history of interpretation and will perhaps never come to a final decision, most interpreters maintaining that there must be the same notion of presence as in the former saying. Joh. Weiss tries to get rid of this notion by taking "is in the midst of you" in the sense of "will then be in the midst of you suddenly, without being announced by outward visible preparations." But in order to express "in the midst of you" Luke would have used ἐμμέσῳ;<sup>1</sup> the rather uncommon expression ἐντός ὑμῶν he can have chosen only with the aim of giving to "in" the peculiar colouring of inwardness.<sup>2</sup> Now it may be an open question, if we can trust his rendering of the Aramaic original. There may have come in a misunderstanding in the very act of translation. But we cannot reach this Aramaic original behind the extant Greek text. And I see no necessity for putting aside Luke's meaning, as inwardness of the kingdom, if not stated expressly by other sayings of Jesus, is quite in the line of what he says about clean and unclean: "*There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him: but the things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man*"; "*for from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed . . . and defile the man*" (Mark vii. 15, 21; cp. Matt. xv. 11, 19). If it is man's heart where the evil thoughts come from, or, in other words, where the devil exercises his dominion, then it is man's heart, too, where the kingdom of God is to be established. "*Thy king-*

Burkitt, *Evangelion da Mepharreshe*, ii. 198, 298. A. Merx, *Die vier kanonischen Evangelien*, ii. 2, 347, understands the Pešitta meaning: "*within you.*" "*Inside of you*" is the Bohairic rendering (G. Horner).

<sup>1</sup> This is found in Luke's writings more than a dozen times; ἐντός c. gen. only xvii. 21.

<sup>2</sup> It is worth remark that the parallels brought forward in favour of the meaning "*in the midst of you*" are all taken from early writers, as Thukydides, Plato, Xenophon, whereas the LXX uses the word in the sense of "*in the interior of.*" I should attribute a great value, too, to the linguistic sensorium of Chrysostom, who champions the inward-view.

dom come, thy will be done" points in the same direction.

3. A third saying is still more difficult. It is found in Matthew xi. 12, 13, and Luke xvi. 16, i.e., at two different places, and in two quite different forms, too. I therefore do not think that it comes from Q, but rather from some other source, perhaps an oral one. We hardly can say what are the original words; we had better put the two redactions side by side:—

MATTHEW.

(a) And from the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and men of violence<sup>1</sup> take it by force.

(b) For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John.

LUKE.

(a) The law and the prophets (were) until John:

(b) from that time the gospel of the kingdom of God is preached, and every man entereth violently<sup>2</sup> into it.

Whatever may be the original form (most of the interpreters trying to gain it by a rather hazardous combination);<sup>3</sup> whatever may be the meaning of that most disputed word *βιασταί* and *βιάζεται* (Luke, evidently taking the latter in a passive sense: *is compelled to enter into it*): one thing seems to be beyond any doubt: the time of Jesus is set in opposition to the time until John, the present to the past, and it is to this present that the kingdom of God belongs, not to a third form, the future. And because it is present, it is to be taken as something inward, some experience of happiness which men try to get so eagerly that they rather jostle one another in the effort to reach it.

4. A fourth saying, which one would mention in this connexion, is perhaps not so certain; it is found in Mark x. 15 (cp. Luke xviii. 17<sup>4</sup>): "*Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shal*

<sup>1</sup> The violent, A.V.

<sup>2</sup> Presseth, A.V.

<sup>3</sup> See the various attempts at reconstruction by Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, i. 75; Harnack, *Sprüche Jesu*, 101; B. Weiss, *Die Quellen der syn. Überlieferung* (*Texte u. Unters.*, 3 ser. ii. 3); H. von Soden, *Die wichtigsten Fragen in Leben Jesu*, does not include this saying in Q.

<sup>4</sup> Matthew omits this word at xix. 14, because he has a various form of the same in xviii. 3.

*not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein.*" While in the second part the notion of the kingdom is the usual one, a different notion seems to be presupposed in the first part. If to receive the kingdom is the condition for entering into the kingdom, it must be in the first place some kingdom before the kingdom, i.e., some inward experience, accessible to man in the present time, before the kingdom in the external eschatological sense is to be revealed. The kingdom of God as an experience of man's heart would be in agreement with what we learned from Luke xvii. 21. On the other hand, "*the kingdom of God*" can be taken here as an abbreviated expression for the "gospel of the kingdom of God," and in this case the conclusion would not be quite necessary.

5. Lastly, we have to mention here the two parables of the mustard seed and the leaven, only the former being given in Mark iv. 30-32, while Luke xiii. 18-21, following probably Q, has the original couple, and Matthew xiii. 31-33 combines, as he likes to do, the Marcan form with the Q-tradition. The notion of the kingdom of God, given by these parables is at any rate quite opposite to the eschatological one which makes the kingdom appear suddenly in its full power and glory. Here we are told that it is growing up, however quickly, and that it is exercising influence by its inheritant power. Certainly Jesus' opinion has nothing in common with the modern view of a gradual evolution, the seed of His gospel coming to grow up by hundreds and hundreds of years. He thinks of a rapid growing up and a quick leavening of the whole people by His gospel. But at all events it is by His own preaching and teaching and healing that the kingdom is to be realised. We would not be surprised to hear Him speak of the great success of His gospel, as He tells His disciples in the parable of the sower that what falls into good ground brings fruit, some thirty and some sixty and some an



hundred (Mark iv. 8). But in these two parables He is not speaking of His gospel, but of the kingdom of God, illustrating its extensive and intensive power. The conclusion is inevitable, that it is by His preaching that the kingdom comes, or, rather, is present; the effect of His preaching is that inward experience of man which we found identified with the notion of the kingdom in two former sayings.

*B.* This peculiar notion of the kingdom of God as some present, inward experience is supported by a set of sayings which show Jesus looking upon His own present activity as means of—not so much preparing, but bringing salvation to His people.

1. When the Baptist sends to Him asking, “*Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another?*” (Luke vii. 19, Matt. xi. 3), Jesus answers neither Yes nor No; He makes John glance over His activity and see how it fulfils what the prophets had said about the time of salvation. In whatever sense you may take the words, “*the blind receive their sight, etc.,*” spiritual or realistic, Jesus’ doings, His preaching, His healing fulfil these expectations. The Baptist, being a stern prophet of the last judgment, had not done any miracle, as we are informed John x. 41<sup>1</sup>: Jesus is surrounded by miracles, the outward miracles of healing being, in His own opinion, only small proofs of the still greater inward miracles of conversion of sinners (Mark ii. 10 f.). So Jesus’ answer to the Baptist is a Yes, but a Yes which has to be made out by the asking man himself: Look and see, and then you will make up your mind that I am really He that should come. Jesus, the humble Son of Man, the preaching and healing prophet, is indeed the Messiah. So He declares to the people by telling them that John the Baptist, the greatest of all prophets, is far behind any one who belongs to the kingdom.

<sup>1</sup> The same is implied in the popular estimation of Jesus’ relation to John, Mark vi. 14 (Matt. xiv. 2).

He is not speaking of Himself, but whoever has ears to hear may understand that He who speaks is more than a small member of this kingdom : He is the King in this kingdom.

2. And His disciples did understand Him. At a time when the people still looked out for various solutions of the problem put before them by this Son of Man, who was so unlike all others, who, being the most humble and meek, yet spoke with power as nobody ever had spoken before Him ; at a time when people called Him a prophet, one of the great prophets of times past, Elijah, or perhaps even John the Baptist himself, risen from death, and, therefore, gifted with miraculous power :—His disciples, by the mouth of Peter, found the right expression solemnly declaring Him to be the Messiah, i. e., the unique, the final bringer of salvation.<sup>1</sup> And He did not decline to be called so ; He only forbade them to tell this to the people, because He was aware that such a claim would lead the people to expect of Him what He never intended to do, i. e., to relieve the people from foreign tyranny, to deliver it from the Romans, and may be, even from the Sadducees ; in one word, to carry on a line of political revolution. This He declined, and therefore He not only forbade His disciples to use the title of Messiah, but He told them at once that He had to be delivered into the hands of His enemies and to be put to death—death, however, not being able to destroy His work or overcome Himself.

3. Jesus' activity was indeed a Messianic one, if only we

<sup>1</sup> See Mark viii. 27 ff. ; Matt. xvi. 13 ff. ; Luke ix. 18 ff. There is an ingenious interpretation of the Lukan form by Prof. F. Spitta in his book *Streitfragen der Geschichte Jesu*, 1907, 85–143 : ὑμεῖς δὲ τίνα με λέγετε εἶναι . . . τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, not being taken as the disciples' personal confession, but as their speaking to the people about Jesus (μηδενὶ λέγειν τοῦτο, ver. 21). Then the whole scene would have another significance than we are accustomed to ; Mark must have misunderstood this, and Matthew reinforced this misinterpretation by his well-known addition. I am not convinced that this was Luke's meaning, nor that his relation is independent of Mark.

take this word not in its national and political sense, but in the purely religious meaning of bringing salvation and happiness. He said to His disciples, according to Luke x. 23 and Matt. xiii. 16 : “ *Blessed are the eyes which see the things which ye see, [and the ears which hear the things which ye hear] :<sup>1</sup> for I say unto you that many prophets and kings<sup>2</sup> desired to see the things which ye see and saw them not, and to hear the things which ye hear and heard them not.*” We can hardly imagine a more solemn form of proclamation for the fact that in Christ’s present actions all promises are fulfilled. And this is not the evangelists, Luke or Matthew, but it is Q or some other old source.

4. That in Jesus was fulfilled whatever was expected for the Messianic time, will further be seen by a comparison of several sayings :

a. A commonplace of eschatological expectation was mutual hatred between the nearest relations. So Mark xiii. 12 (cp. Luke xxi. 16 ; Matt. x. 21, xxiv. 10) records as a saying of Jesus that in the last time *brother shall deliver up brother to death and the father his child, and children shall rise up against parents, and cause them to be put to death.* Now in Q we read nearly the same, but it runs quite another way, Jesus saying—

LUKE xii. 51-53.

Think ye that I am come to give peace in the earth ? I tell you, Nay, but rather division : for there shall be from henceforth five in one house divided, three against two, and two against three. They shall be divided, father against son and son against

MATTHEW x. 34-35.

Think not that I came to send peace on the earth ; I came not to send peace but a sword. For I came to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

<sup>1</sup> This part is wanting in Luke, but it is certainly original, as we have in Matt. : “ *Blessed are your eyes, for they see, and your ears, for they hear.* The parallelism is supported also by the continuation.

<sup>2</sup> The “ *righteous men* ” of Matthew is probably his own ; he likes this combination, cp. x. 41, xxiii. 29.

the father, mother against daughter and daughter against her mother; mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law and daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law.

Jesus is come to fulfil what was expected for the last time. And Jesus Himself realises some of this result of His mission by the unbelief He met with in His own family (Mark iii. 21, 31 ff.; cp. Matt. xii. 46 ff., Luke viii. 19 ff., John vii. 5), and on the part of his countrymen (Mark vi. 1-6; cp. Matt. xiii. 53-58, Luke iv. 16-30).

b. The Messianic judgment was to bring up a sharp separation, as is said in a saying recorded by Q itself: "*Then shall two men be in the field (or according to Luke: In that night there shall be two men on one bed), one is taken and one is left; two women shall be grinding at the mill, one is taken and one is left* (Matt. xxiv. 40, 41; Luke xvii. 34). Now this very separation is worked out by Jesus Himself when He calls some fishermen to follow Him and left others; when He calls Levi and Zacchaeus the publicans and the Pharisees stand outside; when He declines to allow the one who asks to follow Him, whereas He presses on another who is rather unwilling: "*follow me; and leave the dead to bury their own dead*" (Matt. viii. 22; Luke ix. 60).

c. At the Messianic time a large festival was expected, all members of the chosen people taking part in it. Jesus, in His well-known parables accepts this expectation correcting only its last part. Those who were first invited refusing to come, others will be introduced (Luke xiv. 16-24; Matt. xxii. 1-14); this is nearly the same as what He says about the heathen taking a place at the Messianic table together with the patriarchs (Luke xiii. 28 ff.; Matthew viii. 11 f.). But the same is fulfilled already in Jesus' own lifetime by His preaching the gospel of the kingdom to the poor,



declaring that the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of God before the Pharisees (Matt. xxi. 31 f. ; cp. Luke vii. 29) ; it is accomplished when He sits down with publicans and sinners, so that the honourable men who pretend to be alone worthy of His company are rather shocked (Mark ii. 15 f. c. par.) ; when He finds faith among Gentiles in a measure He never had found before among His own countrymen (Luke vii. 9 ; Matt. viii. 10).

5. All this points to the same effect : Jesus is the Messiah, whatever may be the discrepancy between His appearance and the popular expectation. He is the Messiah in this sense, that He brings judgment and salvation. He is the stumbling-block for one class of men and to the other He brings happiness and joyous life. As He is the son, so His disciples are the son, freed from all bondship, so that they need not even pay the regular tax for the temple, a saying which, though found only in Matthew xvii. 26, in a context belonging to a not very trustworthy collection of Peter stories, nevertheless has a genuine colouring.

Jesus as surrounded by His disciples represents the new era of Messianic time. The wedding, a very common Messianic notion, spoken of in so many parables of Jesus, is already going on ; Jesus is the bridegroom, His disciples are the children of the bride-chamber, as He puts it in His apology for non-fasting (Mark ii. 19, 20 ; cp. Matt. ix. 15, Luke v. 34, 35). This is all the more remarkable as we have it not in Q as most of the words mentioned before, but in that same Marcan tradition which we found to be distinguished for its eschatological views.<sup>1</sup> Jesus looked upon His estate

<sup>1</sup> About the authenticity there can be no doubt (against Wellhausen). The question rather is, if those words belong to so early a period in the life of Jesus (Wendt). As a matter of fact Mark's chronological arrangement is not beyond doubt ; it was criticised already by the Elder from whom Papias got his information. But having no means of settling the chronological order by ourselves, we had better refrain from expressing decision. I am not

as belonging already to the new order of things. So in the parables of the piece of new cloth and of the new wine (combined in Mark ii. 21, 22, c. par. with the parable of the bridegroom) He declares as clearly as possible, that there is something new about Him in opposition to all that which was before. It is the same contrast as we found it in the word Luke xvi. 16, dealing with John the Baptist as representative of the time gone and the preaching of the kingdom as the characteristic of the time now.

Here we may stop. The evidence collected is quite sufficient to prove that in the teaching of Jesus there is a strong line of what I would call *transmuted eschatology*. I mean eschatology transmuted in the sense that what was spoken of in Jewish eschatology as to come in the last days is taken here as already at hand in the lifetime of Jesus ; transmuted at the same time in the other sense that what was expected as an external change is taken inwardly : not all people seeing it, but Jesus' disciples becoming aware of it. For the great mass of the people Jesus is only one of the prophets ; for His enemies, Pharisees as well as Sadducees, He is a pseudo-prophet deceiving the people ; but His disciples recognise and acknowledge Him to be the Messiah, the Chosen one of God ; and in His company they enjoy all the happiness of the Messianic time.

Now we must compare this with the first group of sayings dealing with pure eschatology ; Jesus the Messiah to come on the clouds of heaven ; the Messianic judgment to be held at the end of the days ; the Messianic meal to take place after this glorious event, and so on. Both groups are quite distinct and to be kept separate. Neither of them may be reduced easily to the other one without violence being done to the tradition, nor can we put aside one of them as a later

persuaded that there was an evolution in Jesus' thought during His public ministry.

addition or transformation, both being attested by our best sources. One may say that in Mark the eschatological view prevails, whereas the other view is predominant in Q; but Q is not without eschatology nor Mark without the other element. This is the evidence of the Gospel-tradition.

## II.

Before starting a solution of this problem, we have to take account of one more point of tradition, worth being remarked.

Taking together all materials collected hitherto, eschatology as well as transmuted eschatology, we find that they represent only a small part of the whole gospel-tradition; there are plenty of sayings beside these, which we may call, for the sake of brevity, entirely non-eschatological. We do not need lose time with a detailed investigation. Every one knows what Jesus says about trust in God, God's care for the individual, about prayer and the certainty of its being heard, not trusting in riches, loving the neighbour and even the enemy, pardoning offenders, etc. It is (as Harnack stated against Wellhausen) the great value of Q that it represents Jesus from this peculiar side. But even in Mark we have plenty of this non-eschatological, purely moral matter: e.g., Jesus' sayings about cleanness (vii. 1-23), marriage and divorce (x. 1-12), children (x. 13-16), and the rich (x. 17-31). It may be interesting to settle this statement by means of a peculiar inductive investigation.

There are the so-called doublets, i.e., sayings related both by Mark and Q. They are of some importance in the critical study of the Gospels, some critics maintaining that they prove a literary relation to exist between these two main sources—I on the contrary, am rather inclined to say that they prove both sources to be independent, giving the same saying mostly in quite different renderings. But they have another importance, too, as Professor Burkitt has pointed

out<sup>1</sup>: they allow us to infer not only which sayings are the best attested, but at the same time sayings which were the most appreciated, and, therefore, had the widest circulation and the greatest influence. Now out of the thirty doublets, which may be read in Professor Burkitt's book<sup>2</sup> there are but seven dealing with eschatology,<sup>3</sup> all the others containing non-eschatological matter of a moral character. Of course the eschatological background may give a peculiar colouring to some of them; e.g., that *nothing is hid save that it should be manifested*, may, set by itself, well be taken as an announcement of the last judgment. But, in general, we should not miss anything for the understanding of those general moralisations, if we had no knowledge of the eschatology of Jesus.

At this point we may be able to pronounce a fair criticism of the so-called theory of "consistent eschatology." According to this theory there is nothing in the life of Jesus nor in His sayings which is not to be explained by eschatology, that is to say, by Jesus' belief that He was to bring the end of this present order of things. Now (1) this theory is to be maintained only by doing violence to the tradition, which, besides some distinct eschatological matter, gives a few but very expressive instances of what I have called transmuted eschatology, and as the main content a large amount of non-eschatological matters. It means doing violence to Jesus' moral teaching, if this is subordinated to His announcement of the approaching end in the way of being only an "Interimsethik"; it means doing violence to the other group of sayings representing the kingdom and the Messiahship as present, if these are taken only as mere anticipations of the future, to be jumped over, while Jesus' real doctrine is said to be repre-

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, 1906, 147 ff. Cp. also Sir John Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, 1899, 65 ff., and Professor V. H. Stanton, *The Gospels as Historical Documents*, ii., 1909, 59-60.

<sup>2</sup> Nos. 2, 3, 12, 15, 29, 30, 31 in Burkitt's list.



sented only by the first group of sayings, the purely eschatological group. (2) The surprising lights this theory seems to throw upon several points of the gospel history are gained by a strange interpretation which reads into the text what is to be demonstrated : e.g., when the feeding of the multitude as well as the last supper is taken as a Messianic sacrament, assuring to all partakers the participation at the Messianic meal, it has to be admitted that there is not the slightest indication thereof in the texts, but even that probably no one of all who were present was able to conceive this meaning. (3) It is Jesus himself who contradicts this modern view of his activity, viz. that he was working by all his forces to the effect of bringing about the Kingdom of God or the end of history ; in the parable of the seed (Mark iv. 26-29) he expressly states that when the seed has been cast into the ground the man has nothing else to do but to wait for the time of harvest.

It is not only the amount of non-eschatological materials in the Gospels that forbids us to account for Jesus' whole life and teaching by His eschatology. It is at the same time the permanent value of His non-eschatological doctrines that causes us to put them in the first rank, whereas the transmuted eschatology points out in what direction Jesus Himself would form the mind of His believers. It is, lastly, as we have said before, the history of the Christian Church, from its beginning in the apostolic age to our own time, that proves the non-eschatological element to be essential. This statement does not include, however, the opposite thesis, that eschatology has no place at all in Jesus' mind. A sound and sober interpretation will be found to be one which gives to every group of sayings its own value and weight.

ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ.

## THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE PSALTER.

## PSALM XL.

THIS Psalm consists of two parts, differing widely in character and tone. The first part (*vv.* 1–12) is marked by vigour and originality of expression; the second part (*vv.* 13–17) is constructed largely of conventional phrases; it occurs also, with slight textual variations, as a separate Psalm (Ps. lxx.). In the first part, the predominant thoughts are those of gratitude for deliverance, and of spiritual service; in the second part the Psalmist is beset by foes, and prays earnestly for speedy deliverance.

The occasion of the Psalm we do not know: but the case is one in which the contents of the Psalm speak so plainly that, if we did know it, we should hardly understand the Psalm better. It is certainly much later than the age of David.

The Psalmist begins by describing the danger he had been in, and how after patient waiting upon God, he had been rescued from it—

- 1 I waited waitingly for<sup>7</sup> Jehovah;  
and he inclined unto me, and heard my cry.  
2 And he brought me up out of the roaring pit,<sup>1</sup> out of the miry clay;  
and set my feet upon a crag, making firm my goings.

In *v.* 2 he compares himself to a person sinking in a watery pit, or floundering in a morass, where his feet had

<sup>1</sup> 'Horrible' (P.B.V., A.V., R.V.) is a paraphrase; ׀׀׀׀ cannot by any possibility mean 'horrible.' Elsewhere ׀׀׀׀ is a stronger synonym of ׀׀׀׀, and means a *din*, or what we call a *roar*—of the waves or a great host of men (Isa. xvii. 12b, 13 [R.V. *rushing*], xiii. 4 [R.V. *tumult*], Ps. lxxv. 7 [R.V. *roaring*]), or the *uproar* (R.V.m. *tumult*) of a gay city (Isa. v. 14); or the *din* or *crash* of battle (Am. ii. 2; Hos. x. 14 [A.V., R.V. *tumult*]; Jer. xxv. 31). Hence the only sense, consistent with usage, that the word can have here is *roaring*. The expression is obviously figurative; and the Psalmist may have thought of a huge pit or subterranean dungeon (the word *bôr* denotes both), at the bottom of which were roaring waters. 'Destruction' (R.V.m. *alt.*) is also a meaning which ׀׀׀׀ nowhere else has. See further *Oxf. Heb. Lex.*, p. 980 f.

no support (cf. Ps. lxxix. 2, 14f.); but he had been rescued from this perilous position, and placed securely on a rock. The figures, as often in the Psalms, are derived from the country scenery of Palestine. What the danger was we do not know: it may have been sickness, or persecution, or some other bodily peril; or, if the speaker be the nation, it may have been the Babylonian exile: cf. Lam. iii. 53-56, where the nation, after the capture of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, is described figuratively as a prisoner in a 'pit' or dungeon—the same word as here—with its mouth closed by a stone, and with the water flowing over his head.

3 And he put a new song in my mouth, even praise unto our God :  
many will see, and fear,  
and will trust in Jehovah.

The occasion was one adapted to evoke the Psalmist's gratitude, and worthy to be celebrated by a 'new' song, worthy of the new occasion (comp. the same expression, Ps. xxxiii. 3, xci. 1 and xcvi. 1 [from Isa. xlii. 10], cxliv. 9, cxlix. 1): the contemplation of God's mercy and power, shown in his deliverance, will arouse in others feelings of reverence and trust.

4-5. Happy those who trust in a God, whose goodness to His people is unspeakable!

4 Happy is the man that hath made Jehovah his trust,  
and hath not turned to<sup>1</sup> the proud boasters, or such as  
turn aside to lies.<sup>2</sup>

5 Many things hast *thou* done, O Jehovah, my God,  
even thy wondrous works and thy thoughts towards us ;  
there is none to be compared unto thee ;  
if I would declare and speak (of them),  
they are more than can be told.

4b. By the 'proud boasters'<sup>3</sup> are meant loud, self-

<sup>1</sup> Or, *looked at, regarded.*

<sup>2</sup> Or, *and them that have lyingly fallen away* (Cheyne), Hupf., Bâthg. *al.*

<sup>3</sup> The word used occurs only here: but the root and other derivatives occur in the sense of *boastful pride*: Isaiah iii. 5 A.V., R.V., 'behave himself proudly'; Psalm xc. 10 R.V. 'Yet is their *pride* but labour and sorrow' (the ἀλαζονία τοῦ βίου of 1 John ii. 16); and in 'Rahab,' the

confident, and worldly men, who by their ostentatious self-assertion encourage others to rely upon them, and imitate their bad example. Happy the man who is content with God's help, and does not court their patronage or friendship! Those who—not (P.B.V.) 'go about with lies,' but—*turn aside to lies* (A.V., R.V.) are those who desert God for false objects of reliance, vain aims and hopes, empty ambitions, or even, it may be, for false gods (cf. the same word in Amos ii. 4). The other possible rendering, *them that have lyingly fallen away*<sup>1</sup> (i.e. *false apostates*), would denote apostasy distinctly.

6. Jehovah, on the contrary, is a sure ground of trust: He is the author of unnumbered benefits to Israel.

7-9. What adequate response can the Psalmist make for such goodness? And so he enumerates, like Amos (v. 21-24), Hosea (vi. 6), Isaiah (i. 11-17), Jeremiah (vii. 21 ff.), Micah (vi. 8), and other prophets, the great spiritual truth that the true response to God's works of love consists not in material sacrifices, or even in servile submission to an unloved superior, but in the devotion of the heart, in obedience to God's will, as something in which man delights, and which has its home in his inmost being.

- 6 Sacrifice and meal-offering thou hast no delight in;  
ears hast thou digged for me;  
burnt-offering and sin-offering thou hast not asked:  
7 Then said I, 'Lo, I am come;  
'in the roll of the book it is prescribed to me:  
8 'I delight to do thy pleasure, O my God;  
'and thy law is in my inmost parts.'

6. *Ears hast thou digged for me.* The expression, if the

name of the proud sea-monster in Job ix. 13, xxvi. 12, and of boastful Egypt in Isaiah xxx. 7 (cf. R.V.m.) and elsewhere. מַרְהַבָּה, 'pride' or 'raging' (of a tyrannical oppressor), must also be read for מְרֵהַבָּה (which cannot mean either 'golden city' or 'exactress') in Isaiah xiv. 4; notice the same parallel 'oppress' (like a task-master) in Isaiah iii. 5.

<sup>1</sup> For the syntax in this case, cf. Psalm lix. 5 [Heb. 6]; and see G.-K. § 128z.



text is correct, must mean, Thou hast endowed me with the faculty of hearing and obeying, 'digged' being an allusion to the shape of the ears, channels scooped out, as it were, and conveying words to the mind.<sup>1</sup>

7. 'I am come' is a synonym of the usual 'Here I am' (Heb. 'Behold me!'). Like a servant responding to his master's summons, the Psalmist replies, 'Here I am, ready to fulfil thy behests: in the roll of the book it is'—not 'written of me,' a most misleading rendering, but—'written, or prescribed, to me' (see the same Hebrew with this meaning in 2 Kings xxii. 13). The reference may be in particular to Deuteronomy, in which, though ceremonial duties are not repudiated, a spiritual service, consisting of loyal devotion to God, and deeds of charity, mercy and benevolence towards men, is strongly and repeatedly insisted on.

8. A climax on *v.* 7. The Psalmist not only *knows* what God demands, but has a delight in doing it. The thought of the verse corresponds to what is so often inculcated in Deuteronomy, to love, or serve, God 'with *all* the heart and *all* the soul,' i.e. with the intellect and the emotions alike (Deut. iv. 29, vi. 5, x. 12, xi. 13, xiii. 3, xxvi. 16, xxx. 2, 6, 10). 'In my inmost parts' is here lit. 'in my bowels.' The bowels, in Hebrew psychology, are the seat of deep emotion (Job xxx. 27; Jer. iv. 19; Lam. i. 20, ii. 11), or warm affection (Isa. xvi. 11, lxiii. 15; Jer. xxxi. 20; Cant. v. 4): so the law, the Psalmist means to say, lay deep in his affections.

In Hebrews x. 5-7, *vv.* 6-8*a* are quoted, with a remarkable

<sup>1</sup> It lies near to say, 'to the *brain*'; but in the psychology of the Hebrews the heart, not the head, is the seat of intelligence. See e.g. Hosea vii. 11 'Ephraim is a silly dove, *without heart*' [we should say, colloquially, 'without a *head*']; Jeremiah v. 21 'O foolish people, *without heart*' (A.V., R.V. 'without understanding'); and frequently. There is no indication that the Hebrews were aware of the real functions of the brain. They regarded the heart as the region of intelligence, and the 'soul,' kidneys ('reins'), and bowels (cf. on *v.* 8), as the seats of different emotions.

variation, adopted from the LXX, *a body hast thou prepared for me*, for the purpose of contrasting the perfect obedience of Christ with the inefficacy of the sacrifices of the Law. The origin of the variant is uncertain : it *may* rest upon a various reading in the Hebrew ; though naturally, if this is the case, it can have no claim to represent the original text, the sense expressed by it being too incongruous with the context. It is, however, a plausible suggestion that it originated partly in a corruption in the Greek (for which there are many parallels in the LXX), partly in either a different reading in the Hebrew, or in a misrendering of the existing text : ‘ body ’ having come in for ‘ ears ’ through the corruption of  $\text{H}\theta\epsilon\lambda\eta\kappa\alpha\kappa\omega\tau\iota\alpha$  into  $\text{H}\theta\epsilon\lambda\eta\kappa\alpha\kappa\omega\mu\alpha$ ,<sup>1</sup> and *κατηρτίσω* either being an ungrammatical rendering of *כנת* (i.e.  $\text{כָּנַת}$ )<sup>2</sup> for *כרת*, or representing (correctly) a reading *הכנת* (i.e.  $\text{הִכָּנַת}$ ). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews shows no immediate knowledge of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, and treats the LXX as authoritative.<sup>3</sup> He quoted, therefore, the passage as he found it, the word ‘ body ’ at once suggesting its applicability to Christ. In so far, however, as the rendering of the LXX can be brought into harmony with the context—which is often quite impossible with the renderings of the LXX—the ‘ body ’ must be regarded as the organ of obedience : ‘ as the ear is the instrument for receiving the divine command, so the body is the instrument for fulfilling it ’ (Kirkpatrick). On the sense in which the passage is quoted in the epistle with reference to Christ, see below.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. F. W. Mozley, *The Psalter of the Church* (the LXX of the Psalms compared with the Heb., with explanatory notes), 1905, pp. xv, 73 (where instances of similar corruptions are quoted).

<sup>2</sup> The Qal of  $\text{כָּנַת}$ , though found in Phoen., Arab., Eth. (in which languages it has the weakened sense of *to be*), is not in use in Heb. ; and if it were in use, would be an intransitive verb, and could not therefore signify ‘ establish ’ or ‘ prepare.’

<sup>3</sup> Westcott, *Ep. to the Hebrews*, p. 479.

Vv. 9–11. The Psalmist declares that he has given open expression to his gratitude by proclaiming publicly God's goodness towards him; and that he anticipates the continuance of His favour.

9 <sup>1</sup> I have proclaimed glad tidings of <sup>1</sup> righteousness in a great congregation:

lo, I will not restrain my lips,  
Jehovah, *thou* knowest.

10 I have not hid thy righteousness within my heart;

I have declared thy faithfulness and thy salvation:

I have not concealed thy kindness and thy truth from the great congregation.

11 Thou, Jehovah, wilt not restrain thy compassion from me;

let thy kindness and thy truth continually preserve me.

*Righteousness* is that attribute of God in virtue of which He acts justly,<sup>2</sup> and gives men—here, in particular, the Psalmist—their due; *faithfulness* expresses His consistency with His revealed character; *salvation*<sup>3</sup> is the fulness of deliverance and consequent well-being, resulting from the exercise of these attributes; *kindness and truth*—often

<sup>1</sup> In the Hebrew the word (בשרתי) = εὐηγγελιστάμην, as the LXX rightly render it.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Isaiah xli. 2, of Jehovah's guiding Cyrus in his career of conquest; 10, of His protecting Israel, and restoring it to Palestine; xlii. 6, of His call of ideal Israel, 21; xlv. 13 of His prospering Cyrus that he may release the Jewish exiles.

<sup>3</sup> The Heb. words for 'salvation' (יִשׁוּעָה, יִשׁוּעָה, and, as here, יִשׁוּעָה—the last formed by a false analogy, as if from יִשׁוּעַ) mean properly, as Arabic shows, *breadth, spaciousness* (cf. the participle of the cognate verb in Matt. vii. 13, in an Arabic version of the Gospels, for πλατεία); they thus in Hebrew denote primarily a *material deliverance*, as appears very clearly from 1 Samuel xi. 9, 13, xix. 5 (so the syn. יִשׁוּעָה, Ex. xiv. 13, 1 Sam. xiv. 45 *al.*). In the Psalms the context shows that all these words usually mean similarly either *deliverance* or *welfare* (Job xxx. 15, A.V., R.V.), *well-being*, as iii. 2 (A.V., R.V. *help*; so lx. 11), 8 (R.V.m. *victory*; so xx. 5, xlv. 4, cxix. 4), xiii. 5, xviii. 2, 35, 50, xxxiii. 17 ('safety'), xlii. 5 (A.V. *help*, R.V. *health*, i.e. *welfare* ['Heil']); see my *Parallel Psalter*, p. 473, xlii. 11 and xliii. 5 (also *health*), lxxiv. 12, cxxxii. 16 (P.B.V. *health*, as li. 14 and elsewhere; see above), etc.; and in the present passage. In the prophets, especially Deutero-Isaiah, it is often used in a larger sense of a *material deliverance accompanied by spiritual blessings* (e.g. Isa. xlix. 6); and this leads on to the purely spiritual sense which σωτηρία, its equivalent in the LXX, acquires in the New Testament.

linked together, whether denoting human (Gen. xxiv. 49 ; 2 Sam. ii. 6 *al.*) or divine (Exod. xxxiv. 6 ; Ps. lvii. 3, lxi. 7) qualities—express the combined warmth and trustworthiness of the Divine heart. These Divine attributes have been the Psalmist's themes, in his public recital<sup>1</sup> of God's mercies ; they have been manifested in the deliverance of His servant—and, it may be, of others, his compatriots or co-religionists, at the same time ; and he prays hopefully for their continuance. For now fresh troubles encompass him, and the Psalm closes with an earnest prayer for speedy deliverance—

- 12 For innumerable evils have encompassed me,  
mine iniquities have overtaken me,<sup>2</sup> and I cannot see ;<sup>3</sup>  
they are more in number than the hairs of mine head, and my  
heart hath failed<sup>4</sup> me.
- 13 Be pleased, Jehovah, to deliver me ;  
Jehovah, haste thee to help me.
- 14 Let them be ashamed and abashed together, that seek my soul  
to sweep it away ;<sup>5</sup>  
let them turn backward and be brought to confusion, that  
delight in my hurt.
- 15 Let them be appalled by reason of their shame<sup>6</sup>  
that say unto me, Aha, aha.
- 16 Let all those that seek thee rejoice and be glad in thee ;  
let such as love thy salvation say continually,  
'Jehovah be magnified.'
- 17 But I am poor and needy ;  
the Lord thinketh of me :  
thou art my help and my deliverer ;  
O my God, make no tarrying.

<sup>1</sup> 'A great congregation,' as xxii. 25, xxxv. 18: cf. xxii. 22 ; and 'congregations' in Psalm xxvi. 12, lxxviii. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. in their consequences, 'like an avenging Nemesis' (Hupf.) ; cf. for the word Deut. xxviii. 2, 15.

<sup>3</sup> Sight fails him, he cannot see which way to turn, through the distress and anxiety caused by his troubles ('evils'). Compare xxxviii. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Heb. *forsaken*. Heart = courage ; cf. xxvii. 14, xxxi. 24, lxxvi. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf., in the Heb., Genesis xviii. 23, 24 ; Numbers xvi. 26 ; 1 Samuel xxvi. 10 ('destroy' and 'consume' obliterate the distinctive figure of the original).

<sup>6</sup> I.e. the disgrace that will fall upon them.



As has been already remarked, it is strange that a Psalm so original in thought and expression as *vv.* 1–12 should end in such conventional phrases as form the bulk of *vv.* 13–17<sup>1</sup> (which, as was said before, recurs, with insignificant differences, as Ps. lxx.); and it is difficult to think that both parts of the Psalm are by the same poet. On the other hand, *v.* 12 is not a natural ending to the Psalm, and seems to require a prayer to follow it. It may be that the original poet, for some reason or other, adopted *vv.* 13–17 as his conclusion; it may be that the original ending was lost, and a compiler attached *vv.* 13–17 to the part of the original Psalm which remained. On such matters we can but speculate. If, however, *vv.* 1–12 belong together, how is the unity of the Psalm to be maintained? How can the poet in the same breath thank God for his deliverance, and complain that he is surrounded by troubles innumerable? *Vv.* 2–3 cannot synchronise with *v.* 12: if the unity of the Psalm is to be preserved, *v.* 2 f. must describe the danger from which the Psalmist was delivered in the past, and *v.* 12 the fresh troubles which have fallen upon him since. Observe how a single word in P.B.V., A.V., R.V. obscures this. ‘*Hath put*’ in *v.* 3 suggests what has just occurred, and so is in contradiction with *v.* 12: we require aorists throughout *vv.* 1–3: what is described in these verses is then thrown entirely into the past: *v.* 12 describes what is happening in the present; and the two parts of the Psalm become perfectly consistent.

The Psalm is one of those in which the speaker *might* be not an individual, but Israel, as represented by its God-fearing members, and personified (so Cheyne, Bâthgen). The ‘pit’ from which the speaker was rescued would in

<sup>1</sup> *V.* 13*b*, as xxii. 19 *end*, xxxviii. 22*a*; *v.* 14 closely resembling xxxv. 4, with a phrase substituted from xxxv. 26*a*; *v.* 15 *end*, as xxxv. 21; *v.* 16 very similar to xxxv. 27; *v.* 17*a*. as xxxv. 10, xxxvii. 14.

this case be the exile (cf. Lam. iii. 53-6, referred to above; and with *v.* 3, cf. Isaiah xlii. 10, xl. 5*a*, lii. 10*b*). The 'I' of the Psalms unquestionably sometimes denotes the nation (Ps. xliv., cii., cxviii.); and the figures and expressions could be more than paralleled from Lam. iii., where the speaker is certainly the nation. The first (and second) person singular is often used of a people or tribe, even in Hebrew prose; and Israel itself is frequently in the prophets personified as an individual ('When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt,' Hos. xi. 1; 'O Lord, correct me, but with judgement, not in thine anger, lest thou bring me to nothing,' Jer. x. 24).<sup>1</sup> There is thus no objection in principle to this view of the Psalm: we have only to consider whether the expressions and language of the Psalm can naturally, and without forcing or artificiality, be understood of the nation. The explanation of the Psalm remains the same as if the speaker were an individual.

The Psalm thus portrays an *ideal* of obedience and spiritual service. A ready and willing obedience, not to the ceremonial requirements of the Law, but to the moral and spiritual demands which God makes of His worshippers, is the best and truest return which a grateful heart can render for mercies received. As has been already pointed out, this is the teaching of all the great prophets; and here the Psalmist endorses and affirms it in his own person.

It has been remarked above that *vv.* 6-8*a*, as read in the LXX (with some slight variations), are quoted in Hebrews x. 5-7 with reference to Christ ('Wherefore when he cometh into the world he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not,' etc.). It must be obvious that the Psalm, in its original intention, has no reference to Christ: it is some

See further instances cited in my *Introduction*, p. 366 f. (edd. 6-8, p.

Old Testament saint, not Christ, who declares that it is his delight to do God's will ; hence ' I am come ' in *v.* 7 cannot refer to the Incarnation : if further proof were needed, it would be found in *v.* 12, where the Psalmist speaks of his ' iniquities,' which, except by most strained and unnatural exegesis, can be understood only of the iniquities which he has himself committed. It is, of course, perfectly true that parts of the Psalm are appropriate to Christ, and might well have been taken up by Him upon His lips ; but to argue from this fact that the Psalm was written with reference to Him, or that the entire Psalm is applicable to Him, is to confuse two things that are entirely distinct. A possible *application* of a Psalm is no guide to its *interpretation*, and cannot determine its original intention. Rather, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews puts *vv.* 6-8*a* into Christ's mouth, not because the Psalm as a whole refers to Him, but because, as expressing a high ideal of obedience and spiritual service, these verses are, in the words of the present Dean of Ely, a ' fitting expression of the purpose of His life,' and of His perfect conformity to His Father's will. And so the Psalm is suitably appointed in the Anglican Church as one of the proper Psalms for Good Friday.

S. R. DRIVER.

## STUDIES IN THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT.

### IV. THE LORD'S PRAYER.

IN Luke xi. 2-4 the Lord's Prayer is communicated in a reply to a request from a disciple for instruction in this matter. The request is one of the few ascribed to the disciples which do not betray spiritual obtuseness ; and it was defensible on two grounds. On the one hand, as we learn from Seneca, Persius, and Juvenal, the subject of prayer occupied many men's minds in the first century,

the danger dreaded being not that prayer might not be answered, but that it might be answered to the ruin of the petitioner. On the other hand the community was now distinct from the community of John, and a different liturgical formula was desirable. John had remained at the very end of the old dispensation, but had not entered into the new, whence the least adherent of the latter was superior to him.

In Matthew vi. 7 the Prayer is attached to a maxim, *When ye pray, talk not much*, which is not indeed a text of the Old Testament, but a paraphrase of Ecclesiastes v. 1, "Let not thy heart hurry to utter a word before God, for God is in heaven, and thou on earth, therefore let thy words be few." The actual form of the text appears to be found in Ecclesiasticus vii. 14, "Be not tautologous in an assembly of elders, neither repeat a word in thy prayer." The character of the assembly is not specified; it is probably a religious assembly, and the "tautology" <sup>1</sup> condemned was in preaching or expounding the Old Testament.

The ultimate source of both the text in Ecclesiasticus and that in Ecclesiastes is the narrative in 1 Kings xviii. 26, where the priests of Baal repeat the same formula endlessly; and this is probably the reference of the comment attached to the text in Matthew "as the heathen do." The apparent employment of Ecclesiasticus as *Scripture* can of course be paralleled from the Jewish Oral Tradition, where, however, we should ordinarily infer that the word Scripture was not identical with Holy Scripture. The attachment of the Prayer to a comment on a text, and indeed the paraphrase of a Biblical text, is similar to the process which was traced in connexion with certain other

<sup>1</sup> The word used in the text is so defined by Aristotle, *Topics*, 165, b, 16.



genuine precepts and sayings. And if the setting of Luke be compared with that of Matthew, the former appears to be historical, the latter based on theory.

We should expect the Prayer itself to be handed down without variation, and without obscurity; but such an expectation would be disappointed. The Matthaean tradition differs considerably from the Lucan tradition, and the Syriac versions of the Lucan tradition vary to a serious extent; in Matthew the text of LS fails save for the commencement of the Prayer. The relation between LS, CS, and PS in Luke is obvious; the brief text of LS is expanded in CS and completed by PS. LS runs: *Abba, may there be hallowed thy name, and come thy kingdom; and give us the faithful bread of every day; and forgive us our sins, and we too forgive every one who owes us; and bring us not to temptation.*

CS expands: *Our Father which art in heaven*; adds at the end *but deliver us from the evil*; and interprets "and we too forgive" as *and we too shall forgive*; the Syriac idiom of LS being ambiguous.

PS adds the petition, *may thy will be as in heaven so in earth*; interprets "faithful bread" as *the bread of our necessity*, and substitutes *every day* for "of every day"; and alters "and we too shall forgive" into *as we too have forgiven*.

In the Matthaean recension the differences between CS and PS are slight; CS offers "thy wills" for "thy will"; "the faithful bread of the day" for "the bread of our necessity to-day"; and "as we too shall forgive" for "as we too have forgiven." The relation between CS and PS in both recensions is therefore similar; alteration has gone on in the same direction, though the amount is not identical in the two cases.

The originality of the commencement in LS appears to

be attested by the reference in St. Paul's Epistles to the cry *Abba* "Father"; and the absence of both the clauses containing the word "heaven" is very noticeable. The representation by CS of one without the other is characteristic of the tentative and mediating character of that copy. It is worth noticing that the text of Ecclesiastes, with which Matthew brings the prayer into some sort of connexion, gives as the reason why prayer should be short that "God is in heaven and thou on earth."

The light which the older Syriac copies throw on the word rendered "daily"<sup>1</sup> in the ordinary English version of the Prayer is very welcome. The difficulty of the Greek equivalent is well known; its natural rendering is "of to-morrow"; and some early authorities took that view of its meaning. Merx appears to agree with them, and to suggest that the prayer is for a modest competence; a theory which need not be further considered. He seems right in holding that the words *this day* in the Matthaean recension strongly favour the rendering "of to-morrow"; for otherwise the words are unnecessary. Apparently, however, there were two interpretations current of the words *the faithful bread*. They can mean "the true" or "genuine bread"; and we know that on two occasions the disciples were rebuked for thinking that when the Master spoke of *food*, He meant earthly, perishable food; for which He forbade them to labour or take thought, because there was no question that it would be provided. But they might also mean "the constant" or "regular bread"; on the analogy of Isaiah xxxiii. 16, "His bread shall be given and his water shall be *faithful*." And since it seems unthinkable that in a prayer containing so few petitions the first should be for that material bread for which they were told not to care, there can be little doubt that the

<sup>1</sup> ἐπιούσιος.

former view is correct. "Give us the true bread" is a petition in accordance with the spirit which pervades the four Gospels.

Although the LS recension has cut away much, we are therefore inclined to reduce it by yet one more phrase: "of every day," which appears to be an interpretation of "faithful," and an interpretation in the sense which is to be rejected. For that explanation authority could easily be cited from the Old Testament. The word *tâmîd*, applied to *daily* sacrifices, is rendered in the Peshitta of the Old Testament by the word here translated "faithful." But such a collocation as "faithful, i.e. daily," is clearly a text with a comment, not an original text. Merely for the critical process involved we might compare the Moslem formula "In the name of God, the *rahmān*, the Merciful"; where "merciful" is a translation of *rahmān*, which is not an Arabic word. The word "merciful" is attached in order to prevent a misunderstanding; and we know from certain traditions that the misunderstanding was likely to have serious consequences. The insertion of the explanation "of every day" in the earliest form of the tradition of the Prayer shows a definite desire to exclude another interpretation; for the word is also used in the sense of "genuine" in the Peshitta of the Old Testament.

Once then that we get the series of changes into proper focus by the aid of LS their evolution can be traced. The very rule to which the Prayer is attached, *not to repeat a word in thy prayer*, renders a repetition of this sort a difficulty. Meanwhile the presence of the interpretation "of every day" prevents a recurrence to the meaning "genuine," "true."

The easiest solution is that which CS offers, where "of every day" is altered to "of the day," which may be understood, as the Arabs say, "generically" (=of every

day), or "familiarily" (=of to-day). In the Greek of Matthew this interpretation ("of to-day") is finally adopted. The Greek of Luke is difficult; like the CS of Matthew it suggests both.

But for the word "faithful" the common tradition of the Greek Gospels has a difficult word, evidently selected with great care, meaning "of the morrow." The "morrow," literally "the oncoming," might be the oncoming of night or day, according to Eastern and Western systems. It seems possible that this word was suggested by the use of the Syriac "faithful" in the Old Testament for the Hebrew *tâmîd*, meaning "every morning and evening." With either "of every day" or of "to-day" this phrase would not constitute a tautology. The "constant sacrifice" was (as Josephus says) "at the beginning of the day and at the ceasing of the day."<sup>1</sup> Each of these could be (and indeed in Greek authors is) correctly described as "the oncoming."

With regard to the employment of the Peshitta Old Testament by New Testament writers, a convincing example has been given by Professor Nestle, who observes that the quotation "he shall not *strive* nor cry" in Matthew xii. 19 is to be explained from the Peshitta rendering of Isaiah xlii. 2. The same fact will explain part of the narrative of the Temptation. The quotation in iv. 6, as it figures in LS and CS, "in their *arms* shall they carry thee," which is the text of the Peshitta version of Psalm xci. 11, explains how this verse could be applied to Satan's purpose; for *carrying in the arms* is what is there required, rather than lifting up with the hand, to prevent stumbling against a stone. Further, the Syriac of Psalm xci. 11 omits "against a stone"; whence the idea suggested by the verse "they shall carry thee in their arms, lest thou stumble with thy

<sup>1</sup> *Antiquities*, III. x. § 1.



foot," expresses the idea required by the Tempter, who further omits the words "in all thy ways," which would imply not carrying through the air by angels, but being helped over obstacles by the aid of their hands. Here without the old Syriac texts the mode in which the Tempter distorts the verse to his purpose could not be traced.

The later Syriac versions rely on the Greek, and interpret the difficult word by etymology. The view represented by PS and HS is that it means "what is for existence," i.e. "needful." That of JS is rather "what is over existence," i.e. the food of our superabundance or wealth.

The renderings of LS and CS exhibit very different views of the import of the clause attached to the prayer for forgiveness. In LS it is a promise to forgive all debtors on condition of being forgiven sins (or trespasses); and CS makes this still clearer by substituting the future for the participle, which has the same meaning, though not so decidedly. In PS (Luke) forgiveness is asked on the ground that the petitioner has himself done what is analogous; what in the earlier recensions is an undertaking has become a plea. In the Matthaean recension all substitute a request for forgiveness of debts for the request for forgiveness of sins; the analogy has become an identity. But PS exhibits another difference; there is here neither an undertaking nor a plea, but a restriction: "forgive us our debts to the same extent as we forgive debts to us."

Here again the great variety in the interpretation of the clause suggests at least that it was parenthetical—i.e. interpretation of the prayer or justification of it—rather than part of the prayer itself. The maxim that prayer should be preceded by forgiveness of offences is found in Ecclesiasticus, and is there based on Leviticus xix. 18. But it is not difficult to see that the introduction of the doctrine into the prayer produced problems. The

undertaking in the earliest form seemed to be at variance with the maxim that the performance should precede the request; the plea in the second stage sounded like man justifying himself before God, claiming where he should be supplicating. The final form gets rid of these objections, yet implies a certain independence in the petitioner. It may be doubted, therefore, whether even the final revision is absolutely satisfactory.

With regard to the omission of the prayer "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," this was probably rejected by Luke on the ground of exhaustive investigations, such as were illustrated previously. Its difficulties are of course very great. "Thy will be done" is an expression of acquiescence, not a petition; but with the addition "on earth as it is in heaven," it becomes a wish; further, it implies that God's will is not, or at least may not be, done on earth, a proposition from which the human mind ordinarily recoils. It also implies knowledge of what goes on in heaven, which the Author of the prayer may well have possessed, but which the ordinary worshipper would not claim. Hence if this were part of the original prayer, it might be best to interpret it "whose will is done in heaven and earth alike," supposing that the original Aramaic form was a clause admitting either interpretation, the tone of the voice alone distinguishing which was meant. The mention of heaven seems, however, to be connected with the epithet "which art in heaven," which in Ecclesiastes is the ground for using no superfluous words, but which from the original form preserved by LS and attested by St. Paul is shown not to have formed part of the original. With that epithet the introduction of the clause "whose will is done in earth and heaven alike" becomes a ground for the offering of the petition. Without it the reason for its introduction is lost.

The reasons for the omission of the last clause in the Third Gospel, "but deliver us from the evil," are likely to have been critical—i.e. that the best authorities consulted were against its genuineness. The desire to complete the number seven may well have been a reason for its insertion; but the author of the Third Gospel was probably right in attaching no importance to the number in this context.

The two remaining clauses, "may thy name be hallowed" and "thy kingdom come," are attested by all the texts: only LS and CS in Luke insert the conjunction "and" between them. They then connect the prayer for bread with "and," which PS omits. Even this slight difference has doubtless some import: the question being whether all the petitions were co-ordinate, or whether the introductory clauses were expressions of reverence rather than petitions. The former view seems to be that of the earliest authorities, the latter that of the later. Probably in the original dialect only the tone of voice could distinguish between the senses "whose name is hallowed, whose kingdom comes," and the petitional form.

It is characteristic of Oral Tradition that it retains strange words with great tenacity, while varying their environment. It is clear that the word "of the morrow" in the Greek texts must have been found among all or most of the communities whom Luke consulted, though otherwise there was great variety. It appears that the interpretation "of every day" had become attached to the text before the Aramaic was translated into Greek, yet rather as a perpetual comment than as actually part of the prayer, whence its form was not at first stereotyped. The character of the difficult word used for "faithful," if rightly interpreted above, implies that the comment already existed side by side with "faithful"; else some Greek word signifying

“constant” might well have been employed. Yet the nature of that word, which Origen thought was invented by the Evangelists, has the appearance of *official* translation. For the ordinary translator does not invent words.

It would seem that the original words employed are to be found in LS and CS or are not to be obtained at all. A scholar of merit suggested in this magazine many years ago that the variation between *sins* and *debts* in the petition for forgiveness implied that the Aramaic original was the word which signifies both. It seems at least as probable that the occurrence of the word *debts* in the Matthaean recension is accommodation of the petition to the clause attached to the petition, wherein a human debt is made analogous to a sin against God ; and that the true inference is that the Matthaean recension exhibits further alteration than the Lucan recension, the original word being the equivalent for “sins.” Meanwhile the critic of to-day, who can compare texts in his study, has clearly an easier task than that of the ancient Evangelist, for whom each of the questions noticed in these verses may have meant a difficult and dangerous journey.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

### *SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.*

#### IV. SIN IN ITS PRINCIPLE AND DEVELOPMENT.

SIN is now to be more exactly considered in its own nature—not simply in its formal character as transgression of moral law, nor in its enormity as contradiction of the divine Holiness, not even in its obliquity as departure or turning aside from the true moral end, but in its own inmost *principle* and *genesis*, in that deepest spring within the soul from which all its baleful manifestations proceed. Is there such a “principle” of sin ? If there is, it must be of the



utmost importance for the right estimate of sin to be able to lay the finger upon it.

It has been seen that there are theories which, from their nature, exclude the existence of any such all-comprehending principle,—theories, to which sin is something relative only to the finite human judgment, which belongs to the parts, not to the whole, which, from the point of view of the Absolute, simply does not exist,—theories which deny to man free volition, therefore rob him of his power of acting as a voluntary cause,—theories which enchain man in a destiny not of his own making through heredity or the inheritance of brute-instinct. What room, e.g., is left for moral action, entailing responsibility, on such a theory as Herbert Spencer's, who declares that our faith in the reality of freedom is "an inveterate illusion," that man is no more free than a leaf in a tornado, or a feather in Niagara; <sup>1</sup> or as Maudsley's, who affirms: "There is a destiny made for man by his ancestors, and no one can elude, were he able to attempt it, the tyranny of his organisation." <sup>2</sup>

High metaphysical theories, like Hegel's, which make sin a necessary "moment" in the process of the evolution of the absolute "Idea"—a moment of "negation" to be afterwards sublated in a higher unity: in the case of man, a necessary stage in the transition from animal to human consciousness, <sup>3</sup> equally preclude the search for a "principle" of sin, originating in a culpable misuse of human freedom. So with theories, weaker echoes of the above, which trace sin to a necessary play of opposites in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. his *Psychology*, i. pp. 500 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Dr. Amory Bradford, in his book on *Heredity*, pp. 81 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Dr. McTaggart's exposition in his *Heg. Cosmol.*, ch. vi. and pp. 230 ff. This is not to deny that there are instructive points in Hegel's teaching on sin, as in everything he wrote. Some of these are noted below.

the universe—to a law of “polarity” which prescribes that a thing can exist and be known only through its contrary:<sup>1</sup> light through darkness, sweet through bitter, pleasure through pain, good through evil—or which treat it, aesthetically, as the discord necessary for the production of the perfect harmony.

Even here, however, one fact is to be noticed. In all such theories it has still to be recognised that, however it may be in the contemplation of the infinite—of the whole, from the standpoint of the finite, the part, sin, culpability, is a terrible and omnipresent reality. Men do every day things they know they ought not to do, and leave undone things they ought to do. Judged by whatever standard one will, law of conscience, social opinion, public law, offences, iniquities, abound, entailing on the wrong-doer sharp and deserved penalty. It is a proper question to ask—How are such things there? Is there any unity of principle to which they can be referred?

1. A first point in the Christian doctrine of sin is that sin does not arise as part of the necessary order of the universe, but has its origin or spring in *personal will*, revolting against God and goodness. It has not its ground in the nature of God: the suggestion is blasphemy. “God cannot be tempted with evil, and He Himself tempteth no man.”<sup>2</sup> It has not its ground in an uncreated, God-resisting “matter,” as many old thinkers taught, and as even so Christian-minded a man as R. Rothe permitted

<sup>1</sup> Thus Mr. Fiske, in his *Through Nature to God*, deduces the necessity of sin from what he calls “the element of antagonism” in the universe. “If we had never felt physical pain, we could not recognise physical pleasure. . . . In just the same way it follows that, without knowing that which is morally evil, we could not possibly recognise that which is morally good. Of these antagonistic correlatives, the one is unthinkable in absence of the other” (pp. 34–5). In *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1889, Mr. Huxley banters Mr. S. Laing on his use of the word “Polarity” in this connexion.

<sup>2</sup> James i. 13.

himself to believe.<sup>1</sup> Matter, in the Biblical view, is not non-divine, but was created "good." How can it be the source of ethical evil? It has not its ground in a "flesh" inherently sinful—a doctrine which some would read into St. Paul,<sup>2</sup> but with which St. Paul's teaching on the *σάρξ* has nothing to do.<sup>3</sup> Apart from special texts, sin is everywhere represented in Scripture as originating in voluntary disobedience on the part of man,<sup>4</sup> as unfaithfulness to better knowledge,<sup>5</sup> as wilful choosing of evil rather than of good—all flesh "corrupting" its way upon the earth.<sup>6</sup> Only on this ground is sin something that God can judge and punish. This also is the teaching with which the Church, in its creed-formations, has been constantly identified.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Theol. Ethik* (2nd Edit.), i. Sects. 40, 104–30. In his *Still Hours* he says: "Evil, in the course of development, or sin, is not in itself a condition of the development of the good; but it belongs to the idea of creation, as a creation out of nothing, that the created personality cannot detach itself from material nature otherwise than by being clothed upon with matter, and being in this way altered, rendered impure and sinful. . . . The necessity of a transition through sin is not directly an ethical, but rather a physical necessity" (pp. 185–6, E.T.).

<sup>2</sup> Thus Holsten and many moderns. C. Clemen supports this view in his *Christ. Lehre von der Sünde*, i. pp. 200–1. Baur, Pfeiderer, etc., opposed Holsten.

<sup>3</sup> Christ assumed our human nature, yet without sin (Rom. viii. 3; Phil. ii. 7; 2 Cor. v. 21). The bodily members that were servants of sin are to become instruments of righteousness (Rom. vi. 13, 19; Rom. xii. 1). The life which Paul lived, as a renewed man, "in the flesh," he lived by the faith of the Son of God (Gal. ii. 20). It was through "disobedience" that sin and death entered (Rom. v. 12 ff.).

<sup>4</sup> Ps. xiv.; Rom. v. 19; Jas. i. 13–15. Cf. the indictment of Israel, Deut. xxxii. 4–18; Isa. i. 2–4.

<sup>5</sup> Rom. i. 21 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. vi. 12.

<sup>7</sup> This is true of Calvinistic, as of all other important symbols. In the *Westminster Confession*, e.g., the natural liberty of man is affirmed, with his power, in the state of innocence, "to will and to do that which is good and pleasing to God" (ch. ix.), and God's providence is described as extending to all sins, in permitting and overruling, "yet so as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God; who being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin" (ch. v.).

All theories of the universe, it is acknowledged, do not minimise the tragic reality of sin. Many even of those which throw back the origin of sin into the original constitution of things—into the nature of God Himself—are, in an indirect way, a testimony to the awfulness of that reality. Sin—evil—is felt to be a fact too real to be explained as mere seeming, too deeply interwoven into the nature of man and the texture of the world to be accounted for by the contingencies of individual volition. A deeper ground, it is thought, must be sought for it. Hence Zoroastrianism, with its hypothesis of eternally antagonistic principles striving for the mastery—one good and one evil. The dualistic solution reappears in Manichæism, and has a strong fascination for many modern minds.<sup>1</sup> It is overlooked that a principle which is *only* evil—which never knew good and rejected it—is not properly an ethical principle at all. It sinks to the level of a nature-force, beneficent or harmful, as the case may be, but in no true sense moral. Hence the inevitable tendency in dualism to confuse natural and moral evil. Gnosticism took the bolder step of carrying up the origin of evil into the region of the divine itself—into the “Pleroma.” *There* the primal fall took place which re-enacts itself in lower spheres.<sup>2</sup> Modern Pessimistic systems seek to give the theory of the inherent evil of existence an absolute philosophic grounding—one, however, which refutes itself by its own irrationalities and internal contradictions. The original, inexpiable crime is creation. The absolute “Will,” by an insensate act, rushes into existence, and binds itself in bonds of the finite, from which, with the misery it entails, its utmost ingenuity afterwards

<sup>1</sup> J. G. Mill tells us in his *Autobiography* that his father was inclined to favour the Manichæan hypothesis. The God of Christianity he regarded as the *ne plus ultra* of wickedness (p. 40).

<sup>2</sup> Thus specially the Valentinians.



hardly enables it to escape!<sup>1</sup> It is striking to observe the attraction which this idea of a "Fall" in the sphere of the divine has for the framers of absolute philosophies. The Pessimism of Schopenhauer has its roots in ideas of philosophers who preceded him—of Böhme, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel.<sup>2</sup> The system has its service in showing how impossible it is to get rid of sin as a tragedy in the universe. As Professor Flint has said, Pessimism, "like Macbeth, has murdered sleep."<sup>3</sup> It has killed for ever the superficial optimism of the older Rousseau school. Its fatal defect is that, seeking a transcendental ground for evil, it relieves man's will of the responsibility for sin, and shifts the blame back on the Absolute Principle of the universe.<sup>4</sup> With such a view Christianity can make no terms.

The first really deep note in the reaction from the optimism of the French and German *Aufklärung* was that struck by Kant in his section on "The Radical Evil in Human Nature" in his *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*. Kant recognises the existence of a propensity to evil in human nature, but is clear that this propensity can only be really (ethically) evil, and imputable to man, if it is not an affair of mere sensibility or inheritance, but has its origin in an act of personal freedom—i.e., springs from the human *will*. This wrong decision, altering man's whole character, Kant seeks, in accordance with his philosophy, not in the empirical (phenomenal), but in the "intelligible" (transcendent,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea*, and Von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious*. A criticism is offered in the writer's *Christian View of God and the World*, pp. 53 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Illustrations are given in *Christian View of God*, p. 54. Schelling, in his *Philosophie und Religion*, describes the Creation as an "Abfall"—the assertion by the ego of its independence. In quite the strain of Schopenhauer he speaks of this as the original sin or primal fall of the spirit, which we expiate in time. Cf. Prof. Seth (Pringle-Pattison), *From Kant to Hegel*, p. 65. The idea has place in Hegel also (cf. his *Phil. d. Rel.*, ii. p. 251).

<sup>3</sup> *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 294.

<sup>4</sup> Yet v. Hartmann speaks in his *Religionsphilosophie* of the "Holiness" of God!

timeless, noumenal), domain, to which all man's acts of freedom are referred.<sup>1</sup> Few will follow him in this line, but the value of his assertion that moral evil can only have its origin in a misuse of freedom remains unaffected by the peculiarity of his theory of freedom. It is on this account that Ritschl could speak of Kant as laying the foundations of a sound Christian theology.<sup>2</sup>

In other directions, as through the rise of the evolutionary philosophy, necessity—what J. Fiske calls “the brute-inheritance”—is brought back to explain the origin of sin in man's nature. This will require separate consideration.

2. A second point in the Christian doctrine of sin is that, originating in volition as something that *ought not to be*, it can be defined, and judged of, only by *reference to the good*—to that of which it is the *negation*.

This is not the same thing as to say, as some theorists have done,<sup>3</sup> that sin is mere “privation,” absence of a quality of goodness which ought to be present. For sin, while negative in relation to that which ought to be, is, as everyone must see, positive enough as an appallingly active force for corruption and ruin. Scripture, indeed,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the translation of this part of Kant's work in Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, pp. 325 ff., or the exposition in Caird's *Kant*, ii. pp. 593 ff. It is not clearly shown by Kant how, on his theory, sin should be universal.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. his *Justif. and Recon.*, i. (E.T.) p. 387. Kant's importance, he thinks, lies in his having “established critically—that is, with scientific strictness—those general presuppositions of the idea of reconciliation which lie in the consciousness of moral freedom and moral guilt.” He speaks of Kant's “leading thought, viz., the specific distinction of the power of will from all powers of nature” (p. 444). He accepts Kant's distinction of the phenomenal and noumenal in respect of human freedom (pp. 389, 394).

<sup>3</sup> Sin is an *ens privativum*, requiring for its explanation, not a *causa efficiens*, but only a *causa deficiens*. Thus Leibnitz in his *Théodicée*, and many others. Augustine, in his recoil from Manichæism, used similar language, but chiefly as meaning that sin is not a substance, but arises from the perversion of what in itself is good. Cf. the writer's *Progress of Dogma*, p. 147. See also Müller's *Doct. of Sin* (E.T.), i. pp. 286 ff.

speaks of sin—carnal-mindedness—as a state of “death.”<sup>1</sup> It means, without doubt, the loss of the soul’s true life in God—is in that sense “privative.” But it is not a privation which converts man into a clod (reason, consciousness, desire, all active powers remain), but one which, as the result of the taking into the will of a hostile, God-negating principle, holds within it the germ of a new and perverted development. It has a “law” which runs its own course—a “law of sin and death.”<sup>2</sup> In the words of J. Müller, “the perverted negative presupposes a perverted affirmative.”<sup>3</sup> Sin is a power, a tyranny, which defies all man’s efforts, in his natural strength, to get rid of it.<sup>4</sup>

It is not, again, meant, in what is just said, to reaffirm the doctrines already rejected that good and evil are polar opposites, only to be known or realised the one through the other—the good through the evil, the evil through the good. This notion, the offspring of a false dialectic, is really a reversion to the dualism which takes from both good and evil their proper character, and has for its logical issue the disappearance of the distinction altogether in the Absolute, who (Schelling’s “point of indifference”) is necessarily above the contrast. Sinless life, on such an hypothesis—in God, in Christ, in beings higher than man, as angels are presumed to be—becomes an impossible conception. There cannot be an absolute Holiness such as the moral ideal requires us to postulate in God, for only through experience of evil could good, even for God, be known. This, indeed, is what the doctrine comes to in systems which merge God’s life in that of the universe, and make sin a necessary movement in that life. No such necessity exists. The negative can only subsist through

<sup>1</sup> Rom. viii. 6; Eph. ii. 1, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. vii. 21–25; viii. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, i. p. 287.

<sup>4</sup> Rom. vii. 23, 24.

the positive ; but the positive subsists in its own right—in and through itself—and is the presupposition of the other. If it is urged that, for finite beings, the good, at least the highest realisation of the good, can only be attained through experience of evil, the Christian, in reply, takes his firm stand on the sinless development of the world's Redeemer. Sin, indeed, Christ knew, but it was the world's sin, not His own. Temptation He endured, yet without fall. His development was faultlessly pure from cradle to Cross.

To understand sin's principle, therefore, it is necessary, first, to understand the *principle of the good*. This true thought Ritschl carries to an extreme when he affirms that sin, in Christianity, is determined by the idea of the highest moral good—the Kingdom of God.<sup>1</sup> The Kingdom of God is, indeed, the Christian formula at once for the highest good or blessedness, and for the highest moral aim ; but the Kingdom itself presupposes a community of moral beings united for the realisation of righteousness, and themselves “good” in virtue of this fundamental determination of their wills. Ritschl's view inverts the true order of ideas. It is certainly not the idea of the Kingdom of God which first makes it a man's duty, “denying ungodliness and worldly lusts,” to live “soberly and righteously and godly in this present world”<sup>2</sup>—which makes it right, e.g., to be self-respecting, just, kind, truthful, or wrong for one to cherish pride, or envy, or malice, or lewdness in his heart. The wrong of these things lies in themselves ; the ideal of the good excludes them, and demands their opposites. The attitude of mind and will which the individual takes up towards the things which

<sup>1</sup> *Justif. and Reconcil.* (E.T.), p. 57 : “The religious moral good of the Kingdom of God forms the standard of our conception of sin and guilt.” Cf. pp. 329, 334, 348.

<sup>2</sup> Titus ii. 12.



are good, and true, and pure—the “principle” by which his will is regulated in regard to them—is what makes the individual good or bad.

Kant has given a classical utterance on the subject of the good in his dictum that nothing can possibly be conceived of which can be called good without qualification except a *Good Will*.<sup>1</sup> The question of the principle of the good thus resolves itself into the question of what constitutes a good will. Kant would find the answer in a will determined by pure reverence for the moral law. This accords with the philosopher’s moralism, but it falls short of the demand of religion, and specially fails to satisfy the Christian demand. The good will, in the Christian sense, is a will determined, not by its attitude to an abstract law of reason, but, fundamentally, by its attitude to God. “Which is the great commandment in the law?” asked the Scribe of Jesus. Jesus answered: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the great and first commandment, and a second like unto it is this. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”<sup>2</sup> This demand for love to God Christ lays down, not as a requirement for a select few, but as a first, permanent, and unalterable demand, springing from the essential relation of the moral being to God; not as something man is to reach as the goal of a long development, but as the only state of goodness, something that ought to be there from the beginning, and in all stages of development. It is a demand, therefore, applicable to all, Scribes, Pharisees, publicans, sinners, alike. One is reminded of Anselm’s statement of the primary moral obligation, in his *Cur Deus Homo*: “The whole will of a rational creature ought to be subject to the will of God.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Fund. Principles of Met. of Morals*, Sect. i. (Abbott’s translation, p. 9).

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xxii. 36-39; Mark xii. 28-34.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.* i. 11.

Expression may vary. We may speak of the will as determined by "love," or by "fear" of God; as subject to God, surrendered to God, obedient to God; but the essence of the matter is always the same—the will is viewed as *God-regarding*, not *self-regarding*, a will yielded up to God in loving, trustful obedience,<sup>1</sup> for God's ends, not one's own. Only thus, as Augustine of old, who here gets to the root of the matter, apprehended, is it a truly *good* will.<sup>2</sup>

It need hardly be said that a good will, in the sense described, can only exist and develop normally, i.e., in unflinching obedience, in a nature into which sin has not already entered; a nature pure in its springs and impulses, and harmoniously constituted. The good *nature* is the correlative of the good *will*, and the moral demand embraces both. Divine law takes account of disposition, as well as of principle and motive, and requires that the heart be pure, the affections and desires regulated, as befits a state of uprightness. This does not, of course, mean that a nature right in principle is not subject to growth and development. There are *stages* in growth. As in the kingdom: "first the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear."<sup>3</sup> The child thinks as a child, speaks as a child, understands as a child. Jesus, though sinless, advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man.<sup>4</sup> This, however, a growth in goodness, is very different from growth out of evil into good,<sup>5</sup> with which it is often con-

<sup>1</sup> Everywhere in Scripture the test of godliness is obedience. The only disciple Christ recognises is he who does the will of the Father (Matt. vii. 21, etc.). "This is the love of God," says St. John, "that we keep His commandments" (1 John v. 3). Cf. 1 Cor. vii. 19; Gal. v. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Augustine rejected the Pelagian idea of a will neutral to good and evil. If the will has not the love of God as its principle, it is because it has taken into itself an opposite principle.

<sup>3</sup> Mark iv. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Luke ii. 40, 52.

<sup>5</sup> Dorner says: "Evil does not consist in man's not yet being initially what he will one day become; for then, evil must be called normal, and

founded. How absolutely contrary such conceptions are to current ideas of man's natural development—the moral ideal slowly evolving through ages of animalism, brutality and savagery, of superstition, vice, and crime, till the existing (still very imperfect) stage of civilisation is reached—the writer is well aware. Only, it is held, morality must change its nature, and Christ's teaching on man's relation to the Heavenly Father, and duty to Him, be shown to be other than it is, before a different conception of what constitutes goodness can establish itself as Christian.

3. If the principle of the good has been correctly apprehended, the way is open for stating what, in the Christian view, is the principle of *badness* or *sin*. To reach this principle one must go deeper than any mere conflict of higher and lower tendencies in man's nature—of sense with reason, of animal appetency with dawning consciousness of duty, of egoism with altruism, and the like. As examples, Schleiermacher finds the explanation of sin in the relative weakness of the God-consciousness as compared with the strength of the sensuous impulses.<sup>1</sup> Ritschl, not dissimilarly, finds it in the fact that man starts off as a natural being, with self-seeking desires, while the will for good is a "growing" quantity<sup>2</sup> (sin, therefore, is largely "ignorance," and to that extent is non-imputable). Evolution finds it in the presence and sway of the "brute-inheritance." A sufficient reason for rejecting these theories, from the point of view already taken, is that they, one and all, make sin a necessary, at least an "unavoidable,"<sup>3</sup>

can only be esteemed exceptionable by an error. Evil is something different from mere development. . . . Evil is the discord of man with his idea, as, and so far as, that idea should be realised at the given moment. . . . Sin is not being imperfect at all, but the contravention of what ought to be at a given moment, and of what can lay claim to unconditioned worth." (*System of Doct.* [E.T.], iii. p. 37.

<sup>1</sup> *Der christ. Glaube*, sects, 66-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Unterricht*, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Ritschl's word (*unvermeidlich*), *Recht und Ver.*, p. 360 (E.T.), p. 380, "inevitable"). Evolution theories will be considered later.

condition of human development, and describe man as from the first a being with unequal conflict established in his nature—a state in contradiction of the moral idea. The theories take up man at a point at which the disorder of sin is already present.

Martensen comes nearer a true explanation when he views man as, in accordance with “his twofold destiny of a life in God and a life in the world,” moved fundamentally by two impulses—the one, the impulse towards God; the other, the impulse towards the world, which, as having a relative independence, he may be tempted to make an object on its own account.<sup>1</sup> Love of the creature, therefore, rather than God, might seem to be the principle of sin.<sup>2</sup> It is apparent on reflection, however, as Martensen, too, sees, that behind even this stands the wrong act of the will *choosing* the creature rather than God; so that, in the last analysis, the essence of sin is seen to lie in the resolve of the will to make itself independent of God—to renounce, or set aside, God’s authority, and be a law to itself; in other words, in *self-will*, or *egoism*. It is the desire for a false independence of which the story of the Prodigal is the eternal parable; the search for a freedom which really ends in bondage and misery. Augustine calls it “self-love”; it is more truly “selfishness”; the enthroning of self in the core of the being as the last law of existence. It is Christ’s word inverted: “Not Thy will, but mine, be done.” With this corresponds the uniform representation in Scripture of sin as rebellion, disobedience, apostasy, the turning aside from God to one’s

<sup>1</sup> “God and the world are the highest universal powers which stir in human nature, and through the corresponding impulses make man their instrument. For although the world is God’s world, yet in a modified sense He has permitted it to have life in itself. He has bestowed a relative independence and self-dependence on it as being other than God; and this principle of the world’s independence and the world’s autonomy aims at establishing its sovereignty in man and through him by means of these impulses.” (*Christian Ethics*, E.T. p. 95.)

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Rom. i. 25; 1 John ii. 15-17.



own ways ; and of repentance as the return to God in faith, love, and new obedience.

That the analysis of sin's principle here offered <sup>1</sup> is the true one will be manifest in the further tracing of the developments of sin : it is pertinent, at present, to observe how essentially it agrees with the analysis which philosophy itself furnishes when seeking to probe this matter of the nature of evil to its bottom. Kant, e.g., is insistent that the last explanation of sin is the determination of the will to be a law to itself. As he puts it : " A man is bad only by this, that he reverses the moral order of the springs in adopting them into his maxims. . . . Perceiving that they (the moral law and self-love) cannot subsist together on equal terms, but that one must be subordinate to the other, as its supreme condition, he makes the spring of self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the moral law." <sup>2</sup> For Hegel also, whatever the defects otherwise of his theory of sin as part of a dialectic process, the essence of sin lies in the assertion of independent being, a Being-for-Self in isolation from the universal.<sup>3</sup> Dr. McTaggart may explain : Sin " is thus both positive and negative—positive within a limited sphere, but negative inasmuch as that whole sphere is negative. And this does justice to the double nature of sin. All sin is in one sense positive, for it is an affirmation of the sinner's nature. When I sin, I place my own will in a position of supremacy. This shall be so, because I will it to be so, regardless of the right. . . . The position of sin lies in the assertion—or rather in the practical adoption—of the maxim that my motives need no other justification than the fact that they are my motives." <sup>4</sup> When regard is had to this

<sup>1</sup> The subject is discussed in other relations in the writer's works, *The Christian View of God*, pp. 171 ff., and *God's Image in Man*, pp. 212 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. in Abbott, *loc. cit.*, p. 343.

<sup>3</sup> *Phil. d. Rel.*, ii. p. 264.

<sup>4</sup> *Heg. Cosmol.*, pp. 150, 158.

deepest "maxim" of sin, it is obvious that, in principle, as St. James declares, the law is negated as a whole in every single violation of it.<sup>1</sup>

4. Sin, as originating in a law-defying *egoism*, is a principle of *God-negation*.<sup>2</sup> It cannot cohere with love to God, trust in Him, or enjoyment in His presence. The possibility of a spiritual communion is dissolved. The "love of the world," with its new ruling principles, "the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the vain-glory of life," excludes the "love of the Father."<sup>3</sup> The fatality with which sin's principle acts in the depravation and ruin of the soul, its frustration of the destiny of man, its unspeakably baleful consequences for the individual and society, must form a subject for investigation by itself. But it will be of use here, in a general view, to test the soundness of the conclusion arrived at by comparing it with the actual forms of sin in the course of its development.

There is no need, in order to support a one-sided case, to indulge in exaggerated diatribes on the existing condition of human nature. Let all the good—the relative good—one undeniably sees in humanity, be ungrudgingly, even gratefully, acknowledged. The evil of the world is too patent a fact to need heightening through the extravagances of a morbid pessimism, or the grovellings in filth of the coarser school of fiction.<sup>4</sup> Even with ignoring of the Godward side, Kant, in the opening of his work on *Religion*, gives nearly as dark a picture of the wickedness of mankind

<sup>1</sup> Jas. ii. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Hence the prevailing Scriptural representation of sin as *ἀσέβεια*, godlessness.

<sup>3</sup> 1 John ii. 15, 16.

<sup>4</sup> Max Nordau, in his book on *Degeneration*, repudiates the claim of M. Zola, that his series of Rougon-Macquart novels represent "a typical average family of the French middle class, and that their history represents the general social life of France in the time of Napoleon III. . . . The family whose history Zola presents to us in 20 mighty volumes is entirely outside normal daily life, and has no necessary connection whatever with France and the Second Empire" (p. 495.)

as St. Paul does in his first chapter to the Romans. It is not pretended by any one, however deeply convinced of the deadliness of sin, that the evil implicit in sin comes to manifestation at once, or in like degree in all, or that sin in its developments is not checked and restrained by a variety of original principles in human nature, and influences in society, acting in an opposite direction. The original constitution of human nature, as Kant also affirmed, is good, and reacts, so far, to hinder sin's full development. Indelible traces of the image of God remain in man. There is a *νοῦς* which testifies against the law of sin, though often its protests are feeble and ineffectual,<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of human "depravity" has often been misunderstood in this respect—perhaps has laid itself open by some of its expressions to be misunderstood—but even the stoutest upholders of the doctrine—e.g., Calvin—guard themselves against such extremes as are imputed to it. The beauty and goodness of God's natural gifts in man; man's love of truth, sense of honour, skill in law, other virtues and talents, are freely acknowledged.<sup>2</sup> With all abatements, however,

<sup>1</sup> Rom. vii. 14-25.

<sup>2</sup> A few sentences may be quoted from the *Institutes* of Calvin in illustration. "To charge the intellect with perpetual blindness, so as to leave it no intelligence of any description whatever, is repugnant not only to the word of God, but to common experience. We see that there has been implanted in the human mind a certain desire of investigating truth, to which it never would aspire, unless some relish for truth antecedently existed" (Bk. ii. 2, 12). "Accordingly we see that the minds of all men have impressions of civil order and honesty. Hence it is that every individual understands how human societies must be regulated by laws, and also is able to comprehend the principles of these laws" (Bk. ii. 2, 14). "Therefore, in reading profane authors, the admirable light of truth displayed in them should remind us that the human mind, however much fallen and perverted from its original integrity, is still adorned and invested with admirable gifts from its Creator. If we reflect that the Spirit of God is the only fountain of truth, we will be careful, as we would avoid offering insult to Him, not to reject or condemn truth wherever it appears. . . . Nay, we cannot read the writings of the ancients on these subjects without the highest admiration; an admiration which their excellence will not allow us to withhold" (Bk. ii. 2, 15). "Nor do I set myself so much in opposition to common sense as to contend

the Apostolic verdict holds good : " The whole world lieth in wickedness." <sup>1</sup> The question asked is : How far the character of this wickedness bears out what has been said of the root-principle of sin ?

It has often been observed that the forms of sin connected with the indulgence of *the sensuous nature* have a power of veiling the egoism of the principle in which the sin originates.<sup>2</sup> The drunkard's revel, the licentious man's pleasures, have an element of sociability—of companionship—attaching to them, which hides the selfishness which is their core. Yet underneath the roystering mirth of the reveller, and the voluptuous softness of the debauchee, it is not difficult to see that in sensual sin it is *self-gratification* which is the last motive of the whole. The drink-appetite will convert a naturally generous man into the most selfish of human beings. Wife, home, children count for nothing, that his craving may be satisfied. The heartless selfishness of the dissolute man is proverbial. For the gratification of his lust, honour, truth, friendship, are ruthlessly sacrificed, and when injury beyond repair has been done, the victim of his deceit is callously cast off.<sup>3</sup>

It is sins of the flesh which society visits with its most unsparing reprobation. To Jesus, however, who knew, in His tenderness, in how many cases such sins partake more of human infirmity than of deliberate wickedness, they were less heinous than many sins of *the spirit*, in which the egoistic principle of sin is more glaringly apparent. that there was no difference between the justice, moderation, and equity of Titus and Trajan, and the rage, intemperance, and cruelty of Caligula, Nero, and Domitian ; between the continence of Vespasian and the obscene lusts of Tiberius ; and between the observance of law, and justice, and the contempt of them. . . . Hence this distinction between honourable and base actions God has not only engraven on the minds of each, but also often affirms in the administration of His providence" (Bk. iii. 14, 2).

<sup>1</sup> 1 John v. 19 R.V. has "in the Evil One."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Müller on the *Doctrine of Sin*, i. pp. 159-60.

<sup>3</sup> Literature is full of illustrations. One recalls the desertion scene in Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, ch. iii., or Tito Melema in *Romola*, or Thomas Hardy's *Tess*.



“The publicans and harlots,” He told the Pharisees, “go into the kingdom of heaven before you.”<sup>1</sup> He was gentle to the woman who was a sinner, to the woman of Samaria, to the woman taken in her very act of sin,<sup>2</sup> but His denunciations of the hypocrisy, ostentation, covetousness, arrogance, of the Pharisees were scathing.<sup>3</sup> The reason was that He saw how much more of the essence of sin as a God-denying power there was really in them. What but egoism in its varying forms are pride, envy, covetousness, worldly ambition, love of the praise of men, lust of rule? Pride exalts in selfish isolation, covetousness would grasp all for self, envy grieves at the good of another, vanity craves for adulation of self—so through the whole gamut of this class of sins. Self is manifest in all.

There are, however, forms of evil in which the principle latent in all sin appears in yet more hateful nakedness. This is the stage of *malignancy*, in which evil seems chosen for its own sake. “Evil, be thou my good,” says Milton’s Satan, and by a general consent this class of sins are spoken of as “devilish.” Kant uses this term for them.<sup>4</sup> Max Nordau devotes a large space in his book on *Degeneration* to what he calls “Satanism.”<sup>5</sup> Malevolence—evil for evil’s sake—is the outstanding mark of it. There is a positive delight in the sight of suffering, in the inflicting of misery, in the temptation and ruin of the innocent. Nordau’s lurid pictures, drawn from contemporary literature, of this revolting phase of the *fin du siècle* spirit, reveal almost incredible depths of depravity. “There is no indifference here to virtue or vice; it is an absolute predilection for the latter, and aversion for the former. Parnassians do

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xxi. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Luke xi. 37 ff.; John iv. 7 ff.; viii. 3 ff. Society excuses the man, and is severe on the woman. It was to the woman Jesus showed most mercy.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Matt. xxiii.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Abbott, *loc. cit.* p. 334.

<sup>5</sup> See specially his chapter on “Parnassians and Diabolists.”

not at all hold themselves 'beyond good or evil,' but plunge themselves up to the neck in evil, and as far as possible from good."<sup>1</sup> In all its subjects this form of evil is described as connected with the grossest lasciviousness.<sup>2</sup>

By Nordau this "diabolist" tendency is treated as a form of the "Ego-Mania," to the elucidation of which in our latter-day civilisation over a couple of hundred pages of his volume are given. It is easy to see how wickedness so unrestrained should pass over into rankest *blasphemy*, and this may be regarded as the culminating form of sin. In it sin's inmost essence as "enmity against God" is laid bare. "Ego-Mania," however, is not necessarily connected with the outward foulness of the preceding type, and may take shapes of antichristian blasphemy springing from the sheer self-exaltation that will submit to no law of God or man. Nordau, with some justice, takes F. Nietzsche as the crowning example of this Titanic egoism in our era. But history knows of many periods in which a blatant atheism has vented itself in passionate hatred of God. On this the veil may be allowed to fall.

Without carrying sin to any of these extremes, it is easy to see the stamp of egoism which rests on all life in separation from God. Self-centred enjoyment, self-centred culture, self-centred morality, self-centred science, self-centred religion even (Worship of Humanity)—such are among the world's ideals. John Foster remarks somewhere that men are as afraid to let God touch any of their schemes as they are of the touch of fire. It is the old Stoic *τάρκεια*, self-sufficiency, not without a certain nobleness where men had nothing else, but sin in its renunciation of dependence on God. Existence on such a basis is doomed to futility.

JAMES ORR.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 275.

<sup>2</sup> "If Baudelaire prays it is to the devil (*Les Litanies de Satan*). . . . Besides the devil, Baudelaire adores only one other power, viz. : voluptuousness" (*Op. cit.*, p. 293).

COLOSSIANS II. 18.

A CRITICISM OF THE REVISED VERSION, AND AN  
EXPOSITION.

THE Greek Text here is, *Μηδεὶς ὑμᾶς καταβραβεύετω θέλων ἐν ταπεινοφροσύνῃ καὶ θρησκείᾳ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἃ μὴ [the Revisers, after Westcott and Hort and others, omit the μὴ] ἐώρακεν ἐμβατεύων εἰκῆ φυσιοῦμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ κρατῶν τὴν κεφαλὴν.* The A.V. renders: "Let no man beguile you of your reward in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind, and not holding the Head." The R.V., omitting the *μὴ*, renders—the italics are mine—"Let no man *rob you of your prize* [*καταβραβεύετω*—one word—*rob of your prize*] *by a voluntary humility* [*θέλων ἐν ταπεινοφροσύνῃ*] and *worshipping* [*θρησκείᾳ*] of the angels, *dwelling in* [*ἐμβατεύων*] the things which he *hath seen* [*ἐώρακεν*], and not holding fast the Head."

I have on another occasion (EXPOSITOR, September, 1904) called attention to very grave errors of the Revised Version in its dealing with difficult passages; and I venture to say that this is another instance of its errors, and one of the most flagrant. There is error upon error. The renderings are utterly out of harmony with the context, destroy the argument, and render the passage senseless. Postponing to the last the question of the disputed Greek reading, *viz.* the retention or omission of the *μὴ*, *not*, before "seen," I will take the renderings of the various words and phrases seriatim. In considering them it will be

necessary to keep in mind the obvious fact that our verse 18 is an emphatic resumption of verse 16—the verse 17 being of the nature of a parenthesis—and that the whole of the verses 16 to 23 hang together in one argument. The verse 16, dividing the clauses as (a) and (b), runs thus: “Let not any one judge you (a) in [ἐν, sc. *in the matter of*] meat or in drink, or (b) in respect of a feast-day or a new moon or a Sabbath, which, etc.” It is evident that the reference is to *Jewish*, not *Gnostic* demands; and that the resumption in verse 18 covers, in order, both the negative demand of the errorists of clause (a)—sc. not to eat and drink—and their positive demand of clause (b)—sc. to keep and observe. So much is clear. The difficulties that remain are possibly largely due to our ignorance of local circumstances well known to St. Paul and the Colossians.

The first error to be noticed is the rendering of καταβραβεύετω, “rob of your prize.” This is a double error (of which A.V. also is guilty, “bequile of your reward”), arising from a mistaken reference to athletic contests and the award of the prizes (βραβεῖα).<sup>1</sup> The context shows that, although St. Paul elsewhere refers to these contests, there is no reference to them here, but to the assaults of Judaizers on *Christian liberty*. In the compound Greek word the idea of *robbing* does not exist; and all idea of *prize*, if it ever existed, has disappeared. It is a very rare word; but the only two or three instances preserved of its occurrence prove that its signification in usage is that of *giving judgment against* or *condemning*, either as in a Court of Law (Dem. 545. 1), or generally (Eustath. *ad Hom. Il. i.* 399 sqq.; and *ap. Euseb. H.E.* 712 B). That this is, there-

<sup>1</sup> It is not unimportant to note that the verb καταβραβεύετω is in the *present*, not the *aorist* tense; whereas “rob” rather implies a single act, not a line of conduct.



fore, the meaning here is the natural inference : it is confirmed by the “*judging*” of verse 16, of which it is the resumption : “Let not any one *judge* you (ver. 16) . . . let no one *condemn* you” (ver. 18). The Vulg. renders, *seducat* ; Augustine, *convincat*.<sup>1</sup> The Judaizers wished to set up their own standards of conduct for Church membership and, like a certain Diotrephes, excommunicate at pleasure those who refused to accept them (3 John 9, 10. Cf. Acts xv. 5, “It is needful to charge them (the Gentiles) to *keep the Law of Moses*”).

The next error is the change of the A.V. “*in,*” *ἐν*, into “*by*” ; introducing a new and false idea of *means* : the “*in*” is the resumption of the “*in*” of clause (a) of verse 16, “*in the matter of.*” There is further an error of transposition of the “*in,*” which in the Greek *follows* and does not *precede* the word rendered “*voluntary.*”

The next error concerns the treatment of *θέλων*, *volens*, *willing*, which is connected with “*humility,*” and rendered by “*voluntary.*” The connexion of the word may be disputable, but the signification depends upon the connexion, *viz.*, whether it is to be connected with the preceding “*condemn,*” or with the succeeding “*humility.*” Zahn following Grimm and others, connects with the latter, and considers the expression, *θέλων ἐν*, *volens in*, a strong Hebraism for *delighting in*, as in the passages 1 Sam. xviii. 22, “the king *hath delight* in thee” ; 2 Sam. xv. 26, “I have no *delight* in thee.”<sup>2</sup> Other passages are 2 Chron. ix. 8 ; Ps. cxii. 1, cxlvii. 10. According to this view the rendering would be, “Let no one condemn you, *delight-*

<sup>1</sup> As the simple verb *βραβεύω* is used by Paul in the next chapter, iii. 15, for *rule*, “let the peace of God *rule* in your hearts,” the compound *καταβραβεύω* might here not unreasonably be rendered “*overrule,*” there being two other Greek words in N. T. for *condemn*.

<sup>2</sup> The Gr. and Lat. renderings are :—*Θέλει ἐν σοὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς*, *places regi* : *οὐκ ἠθέληκα ἐν σοὶ*, *non places*. And, in Ps. cxii. 1, *ἐν ταῖς ἐντολαῖς αὐτοῦ θελήσει*, *in mandatis ejus volet*.

*ing in, etc.*” But this is open to two strong objections. The Hebraism is foreign to Pauline and New Testament usage; and it does not appear that the motive of the Judaizers was a feeling of *delight*, but rather an affectation of *merit*. It seems necessary, then, to connect the idiomatic θέλων with the *preceding*—a connexion which makes excellent sense, and may be well illustrated by Jos. *Ant.* xx. 11, where its position is the same, μηδεὶς ἂν ἕτερος ἐδυνήθη θελήσας, “no one else could have done it *even had he willed*”; and Greg. *Orat.* 187, ἀποκτείνει με οὐ δύνασθε βουλόμενοι, “you are not able to kill me, *much as you may desire it*” (cf. 2 Peter iii. 5, where the same participle appears in Gr. in the same position, “this they *wilfully* forget.” Cf. also the *wish*, θέλοντες, of the Judaizers to be teachers, 1 Tim. i. 7–9). Accordingly the R.V. margin, “*of his own mere will,*” is much preferable to the R.V. text, and might be retained; but a still closer rendering is even better, “*at his will*”; thus: “Let no one condemn you *at his will*”; or, yet more briefly, “*at will.*” The apostle has in mind some one who would have his *will* to be *law*: “Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas”; and in regard to whom Tertullian can exclaim, “What! Shall human *will* (*voluntas*) have more licence than divine command?” (*Jejun.* xiii.). This θέλων, *willing* or *wishing*, has no reference, as the A.V. and R.V. suppose, to the ἐθελοθρησκεία, *voluntary religion*, of verse 23, which, as one of several words compounded with ἐθελο-, has its own special connotation, and does not glance back to this verse.

The next error is the rendering of ταπεινοφροσύνη by “*humility.*” Now, *humility* is a Christian virtue deserving of commendation; whereas the Apostle is stigmatizing something deserving of reprobation. The rendering, therefore, by “*humility*” cannot be right. There can be no reasonable doubt that Zahn (i. 477) correctly refers the

Greek word to its Old Testament (Gr.) usage and that of the early Church, in which both noun and verb have the signification of *mortification of the soul by fasting*, and simply of *fasting*, as if *νηστεύειν, νηστεία*. Zahn (as Trom. *Conc. s.v.*) cites Lev. xvi. 29, 31, "Ye shall *humble* your souls" (*sc.* by *fasting*: A.V. here and elsewhere, *afflict*); Ps. xxxv. 13, "I *humbled* my soul with fasting"; Isa. viii. 3, "Wherefore have we fasted and *humbled* our soul?" Sirac. xxxi. 26, "If one fast for his sins, and sin again, what profit hath he from his having *humbled* himself?" Tertullian, *Jejun.* xiii., xvi., twice introduces the Greek word in the midst of his Latin, and refers it to *fasting*. Zahn adds other passages; but these suffice, and put the meaning, in the light of the context, beyond question. As no English word, however, connoting also *humility*, conveys the meaning here intended, the choice must lie between *mortification, abstinence, fasting*; and, upon the whole, although *abstinence* would be a good rendering,<sup>1</sup> the last (for general readers) is simplest and clearest: "Let no one condemn you at will in the matter of *fasting*." This is the clause of verse 18 answering to clause (a) of verse 16, the "meat and drink" clause.

The next error is the rendering of *θρησκεία τῶν ἀγγέλων*, "worshipping of the angels"—taking *τῶν ἀγγέλων* as the *objective* genitive, and implying angelolatry. This is impossible. (a) The reference to verse 16 shows that, as the *fasting* which precedes relates to the *meat and drink*, so the *θρησκεία* relates to the *feasts, new moons, and sabbaths* of the Mosaic Law; (b) there is no evidence of any cult of the angels among the Judaizers in St. Paul's day (see Zahn,

<sup>1</sup> I should like to use "*fasting or abstinence*," both terms together, as in the Ch. of Eng. Prayer Book 'Tables and Rules—*Days of Fasting or Abstinence*.' But "*abstinence*" alone is too wide and savours too much of later Gnostic doctrine.

i. 475 sqq., who discusses and shows the irrelevance of supposed allusions). It must be concluded, therefore, that τῶν ἀγγέλων, “*of the angels*,” cannot be the *objective* genitive. Nor yet can it possibly be the *subjective* genitive, *worship rendered by the angels*.<sup>1</sup> For, (a) there is no trace of any such worship; (b) the idea is outside the argument; (c) the close linking of θρησκεία to the preceding “*fasting*” by the copula and the single preposition “*in*” would ascribe to the angels the practice of *fasting* as well as of *worship*; a conception which needs no refutation. What, then, is the explanation? Why are “*the angels*” introduced? The answer I believe to be this. Looking (a) at the reference to the latter clause of verse 16, the *ceremonial observance* clause; (b) to the proper meaning of the word θρησκεία, viz. the *cultus externus*, comprehending, as opposed to internal spiritual worship, all the *external* acts of worship, such as *temple-building*, *rites* and *ceremonies* and *celebrations* (Phil. J. i. 195 gives the concrete examples, contrasting it with ὁσιότης, *holiness of life*—a correct view which gives point to the use of the word in Jas. i. 26, 27); and (c) to the stress laid by the Rabbis upon the *mediation of angels in the giving of the Law*, and the thereby enhanced peril of disregard of its enactments—points certain to be urged by the Judaizers—I conclude that τῶν ἀγγέλων, “*of the angels*,” is the genitive of *origin* (just as *of men*, and *of God*, in verses 19, 22, “*increase of God*,” “*doctrines of men*,” and as *of angels* in Acts vii. 53, “*ordinances of angels*”), and that on account of the Judaizing arguments on this head St. Paul employs the very word of the Judaizers, “*of the angels*,” instead

<sup>1</sup> Euseb. *H.E.* uses the gen. both *subj.* and *obj.* after θρησκεία: e.g. x. 5, τὴν τῶν Χριστιανῶν θρησκείαν, *the religion of the Christians*, sc. practiced by the Christians; vi. 43, τὴν θρησκείαν τῶν δαιμόνων, *the religion of the demons*, sc. the religion in which worship was offered to the demons.



of his own ordinary word, τοῦ νόμου, “of the Law.” (So Jerome, *Ad Algas*, cited in note to Rheims Version; and so partly Theodoret, A.D. 450: see Zahn, i. 476). The veneration of the Law as the *ordinances of the angels* is beyond dispute: it is alluded to by St. Stephen, “ye received the Law as *ordinances of angels*” (Acts vii. 53, εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων); by St. Paul himself, “the Law *ordained through angels*” (Gal. iii. 19, διαταγείσ δι’ ἀγγέλων); and by *Ep. to Heb.*, “the word *spoken through angels*” (Heb. ii. 2; cf. the frequent phrase, “spoken *through* the prophet,” Matt. i. 12, ii. 23, iii. 3, etc.; Rev. i. 1, “the Revelation . . . sent *through his angel* unto John”—as if *angels*, like *prophets*, were the mouthpiece of the Lord). The same point is in view in the arguments of Col. i. 5–18, and Heb. i. 1–14, emphasizing the superiority of Christ over the angels. The Judaizers urged the wrath of avenging angels to overawe non-conformists to the Law.<sup>1</sup> The rendering, then, will be such as this: “*Let no one at will condemn you in the matter of fasting and ceremonial religion of the angels*”; or, for most readers, to avoid misconception, “*ceremonial ordinances of the angels*,” the θρησκεία being the *observances* of verse 16b, viz. observances of *feasts, new-moons, sabbaths, etc.* (Cf. Aug., cited by Tdf., *religionem angelorum, quæ Græce Θρησκεία dicitur*. Vulg.: *religiones angelorum*; Rheims: *religion of angels*. Cf. also Gal. iv. 10, “Ye observe *days, etc.*: I am afraid for you.”)

The next error of the renderings is the worst of all, viz., the rendering of ἐμβατεύων, “*dwelling in*.” And here I must be excused for avowing that it is perfectly inexplicable to me how the Revisers—eminent scholars as they were—

<sup>1</sup> It should be remembered that the Greeks regarded the δαίμονες, *demons*, as the Jews regarded the *angels*, as “guardians and overseers of human conduct” (Plut. i. 573, A, δαίμονες τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεων φύλακὲς τε καὶ ἐπίσκοποι): hence the appeal to superhuman powers would be expected to carry great weight with the Gentiles.

could have arrived at and adopted this rendering, and how any later scholars can have been found to support them. Yet the two most popular and estimable recent commentaries, the *Internat. Crit. Com.* and the *Century Bible*, both follow the R.V.; the latter, without adducing any authority, merely remarking, “*dwelling in* [sc. ἐμβατεύων] is a word that varies in its meaning, being rendered with equal accuracy [!] as in the text, or as in the marg. ‘*taking his stand upon*’ ”; and the former, “ἐμβατεύειν is properly to *step* or *stand on*” [two different things], adding, “So with gen., Soph. *Æd. T.* 845 (825): “hence [!] to  *dwell in*, as Eur. *Heracl.* 875.” But this passage of Euripides has not this meaning: the meaning is to *enter upon*, not *dwell in*; so that even the solitary poetical instance adduced fails.<sup>1</sup> Similarly the use of the word for gods *haunting* a favourite resort gives no countenance to *dwelling in*. The fact is, there is always in the word the idea of *motion to or on*, never of *rest in*: and *in the whole range of extant Greek literature there is not one single instance of the meaning of “dwelling in.”* Nor, indeed, could there be. The literal meaning of the word is that of *setting foot on* (as, e.g., *going on board* a ship), *entering upon* a piece of property (rightly or wrongly, or after wrongful dispossession, as in the Eur. *Heracl.* passage, above), *invading* or *intruding* into the territory of another. Thus Josh. xix. 51 (Gr.), “they went to *enter on* the land,” after the allotment to the tribes; 1 Macc. four times, c. εἰς, *into*, of hostile invasions; Isæ. 74, “he *entered on* the property” (illegally). The metaphorical meaning follows the same lines—and in our verse the meaning is clearly metaphorical—it is that of

<sup>1</sup> The word is a favourite one with Euripides, occurring 6 times in his extant Plays and fragments; twice in the sense of *haunting* or *frequenting*; and four times in the sense of *entering upon*, *ingrediri*, *in possessionem ire*: never of *dwelling in*. In the passage from Sophocles, cited above, by the *Internat. Crit. Comm.*, the meaning is to *set foot on* (Jebb renders, *set foot in*).

going into a matter, entering upon an investigation, carefully or curiously *searching into*. Thus: 2 Macc. ii. 30, it is used of an architect *entering upon* the preliminary study of plans for his building. Phil. J. i. 341, of a scientist "*pur-suing his scientific investigations*;" the illustration being added of a man digging wells in *search* for water. So the Fathers: Chrys. *Op. Sel.* i. 264 (ed. Didot), "God who *searcheth into* hearts." Bas. i. 541, "Though ignorant of the nature of the earth, they make a brag of *investigating* the essence of God." Similarly Greg. Nys. ii. 944. Thus neither literally nor metaphorically is there the slightest foundation for the rendering "*dwelling in*." The examples given—and none exist to the contrary—have shown that "*searching into*" is the correct interpretation; and, as the *search* here intended is held up to condemnation, the A.V. "*intruding into*" may well stand. The Vulg. has *ambulans*; Augustine, *inculcans*: but the A.V., even etymologically, is a felicitous rendering, which need not be dis-lodged; while, as regards the argument, it is an apposite description of the wild speculations of false teachers, the Jewish errorists, on the mediatorial and executive func-tions of angels in the government of the world and the maintenance of the Jewish Law.

The meaning of ἐμβρατεύων being thus settled, it only remains to decide the deferred question of the correct Greek reading, ἃ ἑώρακεν, or ἃ μὴ ἑώρακεν that is, whether St. Paul wrote, as R.V., "*things which he hath seen*"; or, as A.V., "*things which he hath not seen*." The decision will depend on the strength of the *external* and *internal* evidence together: it cannot be decided by the *external* evidence alone. Indeed, where *external* evidence is in conflict, the *internal* evidence, if clear, must always prevail. First, then, as to the *external* evidence for the omission of μή, "*not*" (see it in Tisch. *apparatus*): it is entirely, or



almost entirely, African and Egyptian, and of untrustworthy character :—*sc.* three out of the four oldest extant Uncial MSS., *Vat.*, *Sin.* (originally), *Alex.*—all Alexandrian, Cent. iv. and v.—and *Bezae* (originally), Cent. vi. ; of the large number of Cursive MSS., three only ; of Versions, some African Old Latin (others on the contrary side), the Coptic and the Æthiopic ; and the African Father Tertullian, who is merely *Old Latin* over again. As to the old Greek Uncial MSS., Origen and Jerome and Augustine all testify to the existence of MSS. in their days with *both* readings. Now, without unduly anticipating the evidence on the other side (given below), it is important to remark here at once, in testing the force of the evidence, that *Vat.* and *Sin.* though alone extant of Cent. iv., have not of any necessity more value than other equally ancient Uncials no longer extant, but to whose existence there is ample contemporary, or nearly contemporary, evidence ; also that *Sin.* as originally written may be taken to be more or less balanced by *Sin.* corrected ; *Alex.*, Cent. v., balanced by *Ephraem*, Cent. v. ; *Bezae* original, by *Bezae* corrected ; the *Old Latins* on the one side by the *Old Latins* on the other. The evidence against the  $\mu\eta$ , so far as MSS. are concerned, is thus practically reduced to *Vat.* alone, or (making great allowance) to the concurrence of *Vat.* and *Sin.* ; and it is thus mainly on the concurrence of these two codices that nearly all the leading Textual critics (Tisch., Treg., Westcott and Hort ; Zahn, I regret, follows them), omit the “*not.*” But to estimate aright the value of their combination and decision, it must be remembered that, as Textual critics, they preferably exclude *internal* evidence (often the most decisive) from their purview : and, further, that they *all row in the same boat*, blinded to the luminous sum total of evidence by what has been well termed the “*idolatry*” of *Vat.* and *Sin.*



Now these two codices, though the oldest extant, Cent. iv., are yet nearly 300 years later than the date of St. Paul's letter, and cannot be shewn to be the best authority for Cent. i. : the one, the *Vat.*, very corrupt and remarkable for its omissions ; and the other, the *Sin.*, very careless and depraved. Years ago, as far back as A.D. 1875, I called attention to their abundant and glaring errors (my object prevented my adding others quite as glaring, e.g., Mark iv. 26, and, outside the Gospels, Acts iv. 25 ; xii. 25 ; Rom. v. 1), and protested against the overweening estimation of them by Westcott and Hort (whose method appeared to me radically wrong), urging that once more there must be a "call out of Egypt" (*New Testament*, vol. i. pp. xxx.–xxxiv.). Of this I am to-day more convinced than ever. As Nestle says, "This must now be asserted with far greater emphasis, that the concurrence of *Sin.* and *Vat.*, on which so much stress has been hitherto laid by almost all textual critics, *proves nothing at all*" (*Text. Crit.*, Eng. ed., p. 227). I am satisfied that, until we rid ourselves of this Alexandrian incubus of *Vat.* and *Sin.*, we shall never arrive at a satisfactory and stable settlement of the Greek text of the New Testament. I await von Soden's great work with interest and confidence.

Turning now to the external evidence on the other side, *viz.*, in favour of the *insertion* of the  $\mu\eta$ , "not," we find (a) a far larger number of the uncial MSS., including the valuable palimpsest *Ephræm.*, and the very ancient ones referred to by Origen and Jerome<sup>1</sup> and the corrected *Sin.* and *Bezæ* ; (b) the entire mass of the Cursive MSS., except-

<sup>1</sup> It must be remembered that Jerome, both in his famous "Preface" addressed to Pope Damasus, A.D. 383, as well as in his private letter to Marcella, lays great stress on the fact that he *corrects* the "errors" of earlier Latin versions due to "presumptuous empirics or sleepy copyists" of the Greek MSS., and of these the *ancient ones* : thus testifying to sundry ancient MSS. as old or older than *Sin.* and *Vat.*, having the  $\mu\eta$ .

ing three; (c) of Versions, two of the Old Latins, the Latin Vulgate, the two Syriacs, the Gothic, and the Armenian; (d) of the Fathers, Origen (partly), Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, Theodoret. In every direction, MSS., Versions, Fathers, the balance in favour of the “*not*” largely preponderates. To account for the omission of the “*not*” in our passage may be difficult, but it is difficult to account for scores of readings which, nevertheless, are confidently rejected (see *e.g.* Matt. xxvii. 49; 1 Cor. xv. 49, 52, where a “*not*” is omitted by *Sin.* before “*sleep*”). And I will add, what appears to me an independent strong argument in favour of the  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ , *viz.*, that, if St. Paul himself had not written it, no *interpolator* (and *many* such interpolators would have been needed) would have ventured upon it in such a position as before a perf. indic.,  $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha\kappa\epsilon\nu$ —he would have supplied the usual  $\omicron\nu\chi$ , as in 1 John iv. 29 (“*God, whom he hath not seen*”), instead of the less usual  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ , which implies an opinion, modest or otherwise, of the writer, and, as I believe in this verse, a Pauline sarcasm. The effect can best be given in English in such cases by inserting “*I trow.*” (For this  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  c. indic., cf. John. iii. 18; 2 Pet. i. 9, *lit.* “he to whom these things *are not* present”; and the  $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ , instead of  $\omicron\upsilon\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ , in Jos. *Ant.* xx. 11, above cited, “*which no one else, I trow, could have done*”).<sup>1</sup>

On the *external* evidence, then, alone, the  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ , “*not*,” has far the higher claim on acceptance. But, turning to the *internal* evidence, the decision is as absolutely certain as any decision can be. It must be assumed that St. Paul wrote *sense*. He is condemning conduct which, he distinctly states, springs from two heinous faults, the one

<sup>1</sup> This subjective use of  $\mu\epsilon\eta$  c. ind. is frequent in Plutarch, *e.g.* i. 470 C,  $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$  στρατηγῆ, κλαίων ὅτι  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  ὑπατεύει, καὶ ὑπατεύων, ὅτι  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  πρῶτος ἀνηγορεύθη. 525 F, ἀφαιροῦνται ἄλλων οἷς αὐτοὶ χρῆσθαι  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  πεφύκασιν. In 609 C he employs both  $\omicron\upsilon$  and  $\mu\acute{\eta}$ , but the latter with delicate refinement of meaning

*positive, viz.*, intellectual pride; the other *negative*, “not holding fast the Head” (Christ). Now, if “not” be omitted, the passage will run like this, “*intruding into the things which he hath seen*, vainly puffed up by intellectual pride.” This, after Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* v. 19), is taken to refer to *angelic visions* claimed by the errorists. But (a) no evidence is forthcoming of such visions; (b) the *ἑώρακεν*, “*hath seen*,”—the word for *eye-witness* of fact (John i. 34; xix. 35, *al.*),—cannot be used of *visions* without a word for *visions*, *ὄπτασια*, *ὄραμα*, being either expressed (Luke i. 22; xxiv. 23) or distinctly referred to (Luke ix. 36, with Matt. xvii. 9; Mark ix. 9; of the Transfiguration Vision); (c) St. Paul would not have endorsed the reality of the visions by his use of “*he hath seen*”; it may be taken as certain that he would have written, “*things which he allegeth he hath seen*”; (d) there could be no *intellectual presumption* in investigating the meaning and directions of angelic visions, if any such had been vouchsafed; the investigation would have been praiseworthy. Accordingly, the words “*intruding into the things which he hath seen, being puffed up*,” etc., are so evidently void of argument and sense—and “*dwelling in*” would only make confusion worse confounded—that some critics and interpreters, strangely refusing the authentic “*not*,” have resorted to *conjectural emendations*; among which the *ἀέρα κενεμβατεύων*, *treading on empty air*, of Dr. Taylor, has the approval of Lightfoot, Westcott and Hort. Now, in the first place, this word *κενεμβατεύων* has no existence in the Greek language; and in the next place, if St. Paul really used the word, we should have the amazing result that the true reading has vanished, without a trace or a memory, from every single MS., every single Version, every single Father, East and West alike! Can any one believe this possible? It is absolutely incredible

and absurd. On the other hand, when we retain the “not,” as thoroughly well attested by the preponderance of the *external* and the decisiveness of the *internal* evidence, the reasoning and severe censure of the Apostle, in view of the presumptuous incursions of the errorists into the spiritual world in support of their false teaching, become intelligible and lucid: “Let no one condemn you at will in, etc., rashly intruding into things which, *I throw*, he hath not seen, being puffed up by his carnal intellect” (*νοός*). (To avoid confusion with the “*carnal mind*” of Rom. viii. 6, 7—where there is the different Greek word, *φρόνημα*—it is necessary and more relevant here to render *νοῦς* by “*intellect*”; and the *εἰκῆ*, *at random, rashly* [R.V. *vainly*], is more suitably joined with the “*intruding*” than with the “*being puffed up*”: but it may be taken either way.)

In conclusion, then, after a minute investigation, step by step, of the language and argument of the verse and context, the R.V. is seen to be in error throughout, and to give to the passage partly an entirely wrong sense, and partly no sense at all. The right reading and rendering of the verse will be as follows:—“Let no one condemn you at will in the matter of fasting and ceremonial religion [*or ordinances*] of the angels, rashly intruding into the things which, *I throw*, he hath not seen, being puffed up by his carnal intellect, and not holding fast the Head.”

JOHN B. McCLELLAN.

## THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE GOSPELS.

### IV. JESUS.

#### VARIOUS MODES OF UNDERSTANDING (St. John).

OUR investigation of the Gospel-tradition led us to the conclusion that there are different lines of thought, and various groups of sayings, which have each of them the



same claim to be accounted for, if we try to make out what was Jesus' own opinion. We will do our best to combine them in the way of a psychological analysis of the leading ideas in Jesus. Contrary to the order of our former investigation, we will begin with the third group of sayings, i.e. the non-eschatological group, which we found to cover the most space and to be of the highest importance.

(a) Jesus, as it is commonly said, started as a teacher of piety and morality. So at least people understood Him. They called him a rabbi, remarking, however, that there was something in Him far above the doctrine of the rabbis of His time. It has been proclaimed by many a rationalistic writer of recent time, and especially by modern Jewish authorities, that Jesus was nothing but a reformer of moral ideas, and that He did not go beyond the line of the best moralists of His time, such as, e.g., Rabbi Hillel. There are coincidences, of course, for Hillel also summed up the whole of the law in one sentence, the so-called golden rule. But we need only read attentively Jesus' explanation of the law as given in Matthew v. to see the difference. He expresses not an individual opinion which may be balanced by the authority of some other rabbi—the way in which the rabbinical schools of that time used to settle questions concerning the law—but gives *the* explanation; He fulfils the law, as it is said, by setting finally the rule which is to guide its interpretation. He even speaks with no less authority than the law itself: "You have heard that it was said to them of old time: but I say unto you," and sometimes He sets aside the letter of the law by giving higher ordinances of His own, as in the law of the Sabbath, the law of purification, the law of divorce, etc.

There are others who consider Him more than a rabbi, and are prepared to acknowledge that His teaching is rather to be compared with the teaching of the great

prophets of a former time, the prophets whose great work was to raise the religion of Israel to a higher platform of ethical conceptions. Jesus, it has been said, overcame the rabbinical Judaism of His time, with all its ritualistic and legalistic moralities, by going back to the simple and lofty standard of the old prophets. There is undoubtedly some truth in this statement. We need only read Mark vii. or x. to see how deeply Jesus' mind was filled with prophetic sayings, how He opposed Old Testament authority to the traditional doctrine of the rabbis of His time. But this touches only the form of His utterances, and you will remark that while the prophet is speaking in the name of his God, Jesus sets His own authority even against the Divine Law. There is something more in His teaching than a mere restoration of the old prophetic religion.

In the last twenty years there has been a great change as regards Jesus' teaching—or rather, our view of religion has been changed by rediscovering that morals, however important in religion, are not *the* religion, that there is in religion something beyond all that is moral, intellectual, aesthetic, some real intercourse with God. We may call this mysticism, only that it is not necessarily mysticism in the strict sense of the word with a naturalistic notion about Deity as its basis and including some materialistic means of intercourse with the Divine. In Judaism, certainly, this element of nature-religion had been cast away long before, and it came into Christianity only later through pagan influence. It marks the position of Jesus in the history of religion, that He is the culmination of that line of religion which has broken off all relation to the primitive cult of nature and has put in its place the idea of God's moral holiness, and that to do the will of God makes the man religious. But, as we have remarked already, to do the will of

God is not in itself the religion, but a part of it, or, rather, a consequence of it. The centre of religion is a real experience of God's presence and helpfulness, of His grace and mercy. And this is what we find in complete fulness in Jesus. It is only by taking account of this fundamental part of Jesus' doctrine, that we can hope to approach His own meaning as well as His position in the history of mankind. Jesus' teaching deals not so much with morals, however important the moral element of His teaching may be: He preaches a new relation of God to man and of man to God; or better, he brings, He represents this new relation. And this is, we may say confidently, what constitutes His distinction from, and His superiority to all prophets. He has in Himself the unity with God which He brings to mankind. He does not only tell how to realise a new form of relation to God; He embodies it in Himself.

(b) Now, without entering into the profound question of metaphysical speculation, we may simply say that Jesus, according to His own words, felt this relation to God to be unique in Himself, and that He had no other means of explaining it and speaking about it than by calling God His Father and Himself God's Son. We may be sure He supposed that the same relation ought to exist between God and every one else. But His refined moral sense must have discovered at a very early period of His life the difference between Himself and others in this respect, He Himself being in uninterrupted communion with His Father, while all others were separated from God by sin. He felt the longer, the more that it was His task to bring them into full communion with God. His life was to be devoted to this very aim, to remove all that could stand between God and mankind.

This is, I should think, the real meaning of what we call Jesus' "*Taufserlebnis*," the experience at the moment of

His baptism : He became aware of this as the task laid upon Him by His Father's will. This, at the same time, explains the story of the temptation, that in taking upon Him that task, He had to come to terms with the ordinary Messianic notion of His people. "*Thou art My beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased.*" This Jesus had known all His life ; but at this very moment it gained a new significance for Him. He was to be the Son of God, acknowledged as such by His people ; in other words, He was to be the Messiah.<sup>1</sup> Of course, Jesus did not think of Himself as the Messiah according to the current popular notion ; this He declined, as we learn from the story of the temptation. Whatever may be the kernel of this story, it shows that it is a mistake, in order to get at a solution of the problem, to start from the current popular notion and ask how Jesus could adopt this. The late Professor A. Merx (of Heidelberg) was quite right in denying that Jesus ever thought of adopting this.<sup>2</sup> We have to go the opposite way : we take it for granted that Jesus had a peculiar estimation of His own importance, what German theology calls His "*Selbstbewusstsein.*" Conscious as He was of a unique position involving a great task as well as a supreme authority, He had no other notion in the language of His people to describe this position than that of Messiah. Rabbi was a common title, expressing the human authority of scholarship, a man of letters, a man who studies and knows the law. Jesus was no man of letters : He of course knew the law, but not by scholarly training ; He knew it as the will of His Father. He was far above all that could be meant by calling Him a rabbi. Nor would prophet have been sufficient to express His own self-appreciation ; there had

<sup>1</sup> Cp. on this topic E. Schürer, *Das messianische Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*, Göttingen, 1903.

<sup>2</sup> *Die vier kanonischen Evangelien*, ii. 1, 1902, 186 and passim.



been prophets in great number: He knew His position was unique; the prophets had all been talking about a time of fulfilment to come: He was bringing this time. They all derived their authority from a special calling, from individual acts of inspiration: He did not need such calling; His understanding of God His Father was beyond all inspiration. So to express His unique position there was no other means than to adopt the title of Messiah, and to express His task there was no other way than to preach the Kingdom of God, because the Messiah was to bring salvation, and the Kingdom of God was the most comprehensive term for final salvation. Both notions undoubtedly included at that time many other things. So it has been said, with some appearance of truth, that Jesus, when adopting such terms in a sense different from the current one, was bound to give at the beginning of His teaching a clear statement about His own understanding of it. As He did not do so, He must, we are told, have taken the notions in their current sense, and we are bound to accept them in the realistic meaning of late Jewish eschatology. I do not think the presuppositions are right: Jesus was not a philosopher proceeding upon definitions and conclusions. He was a preacher, or rather, His way was preaching. And we see Him going on slowly in His declarations. He likes to make men find out by themselves what He is. You remember His answer to the Baptist. He likes to put forth things in such a way that they are clear for those who are willing to understand, whereas others may guess as they like. Mark is surely not quite wrong in his statement regarding the parabolic form of Jesus' teaching—parables including indeed, besides their proper aim of illustrating, some element of concealment. So it is easy enough to explain how the Messiahship of Jesus came to be looked upon by His disciples as a mystery not to be revealed to the people.

There is no necessity for accepting the ingenious, but rather too ingenious, theory of the late Professor W. Wrede (of Breslau),<sup>1</sup> who maintained this conception of a mystery to involve the implicit confession that at a later time two opposite views were combined, viz., an earlier view regarding Jesus as Messiah only after His death and resurrection, and a later one taking Him as Messiah already in His lifetime.

As an example of Jesus' own way of dealing with His Messiahship, let us take His entrance into Jerusalem, which usually is declared to be the most solemn form of Messianic self-declaration. But where is the Messianic element? To ride upon an ass is a very common fashion, occurring frequently in Talmudic narratives regarding celebrated rabbis. The devotion of His adherents in breaking branches from the trees and putting their garments in the way, is not so extraordinary in eastern lands as it may seem to western readers. Even the shouting, "*Hosanna! Blessed He who comes in the name of the Lord,*" is not by itself a clear statement of Messiahship, for Matthew, as a matter of fact, says that the people declared Jesus to be the prophet from Galilee (xxi. 11). So His entrance was not interpreted as a royal one, as a solemn declaration of Messianic dignity. I quite agree that Jesus Himself meant to enter the capital of His people as the Messiah, and that by riding on an ass He intended to make allusion to the prophecy of Zechariah; but the manner He chose for His entrance was very fit for declaring His Messianic dignity to those who were able and inclined to understand and to conceal it from the others. Whatever one may think of this behaviour, I am sure there is no other means of explaining the tradition. Jesus goes His way in the full consciousness of His unique position; but while others would have spoken of their mission in the highest terms,

<sup>1</sup> *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*, 1901.

He only preaches the Kingdom of God, and chooses for Himself the lowest of all Messianic titles—a title not even regarded as involving Messiahship by the mass of the people. He does His work, and He leaves it to His Father to reveal His Son to mankind. This He tells us in that famous saying called usually, according to Luke's introduction, "the Agalliasis" (Luke x. 21, 22; Matt. xi. 25, 27). Jesus is the Messiah. However slow may be the understanding of His claim on the part of His disciples, He is the Messiah from the very beginning of His public career, and not only, as has been said recently,<sup>1</sup> from the time of His transfiguration. This transfiguration has significance not for Himself but for His disciples, the heavenly voice being not a declaration on the part of the Father to the Son, like that at the baptism, "*Thou art My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased,*" but rather a declaration to the witnesses on behalf of the Son, "*This is My beloved Son: hear ye Him*" (Mark ix. 7).<sup>2</sup>

Jesus not only preaches the Kingdom of Heaven, He brings it by casting out devils and forgiving sins, by healing diseases and filling men with a new spirit, by spreading around Himself an atmosphere of happiness and salvation. Whoever enjoys in company with Him His complete communion with God, belongs to the Kingdom and gets all its blessings.

All this belongs to what we called the transmuted eschatology; this best expresses Jesus' proper view. The second group of sayings, however small it may be, is the most conspicuous: Jesus the Messiah, i.e. the Saviour bringing actual and present salvation to all those who

<sup>1</sup> Harnack, *Sprüche Jesu*, 138, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Harnack (l.c. 172<sub>2</sub>) is quite right insisting upon the priority of the *Sohnesbewusstsein* compared with the *Messiasbewusstsein*; but these two steps in the evolution of Jesus' self-consciousness correspond to the period before His public ministry and during it, not to two parts of His public life.



follow Him, salvation indeed in a purely religious and moral sense, very different from what people expected: "*Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.*"

(c) There still remains the first group of purely eschatological sayings, and we have now to try to make out their significance for Jesus Himself and His disciples. Thinking of Jesus as a teacher of systematic theology, one would be inclined to say: Granted that Jesus was persuaded that He was the Messiah in the true religious sense of the word and brought salvation to His people, there was no need of talking about a future Kingdom of God or of a coming again in the clouds of heaven. These are notions belonging to a former stage of religious insight, and corrected and overthrown by Jesus' own new views. Transmuted eschatology makes eschatology an unnecessary and even wrong supposition. So one could argue; but I do not think that this is right. Jesus, looking upon the misunderstanding and even hatred with which He met, could not think of His actual work as being the final establishment of God's Kingdom. Jesus reading the Holy Scriptures could not help acknowledging that the prophecies wanted some other fulfilment. Being convinced that He was the Messiah, and that He was bringing salvation to His people and all mankind, He had to look forward to a final success, and it was only in the forms given by the prophets of old and by the apocalyptic tradition that He could imagine it. Being sure that He represented in Himself the culmination of the religious history of His people, He could only think of Himself, trained as He was in Jewish views, as standing at the end of history, at the meeting-point of the two ages. Thus His coming back with the clouds of heaven in the glory of the Father and the holy angels must needs occur in a very short time. This, I think, is the way in which one may easily explain how Jesus came to accept the eschato-



logical views of His time. Conservative as He was, I think this was only natural for Him (if we are allowed to apply psychology to so exceptional a case). He did but add eschatological expectation to His conviction of being already in an eschatological relationship to the world, the term being understood in the transmuted sense. It was an inevitable consequence of His trust in God His Father. God could not leave His work undone or only half done. He would certainly bring it to a plain issue. He was bound to fulfil all His promises. Salvation, as brought by Jesus, was only an individual and inward experience; it ought to be some collective and outward fact. It is, as we have seen, characteristic of Jesus' eschatological teaching, that He makes no efforts to get a more detailed view of eschatology; he confines Himself to repeating the outlines of what was given by prophetic and apocalyptic tradition, emphasising only two points, viz., the responsibility of men regarding the coming judgment and that He Himself is the Son of Man, who will pronounce judgment. As he expressly says about the time, that no one, not even the Son, but only the Father knows it, so He leaves to the Father also the form in which all that is to be expected will be fulfilled. He only expresses His own opinion that it will happen soon, so that men must be prepared, and that it will be glorious, so that He Himself will be justified even in the eyes of His enemies, who condemned Him to death.

If we take it in this fashion, we shall easily come to a fair understanding. And we shall, I think, discover at the same time how to deal with the difficult question whether Jesus was misled in His expectation.

In fact, He did not come back in the clouds of heaven in the lifetime of His own generation. He has not come yet. The history of the world did not come to an end soon after mankind reached its highest religious level

in Jesus ; it has continued through many centuries, going up and down, mankind falling back to a lower standard and climbing again, but never reaching the height represented in Jesus. So He was wrong in His expectation. Was He really ? If we keep to the letter of His words, we cannot help agreeing that He was wrong regarding the outward form of His predictions, and especially the time of God's fulfilment. But this does not involve, I am sure, any imperfection on His side, any more than His opinion about the sun as a star going around the earth, or about the Pentateuch as a book written by Moses. In all these respects He was a Jew of His time. But as we have remarked already, the form of His expectation was unimportant even for Himself. He left it to His Father how and when He would realise it. His belief was that His work and His own person could not be overthrown, that His work, confined as it was to a small circle, should gain universal importance and undisputed success, and that He Himself should be acknowledged by every man as what He was : the King of the Kingdom of God.

Now in this expectation He was not wrong. His work has gone on through His death and resurrection in a wonderful way : the Church founded by His disciples upon belief in His name, has spread through the world, and will—so we hope—gain the whole earth. He Himself is acknowledged and adored as the Son of God by millions and millions of believers. Looking back through history, we may see His work in the judgment upon His nation, the Holy City being destroyed and the nation scattered over the world. So far Luke's interpretation is right ; only it is the view of a later time regarding Jesus' prophecies in the light of a fulfilment, and he himself did not think in this way. We may truly say that it pleased God to fulfil Jesus' words thus, but we would be guilty of false witness if we dared to maintain that Jesus Himself expressed this as His own opinion. . . .

## II.

Beside this historical *ex eventu* interpretation, there is another, which is regarded by many a pious Christian as the true one. I mean the interpretation given to the eschatological sayings in the Fourth Gospel. I have avoided up till now making use of this Gospel, the reason for which will be seen presently. Our research, however, would not be complete if we did not at least glance at it.

As a specimen I select two passages dealing with Jesus' coming (xiv. 15-29), and with the judgment (v. 19-29), two notions of undoubted eschatological origin.

(a.) It is rather hard to say what the coming in chap. xiv. may be meant to be. As the sayings concerning this idea are placed now between other sayings dealing with the coming of the Comforter, one would feel inclined to say: it is Jesus coming by His Spirit; it is at Pentecost that this promise was fulfilled. But there is evidently some distinction between the sending of the Comforter and the coming of Jesus Himself. When we compare chap. xvi. v. 16, "*A little while, and ye behold Me no more (ye shall not see Me, A.V.), and again a little while, and ye shall see Me,*" we feel compelled to think of the appearances of the risen Lord. And this would suit very well the question of that other Judas (chap. xiv. v. 22): "*Lord, what is come to pass that Thou wilt manifest Thyself unto us, and not unto the world?*" The risen Lord appeared, as has been remarked from the earliest time, only to His believers, and the Greek used here, *ἐμφανίζειν ἑαυτόν*, is a technical term for appearances of healing gods who come to visit their adherents in dreams. But let us look more closely at the two verses, xvi. 16 and xiv. 19, and it will appear that there is a marked difference. The former, "*A little while, and ye behold Me no more, and again a little while, and ye shall see Me,*" has certainly to do with death and resurrection. But the latter



in the passage before us, "*Yet a little while, and the world beholdeth Me no more, but ye behold Me; because I live, <and> ye shall live also,*" runs quite differently. It is the abiding communion of the Lord with His disciples, unbroken even by death, which finds here a splendid exposition. That this is the true meaning will be seen by the answer given to Judas: "*If a man love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and WE will come unto him, and make our abode with him.*" It is impossible not to see that this means nothing else than an inward dwelling of God and of the Lord in the hearts of Christians, what we may call mystical union, although St. John understands it rather in an ethical than in a mystical way. Even this idea of an indwelling God can be traced back to an eschatological conception, found in the Old Testament prophets: God abiding in the midst of His people, either in the temple of His Holy City, or perhaps, as it is put in the Christian apocalypse, instead of the temple. There is no need of sunlight, God Himself being in their midst. But you will easily observe how much this is altered. There is no more eschatology; its place has been taken by mysticism; the nation has given place to the individual. Instead of dwelling in the midst of His people, God is dwelling inwardly in the hearts of the individual believers. Now when we ask, Is this Jesus or is it a Johannine conception, one may at first sight be inclined to think of it as a genuine utterance of the Lord. It is very like what we have called transmuted eschatology. I need only remind you of our interpretation of the word *ἐντὸς ὑμῶν* (Luke xvii. 21), which we found to represent Jesus' own teaching, that the kingdom is "within you," i.e. something inward, an experience of the heart, a rule governing man's will. But—we must remark the very important difference—it is the Kingdom of God which is here spoken of, not God or Jesus; it is a purely ethical



inwardness, expressed by these words, while there is some mystical element in the words as given by the Fourth Gospel, personal union between God and man, Jesus and man. And this is not an original view of Jesus ; it is, however, what we find in St. John elsewhere. We need only compare Revelation iii. 20 : “ *Behold, I stand at the door and knock : if any man hear my voice and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with Me.* ” It is the well-known eschatological notion of a Messianic supper, where all the saints will be at table with the Son of Man and the patriarchs. Only it is not said here, “ He who hears my voice shall enter into the wedding and sit down at My table,” but, “ I will come in to him and will sup with him.” It is again an inward and individual experience instead of an outward and collective fact ; the eschatological picture is turned into some mystical idea. Here we have the Johannine conception as we found it in the Gospel. So I venture to say : The coming of the Lord promised by Himself as an outward eschatological act is changed into an inward mystical experience by this Johannine colouring of His words. I quite agree that there is some connexion with one line of Jesus’ thoughts. His conception of the ethical inwardness of religion reacted upon the eschatological ideas, and out of this combination there arose what we rightly may call the Johannine mysticism. Only, in order to understand this process thoroughly, we must remember that it was not in Palestine but in Asia Minor that St. John—whoever he was—lived ; that he was surrounded by a Hellenistic atmosphere ; and that this, full of mysticism, helped to transform his Jewish conceptions. The ethical inwardness of Jesus and the mysticism of Hellenistic religion had to co-operate in order to produce this change of attitude. So it happened that the idea of the Parousia was turned into the idea of Jesus coming into the hearts of His believers.

This interpretation, however, does not account for the whole passage we are dealing with. We do not reach the full meaning of its content if we confine ourselves to this mystical colouring of the original eschatological conception. There is another element in it, which we may call an historical adaptation: the coming of Jesus is understood as meaning the appearances of the risen Lord. This at least is the meaning of some words in these chapters, as we have seen before, the promises of Jesus that He would come again being interpreted from the experiences of the earliest Christianity as fulfilled in the appearances of the risen Lord.

Another experience was the coming of the Holy Ghost, and this led to the juxtaposition of the sayings regarding the Comforter with the sayings about Jesus' own coming, with the result that the latter may now be understood as identical with the former.

So we may rightly distinguish a triple stratification: (1) the underlying eschatological one, representing Jesus' own view; (2) the mystical one, which we may call the main Johannine stratum; and (3) a twofold historical adaptation: Jesus' coming is to be seen in His appearances or in His sending the Comforter; both these adaptations may be attributed to a later stage of Johannine thought, represented by the author of the Fourth Gospel, whom I believe to have been a pupil of John the Presbyter, the Elder of Ephesus.

(b) The other passage which I choose as an illustration is found in chap. v. vv. 19-29. This passage deals with resurrection and judgment, two notions which undoubtedly belong to the eschatological stock of late Jewish doctrines, and are found in Jesus' teaching in their original meaning. But here in the Fourth Gospel we have them coloured almost to an opposite meaning. Except the last two verses, the

passage in question deals entirely with the spiritual experiences of Christianity. The judgment—or, as I would prefer to translate, the discrimination—between good and bad happens not at the end of the world, but, as it is said in chap. iii. *vv.* 18–21, when Jesus preaches (or the gospel is preached) and one man believes and the other refuses. This is what the Fourth Gospel calls the judgment, a self-going-on process, an automatic judgment upon the moral work of men: those who do well will be attracted by the light of the gospel, those who do badly will withdraw from this light. And so their fate will be decided without any special judgment having to be pronounced on the part of God. This is called *ἡ κρίσις*, *the judgment* (R.V.), or, as the Authorised Version has it, *the condemnation*. So it is said: “*He that heareth My word, and believeth Him that sent Me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgement but hath passed out of death into life*” (or, *is passed from death unto life*, A.V.). This gives the old notion of resurrection, but changed into something inward, so that it reminds us of the teaching of the Gnostics, as given by the Pastoral Epistles, that the resurrection has already taken place (*ἀνάστασιν ἤδη γεγονέναι*, 2 Tim. ii. 18). This spiritualising tendency of Johannine teaching is best seen in chap. v. *v.* 25, “*Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live.*” This sounds purely eschatological, very like the description of the great act of resurrection as we find it e.g. in St. Paul’s first letter to the Thessalonians (iv. 16), “*For the Lord Himself shall descend from heaven, with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first.*” But as it stands in John v. it cannot be taken in this eschatological sense, but only in a spiritual one: the dead are men dead in their sin; the voice of the Son of God is the preaching of Jesus; not all are listening



to it, only some hear it, i.e. credit Him, believe in Him ; those who believe gain life, not only a life of future time, but life in the full sense of the word, presently.

This meaning here is unmistakable. But the Fourth Gospel does not stop here ; it goes on supplementing the inward spiritual view by an outward eschatological outlook, and thereby distinguishing Johannine theology from the doctrine of Gnostic heretics. We read nearly the same words again, only a few verses later on, v. 28, 29, but now in a clear eschatological form : “ *Marvel not at this ; for the hour cometh, in which all that are in the tombs shall hear His voice, and shall come forth, they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment* ” (or better, *damnation*, A.V.). It is quite clear : these verses are dealing with some future event—there is no word about the hour being now, as in v. 25 ; they speak of a general resurrection—there is no distinction between those who hear and those who do not hear ; they indicate a bodily resurrection—“ *all that are in the tombs* ” is not susceptible of a spiritual interpretation as “ *the dead* ” of v. 25. There are two different notions of life expressed in these two verses : inward, present, spiritual ; and external, future ; in one word, eschatological. Chap. v. vv. 28, 29 gives indeed the description of what is called in Revelation xx. 7–15 the second resurrection, only that what precedes in v. 25 does not correspond to the first resurrection in Revelation xx. 1–6. It is not so much a first and a second resurrection as a regeneration and then a resurrection. Of course, vv. 28, 29, as they are put now, are meant to be an explanatory repetition, a corroboration and at the same time an interpretation of v. 25 ; but taken in their proper sense, they deal with two quite different notions and originate in different conceptions ; vv. 28, 29 give the current popular eschatology in its realistic form,



which has been transmuted by spiritualising in *v.* 25. The curious phenomenon here is that the transmuted eschatology appears as the main line, the underlying popular eschatology only as an additional feature.

Now this comes very near to what we found in Jesus' own teaching : transmuted eschatology with an additional element of real eschatology ; it is, however, not quite the same. There is a slight difference which prevents us from tracing back this Johannine tradition immediately to Jesus Himself. He never speaks of the judgment as some inward experience of man : to Him it is some future event. He often talks about entering into life, but never as done by the very act of believing in His word : to do so is a privilege granted by God or His Messiah in a future time. On the other side, the idea of a bodily resurrection of all mankind on the day of judgment, so common in late Jewish literature and not uncommon even in the Synoptic Gospels, belongs rather to that stratum of later eschatological additions which we recognised there in our first lecture.

Here we may stop our inquiry into the Johannine branch of Gospel-tradition. The two illustrations I ventured to give will be sufficient, I trust, to show the complicated nature of Johannine doctrines, and what I think to be the right way of dealing with them. There are different stratifications, as modern research (Wendt, Spitta, Wellhausen, Ed. Schwartz) has made more and more conspicuous. Beside some genuine sayings of the Lord, we have what may be called the Johannine tradition, resting largely upon original conceptions of Jesus, but transforming them in the direction of mysticism ; and then we have some additional matter, in our case the real eschatology, which perhaps may be traced back to the author of the Fourth Gospel, as distinguished from St. John ; it is, however, possible that it belongs to

a later redaction, of which chap. xxi. gives ample proof.

The main Johannine stratum, with its characteristics of individualistic, ethical, inward transformation of the current Jewish eschatology, bears signs of close affinity to the gospel of Jesus; but at the same time there is a marked difference: the Johannine doctrine has a distinct touch of mysticism, which is entirely wanting in the teaching of Jesus, and is to be explained by Hellenistic influences.

The validity of this distinction being granted, we may, without fear of misunderstanding, declare that we take the Johannine doctrine as an approximately good expression of Jesus' own views. The mystical inwardness of St. John certainly approaches far more nearly to Jesus' real meaning than the enlarging and enforcing of His eschatological utterances which we remarked in some passages of the Synoptic Gospels, especially St. Matthew. However strong Jesus' belief in eschatology might have been, it was only of secondary importance for His religious life, and for His teaching. It was a misunderstanding on the part of primitive Christianity when they laid the greatest stress on this side of the gospel. It may be called even a sign of decline that the expectation of some outward, realistic event overgrew the joyful experience of inward, present salvation. Later Christianity, when following the Johannine line of thought, came nearer to the true intention of Jesus Himself, notwithstanding His own belief in realistic eschatology.

Christianity is—and will ever be—the religion of sure salvation, brought by Jesus and to be experienced by His believers already during their present life. This does not exclude Christian hope. On the contrary, the more present salvation is experienced in mankind, the stronger Christian hope will be. This is the great lesson given to us by Jesus Himself; He realised in Himself the complete and supreme communion with God, and yet He looked forward to a

time of final salvation. He was the Son of God, and He had to bring salvation; but His gospel reached only few, and only individuals realised what was given to them in Jesus! However fully they submitted their own will to God, there were powers of evil outside them. The Kingdom of God is not established so long as its dominion is only recognised by individuals; it wants to be collective, universal. Jesus' victory over Satan, His casting out of devils, was only an anticipation.

And this is the abiding truth in eschatology: it is to be sought not in the particulars of Jesus' coming and similar details, but in the fact that we have to expect and to pray for a state of things in which God's dominion will be fully established, and all obstacles, all evil energies finally destroyed.<sup>1</sup> We have seen in St. John's Gospel—and the later history of Christianity affords plenty of similar examples—that this looking out for some external real change is well combined with the finest and best inwardness. The Christian is a new creature, but he looks for a new heaven and a new earth, and his prayer will be for ever as His Lord taught him: "*Thy kingdom come.*"

E. VON DOBSCHÜTZ.

### MIRACLES AND THE MODERN CHRISTIAN MIND.

"It is time," observes a recent writer, "that defenders of the Christian faith gave up apologising for it." The tendency to apologise for religious belief, so justly reprobated, has made itself felt nowhere more markedly than in connexion with miracles. All sorts of ingenious excuses have been offered for their occurrence in Bible times. They were necessary, as it has been put, "to arrest the attention

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Dr. Kölbing (formerly Principal of the Moravian Seminary at Gnadefeld): *Die bleibende Bedeutung der urchristlichen Eschatologie*, 1907.

of an age whose modes of thought were simpler and less scientific than our own, and to which they would appeal as a perfectly appropriate mode of spiritual address." The idea that once miracle supported faith, but now faith supports miracle, is likewise very familiar, and in certain quarters has come to be regarded virtually as 'common form.' Nor would any wise man dream of denying that modern radical critics have often enough been right, or that the Church ought not ungratefully to overlook the help they have given in relieving faith of responsibility for some of the dead matter which has so far kept its place in the Christian tradition. That is always a service which clear-eyed religion welcomes. Believing too much may prevent a man from believing worthily. His faith, like his brain, may be overtaxed.

But in eliminating what is unfit to survive, in operating for *Aberglaube* or over-belief, we have need to beware of cutting a nerve that is really vital, though a hasty inspection may have pronounced it unessential. That has happened before in Church history. And the present paper is an attempt to show that it is what always happens when miracles are excised from the Christian creed. Able men tell the Church to-day that abandonment of the supernatural is the price of their return to her allegiance, but they know not what they ask. The Church that parts with the supernatural will have parted with the springs of gladness. Quite apart from opinions we may form as to this or that Bible narrative there are elements in living faith at this hour which, if they mean anything, mean what is miraculous to the core. They are intelligible only as implying, and constituting, a supernatural relation between God and man. And to be clear about this cannot but affect our conclusions as to what was or was not likely in the first century. Or to put the issue as directly as



possible : if a man is not a Christian, his experience does not apparently furnish him with the materials for belief in miracle, and, so long as his attitude to Jesus remains what it is, I see no way in which he could be convinced that miracle is real. On the contrary, if a man *is* a Christian, it is possible to show, by a sympathetic analysis of his experience, that by virtue of his attitude to God in Christ he is already committed to faith in the supernatural, not as something merely that came to intermittent manifestation in the first century, but rather as that which, for every Christian, is real now and here.

A certain disposition, it may be noted, has often shown itself within the Church to sanction as Christian the confused idea that miracles may possibly have happened once, but are unknown to-day ; the rider being added, in certain quarters, that since they do not happen now, the question whether they ever happened at all is of no great consequence. The age of miracles is past. It may be that bibliolatry has aided the currency of this notion among Protestants. The Bible, it is rightly held, is the record of God's personal approach to man, supremely in Jesus Christ ; but the erroneous inference is drawn from this that the life of Jesus, and perhaps also the adjacent age, formed a holy island in the sea of history ; a sacred precinct where, it may well be, events took place of a very remarkable kind, but just such events as from the nature of the case had no need to occur again. Clearly this line of argument, to be convincing, must tacitly involve the premise that a change has come about either in the character of God or in the moral situation of man. If God is farther off from the world than in the first century, or if man can now redeem himself, the cessation of miracle is no great wonder. But if we are still captives of sin and death, and if God is still loving and mighty, it is difficult to see why His saving interposition

should be less in place now than previously. And this means that miracle is still a live interest of faith. For a moment conceive the evidence for Bible miracles being a score of times stronger than it is ; conceive it being so strong as to be virtually unassailable : in spite of this, if these miraculous occurrences had nothing in common with our own experience, if they were completely out of line with what we know God's loving care is effectuating in our lives now, religion would simply have no concern with them whatever. Like the pound-notes of a bank that broke fifty years ago, they would be worthless. And conversely, if our experience to-day exhibits no trace of a power of God which neither nature nor humanity, functioning in their normal ways, can explain, that is an argument against the historicity of the New Testament record, so far as it includes miracle, which absolutely nothing can get over. We may assume, therefore, that the experience of the first age and of our own really hangs together. For the Christian Deism that puts miracle into the first century but denies it to the twentieth, there is nothing to be said, either from the philosophic or the religious point of view. Only as deep is felt calling unto deep, only as we trace a transcendent saving power of God in life to-day, have we the courage or the desire to believe the amazing things proclaimed by the apostles. All discussion of miracle, therefore, which does not presuppose the Christian experience of redemption, is labour thrown away.

It is not too much to say, indeed, that faith in miracle is both more difficult to-day, and more vital, than ever previously. Why is this ? Just because we perceive the alternatives with a sharpness and decision that no age has ever equalled. The modern mind has taken in the conception of the world as a closed system of physical sequences. And in the main that conception is a modern

novelty. Exaggerated statements have no doubt been made as to the absence from Biblical minds of the idea of natural law. We are invited to suppose that there existed for them no fixed order of any kind, so that the opening of blind eyes and the resurrection of dead men were in no way felt to be astonishing or exceptional events. Why in that case Scripture writers should have formed the idea of miracle at all, it is hard to comprehend; since by hypothesis anything might happen, and there could be no such thing as a startling or significant exception. Clearly this will not do. In New Testament days they were as much aware as we are that a dead man normally remains dead. The sisters in Bethany understood too well the finality of the grave to have any hope that Lazarus would return to life. Nevertheless, true as this is, it ought not to be allowed to obscure what is the differential feature of Bible thinking, namely, the belief that all events, normal and abnormal, stand in an equally direct relation to the power of God. All things are immediately under His control and flow forth from His activity. This being so, it was easier and more natural for men of that time to hold fast the conviction that within the course of the world God is able to manifest His power in exceptional modes of action.

To-day, however, the situation is very different. To-day the Christian believer is faced by the conception—often enunciated as the basal presupposition of all science—that the world is an inviolable system of mechanical causation, a complex unity of rigidly fixed forces, acting and interacting in absolutely pre-determined ways.<sup>1</sup> This conception is ardently engendered in innumerable minds not merely as an assumption justly made by the scientific investigator,

<sup>1</sup> For a classical criticism of this theory see Professor James Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.

but as the last and highest truth about the world accessible to the human intelligence. Religious thinkers who are in earnest with such a notion must feel as if a rigid world-system had come to stand between God and man ; it is (so to speak) a fate for Him no less than for ourselves. The course of history, equally with the course of nature, is only clock-work running down, and to talk about God's love intervening, at any point, or acting directly upon us, becomes merely unintelligent. "We are," as Huxley put it, "but parts of the great series of causes and effects which in an unbroken continuity composes that which is and has been and shall be—the sum of existence." I will not dwell upon the point that if this view of the world bars out miracle, it does so for reasons that bar out many other things beside ; as, for example, free moral action and everything that may be described as spontaneity or mental activity in the human past. Man's volition, indeed, counts for nothing in the course of events. It is very possible that the protest we raise, in the name of ethics, against this barely mechanical theory, this iron law of sequences, may open doors into the transcendent that let in much more than moral freedom. But at least it is now clear what is meant by the statement that faith in the supernatural is vital to-day just because it is so difficult. We feel as never before how much we stand to lose by the surrender of this faith. As it has been put : "With the increasing pressure of this notion of iron law, there is an increasing sense of the need of a power above it. Instead of being a drag upon faith, the miraculous, the idea of revelation, or whatever you choose to call it, is once more going to be a pillar of it." <sup>1</sup> If we are not to confess that heredity makes us prisoners to the past, and environment to the present, the belief must be held fast

<sup>1</sup> Figgis, *The Gospel and Human Needs*, p. 21.



that this mesh-work of cosmic forces is the expression of a conscious Will, not confined to, or exhausted in, these forces, but able to use them for His independent aims.

In what follows I wish to put forward the suggestion that the Christian, *quâ* Christian, has no option but to believe in the supernatural, because his own experience as a religious man is full of it. Reserving the question as to whether they can somehow be linked together in a unity, we may say that there are three obvious aspects of the believing attitude to God which are essential to faith and yet implicitly affirm at the same time that Divine freedom of action within the world, that free use on God's part of the natural order, which is equivalent to miracle.

(1) *The faith that prayer is answered.* We are justified, I think, in holding first that Christian faith is unreal apart from prayer, and next that prayer itself implies a belief in some sort of direct communion with God. Is this belief true? Do I have actual communion with the Father, in which He acts freely upon me and I in my own measure act on Him? Is there fellowship between us which is a real fact for His mind no less than for my own? When I pray, am I indulging in a mental exercise that merely stimulates me by its reflex influence, as a boy keeps his courage up by whistling; or am I in truth responding to the direct touch of God on my soul? Of course the purely reflex theory has its advocates, but it is usually only a question of time until they begin to feel that if they are right the word "prayer" is a misnomer. Once prove to men that supplication reaches no ear but their own, and that its influence moves always within the circle of their own mind (the subliminal self included, if there is such a thing), and they will give over praying, as an extremely roundabout mode of attaining what may be attained much more directly. That view of prayer cannot be right, how-

ever, which at once puts an end to prayer when it is clearly grasped.

The man who prays, therefore, instinctively and of necessity holds to the real nature of fellowship with God. He is conscious that the Divine mind and his own are in a real relation of reciprocal activity. Now the point to note is that such fellowship is essentially a supernatural thing. It is something that simply breaks through the mechanical theory according to which the universe is a closed system of necessary causation, admitting of no free intervention from within or without. It means that God is entering into personal converse with man, and that man is answering back again. This, from the point of view of a world completely "given," and so, as Laplace put it, capable of deduction from its formula, is as miraculous a fact as we could wish. No man, then, who holds that prayer is truly heard and answered can with any logical consistency deny the possibility of miracle, nor can any one who utterly denies miracle justifiably contend that prayer is heard. The two things hang together. We have in fact to choose, to say whether or no we shall conceive the world in such wise as to admit of a living fellowship between God and man. And if, being Christians, we cling to the fact of communion with God as the most certain of all certainties, we are implicitly affirming a relation of ethical freedom both on God's side and ours, not a relationship every change in which is mathematically calculable beforehand.

To take at once the test case, can Jesus' life of prayer be regarded as anything more than a delusion, if we adopt the view that the world is a closed system? If it be replied: Yes, but Jesus had a different conception of the universe from ours, the statement indeed is incontestable, but quite irrelevant. Had the faith of Jesus hung upon a certain view of the world, it might have perished—it would

have perished—with the inevitable advance of science and philosophy. But it hung upon a certain view of God, and this we men of to-day may share.

Thus in the supremely Christian act of praying in the assurance to be heard, we implicitly take for granted the reality of the supernatural. It matters not one whit though the blessings we seek are spiritual rather than physical. There is no principle of philosophy, and certainly there is none in Christian faith, to justify that distinction.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, we conciliate no one by renouncing the right to pray for blessings physical; for after all the universe is one, and is orderly throughout, and from the point of view of science the hearing of a prayer for inward grace is just as inexplicable, and no more, than the hearing of prayer for the cure of mortal disease. And it seems to follow from the above that the man who does not pray is scarcely qualified to form an opinion as to whether miracles are real or not. He throws away the best chance open to him of contemplating a miracle (so to speak) on its inner side.

(2) *The faith that the world is providentially governed.* This also is an element that no one will deny to be vital to Christian religion. And vital in the strictest sense of that word; personal Christianity cannot live without it. It is set at the heart of the religious view of the world, and diffuses a particular kind of atmosphere over the whole of our

<sup>1</sup> “The conception of a mechanically determinate system of law claims to dominate the psychical realm quite as much as the physical. We must break with that conception (as anything more than a scientifically useful fiction) in the former realm, if we are to believe in real answers to prayer for spiritual grace; and if we break with it there, it is philosophically inconsistent to admit its complete validity in the physical world. The experimental demonstrations of the existence of particular physical laws can place no difficulty in our path. For such demonstrations prove only that the laws hold good under all the conditions covered by the experiment.” From a striking article by Professor A. H. Hogg on “Christianity as Emancipation from this World,” in the *Madras Christian College Magazine* for August, 1909.

experience. Apart from a robust and all-pervading conviction that Almighty God is ruling all things, and ruling them in perfect love, our faith is not continuous with the faith of the New Testament; it is no longer the faith that overcomes the world. Now I wish to put the question whether it is possible to hold that God really governs the universe, except by implicitly assuming what is tantamount to miracle. Of course (as in certain philosophies) He might *be* the universe, and in that case the conception of miracle were unmeaning; or again, He might *watch* it, its ills and agonies, from afar off, and on such terms also the religious interest in miracle would have vanished. But can He govern it except as He affects its course of movement, and affects it by way of real initiation? Can He govern it at all unless He interposes creatively, as a *vera causa*? I find it difficult to understand what significance we are to attach to the providence of God, in which every Christian believes, if He is to be regarded simply as contemplating the cosmic processes at every point, and letting them have their own way. There is no answer, as it seems to me, to Lotze's words: "One who regards the world as a system of causes and effects in which there are no free beginnings, has no right to speak of it as being governed at all."<sup>1</sup> Now a miracle is nothing more or less than a free beginning on God's part. I am not saying we can demonstrate the reality of it. Perhaps we do well to distrust all demonstrations, both for and against, on such subjects. But I say that if we exclude the very possibility that such a thing should be, we leave God nothing to do in governing the world. In particular His providence can no longer be given an immediate relation to the life of every individual; whereas it is the first and last certainty of the Christian

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Religion* (Conybeare's translation), p. 113.



mind that God is able to help each one of us, in all places and at all times, that His care for each is as personal and as direct as if there were no other soul in being. The message of Jesus is built on this. But how the care of God is to touch the individual life if for Him "free beginnings" are excluded, is indeed hard to say. So that we have here a point right in the centre of faith at which the reality of the supernatural comes home to us directly.

Of course there is a large group of writers who assure us that faith in Providence is something very different. What faith in Providence means, they say, is this. My assurance that I am God's child so fills me with strength that I am more than equal to the burdens and adversities of life. My soul is so raised above the world as to be independent of its accidents, able to draw nourishment from all that happens, however dark or hostile. Calamity is felt not to be a fate, but an inspiring summons to effort. We believe in Providence, therefore, when we rise to the confession that all things may be viewed as having their place in a vast beneficent Divine plan. Nothing in the causal nexus of the world is altered—there is no modification of the course of events in that sense—but the soul is suffused with power to overcome. What happens is a change within the human personality; faith in Providence arises in him as a spiritual capacity to interpret the processes of nature and history in a certain way. But outside his mind God alters nothing.

There is just one weak spot in this construction. If this is all that Providence means—the production in us of a certain spiritual temper—what shall we say regarding the man who has no faith? Is there a Divine care over his life also? *Ex hypothesi* he is not yet able to construe things in this believing way: no triumphant certainty lifts his soul above dark and disappointing episodes; does

it then follow that Providence is out of all relation to him? So it would appear. We read in Bousset that "God's personal care for us, in which we believe, would be perfectly ineffectual if we individuals did not understand and comprehend it."<sup>1</sup> Surely the Christian mind cannot acquiesce in such a view. Surely a man may look back on long years passed before he knew God as Father, well assured that even then, although as yet he had given not a thought to the Divine care, it was still around and above him, guiding him forward, despite his blindness, to the hour of opened eyes and penitent recognition. But if so, there is more by far in Providence than our interpretation of the course of things; it is something objective, an actual power of God in control of all that is, a power which is in real exercise. And faith will never be content with less than the conviction that the providence of God is not simply a collective religious name for the actings of cosmic forces, but a higher control which these forces serve.

A curious piece of evidence confirming the statement I have just made may be found in Bousset's own argument. After stating, on the next page, that "to pray is to lead our life under God's eyes and to accept our life from His hands," he proceeds in a strain that comes as a surprise to one who has followed his line of thought attentively. "If our life," he writes, "is based on this foundation, this attitude will again and again be concentrated in definite prayers for this and that. We shall again and again think and feel that a definite course of events may be of the utmost importance for our inward, higher life—perhaps, indeed, we may judge, necessary for its successful development. Now—so our faith tells us—we are not forbidden to ask God concerning the shaping of outward events and occurrences, and in such cases there is no absolute and permanent dividing line

<sup>1</sup> *Faith of a Modern Protestant*, p. 62.

between the important and the unimportant, the inward life and outward facts.”<sup>1</sup> These words are true, one feels, to the irrepressible instinct of the man who prays. Such a man knows that with God all things are possible—even, in Bousset’s phrase, ‘the shaping of outward events.’ But just as clearly they are words which it is impossible to reconcile with the uncompromising utterance two pages earlier, bidding us “admit at once, quite frankly, that nothing in the outside material world will be altered through our prayer, that nothing will happen that would not have happened without our prayer.” Bousset himself being witness, therefore, we see that faith is indissociable from the certainty that God does govern the world, that things happen in response to prayer which would not have happened without it. No theory, of history or metaphysics, can stifle that assurance. And the real control of things on God’s part demanded by it is, as we have seen, obviously and unequivocally supernatural in character.

(3) *The faith that sin is forgiven.* Here we come still closer to the heart of personal religious experience. And once more what calls for emphasis is the wholly supernatural character of that experience. For every man who has received the forgiveness of God knows that a change has passed upon him that nothing in nature or in himself can explain.

Few things in the Gospel record are more significant than that scene at Capernaum (Mark ii.) when Jesus healed the sick of the palsy. It is clear that to Jesus the word of healing and the word of pardon were both miraculous. Men, as we know, can neither cure disease nor forgive sin by a word. For them to talk of either thing is easy—and useless. But when the paralytic rose up and carried out his bed, Jesus bade His critics mark the demonstration

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* p. 63.

implied in the cure that His pronouncement of pardon was just as effectual. Pardon and cure are the two aspects of salvation for the whole man ; and the power of God alone can explain either. As it has been put : “ It is not declarations we have to do with, here or anywhere in the gospels, but achievements. Jesus no more told the man his sins were forgiven than He told him he was not lame. With the same word of redemptive power He lifted the disabling touch of sin from his soul and of paralysis from his limbs, and in doing so revealed what He was.”<sup>1</sup> So, to His own question : Whether is easier, to forgive or to heal ? the answer—if we speak in Jesus’ sense—is that both are equally impossible with man and equally possible with God.

The result now reached, that pardon is for Jesus a miraculous thing, will be admitted to be of importance. What is nearly as important is the fact that the Christian consciousness yields an estimate of pardon which is in complete harmony with Jesus. In the soul of a pardoned man, all the pardoned feel, there has taken place that which mere psychological forces could never have produced, and which is so ineffably great that it asks for a supernatural cause. For in the forgiveness of sin something is done to us, and upon us, that gives a new start to life. It is not merely that the tendencies of character are reversed ; prior to that, and as conditioning all the rest, the burden of past sin, of sin that cleaves to us with the warning that it is ours for ever, is lifted clean away, and we find ourselves drawn back to the great heart of God the Father. Who, indeed, but God can set before us this open door ? Who but God can knit up the broken threads of trust and fellowship ? Who but God can speak the liberating word of absolution,

<sup>1</sup> Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*. p. 306 f.



or say to the aching heart, " I have blotted out, as a thick cloud, thy transgressions ; return unto me, for I have redeemed thee " ? And thus in forgiveness, in the only sense in which a religious man cares to use the word, God does a decisive and supernatural thing, which none but He can do—He separates between sin and the sinner. He abolishes the guilt of the sin ; not by declaring that it is not sinful ; not by making a pretence about it or forgetting it, but by depriving it of its power to expel the sinner from His presence. One who comes seeking God with this load of conscious guilt upon his spirit may indeed be gravely tempted to doubt the possibility of its removal, more especially if he has felt the influence of that sombre naturalistic pessimism by which the modern mind is so often haunted, and which bids the sinner endure his fate with a dumb, brave stoicism as best he may. But in unnumbered lives all these misgivings have vanished in the presence of Jesus Christ. Fact has proved stronger than determinist logic. For the man to whom forgiveness is real has now learnt that within and above all cosmic law there is a Father ; that he is faced by no mere impersonal tendencies, but by the living God, who in Jesus puts forth His hand to meet and grasp ours, and through forgiveness ushers us into a new and blessed world of good.

Now this, I repeat, is in the strict sense miraculous. It is something to which the normal operations of phenomenal reality are simply irrelevant ; something which transcends all their relations of inviolable sequence, just because it is God Himself entering a human life in an immediate (yet not unmediated) way, and inaugurating a new relationship in which He and that life shall henceforth stand to each other. The psychologist may have to say much that is of importance as to modes in which the assurance of pardon captures the focus of consciousness, and instals a new

system of ideas as regnant over the inner life. But what interests the believer is not this; rather it is the direct personal action of God in bestowing on him the peace of reconciliation. It is part of the definition of forgiveness that its only source is God. He alone can rescue us from the necessities and fatalities of evil in which science and history seem to involve us, so making free personal life incredible. Forgiveness, imparted to us in His love, is the experience in which we really become persons—not things, nor links in a chain, but free men.

If the analysis given in the foregoing pages be sound, the Christian believer may justly recognise in his own experience the continuous presence of elements, whose reality is not to be denied—at least by him—yet which turn out, when more closely scrutinised, to be intrinsically supernatural in character. Or to put it otherwise, these elements are intelligible only if the theory is false and inadequate which regards the world as a closed system of forces, all the changes in which—a sufficiently powerful mind being assumed—are capable of computation in advance. Three such elements I have endeavoured to define. There is the fact—to the Christian it is a fact—that prayer is heard. There is the fact—to the Christian it is a fact—that God rules the world. There is the fact—to the Christian it is a fact—that sin is forgiven. But if for me prayer is heard, and the world Divinely governed, and sin forgiven, then I know that God is a free spirit, able to bring events to pass that transcend all natural forces acting with mechanical necessity, able to “release into the phenomenal order the pent-up fulness” of His own Divine activity. That is to say, since after all the universe is one, the implications of living faith prove to me that nature, with its apparent iron uniformity, is but a fragment of the whole reality: the whole being richer, more plastic, more full of unimaginable potentialities,

and the regularities of nature but part of the vast resources of God, 'who doeth wondrous things.'

I do not set forth this view as a proof of miracle that might avail to convince one who has not yet taken the Christian attitude to Christ. I do not feel that any such convincing proof is possible. But I suggest that for a believer there exist immediately known facts in his own experience which are to him a clear proof that miracle is real. And this necessarily has a bearing on his conclusions as to alleged supernatural events in the past. If a God of redeeming love is working now and here, in ways that we can test, that is at all events a fact not to be overlooked in our estimate of the amazing things recorded in the New Testament.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

*HISTORICAL COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST  
EPISTLE TO TIMOTHY.*

XXV. CHARACTER OF TIMOTHY'S POSITION AND DUTIES.

THE passage iv. 6-16 mentions the chief kinds of duty in the congregation which will have to be performed by Timothy. These are (1) Reading of the Scriptures: (whether in public or in private or both is not stated); (2) Exhortation (together with reproof of faults); (3) Teaching. To these may be added, as primarily personal, but as indirectly affecting the Church, (4) Cultivation of the gift of inspiration. Elsewhere it is in many passages mentioned or implied that he (and so also Titus in Crete) had a leading part to play in the selection and appointment of Church officials, Bishops or Presbyters, Deacons, Deaconesses, Widows.

Reading of the Scriptures of course implies much in the way of explanation and interpretation and comment. Exhortation and reproof are often referred to, e.g. iii. 15,

iv. 1 f., vi. 17, and clearly Timothy was intended to keep an attentive eye on the conduct, the life, and the development of all members of the congregation, so far as possible. Teaching is closely related to both reading and exhortation. The three kinds of work go naturally together, and each helps the other: exhortation and teaching must be based on the Scriptures. Inspiration, cultivated by attentively listening for and expecting the Divine revelation, is the condition through which alone these duties can be rightly performed.

None of these partake in any degree of sacerdotal character. All are incumbent on every Christian in the congregation: the difference being that Timothy was to devote his entire time to work in the congregation, whereas ordinary members had other work which required much of their time and attention. That it was a prime duty for every Christian to work and to make a livelihood is not explicitly stated in the Pastoral Epistles, but it is tacitly implied<sup>1</sup> throughout; and these Epistles are in perfect agreement with Paul's teaching in his other letters, and with his practice as regards the obligation to work. Further, the duties of Bishops and Deacons were in a sense the duties of every Christian, but were incumbent specially on the officials as being more free to give time and attention to them. Those duties, then, were equally incumbent on Timothy, so far as lay in his power; that is to say, he was expected to exercise a general supervision of and responsibility for their performance by the officials. In this way the supreme direction of the organisation of charity and of Church business generally must be supposed to lie ultimately with Timothy at Ephesus and with Titus in Crete.

Is it, therefore, safe to conclude that Timothy had no-

<sup>1</sup> For example, v. 4, 8.



thing in the way of duties of a more priestly type ? It would only be safe to make that inference if we could be sure that the Epistle was intended to be a complete treatise on the duties of a person in Timothy's position, and that it mentioned every department and class of duty which he would be called on to perform. But that is diametrically opposite to the nature of this letter and of every one of Paul's letters. He has no thought of composing a complete treatise on Timothy's duties. He aimed at giving certain useful counsels, without any thought of completeness.

It is not justifiable, then, to infer from this Epistle that Timothy would not be expected to perform any duties which we should regard as priestly. But we must remember that to the author of Hebrews every Christian is a priest, and that (as the present writer believes),<sup>1</sup> that Epistle was written in strong sympathy and frequent communication with Paul, and was approved by him. Every Christian was a teacher, and much more so was Timothy. Every Christian was a priest : much more was Timothy a priest. When a Deacon or Bishop was appointed, Timothy laid hands on him. So doubtless did the whole Presbytery ; but Timothy is specially singled out in v. 22, as if he stood out above the others ; so Paul sometimes mentions himself, sometimes the Presbyters, as laying hands on Timothy : he was above and apart from all, and what they did in association he did as the head of all.

Similarly we must infer that over the whole ritual and order of the Church (which is partly described in chapter ii.) Timothy was in charge and acted as the one vested with supreme authority. That seems to be implied in iii. 15. We can hardly doubt that, if Timothy were present at the Eucharistic meal, it would fall to him either to take the leading part or to delegate it to another. Yet the Eucharist

<sup>1</sup> *Luke the Physician and Other Studies*, p. 304.

is never mentioned explicitly in the Pastoral Epistles, though I cannot doubt that iii. 16 contains a veiled allusion to it, and iii. 15, 16 clearly allude to knowledge needed by Timothy in his Church work.

In short, we must conclude that the silence of the Epistle furnishes no negative evidence regarding the extent or character of Timothy's duties. The subject of the priesthood must be treated on other grounds; and the present writer is not competent to discuss it further than the general statement in the last paragraphs. In any such special treatment, it would have to be kept clearly in mind that the organisation of the Church was still in an incipient stage, and that no hard distinctions had as yet come into existence, such as were enforced in the struggle for existence during later times.

#### XXVI. THE ORDER OF WIDOWS IN THE CHURCH.

The passage v. 3-16 refers to the widowed women, who have no longer the regular family circle of duties, and who are therefore in an exceptional position. They were naturally so numerous that their position needed some consideration. In the narrow restrictions of ancient social life, it was not easy for them to maintain their children after the earning member of the family had died, and they stood in need of special consideration and help.

The Church from the first had recognised that it was bound, as a community, to look after and provide for widows. In Acts vi. 1 it is evident that special provision was made to feed such families, and that difficulties were arising as the congregation grew larger and more varied in character: to meet this difficulty the Board of Seven was appointed. In Acts ix. 39 it is apparent that the widows had certain charitable duties which they performed, and thus something like a rudimentary Order of Widows,

such as was in full vigour during the second century, had come into existence, not merely in Jerusalem but also in Joppa and doubtless universally, in the very earliest stage of the Church development.

In this Epistle the Order of Widows is still in a fluid and uncertain condition, and Paul lays down certain principles according to which Timothy should treat these cases.

In the first place, it is assumed as self-evident that all widows must be provided with subsistence (i.e. for themselves and children); but Paul insists that, where they have children or grandchildren able to help them, it is the duty of these descendants to provide for their parent or grandparent; and it is a sin of the deepest dye to neglect this duty. Church help is given only where private help fails.

In the second place, an Order of Widows is implied who had foresworn the world and devoted the rest of their lives to Church work and charity. Paul is convinced that it would be a bad thing if such Widows returned to the ordinary life of the world: they had been admitted to a position of honour and influence on certain conditions, and they must not fall from the performance of those conditions. To prevent such lapse, he would admit no one to the Order of Widows who was less than sixty years of age, when she presumably had no longer in Paul's estimation any temptation to resume the ordinary social life.

Younger widows he would not admit to the Order, but would advise to enter into a second marriage and to devote themselves to the life of the family.

The qualifications of the Order of Widows are described in v. 9-10. In the first place each Widow must have been "a woman of one man." It is clear that this does not mean that she must not have been married a second time, for Paul advises all young widows to marry again; and it is

impossible to suppose that he regarded the early death of a husband as a practical disqualification for the Order, however good and noble the life of the woman might be. The meaning is exactly similar to the similar expression used about Bishops and Deacons, and discussed already in another place.

We have already referred to the signs in v. 11-13 of Paul's old dislike and depreciation of marriage, which he showed in his first letter to the Corinthians, as being merely a second-best way of life and a concession to the weakness of human nature.

Then the other qualifications are summed up in the words "well reported of for good works." Like the male officials, the Widows must be free from reproach, having a good standing in the congregation, so that their appointment should command general approval.

The qualifications summed up in the brief term "good works," are enumerated more fully in the following words, "if she hath brought up children, if she hath used hospitality to strangers, if she hath washed the Saints' feet, if she hath relieved the afflicted, if she hath diligently followed every good work." The person selected for the Order must already have proved in her life a tendency to perform the duties of the Widows; and this enumeration may be taken as a fair statement of the purposes which the Order of Widows was intended to fulfil.

Finally, Paul reiterates that not merely male descendants and relatives, but also female, were under the duty of providing for any widow of their family, and not leaving her to become a burden on the charity of the Church.

With regard to the age of sixty, at which widows begin to be eligible for the service of the Church and for devotion to the Divine life and separation from the family cares, a question arises. Was this a point selected by Paul purely



from his own judgment and experience, or was it generally recognised as marking an epoch in life, at which retirement from active life and devotion to religious duties might become suitable and proper ?

While it is not possible to attain certainty, the second supposition seems much more probable and more in accordance with Paul's principles of administration. Probably those who are better acquainted with ancient Oriental ideas about periods in life will be able to quote examples of a belief that the age of sixty was a turning point, where a new life might suitably begin. It is said that the old Hindu law contained the rule of life for men, twenty years a boy, twenty years a fighter,<sup>1</sup> and twenty years head of a household: thereafter one might wisely abandon the life of the world and of business, and devote oneself to the Divine life (which to the Hindu meant contemplation and retirement).<sup>2</sup> In the EXPOSITOR, December, 1908, p. 547 f., it is pointed out that about A.D. 341 Bishop Eugenius of Laodiceia thus retired from active life and adopted the life of a recluse. He must have been not far from sixty years of age then, as is evident from the facts of his career.<sup>3</sup>

Sixty was recognised among the Greeks also as an age when life changed. One who was devoted to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures, like Mimnermus, wished to die when he reached that age. The more vigorous and manly Solon, a true Western in spirit, rebuked Mimnermus and desired to live till he was eighty, and to maintain his activity to the end.

There was evidently some general belief that sixty was

<sup>1</sup> This second period, from twenty to forty years of age, corresponds roughly to the Greek conception of youth, *νεότης*, as has been shown in a previous Section. So in Latin *juvenis* often means a man of military age.

<sup>2</sup> I take this from Kipling's story "The Miracle of Purun Bhagat" in the *Second Jungle Book*, a story which appears to me to be the finest piece of Oriental work that he has done.

<sup>3</sup> EXPOSITOR, November, 1908, pp 385-419.

the age for entering on the religious life ; and this belief was probably not without influence on Paul when he fixed that term for the order of Widows. But of course the age was merely permissive, not a regulation of duty.

W. M. RAMSAY.

### *THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.*

#### IX. THE TRIUMPHAL ENTRY, AND THE LAST SUPPER.

WE will now pass to consider the account given in the Fourth Gospel of the triumphal entry into Jerusalem. It is often said that this Gospel exhibits an obvious exaggeration in the matter of miracle. It may be well, then, to point out that here at any rate there is a very marked absence of anything of the kind. There is nothing said of the prevision of Jesus in the matter of the finding of the ass's colt. Our Evangelist merely says that Jesus, having found a young ass, sat thereon. The writer does not say whether or not the Synoptic account of the finding of the ass is correct. Further, there is something very natural about the whole incident as it is told in his Gospel. The impression we get from the Synoptists is that Jesus was accompanied by a great crowd of people as He travelled towards Jerusalem, these having been with Him all the way. We learn from St. John that the multitude that had come to the feast in Jerusalem hearing that Jesus was coming to the city went out to meet Him and greeted Him with "Hosanna ; Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord, even the King of Israel." In regard to the use of this greeting Edersheim writes : <sup>1</sup> "It must be remembered that, according to Jewish tradition, Psalm cxviii. 25-28, was also chanted antiphonally by the people of Israel, as they went

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, ii. p. 368.

to welcome the festive pilgrims on their arrival, the latter always responding in the second clause of each verse, till the last verse of the Psalm was reached, which was sung by both parties in unison, Psalm ciii. 17 being added by way of conclusion."

It would seem, then, that our Evangelist gives us an accurate picture of the occurrence. The multitude came out to meet Jesus to give Him a special welcome because, according to the Evangelist, they had heard of the miracle which He had wrought. He says: "The multitude therefore that was with him when he called Lazarus out of the tomb, and raised him from the dead, bare witness. For this cause also the multitude went and met him, for that they heard that he had done this sign."

Now this point is certainly not brought out in the Synoptic account. There is mention of the multitudes that went before and that followed, but we should not gather from this, without the help of the Fourth Gospel, that those before were they who had come out from Jerusalem to welcome Jesus and were now escorting Him in triumph into the city.

And though St. John says that this entry of the King into the city accorded with the words of the prophet, "Fear not, daughter of Zion: behold thy King cometh, sitting on an ass's colt," he tells us that the disciples did not at the time understand the significance of the event. "These things understood not his disciples at the first; but when Jesus was glorified, then remembered they that these things were written by him, and that they had done these things unto him." We compare this statement with those others in ii. 17, 22, where we have already seen the writer able to speak in the name of the disciples. This statement, like those others, is at once intelligible if the Evangelist be the Apostle St. John.

I do not think that more need be said of the triumphal entry. It remains now to consider our Evangelist's account of the Last Supper, this being the last of the events that he has in common with the Synoptists.

There is first of all the question of the connexion of this Supper with the feast of the Passover. Our Evangelist says nothing about it being a Passover celebration. Indeed it is clear from his narrative of subsequent events that he certainly did *not* regard it as the Passover. For in xviii. 28 he says that the accusers of Jesus would not enter the pretorium that they might not be defiled, *but might eat the passover*. Again he remarks incidentally in xix. 14, that when Pilate sat on the judgement seat at a place called in Hebrew Gabbatha, it was the Preparation of the Passover. In xix. 31 and 42 he again speaks of the day of the crucifixion being the Preparation. Now while the use of the term "Preparation" in these last two verses might be interpreted by making it apply to Friday, *quâ* Friday, which was the Preparation for the Sabbath, it seems impossible to accept this interpretation in view of the other two verses to which reference has been made. I acknowledge that in taking up this position I have against me the emphatically expressed opinion of Edersheim, but I fail to see that he has proved his case. He thinks that there is no difference between the Synoptists and St. John as to the day of the month on which the Lord ate the Last Supper with His disciples. He considers that the language of the Fourth Evangelist does not preclude the possibility that that Supper was the Passover feast which was celebrated on the evening of Nisan 14. Thus he interprets the eating of the passover in xviii. 28 as having reference to the *Chagigah* on Nisan 15; but even if this be possible there is still the expression "the Preparation of the Passover" in xix. 14 to explain. Edersheim inter-



prets this to mean the Friday in Passover week. It would not then be the Preparation of the Passover itself, but the Preparation of the Sabbath of the week of the Passover. This, if a possible interpretation, seems hardly a natural one. And there is the incidental remark made by the Evangelist in xiii. 29, which tells against it. When Jesus had said to Judas at the Supper, That thou doest do quickly, the writer adds that no one at the table knew for what intent He spake thus to him. Some thought, because Judas had the bag, that Jesus said unto him, Buy what things we have need of for the feast. This seems to show that in the view of the writer the Supper at which they were sitting was not the Passover feast, for which preparations were yet to be made.

On the whole, then, I share the opinion of most scholars that the Fourth Gospel makes the crucifixion take place on the 14th Nisan, and that the feast of the Passover would be on the evening of that day. In this case we have a distinct difference between our Evangelist and the Synoptists, who appear to make the Last Supper a celebration of the Passover. Thus in Mark we read: "On the first day of unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the passover, his disciples say unto him, Where wilt thou that we go and make ready that thou mayest eat the passover? And he sendeth two of his disciples, and saith unto them, Go into the city, and there shall meet you a man bearing a pitcher of water: follow him, and wheresoever he shall enter in, say to the goodman of the house, The Master saith, Where is my guestchamber, where I shall eat the passover with my disciples? . . . And the disciples went forth, and came into the city, and found as he had said unto them: and they made ready the passover. And when it was evening he cometh with the twelve." This account, somewhat abbreviated, is reproduced in Matthew ;

and St. Luke repeats it almost verbatim. The latter, however, has information about the Last Supper from some source other than Mark (St. Luke xxii. 14-38), and he represents Jesus as saying to His disciples, when He sat down with them: "With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer; for I say unto you, I will not eat it until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God." There are two very interesting notes on the meaning of this saying which are published in the *Journal of Theological Studies* for July 1908, by Professor Burkitt and the Rev. A. E. Brooke. Professor Burkitt certainly holds no brief for the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel, but he takes the view, which Mr. Brooke shares, that these words in the mouth of Jesus imply that the meal of which Jesus and His disciples were then partaking was *not* the passover feast. Professor Burkitt takes our Lord to mean: "Near as this Passover is, and much as I have longed to celebrate it with you, it is not so to be, for I shall not eat it; within the next twenty-four hours the enemy will have done his worst, and the next Passover that I shall eat with you will be the Messianic Feast."

I may be allowed to say that this view, now put forward by Professor Burkitt and Mr. Brooke, is one that had occurred to me independently some time ago. The natural meaning of the words, taken by themselves, seemed to me to be just as Professor Burkitt has paraphrased them. The difficulty, however, was to reconcile this interpretation with St. Luke's unambiguous statement a few verses before that it was the Passover feast in which Jesus and His disciples were engaged.

But the explanation of the discrepancy is probably that which Professor Burkitt himself gives. St. Luke at least has two sources from which he derives his information. One is, of course, the Gospel according to Mark, which he

freely quotes. The other sources used by him may have supported a view inconsistent with that taken over from the Gospel of Mark. In other words, St. Luke's other sources may have regarded the Last Supper as *not* being the Passover.

Certainly the statement made in Mark xiv. 12 that they sacrificed the Passover on the first day of unleavened bread is an inaccurate one; for the first day of unleavened bread was the day after the Passover, viz., the 15th Nisan. If, then, the Gospel of Mark is inaccurate here, it may be also inaccurate in making the Last Supper a paschal celebration, this inaccuracy being taken over in Matthew and by St. Luke. So though the Fourth Evangelist differs from what is commonly called the Synoptic view of the date of the Last Supper, it may well be that he is right after all.

For, again, Mark, followed by Matthew, represents the chief priests, etc., as saying, when they were plotting to take Jesus and to put Him to death: "Not during the feast, lest haply there shall be a tumult of the people." But if the Last Supper were a Passover celebration, then it becomes clear that the Jewish authorities did the very thing which they decided not to do. It seems more likely than not, then, that the Fourth Evangelist is correct in not calling the Last Supper a Passover celebration. And it must be acknowledged that only one who was well informed could have thus corrected the error made in the other Gospels, for he does correct it, not by saying that the Last Supper was not a Passover, but by stating plainly that the Crucifixion took place on the day of the Preparation, the day, that is, on the evening of which the Passover took place.

We now pass from our Evangelist's dating of the Supper to what he has to say of what took place at it. His account

is, as every one knows, much fuller than that given by the other Evangelists and yet he omits all mention of the institution of the Eucharist. This, for some unaccountable reason, seems to give great offence to those who deny the apostolic authorship of the Gospel and discredit its historical character. They speak as if the Evangelist had somehow put the institution of the Lord's Supper out of its place, because in his Gospel Jesus is represented as teaching truth preparatory to it in the synagogue at Capernaum after the feeding of the five thousand (St. John vi.). But why should this discourse not have taken place as St. John records? Something of the kind seems almost a necessity. For what meaning otherwise could the disciples have attached to the words of Jesus when, as according to the Synoptists, He instituted the Eucharist at the Last Supper? When He said, "This is my body," "This is my blood," must there not have been some previous teaching which would prepare the minds of the disciples to hear such startling words? I have never been able to see why He who spake thus to the disciples at the Last Supper, and who is believed to have thus spoken because the Synoptists record the fact, should not have spoken a year before, as the Fourth Evangelist represents, in the synagogue at Capernaum. We have already seen that Schmiedel regards this discourse as unhistorical because it gives the meaning of the Eucharistic Supper a year before it took place, and the insertion of it appears to him therefore to detract from the historical value of the Gospel as a whole. But it is not a very exact statement of the case to say that the Capernaum discourse gives the meaning of the Eucharistic Supper before it took place. For the discourse makes no reference to the Eucharistic Supper. It certainly abounds in teaching preparatory to the institution of the Eucharist; but that is a different thing.



Though the Fourth Evangelist, in his full account of the Last Supper, says nothing of the institution of the Eucharist, it does not follow that he did not know it was instituted then. Such a supposition would be absurd. Instead of finding fault with him for not repeating what was already known, we ought rather to be grateful to him for telling us so much that was not generally known and which he, if he were an eye-witness, was in an exceptional position to record. And I cannot see that there is anything which he writes on the subject which is in the least degree improbable *a priori*. He tells of two incidents which the other Evangelists give us, namely, the foretelling of the betrayal by one of Jesus' disciples sitting with Him, and also that of the denial of Peter. It is true that Mark and Matthew put the latter after Jesus had left the upper room, but it is worthy of note that St. Luke, relying no doubt on some other trustworthy source, represents it, as our Evangelist does, as taking place at the Supper. And I fail to see how any one can read the story in the Fourth Gospel of the Lord's disclosure of the betrayal of Judas without being impressed by its historical likelihood. It is told, as only one who was present on the occasion could have told it, with a most remarkable minuteness of detail. When Jesus made the announcement that one of them would betray Him, our Evangelist gives us the picture of the disciples looking one on another in bewilderment, doubting of whom He spake. Then he tells us that there was at the table reclining in Jesus' bosom one of His disciples, whom Jesus loved. This would be John himself. To him Simon Peter beckoned that he might find out who it was. And he leaning back, as he was, on Jesus' breast saith unto Him, Lord, Who is it? And Jesus answered: He it is for whom I shall dip the sop and give it him. So He dipped the sop and gave it to Judas, the son of Simon

Iscariot. Nothing but prejudice against the Gospel as a whole could deny to this account real historical value. Who could have invented all these details on the ground of what the other Evangelists tell of the same event? The verisimilitude of our Evangelist is here past all question.

Nor is there anything at all improbable in the story of the washing of the disciples' feet on this occasion, followed by the exhortation to humility and service. For from St. Luke we learn that there had arisen a contention amongst the disciples which of them was to be accounted the greatest.

And the subsequent teaching given by Jesus is set forth in such a way that there seems no improbability that it was actually given. The difficulties which the disciples found in what He said to them are brought out. One after another questions him; and each time the disciple who addresses Him is mentioned by name. First it is Thomas: Lord, we know not whither thou goest, and how can we know the way? Then Philip: Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us. And later it is Judas (not Iscariot): Lord, what is come to pass that thou wilt manifest thyself to us, and not unto the world? There is, it is true, one case where the disciples are said to have spoken collectively (xvi. 29), but this naming of individuals in three cases is not to be passed lightly over. It is at once explicable on the theory of the Johannine authorship.

It need not be claimed that the Evangelist is recording the *ipsissima verba*, or the Greek equivalent of the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus. But there seems no reason to doubt that we have in these chapters a faithful representation of the teaching of the Master on momentous subjects, given at a time when the minds of the disciples were receptive by reason of the solemnity of the occasion. Our author tells us of a promise made by Jesus that the Holy Spirit would bring to the remembrance of the disciples the things that

He had spoken to them. Why should we doubt that this disciple had found the promise fulfilled in his own case, and that the words of Jesus which he has recorded were indeed spoken by Him? If we have not preserved for us the letter, yet we may believe that we have what is more important, the spirit.

E. H. ASKWITH.

### NATHAN AND DAVID.

#### THE KNOWLEDGE OF SIN UNDER THE OLD COVENANT.

SIN, according to the Christian definition, is an offence against a personal God. The term has no meaning for us apart from our thoughts about the Almighty, and indeed, without the manifestation of the will of God there can be no knowledge in man of sin and innocence. A sin is an act of self-assertion against God; it is the setting up of a human will against the Divine.

This view that sin is not a fall from an abstract ideal, but an offence against some person, has its roots in the Old Testament. There the verb "to sin" and the verb "to transgress" are both applied to offences even against *human* persons. The butler and the baker of the king of Egypt, in Hebrew phrase, *sinned* against their lord,<sup>1</sup> and Meshah, king of Moab, when he made his claim to independence, *transgressed* against Israel.<sup>2</sup> "Sin" was unthinkable for the Hebrew apart from the thought of the person offended by the sin, and in the vast majority of cases in which the two verbs are used the reference is to JEHOVAH.

Of David's devotion to the God of Israel there can be no doubt; it is safe to say that he desired to please Him, and to avoid sin. But though this be true, it must be added that David's account in the First Book of Samuel is charged with deeds of rapine and of blood,<sup>3</sup> and in the Second Book

<sup>1</sup> Gen. xl. 1.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Kings i. 1.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Sam. xxvii. 8-12.

with adultery and with murder. He was a robber-leader before he became king, and in his later years a double crime brought dishonour upon his reign. How are facts so divergent to be reconciled ?

The key to the discrepancy is, no doubt, to be found in St. Paul's testimony that "Through law cometh the knowledge (*ἐπίγνωσις*) of sin."<sup>1</sup> The moral law now enshrined in the Pentateuch was, we have good reason to believe, unknown to David, or at least unknown in its context, i.e., unknown as part of the covenant made on Horeb between JEHOVAH and Israel. It would, indeed, be much too large an assumption to suppose that the great king of Israel knew the Ten Commandments as we know them. We know them as emphasised by a two-fold repetition in the Pentateuch. We know them in a full text, in which (if we dare say so), we hear the very accents of a personal God speaking with the emotions of love and jealousy to the people of His choice. We know them as traditionally ascribed to Moses, the greatest religious leader who ever arose in Israel.

But, unless the results of the critical study of the Old Testament for the last 150 years are to go for nothing, the probability that David knew the Ten Commandments as we know them is quite remote. The Pentateuch, except in germ, did not exist in his day. The full text of the Ten Commandments is comparatively recent, being due, perhaps, both in Exodus and in Deuteronomy, to the Deuteronomist of Manasseh's day and his school. The earlier text was short,<sup>2</sup> and the personal note was not struck in it with the power of appeal which belongs to the fuller text. Lastly, it is doubtful if the Ten Commandments, when first written down, stood in the authoritative context in which they now appear. Such are the conclusions with

<sup>1</sup> Rom. iii. 20.

<sup>2</sup> As in Commandments vi.-ix.



regard to the Decalogue which have secured the support of an influential band of Old Testament scholars to-day, conclusions which we dare not neglect in dealing historically with David's spiritual development. We have to admit the probability that the moral law was known to David only in a dry abstract, and apart from the context which gave it its power over the Jews of a later age.

But in order to state the whole truth, it is necessary to go one step further. We have to admit the possibility that the law of the Ten Commandments was not known to David in any form. By what means was he to know it? We cannot point to any organisation of religious and moral teaching for the people in general at so early a date. "Schools" (or rather "societies") of the Prophets existed in Samuel's time, but it remains to be proved that any religious instruction was given to the members. The case of many monastic societies in the West and of the Dervish communities of the East suggests a negative conclusion. Nay, the very insistence on religious teaching which marks the book of Deuteronomy (vi. 4-9; xi. 18-20) serves as an intimation that in earlier times there had been neglect of it. If it be objected that there is conclusive evidence that both David and Solomon were zealous for worship, it must be answered that (unfortunately) zeal for religious knowledge is not necessarily bound up with zeal for worship.

The custodians of the book of the Law were the Priests, and theirs was the duty of teaching its precepts and expounding its contents (Deut. xxxi. 24-26; 2 Kings xxii. 8; Neh. viii. 1, 2; Mal. ii. 7). But did they exercise their office, and, above all, did they teach the moral precepts of the Law? Did they teach the Ten Commandments in the days of David? Or were they at best content with the prescription to recite the whole Law *once in seven years* at the Feast of Tabernacles? (Cf. Deut. xxxi. 10-13).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 2 Sam. vi. 14-22.

It is not an idle question, for David's life, both before he became king and afterwards, is an unusually dark enigma, if he knew the moral Law as it is set forth in Exodus xx. or Deuteronomy v., as we know it. On the one hand he was devoted to the service of JEHOVAH. He would sacrifice equally his kingly dignity and his property to his God;<sup>1</sup> he would accept chastisement from the Divine hand with meekness,<sup>2</sup> and scathing rebukes from the LORD's prophets.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, his breaches of the moral law are monumental. Is it *probable*, then, that he knew the Ten Commandments at all? Is it *possible* that he knew them as the central part of the covenant which JEHOVAH made with His worshippers? It *is* possible (for the heart is perverse in its workings), but few suppositions are more improbable.

David is a great religious figure, but we must not attribute to him a degree of religious knowledge which can in no way be reconciled with what we know of his conduct. In fact, the significance of his life is that starting in ignorance he became a disciple, a learner, through sin and suffering. The story of the numbering of the people (2 Sam. xxiv.) and the story of Bathsheba (xi., xii.) taken together make this conclusion certain.

David learnt about sin. How much there was for him to learn appears from these two narratives. A comparison of the two brings out one great fact at once. According to the first of these David commits a double crime of the first magnitude, and (so it appears) he shows no sign of repentance for a period of nine months. No doubt we should like to think that he was troubled often during this time with qualms of conscience, but if we follow the narrative just as it stands, we have no right to assume that he felt troubled in mind at all. Even when Nathan the

<sup>1</sup> 2 Sam. xxiv. 24.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Sam. xv. 25 f.; xvi. 11 f.      <sup>3</sup> 2 Sam. xii. 13; xxiv. 14.

prophet appears, the sight of the prophet makes no immediate impression on him. He hears Nathan's story to the end, and never suspects that the rich man who robbed his poor neighbour of his one ewe lamb is himself. No! he snaps out his indignant verdict, "The man who hath done this thing is worthy to die." There is, indeed, a treble horror about David's fall. He not only (to use Christian language) broke with deliberation first the seventh Commandment, and then the sixth, but the crowning horror (from the Christian standpoint) is that he did not realise that he had sinned at all against his God, until "the LORD sent Nathan unto David."

On the other hand, we find something quite different when we turn to the second narrative, that of the numbering of the people, given in 2 Samuel xxiv. On this occasion David needed no prophet to tell him that he had done wrong. It is true that Joab remonstrated on receiving the order to make the census, but Joab was no substitute for a man of God. On this occasion David's conscience awoke of itself; when the numbering was accomplished (so we read) "David's heart smote him." It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the king (and probably Joab also) considered that it was a greater sin to number Israel than to take away a man's wife and to proceed to the murder of the man himself.

Here we have one clue as to the view of sin which prevailed in early history. *Why* was numbering the people a greater offence than murder and adultery combined? Because in the eyes of the early Israelite the one was a sin against JEHOVAH, while the other was not.

The census trenched on JEHOVAH's prerogative. The people was His people; it was for Him to make Israel few in number, or again to make Israel as the stars for multitude. And as it was His work to make the people few or many,

so the knowledge of their number was His secret, the secret of Him who

“ telleth the number of the stars,  
And giveth them all their names ” (Ps. cxlvii. 4).

It made no difference whether a native king (David) or a foreign king (Caesar Augustus) ordered a census. Joab remonstrated with David, while Caesar had to reckon with the formidable rising of Judas the Galilean “ in the days of the enrolment ” (Acts v. 37).

But the working of the Eastern mind is obscure to us Westerns. When David would number the people, he was confronted with the belief of Joab and the reviving conviction of his own mind that Israel was the LORD'S people. When, however, the king treated individuals as his own, when he caused one of his subjects to be slain, and took possession of his wife, Joab acquiesced, and people generally acquiesced, until Nathan stood up and said, *Thou art the man!* The king was allowed certain privileges of oppressing the people over whom he ruled, but he was not allowed to challenge JEHOVAH'S possession of the people as a whole.

We gather from a comparison of the two narratives that in early Israel the idea of sin was known, but the idea was by no means co-extensive ethically with our own. Sin was taken to be an infringement of the rights of JEHOVAH, but David had not yet seen that the rights of each member of JEHOVAH'S people were the rights of JEHOVAH Himself. It was the work of Nathan the prophet to teach the king a new lesson, and to teach him a little way towards the Christian truth, *Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these least, ye have done it unto Me.*

Nathan's teaching started from the principle which all accepted, that Israel was the LORD'S people, but it did not stop with the mere general application of the principle. The individual Uriah, Hittite foreigner though he was,



was the LORD'S. JEHOVAH was the protector not only of Israel in general, but of Uriah in particular. David had done double wrong to JEHOVAH'S client. In so doing he had despised JEHOVAH. There is, indeed, no getting round the emphatic message which the prophet delivers in the name of his God, "Thou hast despised me." In *v.* 14 the Hebrew transcribers of the Old Testament of later days tried to evade the tremendous sentence. The Massoretes, from a mistaken feeling of reverence, altered "Thou hast despised the LORD" into the euphemistic nonsensical words, "Thou hast despised the enemies of the LORD,"<sup>1</sup> and the Authorised and Revised Versions, trying to make sense of nonsense, have given the impossible rendering, "Thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the LORD to blaspheme." But Nathan said something far more direct; twice over he told David, the LORD'S Anointed, that he had despised the LORD.

We have thus a progress in David's knowledge of sin, i.e. in his recognition of what constitutes sin. We may take Psalm xviii., 2 Samuel xxiv., and 2 Samuel xii. as three stages illustrating this progressive knowledge. Whether their chronological order corresponds with their spiritual order, we hardly know.

From the Christian standpoint the first step in the recognition of sin is a true knowledge of God. It is not to be counted a knowledge of sin when the polytheist is overtaken by some calamity and infers from it that he has offended some one or other of the several gods who make up his pantheon. Offence may have been given by some action merely external, which does not belong to the sphere of morals at all. But sin in its Hebrew and Christian sense belongs to the realm of ideas which acknowledges a binding morality which draws its force from the One Moral Ruler

<sup>1</sup> For a parallel case of euphemism see 1 Sam. xxv. 22.

of the Universe. Polytheism, under which a man's duty is supposed to be owed to several different deities, whose wills may be in conflict, does not supply a fixed standard by which sin may be judged. To the polytheist the notion of sin must be arbitrary and wavering.

David first learns to know his God JEHOVAH, his one God, to be his deliverer and his teacher. At once a sense of duty springs up, and with it a knowledge of the possibility of a breach of duty. It is true that in Psalm xviii. which illustrates this David declares his innocence. But this very declaration of innocency implies the knowledge of the possibility of sinning. A real standard of right and wrong became possible for David when JEHOVAH became to him a *known* God. So when (as 2 Sam. xxiv. shows) David infringed a Divine privilege, one of the *rights* of JEHOVAH, he knew at once the quality of his action: he had sinned, and he made the confession to the LORD: "I have sinned greatly."

The next step after realising the nature of sin is to realise in general the boundaries of sin. These general lines were marked out in the Ten Commandments. But if the Ten Commandments in David's day were neither written on visible stones, nor stored in the general memory, nevertheless JEHOVAH did not leave Himself without witness. The Prophets asserted moral principles, though the priests' lips were silent. The parable of Nathan was as potent as a voice from Horeb to assert the Divine obligation of clean hands and a pure heart.

David learned that the injury done to Uriah was of the nature of sin, was indeed an offence against JEHOVAH. His well-known words are no bare confession of a fault committed; they are rather the acknowledgment of the reception of an ethical revelation: "I, who thought I had only the rights of a subject to deal with, *I have sinned against Jehovah.*"

W. EMERY BARNES.

*THE TEXT OF THE GOSPELS.*

IN the present position of textual criticism of the New Testament it is necessary to speak of problems which await solution rather than of results which have been reached. From 1882 to the present day Westcott and Hort's theory has held the field in England, and to some extent, in Germany. Every one will remember that this theory is roughly as follows: They thought that the text of the New Testament could be explained as consisting of three main recensions, which were afterwards worked over and so formed the late Syrian or ecclesiastical text of Antioch. To these three recensions the names were given of Neutral, Western, and Alexandrian. Since their time there has been a general tendency up to the present to accept the theory that the late text is based on these recensions, but there has been considerable controversy as to the reconstruction of the recensions themselves. Especially has this been the case with the Western text, which, instead of proving to be the unity which they imagined it to be, has, as it were, disintegrated under the hands of the critics, until it has become difficult to speak any longer of the Western text in any but a purely academic sense, as it is quite certainly not Western in origin and almost equally certainly not a single text but many texts. Still, with this degree of modification the theory of Westcott and Hort has held the field.

We are now faced with the new theory of Professor von Soden of Berlin, which will have to be compared with those of Westcott and Hort and submitted to very close examination before being accepted or rejected. In the present article I do not propose to make any contribution to this examination, but merely to explain the main issues. Von Soden's work falls into two divisions: The first part, which

is purely mechanical, consists of the rearrangement of the nomenclature of MSS. He has given up the old system, which used the capital letters of the Latin, Greek and Hebrew alphabets for uncial MSS. and numerals for cursive MSS., and has in place of this worked out an ingenious system of assigning numbers to the various MSS. in such a way as to tell us at once the approximate age and contents of the MSS. in question. Older scholars who have been brought up under the old conditions are naturally (though not, I think, justifiably) aggrieved at this change, and under the leadership of Dr. Gregory of Leipzig, supported by Dr. Kenyon in this country, are trying to make a stand against this innovation. Yet they themselves have felt obliged to alter the old system in many ways, and for my own part I feel convinced that in the end the Berlin method will be found to have so many advantages over the old one that it will be generally adopted. Even if it were not distinctly better than the old method, it would probably win the day, because in the end we are always forced to use the system of nomenclature employed in the *standard critical edition*. The critical edition of the past and of the immediate present is that of Tischendorf, which uses the old notation, but it is only a matter of a few years before von Soden's edition will be published, and it is difficult to believe that it will not be the standard edition for at least the next fifty years. The reason for this belief is that von Soden was financed by an exceedingly rich Berlin lady and was enabled to send scholars to every library in the world containing MSS. and to investigate the character of every MS. in a manner which surpasses everything which has been done in the past, or which will be possible in the future, unless, indeed, Dr. Gregory or his friends can produce another millionaire and so enrich the world with yet another critical edition using his notation.



The second part of von Soden's theory is concerned with the grouping of the various MSS. His results are these : In the fourth century there were three main recensions of the text of the Gospel. To these he gives the name of *K*, *I*, *H*. *K* corresponds roughly to Westcott and Hort's Syrian text, and is connected by von Soden with Antioch, and especially with the recension which is known to have been made by the martyr Lucian. There are, of course, many differing sub-types of *K*, and von Soden has spent much trouble in grouping the various late MSS. into them ; for our purpose none of them are very important.

*I*, found in many important sub-types, roughly corresponds to Westcott and Hort's Western text, and *H* to Westcott and Hort's neutral text ; but von Soden thinks that the Alexandrian text of Westcott and Hort is nothing more than a subdivision of *H* of no special importance.

The probably correct elements in this theory which will be accepted by almost every one without much dispute are that *H* and *K* really represent definite recensions. Furthermore, no one is likely to dispute that a number of the subdivisions which von Soden traces in *I* really represent actual groupings of MSS. Many of them, indeed, had already been recognised, and some of them had been edited, though in every case von Soden seems to add to the extent of our knowledge.

The doubtful points require a somewhat longer statement. In the first place the reconstruction of *I* is exceedingly doubtful. von Soden's method is somewhat as follows : He reconstructs a number of sub-groups belonging in the main to *I*. To these he gives the names of *H*<sup>r</sup>, *Φ*, *J*, *I*<sup>a</sup>, and so on. Perhaps in some details his work will be criticised, but in the main this part is probably correct. Then he reconstructs from a comparison of these groups the original text of *I*, and here he has to deal with

our old friend, Codex Bezae. It is common knowledge that the Codex Bezae which is now at Cambridge is a Graeco-Latin MS. of the sixth (or, I think, more probably of the fifth) century, with a very remarkable text which Westcott and Hort regarded as the chief authority for the Western text. It frequently agrees with the old Latin version and sometimes with the old Syriac. Now von Soden regards *D* as one of the authorities for his sub-group *I*<sup>a</sup>. The other members of this group are the MSS. which are generally described as 28, 565, 700, and a new MS. to which he gives the number of 050 and Gregory the symbol Ⓞ. But he does not think that Codex Bezae is in any way a pure representative of the type, but has been contaminated by the Latin and Syriac versions. Thus his reconstruction of *I* leaves out a great many of the passages which Westcott and Hort regarded as typically Western, and *I* is as a whole a much less bold and remarkable type than the Western text of Westcott and Hort. I imagine that in the future we shall hear a great deal more of this point. There are the two possibilities: either Codex Bezae really represents an original Greek text contaminated by Latin and Syriac influences (which is the theory of von Soden) or it is a tolerably good representative of the same type of text as was made use of by the translators who produced the Latin versions. That has been up till now the dominant theory, and for myself I am not disposed to abandon it. If this second theory be adopted, it is plain that Codex Bezae is not a representative of *I* at all, but of an earlier text which may have been known to *I* but was rejected by it in its main features.

Another point on which von Soden's theory will meet with severe criticism is his rejection of Westcott and Hort's Alexandrian text. The point is this: No one doubts that there is a close connexion between 6 or 7 MSS., of

which the best known are  $\aleph$  B C L  $\Psi$   $\Delta$   $\Xi$  33, supported more or less by the Egyptian versions. But between these MSS. the chief difference is that which separates  $\aleph$ B from the others. Westcott and Hort's theory was that  $\aleph$ B represent the earlier stratum, and that the others are a more or less literary recension made in Alexandria. The frequent agreement between  $\aleph$ B and the Egyptian version was explained by the theory that the makers of the Egyptian version used early MSS. of the same type as  $\aleph$ B. von Soden rejects this theory, regards the other MSS. as frequently preserving the true text of *H*, and explains the peculiar characteristic of B as largely due to the influence of the Egyptian version on B. It is impossible to speak with certainty as yet, and the last word in this matter will probably have to be spoken by some one who has an intimate knowledge of the Egyptian dialect, a knowledge which is not often found, and is still more rarely employed in the interests of New Testament criticism. But with the greatest diffidence and reserve I must confess that the examples which von Soden gives in support of his theory seem to me singularly unconvincing. What is required is the proof that Egyptian idiom has produced readings in B which are not Greek, and almost all that he has produced so far seem to me to be readings which are indeed found both in B and in the Egyptian version, but are perfectly good Greek and may quite as well have originated on the one side as on the other.

Thirdly, there is room for considerable doubt whether von Soden is right in regarding *K* as entirely independent of *I* (supposing that *I* is a real entity) and *H*. Of course, if his theory holds good in other respects, this must be the case; for he believes that he can connect *H* with the recension said to have been made by Hesychius and *I* with a recension made or at least used by Eusebius. If he be

right in these two points. *K*, the recension of Lucian, cannot be derived from the combination of the two *I* and *H* in the way in which Westcott and Hort believed. It is, however, necessary to be careful not to be unfair to von Soden on this point. The temptation for English scholars is to say that Westcott and Hort demonstrated by the argument from conflation that *K* is the resultant of the two other texts, and that therefore von Soden's theory is clearly wrong. Westcott and Hort certainly proved that *K* is the resultant of a combination of earlier texts, but the weak point in the attack on von Soden is that although *I* and *H* *roughly* correspond to Westcott and Hort's Western and Neutral texts they do not do so completely, and (according to the Berlin School) are much later than the two recensions postulated by Westcott and Hort.

In this way von Soden reconstructs his three recensions *I H* and *K*. he then goes on a step further and reconstructs the *I-H-K* text, which he thinks was the common origin of the three. It is worth while to consider carefully the importance of the general hypothesis underlying this assumption. It is that before the fourth century, at some period which is not accurately defined, there was in existence a single text of the Gospels which was universally used, and that the recensions found in the fourth century, and represented by our MSS., are deviations from an originally common source. As I shall show later, I believe that it is this hypothesis which is the weakest point in von Soden's theory, but for the moment let me continue to describe his hypothesis. He believes that *I-H-K* was used in a tolerably pure form by Origen, and that he can trace its use in other earlier writers of Greek. But he has then to surmount the difficulty that the oldest authorities for the text, namely the Latin and Syriac versions, differ very widely from *I-H-K*, and that the Church fathers who used these ver-



sions show no signs of knowing any other type of text, and he tries to do this by a liberal use of the hypothesis that the Diatessaron of Tatian was almost universally known in the third century. In other words he reduces all the textual variation of the third century to the formula *I-H-K plus Tatian*. In different localities the proportions of the mixture were different, but in the main it is not unfair to von Soden to say that if a reading is neither *I-H-K* nor an obvious error he ascribes it to Tatian if he possibly can. This is the most serious part of the hypothesis, and it is probably worth while to spend a few minutes in discussing the material which is available for controlling it.

You will remember that Tatian was an Eastern by birth who became a pupil of Justin Martyr in Rome. He afterwards went back as a missionary to the Churches of Mesopotamia, and he also became a heretic. It is doubtful whether he became a missionary first and a heretic afterwards, or became a missionary because he found it impossible on account of his heresy to remain in Rome. Neither possibility can be excluded, and historical parallels could be produced for both. In any case in Mesopotamia he made use of a harmony of the four Gospels which is commonly called the Diatessaron. Whether he made this harmony himself in Syriac, or brought it with him in Greek and translated it into Syriac is doubtful. The activity of Tatian in Mesopotamia may be dated somewhere in the last thirty years of the second century, and for another 300 years the Diatessaron was the authentic Gospel of the Syriac Church. Probably the Syriac Church also possessed the four Gospels translated separately, and this translation is what we call the old Syriac. It was not, however, the official authorised version and never displaced the Diatessaron. But at the beginning of the fifth century Rabbula, bishop of Edessa, filled with a desire to make Syriac Chris-

tianity agree more closely with that of the Greek Church of Antioch, displaced the Diatessaron by a new translation, to which the name of Peshitta was afterwards given, and the Diatessaron not only fell into disuse but was destroyed whenever it was met with by the orthodox. The result is that there are no copies in existence of the Syriac Diatessaron. In that case, it may be asked, how does von Soden reconstruct the text of the Diatessaron with sufficient accuracy? The answer is that we have in an Armenian translation copious quotations from the Diatessaron in the commentary of Ephraim, and a large number of quotations in the Syriac writings of the fourth century Aphraates. These quotations really give us considerable information about the text of the Diatessaron, and the English school of students of this question, headed by Professor Burkitt, maintain that we have no other source which is reliable for the text of the Diatessaron. There are, however, two other documents which in a certain sense contain translation of the Diatessaron. One is the Codex Fuldensis, written by Victor of Capua in the sixth century, which is clearly based on the Diatessaron, but is textually useless because the compiler has merely copied the text of the Vulgate and followed the order of the paragraphs in the Diatessaron, so that the manuscript is an authority for the Diatessaron only so far as the order of the paragraphs is concerned, and is textually an authority—an exceedingly good authority—for the text of the Vulgate and not for the Diatessaron. Besides this there is an Arabic translation of the Diatessaron; but here also it is stated that the compiler did almost exactly the same as the compiler of the Codex Fuldensis, that is to say, he translated the ordinary Syriac text and only followed the order of the paragraphs in the Diatessaron. Probably, therefore, the Arabic version represents, not a translation from the original Diatessaron, but a translation from a

copy of the Syriac Diatessaron in which the text, as distinct from the order of the paragraphs has been replaced by that of the Peshitta. *There are, however, a few places in which it would appear that the writer who adapted the text was influenced by the original Diatessaron.* Now, the question between von Soden and other scholars is likely to turn very largely on the extent to which this is true. My impression is that von Soden thinks that there is a considerable amount of original Diatessaron text to be recovered from the Arabic, and that Professor Burkitt is inclined to the opinion that the Arabic is textually worth little more than the Codex Fuldensis. You will see that we have here a subordinate problem which will call for a good deal of controversy before it can be settled. We cannot really discuss von Soden's theory until we have made up our minds about the text of Tatian. And I fear that von Soden himself has assumed the solution of this problem somewhat too lightly. My own examination of the passages which he attributes to the influence of Tatian suggests that many of his examples are open to grave doubt, and that it is not impossible that when the whole question has been properly investigated we shall be forced to the conclusion that the number of passages in which the influence of Tatian is a really probable hypothesis is so small that the whole theory collapses. Most people who have written at all about von Soden have discussed this point, and those who read German will find an excellent statement of almost the latest criticism in Nestle's last edition of his *Einführung in das Griechische NT.*, Ed. 3, 1909 (not translated).<sup>1</sup>

It has also often been said that von Soden pays too little attention to the Latin and Syriac versions. This is partly

<sup>1</sup> I may also refer those who wish for more detailed information as to von Soden's grouping of MSS. to my *Professor von Soden's Treatment of the Text of the Gospels*, published by O. Schulze & Co., Edinburgh, 1908.

true. I believe it to be a real defect in his book that he has dismissed the history and the text of these two versions with insufficient study. But the criticism is partly based on a misconception which is very unfair to von Soden, who, let me repeat, has in any case done more for the text of the New Testament than any other living man. The reason for this misconception is once more the fact that his *I* text does not entirely correspond to Westcott and Hort's Western text, and that people talk as if it did. According to von Soden the *I* text is later than the great versions, which represent an altogether different type. His point is that all Greek MSS. represent Greek recensions, based on *I-H-K*, and that the versions represent independent use of this original text, contaminated by Tatian. I very much doubt whether this theory is right, but that does not take away the fact that on his own theory von Soden is justified, and has not neglected the versions in reconstructing his three recensions for the simple reason that the versions have nothing to do with them.

It is plain that the complete criticism of von Soden will call for many years and a whole series of special studies. Until they have been made it is idle to do more than explain the points at issue and to express a tentative opinion as to the results of a superficial examination. Even superficial examination of a book containing about 2,000 pages, many of which are closely printed tables of Greek variants arranged with an insufficient indication of the place where one really ends and another begins is, in my own experience, a matter of months rather than weeks. But there is another line of criticism which is legitimate. One may ask whether von Soden's theory is historically probable. That is to say, is it historically probable that there was originally a single text of the Gospel, that this was contaminated by Tatian, and that the recension of the fourth century represents deviations



from an original text? I am prepared to argue that it is historically one of the most improbable that can be conceived.

Let us consider the probable history of the Gospels after they came into existence in roughly their present form. I take it that there is a general agreement that the four Gospels existed as documents at the beginning of the second century. There is also a tolerably general agreement that they did not become "Holy Scripture" for at least another fifty years. What happened during this fifty years? The Gospels had at this time a value, not because they were sacred books, but because they related the sacred history. Later on they were important for themselves as well as for their contents. The result must have been that in each Church any one who was possessed of a copy of one of the Gospels was inclined to value it in proportion as he believed that it contained all the facts. If he heard of a new fact, from whatever source, he put it in, and added it when he made a new copy. In this way every scribe was more or less a redactor. We must remember that it is unlikely that at this period each Church possessed four Gospels; more probably one locality had one and another locality had another. Gradually various localities came to have two, and then three, and finally four. We can prove that the "four-Gospel canon" came into existence in this way by the method of accretion, because in the earliest authorities we find no agreement as to the order of the Gospels. The result would be that during this fifty years the text of each individual Gospel had a local history of probably greater variation than can be found in the next 1,500 years. The next stage in the process was the attribution of sacredness to the text. From that moment the tendency to create variation was checked, and the ultimate standardisation of the whole became inevitable. At first, no doubt, each Church, though it accepted the four-Gospel canon, held to its own local text,

and the result was that there came into existence copies, no longer of the single Gospel but of the four Gospels, which perpetuated these strongly marked local texts. There was, no doubt, a text of this type in Africa, from which the African Latin version was made, and probably this took place in the second century, though it is just possible that it may not have been before the third. In the same way, Tatian either made his Diatessaron from the Greek text of the four Gospels current in Rome or from a Syriac text current in Antioch, or in the alternative from the Greek text current in Antioch. For reasons which have been given by Professor Burkitt the probability is that in the main he translated the Greek text which was used in Rome, and that this explains the undoubted resemblances between the European Latin and the Syriac text, as well as the fact that you do not get anything like the same resemblance between the African text and the Syriac.

In this way, then we have to imagine that the end of the second century, just at the moment when the "Four-Gospel Canon" became "Holy Scripture," saw the maximum amount of textual variation. I admit that this is merely hypothesis: but I would also maintain that it is an hypothesis which is extraordinarily probable in itself, and that it explains all the facts which we know (though, unfortunately, we do not know very many) about the text of the second century. In the third century the growing intercourse between the various Churches necessarily led to a comparison of texts and the beginnings of standardisation. Accepting, as I am inclined to do,<sup>1</sup> von Soden's view, that in the fourth century there were the three types, *I, H, K*, we have to see in these not, as he thinks, three forms of deviation from *I-H-K*, but three attempts, in three great centres, to standardise the almost infinite variety of local texts, in

<sup>1</sup> With some reservations as to *I*.

exactly the same way as Jerome did a century later with the equally infinite variety of Latin texts. The ultimate issue of this process was, of course, the production of the standard Greek text of the Church of Constantinople, a process which reached its last refinement in the edition published by the patriarch of Constantinople a few years ago.

I submit that this theory is a reasonable alternative to that of von Soden, and it is worth remembering that his *I-H-K* is at least as much an hypothesis, unsupported by direct documentary evidence, as is the suggestion of a series of local texts which were gradually brought into agreement.

I should like to occupy the remainder of my time in a somewhat broader question. Textual criticism is a desperately dull subject for all but a few specialists, but the public has a right to ask what is its general importance. To this question I propose to give an answer, and it is most important to notice that the answer given is different from that which would have been returned even by Westcott and Hort. I take it that Westcott and Hort would have said that the object of textual criticism is to restore the autograph of the Gospel with a view to writing the Life of Christ. The various recensions were merely lamentable corruptions. How do we stand now? We should say, I take it, that if we want to write the life of Christ, the reconstruction of the original text of the Gospels is insufficient, and that the recensions are in some ways quite as important as the original text; because, if we compare the various recensions of different localities, we can use them to illustrate, and even to explain, the various developments of doctrine and practice in the various Churches, and thus attain as it were a kind of parallax, which helps us to reconstruct the original "point of view." Now, if we want to write the life of Christ, nothing is more important than to understand the "point of

view" of the people who wrote the Gospels. We cannot get behind the documents unless we know the sort of thing which is likely to have influenced the writer, and anything which tells us what they believed helps us to understand this.

But one must say more than this. Supposing we could reconstruct the original text of the four Gospels, it would not have the same value to us as it had to Westcott and Hort for the study of the life of Christ. Between them and us falls the shadow of the Synoptic question. You will be generally aware that the results of a century's work at this problem are at last beginning to reach some sort of definiteness. There is an almost common agreement that Mark is one of the sources of the two other Gospels, though there is less agreement as to whether Mark itself is a composite document. Think what that means;—it means that for the purpose of writing the life of Christ we have in the Marcan sections not three but one primary document of the first century, and that so far as Matthew and Luke cover the same ground as Mark they must be regarded not as parallel accounts but as two early commentaries on Mark. They have their own very great use, but no historian who has the original source thinks of building on a commentary, however excellent it may be. Therefore we may say that while, so far as the study of the life of Christ is concerned, the reconstruction of the text of Mark is really important, the reconstruction of the text of the Marcan passages in Matthew and Luke has, comparatively speaking, only a secondary importance.

Moreover, it is plain that any one who wishes, I will not say to write the life of Christ, but to write something about His life, must base all his conclusions not on the text of the Gospel, but on the reconstruction of the sources of the Gospel. It may be said that this leaves us a very insecure foundation. That may be so: possibly the result of research may



be to show that it is for us just as impossible to know Christ after the flesh as St. Paul believed that it was for him inexpedient. But even if this be so, it is better to know it. A builder is not absolved from examining the ground on which he is going to build, because he will have to alter his plans if it prove to be unsuitable.

Textual criticism combined with source criticism has taken away from us for good the old idea of the "holy original." It has given us in its place a series of documents which enable us to trace the history of early Christianity. The value of that result depends entirely on the way in which it is used. If it be treated from the standpoint of Western civilisation and of the nineteenth century, which contented itself with labelling this practice as magic and that account as legendary, its value will be small; but, on the other hand, for those who take the trouble to get behind documents, however corrupt, and practices, however foolish, and try to understand something of the spirit which animated the men who wrote and the deeds which are described, its value can scarcely be overestimated; for I venture to think that it will make clear that what made Christianity a great power in those days was neither a complicated theology nor an elaborated cultus, but the personal experience of individuals, which, though expressed differently, was essentially the same as our own, and it will be possible to see that the obscure phraseology of the theologian, which differs in every age and is soon forgotten, is only the attempt to express permanent facts which in themselves are few and simple, even though they surpass thought and defy language.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

*EUCKEN AND CHRISTIANITY.*

WE hear much at present of dissatisfaction with the old forms of the Christian faith and of the necessity for something new. The need for a new form of Christianity has been set forth with great force by one of the most eminent philosophers of our day—Professor Eucken of Jena—in publications which are perhaps more widely read at present than any other serious books. In *Christianity and the New Idealism* in particular, we have his views given in a concentrated form with great lucidity and intense earnestness. The common Christianity, he thinks, fails with respect to its special historical basis as it is usually stated, and in the form of its dogmas, which the culture of the day is unable to accept. But its greatest weakness is its inability to embrace the whole spiritual life of man—all the aspiration and work that are distinctively human. There are other features which call for reconstruction, but these seem to be the chief ones. The new form, Eucken holds, must lose nothing of the eternal substance enshrined in the older forms; but that substance must receive a new setting and be given a wider scope. It must be such as shall find its natural expression, not in a limited sphere marked off as religious, but in the whole of life. And this new form of Christianity can only be derived from the recognition of a transcendent Spiritual Life which, as immanent in man, seeks expression through him. We must base our religion on the assured fact that there is such a Spiritual Life, a “superhuman Power at work within us, lifting us above the narrow limits of our private and particular existence, renewing us, and also transforming our relations to our fellow men”; and we must derive our knowledge of that Life from observation of its manifestations. From various points of view Eucken shows the Reality of

this Spiritual Life, as something incapable of being originated by ourselves; but "revealing itself as a unique creative force within our human existence, thus lifting life into a higher plane." The Churches, in the form in which they have existed, have failed to give due recognition to, and therefore also complete expression of, that Life as a whole, so that we now find a gulf existing between what we may term its religious and secular manifestations, as well as between religion and modern culture and modern social aims.

This basing of religion on the reality of a transcendent yet immanent Spiritual Life is a very helpful thought. It gives us the grounds of our religious and of our Christian faith within ourselves, yet not of ourselves. It brings the supreme religious Authority within each man's own soul, while it does not allow him to rest in mere individualism, but causes him to take note of all spiritual manifestations. If the nature of this Spiritual Life be truly apprehended, it will give adequate direction to all who are thoroughly honest with themselves and responsive to the life which seeks to express itself in and through them and in and through mankind as a whole.

But what we desire at present to point out is, that this just carries us back to that which Christianity itself affirms to be the deepest thing and the abiding reality within itself, which, however, has been too greatly overlooked—which, indeed, the Church as a whole has failed duly to recognise and give its true place to—must we not say, has too often gone contrary to?

This Spiritual Life which we must grasp as the fundamental reality,—what is it but the movement of the living Spirit of God in man? If Life be real, this, which is the source of our highest life, is the supreme reality. If it be a reality—*the* reality—it must be an entity of some kind, not a physical but a spiritual entity. If it be transcendent of us it must be in itself greater than we are, there-

fore not less than personal. It is also *here*, moving in the depths of each man's being, seeking adequate expression : we do not have to go in search of it. While real, it must be at the same time the ideal to which we should be conformed. It can only make itself known to us by causing ideals to arise before us and inspiring us to realise them. It is not reason merely, nor is it ideal only ; it is Life itself—causing us to experience certain feelings and cravings, to be dissatisfied with the actual world and our actual selves, to long for a higher, fuller life and a satisfaction which can only be found through response to and harmony with itself. But this is just the nature, and these are the very functions of the Holy Spirit of truth and love, the presence of which over us and in us is that which distinguishes Christianity as the dispensation of the Spirit. It was the coming of that Spirit on men that created the Church, and it should still guide and inspire the Church. Those in whom that Spirit dwelt “needed not that any man should teach them” ; let them only be true to the Holy Spirit of Christ and of God. That Spirit was the principle and the power of the spiritual life in the individual and in the Christian communities. It was the presence of that Holy Spirit, Jesus said, that was the presence of God in the Son of man ; not merely the power by which He did His mighty works, but, as He said to His disciples, it should be in their experience, a teaching and illuminative Presence : “the Holy Spirit shall teach you.” If Christ were visibly present on earth His Church would naturally look to Him for constant guidance. But in that Holy Spirit He was to be with them and in them for ever. By that Spirit His followers should be guided “into all the truth.” That indwelling Spirit should be more to them than Christ could be while He was with them in the flesh. It was the Spirit of the Father as well as of the Son—God in all the fulness of Spiritual Life.

That Spirit, we know, did not then for the first time come



into being or make its presence felt in man. The Old Testament—to go no farther—is a witness to the reality of pre-Christian Divine inspiration. Not only holiness but wisdom in counsel and skill in work were attributed to the Spirit of God as their source. It was a new outpouring, or rather, a fuller realisation of a Presence always with us and always seeking expression through man, that came to the world through its manifestation in Christ and His Cross, where God was reconciling the world to Himself so that He might fully dwell in men as their God, making them truly His “people.” It was, in one aspect, an unveiling of the nature of that Spiritual Life which is at once immanent in man and transcendent of him, always moving him to something higher. As it appeared in Christ, and through Him came to men, it was at the same time “an entry of the eternal into time,” its fullest entrance, to be an abiding presence. But the Eternal was always there and has been always the same. Through its complete expression in Christ the nature of the Divine Eternal Spirit was made better known, and men brought into such relationship to God that it came to them with greater power. In this way a new influx of the Spirit went forth through Christ and His Cross; but it was the one Eternal Spirit of God that came thus in power, not something entirely new. And, although that same Spirit still comes to us through these media, it is still in itself that eternal and universal Spiritual Life that seeks to possess and to find expression through all men.

In that Spirit we have all that we need, if only we will believe in its presence, realise its character and be responsive to it. We have in it all that we *can* have; for it is God Himself in man. To bring men under the full influence of that Spirit is the very purpose of Christianity. Its doctrines, ritual and institutions have their entire value in their power to accomplish this—in their ministrations to life

in the Spirit. Whenever the Church has erred it has been through ignoring or failing to be true to that Spirit, in forgetting its character as revealed in Christ, or in failing to seek expression for it in the whole of life. Since it is the deepest thing in man, it seeks to inspire, not one department of activity only, but *the whole life*. No kind of work can be outside its influence, no aspiration is worthy which it does not inspire, no aim is true which is not in harmony with it. We may not be conscious of it, but all that is true and good is its working. If it were universally responded to it would not only make the individual life divinely true, but would unify society. Humanity, moved in all its work and in all its aims by the one Divine Spirit, that God may be all in all, is the divine ideal which Christianity comes to make actual. This is the one supreme thing the Christian Church ought to keep before her. We need nothing more than to be true to the Spirit as we have come to know it through our relation to Christ. In no other way can we imagine how the universal Spiritual Life can move us than as such a teaching and inspiring Spirit. All our failure is failure to be true to that Holy Spirit of God and of Christ. We ought to be thankful to philosophy if it can help, as Eucken is doing, to make plain the reality of the Spiritual Life and the absolute necessity of giving it full expression. But we have no need to grope after some new way of apprehending the truth or of knowing the mind of the Spirit. In spite of all that is so well and truly said, Eucken seems, in common with most philosophers, to regard Christianity too much as something external, instead of seeing it to be, in its truth, identical with the Spirit of Life within us, as that has been manifested in truth and power in Jesus Christ. All that we have to do is to be true to that which has thus been made clearly known and brought home to the consciousness of each soul open to the truth. There can be nothing higher than God's Holy Spirit of

truth and love ; there can be no truer inspiration than that which proceeds from the presence of that Spirit within us ; we can find no surer guidance in all our work and aims, individual and social, than to follow its leading. What we need to do is to bring all our doctrine, all our ecclesiastical institutions, all our religious, all our secular work, all our social aims completely under the dominance of the Spirit of God which is already with us and perfectly well known to us. What is wanted is the will to obey it—to be “ led by the Spirit.” We must not keep calling for something new while we ignore or insufficiently realise and obey that which has already been divinely given to us. We must also cease to argue so much about mere outward historicity—Eucken warns us against the dangers of an unspiritual historicity—and fix our attention more on the culmination, on that which has been made consciously and abidingly ours through the historical manifestation of God in Christ. Do not let us lose ourselves in discussing the details of how the gold was mined ; let us rather grasp and hold fast and use the gold itself. What we have is something above doubt and beyond question. *We know* that a Holy Spirit of truth and love, of righteousness and all goodness claims our entire life, seeks to live in us and to work through us. This is God Himself as He has made Himself known in Jesus Christ. Again we ask, What more do we want ? What more does the world in all its life and work require ? What more can we with all our searching find ? The one thing needed is to be wholly responsive to this Divine Spirit of life, to let the Spirit—that is, God Himself—be everything to us.

The issues that confront us at this time are, as Eucken reminds us, momentous. A large part of the civilised world is becoming indifferent to Christianity, to all spiritual religion. This means, of course, that God in His supreme relation to the world is being forgotten. Even with many in pro-

fessedly Christian associations the religious tone is becoming lowered. Religion is too much a surface-matter—a matter of creed and discussion, of form and outward ritual—too greatly severed also from our other activities. While God is formally acknowledged, His actual spiritual presence within seems to be less of a reality. Discussions concerning the Christ of history have tended to hide the presence of Christ in the Spirit. How many are there who realise that that Holy Spirit of which we read so much in the New Testament, the indwelling of which was so vivid in the experience of the first Christians, is the very presence and power of God and of Christ within us, one with the Divine Spirit of man's true life? If this were realised it would bring our whole life under one Divine inspiration. Not only so: it would bring to us at the same time those influences that would most strongly move us to yield ourselves up to God in the Spirit.

We have made too little in our theology of the reality of that present Divine indwelling—of that Spirit of God and of Christ—which is the source of all truth and of all goodness, which *is* the truth and the holy love that God is moving within us. We have thought of that Holy Spirit too greatly as something detached and separate from the Spirit of God as the Spirit of all true life. The Holy Spirit has for this reason sometimes received only a formal recognition in theology. As a rule, it has been ignored by philosophy. In the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* it is said to have no philosophical significance. Can we wonder that Christianity has got into the present serious position when that which is its ever present Divine power has been so greatly overlooked?

We need to think more earnestly on that Divine presence and indwelling the realisation of which was the designed outcome of the whole earthly appearance and work of Christ. We need to observe and meditate on its manifestations,



above all in Christ, so as to have a clear perception of its nature, and discern its oneness with the Divine spiritual life that moves in all men. We need to look into the depths of our own being, wherein that Spirit is moving, and endeavour to give full expression to it in those orderly forms of thought and life to which it would lead us. Eucken pleads for metaphysics as that which would help us to reach a more desirable condition in religion. Metaphysics, in the sense intended, is simply deeper thought in recognition of that spiritual world which *must* lie within and beyond all that is physically manifested, which is, indeed, "the soul's true home." Undoubtedly, for want of such deeper thought religion suffers. One of the most regrettable features of the present is the disinclination to think deeply. We want everything presented to us in tit-bits. If metaphysics will help us, let us take to it seriously.

But, while we require to bring all our religious forms "into harmony with that phase of the spiritual life to which the world's historical development has led us," we must be careful to note what really *is* of the Spirit of God. What we need most of all is to realise *the nature* of that Holy Spirit which is the crown of Christianity and to see its oneness with the universal Spiritual Life which seeks to possess us. Eucken himself says that his "whole inquiry stands for the conviction that in Christianity, as a religion of moral redemption, such a revelation of spiritual reality has actually been given, and with it, from the deepest founts of being, an inspiration that stirs us to the pursuit of ends that can never be superseded." "It is not our duty," he says, "to fight for a new religion; we have but to kindle into freshness of life the fathomless depths of Christianity." There *are* depths which have not yet been fathomed, even infinite depths. But the essential nature of the Spirit has been clearly revealed. "Who," Paul asks, "hath known the mind of the Lord that he may instruct Him?" "But,"

he adds, "We have the mind of Christ." We have it in the Spirit, he says—"the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given to us by God." The mind of Christ is the mind of the Spirit because it was the mind of God in His self-revelation of perfect righteousness and infinite love in Jesus Christ. We shall look in vain for any higher revelation; for, as already said, there *can* be nothing higher. What we have to do is to realise it and apply it to the whole of life under the guidance of the ever-present Spirit. Taught by the Spirit, led by the Spirit, we shall be guided into all truth of thought and life, and, as we are true to that Spirit of God within us, our whole lives will increasingly express the Divine, and the world will become that expression and manifestation of the life of God in man in which alone real individual and social good can be found.

We dare not despair of truth and righteousness or of religious and social unity when we have God Himself deepest in our life—the very Spirit of our highest life. No doubt there is that in man which, in the interests of his lower, earthly nature, ignores the presence and resists the expression of the Divine Spirit in his life. But if men were once led to see clearly that their life can only be true and good as it obeys the Divine Spirit of life: if religion were seen to be, not merely communion with a God outside of us, but unison with a Divine Spirit within, and Christianity the highest form of religion because it is the supreme revelation of the nature of that Divine Spirit and a redeeming influence to bring us into living unison therewith, the opposition would be gradually overcome, and Christianity would bring effectively the inspiration of a universal spiritual life. The essential thing is to see that everything in Christianity culminated in the revealed presence of God with men in the Holy Spirit, and to give in all things complete expression to that Spirit.

W. L. WALKER.

## A MARTYR OF THE THIRD CENTURY.

THERE was found at Synnada of Phrygia in June, 1907, and sent to the Museum of Broussa, one of the most remarkable of the early Christian monuments that are now being slowly discovered, year after year, one here and one there, in Asia Minor (chiefly in Phrygia and Lycaonia). It is a small box of marble, about six inches long in its largest part (where the moulding projects most prominently); and it has the form of a tiny sarcophagus, differing only in being higher than its length, whereas sarcophagi generally are longer than they measure in height. I speak of the height including the lid or cover (which is a separate piece both in the large sarcophagi and in this small box). With the box, and apparently inside it, though the account is not quite clear and explicit on this detail, there were found fragments of a skull. On the body and on the lid of the sarcophagus are inscriptions.—

(1) On the body:—

ὠδε ἔνα Τρο-  
φίμου τοῦ μ-  
άρτυρος ὀστέ-  
α

Within are Tro-  
phimus the M-  
artyr's bones

(2) On the lid—

τίς ἂν δὲ ταῦ-  
τα τὰ ὀστέα  
ἐκβαλεῖ ποτέ,  
ἔσται ἀντὶ  
πρὸς τ[ὸν] θεό-  
ν<sup>1</sup>

And whosoever  
shall these bones  
ever cast out,  
he shall have to  
reckon with God.

Monsieur G. Mendel, who is the author of the excellent

<sup>1</sup> Grammatically the only difficulty lies in *ένα*, apparently a vulgarism for *ἕνα* or *ἓν*, a relic of local Phrygian Greek.

Catalogue of the Museum at Broussa,<sup>1</sup> and Monsieur H. Grégoire, whose opinion he quotes, are agreed in regarding this box as having been intended to contain part of the remains of Trophimus from Pisidian Antioch, who suffered at Synnada in the short persecution under the Emperor Probus, 276-282 A.D. There are no two scholars whose opinion on a matter of Christian antiquities in Asia Minor ranks higher; and their agreement may be taken as very strong, though Monseigneur Duchesne regards the box and the inscriptions as later than the fourth century. MM. Mendel's and Gregoire's arguments are (as they both recognise) founded largely on the criteria of the dating of Christian inscriptions in Phrygia, which are laid down in my *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, ii., chapter xii. I have sometimes feared that my views might be considered to exaggerate the antiquity of Christian monuments in Phrygia; and it is a great encouragement to find that the same reasons which in 1894 appeared conclusive to me are still regarded by two such excellent scholars as decisive. The discoveries of the intervening sixteen years, have distinctly tended to confirm the main lines of my chronological system. In our view the formula "he shall have to reckon with God" belongs to the third century, when Christianity, in its public appearance, was still concealing itself under cryptic symbols and language. After the triumph of Christianity, in the epoch to which Mgr. Duchesne assigns this monument, one can hardly suppose it possible that no cross or other open sign of religious character should appear in the epitaph or on some other part of the box. The use of the cross in Christian epitaphs, or of some equivalent symbol, became almost universal soon after A.D. 340.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> All that I say is taken from this publication.

<sup>2</sup> The usage had not been established when Bishop Eugenius of Laodicea of Lycaonia prepared his sarcophagus in A.D. 341 (EXPOSITOR, November, 1908).



The inscriptions, brief as they are, are marked not merely by the presence of an early formula, but by the absence of any late and stereotyped Christian expressions. At the date to which Mgr. Duchesne assigns the monument, we should expect a term like *τοῦ ἁγίου μάρτυρος*. The public cult of the holy martyrs was fully established by that time, and an adjective of respect could hardly be omitted. In that later period this monument would naturally have to be regarded as a reliquary made to contain relics (supposed or real) of the Saint, and preserved in a Church for general reverence and worship. We can hardly suppose that a tomb, with a sepulchral inscription, was made for the bones of a person who had died a century and a half, or even more, previously. But this monument is marked as sepulchral. The form of the inscription cannot be mistaken. Had this been a reliquary, much greater horror would have been expressed at the thought of the bones being thrown out, and a severer punishment would have been denounced against sacrilege.

The small size of the box must be explained by the supposition that the Christians did not obtain the corpse from the Roman authorities. They only succeeded in getting a part which they buried. The words which I have used in the *Cities and Bishops of Phrygia*, ii., p. 730, "Rome did not war against the dead; and the remains of the martyrs were allowed to be buried by their friends"—while true of the case there mentioned and of many others—are too absolutely expressed; and exceptions must be admitted even in the earlier persecutions, still more in the later. The Roman officials observed the eagerness of the Christians to get possession of the corpses of the martyrs, or even parts of them, and probably dreaded some mystic or magical power which might be given by the relics of the dead: accordingly, as early as the martyr-

dom of Polycarp (probably A.D. 155) his body was refused to the Church. The high respect and veneration for the martyrs, which began quite early, passed gradually into a public cult, and gave rise to some abuses as early as the time of Diocletian.

Each new fact regarding the state of Christianity in Asia Minor during the third century has its distinct value ; and we are gradually collecting the materials out of which a clearer idea of the beginnings of the Eastern Church can be formed. Monsieur Grégoire accepts the early date assigned to Paul the Martyr of Derbe (whose tombstone was published by Miss Ramsay in *Studies in the History of the Eastern Provinces*, p. 62), remarking that a commonplace sepulchral formula, such as is employed in the epitaph, is not the sort of inscription that would have been placed over a martyr in the time following the triumph of the Church. He here recognises fully and confirms by his authority our principle that those simple forms of sepulchral inscription, common to pagans and Christians, or only slightly modified from pagan phraseology, belong to the period before Constantine, and disappear with the generation which was living at the time when the peace of the Church was finally assured.

The same scholar also accepts my interpretation of the epitaph of the five Phrygian " children, who on one single occasion gained the lot of life " : they are five martyrs, who suffered at Hieropolis, not far from Synnada, probably in the persecution of Decius 249-251 A.D., and were buried by their spiritual father, doubtless the Bishop of the Church. On the other hand he is not convinced by the conjecture advanced by Mr. Anderson and myself in the *Studies in the Eastern Provinces*, pp. 125, 201, that Bishop Akylas (Aquila), whose epitaph we have published, was a martyr. The language of the epitaph is obscure, and the text is

not complete.<sup>1</sup> But it is a gain to have assured three graves and epitaphs of martyrs during the third century.

A list of the recent books and articles bearing on the topics touched on in this article may be conveniently added here. The *Acta* of the martyrs Trophimus and his companions are published in *Acta Sanctorum*, September vi., pp. 12 ff., Migne's *Patrol. Gr.* cxv., pp. 733 ff. See also Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchr. Litt.* ii. 2, p. 481 note; Goerres, *Jahrb. f. protestant. Theol.* xvi., 1890, pp. 616 f. (who denies the authenticity of the *Acta*); Allard, *Hist. des Persecutions*, iii. p. 279, 4; and Aubé, *L'Église et l'État*, p. 52 f. (who both maintain the authenticity);<sup>2</sup> Mercati, *Studi et testi*, 5., *Note di letteratura biblica e cristiana antica*, xv. pp. 206-226; *Un apologia antiellenica sotto forma di martirio*. On the formula "he shall have to reckon with God," see *Monumenta ecclesia liturgica* by Cabrol and Leclerc, i., *reliq. liturg.*, section i., *reliq. epigraph.* p. 12\*, no. 2798.

W. M. RAMSAY.

<sup>1</sup> Monsieur Mendel also points out that the form of the letters in the epitaph of Trophimus the Martyr favours an early date, though not sufficient to prove the period absolutely.

<sup>2</sup> My impression has always been that the *Acta*, which are extremely interesting and well deserve a special publication, are of the fourth or fifth century, and probably quite trustworthy in the main outlines, but giving a later view of the situation.

*SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.*

V. SIN AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY—THE ISSUES.

ENOUGH has been said to indicate how seriously the Christian doctrine of sin is imperilled by the forms assumed by modern philosophical speculation. It is now necessary to consider the bearings on this doctrine of the still more formidable influence—more formidable because more widely extended and more penetrative of modern thought—of current theories of organic evolution.

No one who studies the evolutionary theory of man's origin, enormous antiquity, and primitive brutishness can doubt that there is call for such inquiry.<sup>1</sup> The force of the theory goes even deeper than in its effect on the doctrine of sin. In the forms of it that seem to find most favour with its accredited representatives—e.g., in the volume, *Darwin and Modern Science*, recently issued at Cambridge in connexion with the Darwin commemoration—it profoundly touches theism itself. There is no need for apology for any Christian thinker, though neither a biologist nor a naturalist, giving earnest attention to this subject. It is not a matter of choice: it is forced upon him by the necessity of the case. The theologian may be to blame when he rashly or dogmatically intrudes into the domain of science; on the other hand, it is not his place to be silent when the scientist makes bold inroads into *his* domain, and, in the name of science, would sweep away spiritual facts which stand on their own grounds of evidence as securely as any facts of external nature. Truths in nature

<sup>1</sup> In a note on "Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil," in his *Thoughts on Religion*, G. G. Romanes says: "These, 'all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit by the scientific proof of evolution . . . and, as constituting the logical basis of the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to involve in their destruction the entire superstructure.'"



and truths in the spiritual world cannot, of course, be in real collision. But this requires to be made clear against unwarrantable assertion on either side.

The present writer has no desire or intention of intruding into the sphere of science proper. He claims no more than the right of every intelligent mind to consider theories of science as expounded by their best representatives in the light of their own evidence, and to judge of them from the point of view of a sound connexion between premises and conclusions. He has no concern to dispute evolution within the limits in which science has established it, or rendered it probable. He would only plead for its being kept carefully within these limits in its bearings on religion. It will be seen in the sequel how far "evolution," in current use, is from being a term of single or simple meaning; how little it stands for one definite, harmonious view of the origin of organic beings; how many ambiguities, confusions, fallacies, conceal themselves under its high-sounding name. Only admiration, mingled with astonishment, can be felt at the ceaseless patience and marvellous skill with which a host of investigators are engaged in unravelling the intricacies of Nature's mystic web; but it may be claimed that the result is to show how little that is really scientifically proved conflicts with those beliefs on man's nature, origin, and sin, which lie at the roots of our most cherished Christian convictions.

1. Evolution is to be considered in its special bearings on the doctrine of sin; but this involves, to start with, a brief estimate of *the general trend of evolutionary theory* as a phase of the thought of the age.<sup>1</sup> Older controversies may, for the most part, be put aside: as authoritative guides for modern opinions one cannot do better than

<sup>1</sup> A more general review of evolutionary theories may be seen in the writer's book, *God's Image in Man and the Defacement*, and in his earlier work, *The Christian View of God and the World*.

take the volume already named, *Darwin and Modern Science*, with its twenty-nine essays by writers of distinction, supplemented by the able works on Darwinism and Heredity by Professor J. A. Thomson,<sup>1</sup> and the acute and valuable book by Rudolf Otto, of Göttingen, translated under the title of *Naturalism and Religion*.<sup>2</sup> Darwin's own works, naturally, must always be kept in view, though it will become apparent—Otto specially works out this thesis—how broad a distinction needs to be drawn between “Evolution,” and “Darwinism” as a special theory of the process.

Evolution, in some form, has *long been in the air*. Hegel was an evolutionist as truly as Darwin, but there is a wide difference between the philosophical and the scientific conceptions. Hegel beheld in the evolutionary process the movement of “idea.” Darwin built his theory on observation and interpretation of the facts of nature, eschewing any but natural factors in his explanations. His supreme service was that, in Professor J. A. Thomson's words, he made the thought of evolution “current intellectual coin.”<sup>3</sup> He gave it scientific precision and enlarged basis, and connected it with a theory of the “how” in “Natural Selection.”<sup>4</sup> The *fact* of evolution is now generally accepted: the *how*, it will be found, is still much in debate. It is here, in truth, the crux lies. Is “natural selection,” or any purely “causal-mechanical”<sup>5</sup> theory, an adequate account of evolution?

<sup>1</sup> Chiefly his recent (closely related) works, the *Bible of Nature and Darwinism and Human Life*.

<sup>2</sup> The German title of Otto's book is *Naturalistische und Religiöse Weltansicht*. The translation is published in the “Crown Theological Library.”

<sup>3</sup> *Darwinism and Human Life*, pp. 17, 19.

<sup>4</sup> Darwin laid chief stress in his own claim on the discovery of the “How” (cf. *Origin of Species*, Introduction). Yet it is the “How” which is now a question. See further below.

<sup>5</sup> *Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 242.

A first impression produced by a study of Darwinism, as set forth by its advocates in the Cambridge volume, is its undisguised *naturalism*. Darwin, it is well known, seeks to give an entirely natural account of how species have originated, of how the rise has been effected from lower to higher orders of organic existence, finally, of how man has been developed, in both body and mind, from the animal forms nearest to him. The agency chiefly relied on to produce these changes is "natural selection,"<sup>1</sup> which, acting on unguided variations,<sup>2</sup> under the conditions of the struggle for existence, brings about the adaptation hitherto supposed to imply the presence of mind. Theologians, therefore, did not misrepresent Darwin in speaking of his theory as, in its essential character, inimical to theism. Of course multitudes of evolutionists qualify this naturalism in various directions—therein deserting Darwin. So far, however, as the volume, *Darwin and Modern Science*, is a true index to the prevailing trend of evolutionary thought, it cannot be described as other than unfavourable to a religious interpretation of nature.<sup>3</sup> In the majority of the papers nature is regarded as capable

<sup>1</sup> While not upholding selection as the "exclusive" means of modification, it was that on which, at the beginning, Darwin laid practically all the stress. His book was entitled *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*. In the third edition he wrote (p. 208) that if it could be demonstrated that any complex organ could not be formed by this means, his theory "would absolutely break down." This opinion he lived to modify (*Descent of Man*, i. p. 152).

<sup>2</sup> Variations are not indeed without causes, but are held to be without design (in this sense "fortuitous"): are, as Darwin repeatedly calls them, "chance" variations. In *Life and Letters*, ii. p. 369, he speaks of "the action of selection on mere accidental variability." There is more here than the ignorance of conditions with which Prof. Thomson would ward off the objection of "fortuitousness" (*Bible of Nature*, p. 170). Prof. Ward, in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, dwells on the difference between "evolution without guidance and evolution with guidance" (i. p. 205).

<sup>3</sup> In certain of the essays this is made a boast of. Darwin is praised for his agnosticism and rejection of Christianity (pp. 114-15, 496); Christianity itself is satirized (p. 495).

of working out all her results in the order, beauty, harmony, adaptation of the world without the aid of intelligence or purpose.<sup>1</sup> Teleology—and this not simply the old teleology of Paley, but the immanent teleology which, in all secondary causes, sees the internal direction of means to ends, and general advance of creation to a predetermined goal—is eliminated. To the consistent Darwinian God becomes, as to Laplace, a superfluous “hypothesis.” It is a barren concession of Huxley and others that there *may* be teleology in the total system, though we cannot possibly prove it. If the universe can be explained without intelligence, why postulate it? The contention of pure Darwinism is that it can be so explained.<sup>2</sup>

It is a point of importance that Darwin will allow selection-value only to excessively *small and rare* variations, and that, of consequence, the process of evolution is assumed to be slow and insensible.<sup>3</sup> It will be seen afterwards that this is a point in which the newer evolution tends to break with Darwin; but Weismann strenuously supports Darwin in it.<sup>4</sup> In its bearings on man’s origin, it leads to the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g., pp. 61, 99, 100, 139, 141, 225, etc. “Assuming,” says Prof. Bateson, “that the variations are not guided into paths of adaptation—and both to the Darwinian and to the modern school this hypothesis appears to be sound if improved” (p. 99).

<sup>2</sup> Weismann, in his work *The Evolution Theory*, i. pp. 55–6, remarks: “The philosophical significance of natural selection lies in the fact that it shows us how to explain the origin of useful, well-adapted structures purely by mechanical forces, and without having to fall back on a *directive* force.” R. Otto, in *Naturalism and Religion*, emphasises this as the characteristic mark of Darwinism—the reason for which Darwin is called the Newton of biology—“its radical opposition to teleology” (p. 89, cf. p. 140).

<sup>3</sup> He gives as an illustration a bird being born with a beak  $\frac{1}{100}$  of an inch longer than usual (*Life and Letters*, iii. p. 33). He does not doubt “that during millions of generations individuals of a species will be born with some slight variation profitable to some part of its economy” (*Ibid.* ii. p. 124).

<sup>4</sup> *Dar. and Mod. Science*, pp. 22–3. Cf. *Evolution Theory*, i. p. 55: “Natural selection depends essentially on the cumulative augmentation of the most minute useful variations in the direction of their utility.”



conclusion that man has only very slowly and gradually risen from the ape (or cognate) condition, acquiring his higher powers through favourable variations of mind and body, preserved by natural selection and accumulated during long ages of semi-brutishness and savagery, till by degrees he attains to speech, arts, and civilisation.<sup>1</sup> 150,000, 300,000 or 500,000 years are not thought too long to allow for this development.<sup>2</sup>

2. It must be seen, without need of detailed argument, that the Darwinian evolutionary theory, thus sketched in very general terms, strikes deeply into the heart of the *Christian doctrine of sin* as that has been commonly understood. It does so both on the theistic and on the anthropological sides; but attention may be confined at present to the side of man. The older conception of an historical "Fall" of man of course goes. Instead of a fallen son, man becomes a rising creature. His origin is pushed back so far, his primitive condition is pictured as so brutish, such countless generations of animalism and savagery intervene before he gets his foot on even the lowest round of the ladder of civilisation, that the idea of a "Fall" from an original state of integrity (*status integritatis*) is out of the question. The doctrine of a "Fall," therefore, as taught in Genesis and by the Apostle Paul,<sup>3</sup> is ruled out by evolutionary science and by the New Theology<sup>4</sup>—as by the older philosophy—as inherently absurd.

<sup>1</sup> The arguments in Darwin's *Descent of Man* are conveniently summarised in several papers in *Dar. and Mod. Science* (specially those of Prof. Schwalbe on "The Descent of Man," and of Hæckel on "Darwin as an Anthropologist") and in Prof. Thomson's works as cited. Darwin himself has a convenient summary in his closing chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g., Thomson, *Bible of Nature*, pp. 191-2; A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*, p. 456; *Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 130.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. iii.; Rom. v. 12 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 21; 1 Tim. ii. 13, 14; cf. John viii. 44; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xii. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. R. J. Campbell thinks the doctrine of the Fall is largely responsible for "the theological muddle." "This doctrine has played a mis-

It is not only, however, a particular theory of the origin of sin that is put in question by the evolutionary conception: *the very idea of sin*, in the Christian sense, is essentially altered. Sin is no longer the voluntary defection of a creature who had the power to remain sinless. The very possibility of sinless development is excluded. Sin becomes a natural necessity of man's ascent: a something unavoidable in his history. It is, therefore, at least in its earlier manifestations, a thing exceedingly venial—hardly, indeed, imputable at all. The idea of a "guilt" in sin is weakened till it almost vanishes. With this must naturally be given up the idea of a world lost and perishing through sin, under condemnation, needing redemption and renewal. What has been called hereditary sin becomes the yet uneliminated brute inheritance.<sup>1</sup> The basis of the Christian Gospel seems removed.

In support of the contention that *the Fall* is no proper part of Christian doctrine, it is frequently urged that, after the "mythical" account of Genesis iii. (if even there<sup>2</sup>) no further trace of the doctrine is found in the Old Testament. The prophets knew nothing of it. This statement, however, goes much too far,<sup>3</sup> and hardly looks below the surface. It would be truer to say that the fact of the

chievous part in Christian thought, more especially, perhaps, since the Reformation. . . . What I now wish to insist upon is that it is absolutely impossible for any intelligent man to continue to believe in the Fall as it is literally understood and taught" (*New Theology*, pp. 53, 55). He does not seem to believe in it in any sense.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. in the above *Christian View of God*, pp. 117 ff.; *God's Image in Man*, pp. 201 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Tennant, in his book *The Fall and Original Sin*, will hardly allow that the doctrine of a moral Fall is taught even in Genesis; cf. Campbell, *Op. cit.*, pp. 55, 56.

<sup>3</sup> The J narrative, which records the Fall, is older than written prophecy. Wellhausen, also, in his *History of Israel*, assumes that the P writer was acquainted with JE on this subject (p. 310). On the historical kernel in Genesis iii. cf. Westphal, *Law and Prophets* (E.T. of his *Jéhovah*), pp. 33 ff.

Fall is presupposed in the whole picture which the Bible—Old and New Testament alike—gives of the world as turned aside from God, and in rebellion against Him.<sup>1</sup> Put the third chapter of Genesis out of view, the facts of the sin and disorder of the world have to be dealt with, and accounted for all the same. The question is—Can they be accounted for, in harmony with a true idea of sin, on the ground of such a picture of man's origin as Darwinian evolution offers ?

Many Christian theologians, whose views are entitled to the highest respect, even if one feels it impossible to agree with them, think *an affirmative answer* can be given to this question.<sup>2</sup> These thinkers are impressed with the facts of evolution, with the consensus of opinion for the animal origin, slow development, and immense antiquity of man, and do their best to show that the Christian doctrines of man's moral nature and sinful condition are not affected by them. The argument may be set aside that man's nature being what it is, sin also being a fact of universal experience, it matters little what theory is held as to how they came to be. Beginnings and ends, causes and effects, must be brought into harmony, else, if the theory is wrong, the attitude to duty and to sin will soon change. The ground, therefore, usually taken in these irenic attempts is that there is room for the facts of man's moral life even

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gen. vi. 5-12; viii. 21; Ps. xiv.; Rom. i. 18 ff.; iii. 9 ff., etc. Dillmann, in his *Alttest. Theol.*, holds that the Old Testament everywhere presupposes the rule of sin and death in contradiction to its original destiny, and the presence of an inborn evil tendency (pp. 369, 376 ff.). "So," he writes, "we are brought back to the doctrine of the prophetic narrator, of an original state and fall of the first man, who, from an uncorrupted nature, giving entrance to sin, did that which had fatal consequences for the whole race" (p. 380).

<sup>2</sup> Among others may be mentioned Dr. Gore, Bishop of Worcester (*Expos. Times*, April, 1897), Dr. Driver (*Genesis*, pp. 56-7), Dr. J. R. Illingworth (*Bampton Lects.*, pp. 143 ff., 154 ff.), Principal Griffith-Jones (*Ascent through Christ*, pp. 138 ff.).

on the Darwinian view of his origin. Be the starting-point as low as one chooses, there is necessarily, it is claimed, a stage in man's development when moral sense awakens, and rudimentary ideas of right and wrong begin to be formed. Then the crisis arrives. As endowed with freedom,<sup>1</sup> the individual can choose good and evil, and, with wrong choice, sin begins.

The question may be postponed whether, on a consistent Darwinian basis—man's mental and moral equipment being viewed as a simple development from that of the animals—there is any satisfactory explanation possible of the rise of moral ideas, or real place left for self-determining freedom. But, apart from such questions, involving the problem of the origin of spiritual personality, can it be held that this theory really yields an idea of sin adequate to the Christian conception? Or does it not rather take the foundation from that conception? It seems very plain that it does so.

The picture with which this theory starts is that of a being in a *condition of transition* from animal to man—"a miserable, half-starved, naked wretch, just emerged from the bestial condition, torn with fierce passions, and fighting his way among his compeers with low-browed cunning."<sup>2</sup> Reason and conscience are yet in germ, and animal impulses rule. Is this a state which, from the Christian point of view, can ever be regarded as normal for the moral being? Is it a condition in which we should expect a God of holiness and Fatherly love to launch His moral creature on the world? The thoughts will not harmonise. It does not touch the essential difficulty to

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Gore grants that, if science persists "in denying that man has any freedom of will, and, therefore, that he can have any responsibility for his actions—if science persists in denying that, then science and the Bible can never agree together" (*loc. cit.*).

<sup>2</sup> *Christian View of God*, p. 180. Cf. *God's Image in Man*, pp. 208-9.



say that it is a state to be *outgrown*. What morality affirms is, that it is not a state a moral being ought ever to be in. Moral law, it has been seen, demands not only right action, but a right state of the *soul*—a subordination of passion to reason, control of lower impulses, purity of motive and disposition, a right direction of the will towards God. Of this the state described is the diametric opposite. It is not simply that this right state is an *ideal* to which the developing being should aspire: it is a state in which he should be *now*, and always, according to the stage of his growth. Christ's "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," etc.<sup>1</sup> binds man absolutely. He admits of no exceptions. To bear the image of God, as He conceives of it, is not merely to possess in the nature the elements of that image—rationality, freedom, moral knowledge—it is to be a state positively conformable to that image. Sin, it was seen, is more than mere moral fault. It is, fundamentally, transgression of *God's* law, the breach of man's relation to *God*, contrariety in heart and conduct to the *divine Holiness*. How, then, shall we judge of the being whose nature is in violent turbulence, whose life is brutish, who has not even the glimmer of a right knowledge of God? What meaning can be attached to "sin" in the case of such a being? Man is in a wrong state to start with. Where is the leverage in nature that will ever lift him out of it? "Evolution"—"Natural Selection"—stand here powerless.

The reply given is—Yes, but man has *free-will*. He is not a creature of necessity, of environment, of circumstances. He has it in his power, as moral consciousness awakens, to choose the good and refuse the evil. Hence responsibility, and the possibility of sin. It is again pertinent to ask—How much "free-will" does naturalism leave to man? And, if naturalism be broken with, Darwin-

<sup>1</sup> Mark xii. 30.

ism may be given up at once. But, viewing the matter more nearly, one must be careful here not to impose upon himself or others with words. Man has, indeed, the endowment of freedom ; without that moral life would be impossible. But it has already been seen that, in order to the exercise of freedom, there is needed a balance and harmony of nature : a state of soul which gives freedom opportunity to act. Freedom is not omnipotence. It is not power to act under any and every condition. There is a free, but there is also a fettered will. It is so even in Christian experience. St. Paul's searching analysis in Romans vii. is the experience of everyone here. " I find then the law, that, to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man : but I see a different law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members." <sup>1</sup> From this bondage only grace can deliver. How much greater the mockery of speaking of " freedom " in the case of a being emerging from the state of animalism, ignorant of God and goodness, the subject of powerful and ungoverned impulses—a freedom enabling him to check and conquer the lower tendencies in his nature, and live uniformly in accordance with the higher ! The task set before such a being is an impossible one. The only consistent position here is frankly to declare, as is done by the bulk of evolutionists, that sin in the developing being is inevitable, but is *venial*, something to which no serious " guilt " can be attached.

The issue which arises here is very clear, and of supreme importance. Assuming that *the Biblical conception* has been correctly described as having for its presuppositions God's changeless holiness in His relations with man, moral law apprehended with sufficient clearness to show man

<sup>1</sup> Rom. vii, 21, 22.

his duty, the possibility of obedience, and sin as voluntary departure from rectitude, it can hardly be denied that evolutionary theory, as ordinarily presented, traverses that conception in every particular. It denies to man, as already shown, the possibility of sinless obedience, it leaves the greater part of what is considered as wrongdoing—lust, cruelty, bloodshed, etc.—outside the category of sin on the ground that the conscience of primitive man was not yet sufficiently developed to regard these things as wrong, it treats such transgression as man was capable of as venial, it deprives the acts of the character of *sin* through the absence of serious moral views of God.<sup>1</sup> It is futile to suppose that positions so incompatible can be combined into a unity of view entitled to call itself Christian.

3. We seem thus to be brought to an *impasse*, from which no outlet is evident, save, on the one hand, in the *surrender of the Christian conception of sin*, confirmed as that is by ages of deepest religious experience, or, on the other, in the *rejection of the doctrine of evolution*, which science well nigh universally accepts as the truth. Neither alternative can be entertained. Sin is far too real a fact, is bound up too surely with the experience of redemption in Christianity, to be thus summarily got rid of. If one took certain scientific writers strictly at their word, one would have to admit that, up to the present, evolution had not been proved at all.<sup>2</sup> But this is over modest.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *God's Image in Man*, pp. 208–9.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Thomson says: "There is no logical proof of the doctrine of descent" (*Dar. and Human Life*, p. 22, cf. pp. 26, 189. Cf. the admissions of Weismann below). It is striking to find both Mr. Darwin and his son and biographer in *Life and Letters*, iii. p. 25, announcing: "We cannot prove that a single species has changed." Mr. Thomson, comparing evolution and gravitation, says (p. 26): "We are aware of no facts contradictory of either." Not contradictory, perhaps, of evolution in the general sense, but, as his own pages show, abundantly contradictory of the specific Darwinian theory of evolution. (See below.)

The proof for some form of organic evolution, within limits, is peculiarly cogent. The problem, therefore, assumes a new shape. Granted that evolution is real, does Darwinism truly describe its process, and, if not, do the same difficulties arise on the newer, or modified conception of evolution which takes the place of the older? It is here, not in mediating attempts which surrender the essence of the Christian position, that a solution of the seeming antinomy must be sought.

One has only to study the newer phases of evolutionary opinion, as reflected in the works already mentioned, and in other recent literature, to become aware of the *remarkable, sometimes revolutionary, changes* which have taken place on this subject since Darwin first promulgated his theory of natural selection. The changes have been greater than most, even well-informed, people realise.<sup>1</sup> They leave no part of the theory untouched—variability, struggle for existence, natural selection, slow gradations, heredity, purposefulness—and transform it from within in such a way as largely to alter the perspective created by it. The crucial point of all—as stated at the outset—is the sufficiency of “natural selection,” or of any “causal-mechanical” view, to account for organic life, growth, structure, adaptation, the ascending order and correlation of nature’s kingdoms, the crowning appearance of man. It is precisely here that the changes of opinion are most instructive.

Reference was earlier made to the prevailing “natural-

Of plants, Prof. D. H. Scott observes that, “as regards direct evidence for the derivation of one species from another, there has probably been little advance since Darwin wrote” (*Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 200).

<sup>1</sup> Otto’s book, *Naturalism and Religion*, is of special value as showing the extraordinary variety of developments of opinion on the evolutionary theory in scientific circles, especially on the Continent. “The differentiation and elaboration of Darwin’s theories,” he says, “has gone ever farther and farther; the grades and shades of doctrine held by his disciples are now almost beyond reckoning” (p. 94).



ism" of the volume in commemoration of Darwin (*Darwin and Modern Science*); a scarcely less characteristic feature is its pervading *assumptiveness*. The sufficiency of "natural selection" to account for the phenomena of organisms (with much else, as the origin of life from the non-living),<sup>1</sup> is *assumed*, not proved; this on the avowed ground that only natural causation can be admitted. An example or two may be taken from Weismann. We cannot bring forward formal proofs in detail, he says, "yet we must assume selection, because it is the only possible explanation applicable to whole classes of phenomena. . . . *We must accept it because the phenomena of evolution and adaptation must have a natural basis, and because it is the only possible explanation of them.*"<sup>2</sup> This is precisely the point—Does it explain them? On the well-known difficulty of small initial variations, he remarks—"To use a phrase of Romanes, can they have *selection-value*? . . . To this question even one who, like myself, has been for many years a convinced adherent of the theory of selection, can only reply: *We must assume so, but we cannot prove it in any case.*"<sup>3</sup> On sexual selection: "An actual proof of the theory of sexual selection is out of the question, if only because we cannot tell when a variation attains to *selection-value*. . . . *We must assume this [advantageousness] since otherwise secondary characters remain inexplicable.*

<sup>1</sup> Weismann, like Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, Haeckel, and others, while admitting the impossibility of proof, "holds fast" to belief in an original "spontaneous generation" (*Evol. Theory*, i. p. 370; cf. Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, p. 239). Prof. Thomson says: "Though many thoughtful biologists, such as Huxley and Spencer, Nügel and Haeckel, have accepted the hypothesis that living organisms of a very simple sort were originally evolved from not-living material, they have done so rather in their faith in a continuous natural evolution, than from any apprehension of the possible sequences which might lead up to so remarkable a result" (*Bible of Nature*, p. 116). Cf. his quotation from Bunge (p. 99).

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 6. Italics are his.

<sup>3</sup> P. 26.

The same thing is true in regard to natural selection. It is not possible to bring forward any actual proof of the selection-value of the initial stages, and the stages in the increase of variations, as has been already shown.”<sup>1</sup> Religion, plainly, is not the only thing which makes a demand on faith.

Darwinism is essentially a theory of natural selection acting on accidental variability.<sup>2</sup> It is not disputed that variability, struggle for existence, natural selection, and heredity, have much to do with the process of evolution; Darwin's greatness lies in having made this clear. What is questioned is, the *sufficiency* of these causes, and the *adequacy* of the Darwinian interpretation of their operation. The chief significance of the change in recent times would seem to be that, whereas in Darwinism, the stress was laid mainly on *external* causes—nature, as it were, through selection, under the keen competition for existence, carving the organism into shape out of “the raw material” (Professor Thomson's phrase) furnished to it by variation, the tendency in newer thought is to transfer the secret of evolution more and more to causes *within* the organism, and to regard the external causes as subsidiary—stimulative, discriminative, eliminative—not primary or originative. With this goes, naturally, a larger recognition of definiteness, direction, and correlation in variation, and surrender of the idea that evolution must necessarily proceed by extremely slow and insensible degrees. The bearing of

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 49-50. Similarly in mental evolution, Dr. C. Lloyd Morgan writes that “presumably the majority of those who approach the subjects discussed in the third, fourth and fifth chapters of *The Descent of Man*, do so “in the full conviction that mental phenomena, not less than organic phenomena, have a natural genesis (*Op. cit.*, p. 444).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Darwin, already quoted, *Life and Letters*, ii, p. 369. Weismann says: “Nature preserves in the struggle for existence all the variations of a species at the same time, and in a purely mechanical way, if they possess selective value” (*Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 32).

such change of standpoint on our immediate subject will, by and by, be apparent. Meanwhile, a few illustrations may be offered of the extent of the change.

Darwin believed that, while much had been adduced by others to render probable the *fact* of evolution, it was reserved for himself to put the theory on a secure basis by showing the *how* of the process in natural selection.<sup>1</sup> Now, on all sides, the admission is made that, while the *fact* is certain, the *how* is yet to seek. "The fact of evolution," says Professor Thomson, "forces itself upon us: the factors elude us. There can be no dogmatism."<sup>2</sup>

The difficulty begins with *variation*. "*The kernel of the riddle,*" Weismann says truly, "*lies in the varying.*"<sup>3</sup> It is easy to speak of "useful variations," but how do the variations come to be there, to arise just when wanted, to persist in a definite direction—say the formation of an eye or an ear, or of the electric organ of certain fishes? Is this explicable without direction—without reference to an inner teleology? Weismann himself asks: "How does it happen that *the necessary beginnings of a useful variation are always present?* . . . Natural selection cannot solve this contradiction: it does not call forth the useful variation, but simply works upon it."<sup>4</sup> "Correlation"

<sup>1</sup> *Origin of Species*, Introd.

<sup>2</sup> *Bible of Nature*, p. 153. Weismann says: "The *How?* of evolution is still doubtful, but not the *fact*, and this is the secure foundation on which we stand to-day" (*Evolut. Theory*, i, p. 3). Huxley repeatedly made the same admission (cf. art. "Evolution" in *Ency. Brit.*, viii, p. 751). In an address at Buffalo (Aug. 25, 1876) he said: "We know that it [evolution] has happened, and what remains is the subordinate question of how it happened."

<sup>3</sup> *Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 27. Prof. Bateson, a high authority, quotes from Samuel Butler (*Life and Habit*, p. 263): "To me it seems that the 'Origin of Variation,' whatever it is, is the only true 'Origin of Species,'" adding: "And of that Origin not one of us knows anything" (*Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 99).

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 27. Weismann speaks of the argument as "reasoning in a circle, not giving 'proofs.'" Prof. Thomson quotes Bateson: "We

also has to be taken into account, with the new problems connected with heredity. These will come up after.

The difficulty thus arising for natural selection is increased when it is discovered, as seems granted by most writers in the Cambridge volume,<sup>1</sup> that the variations which have selection-value, are not always, as Darwin and Weismann assume, exceedingly slight and rare ("imperceptible," "minute," "insensible," "infinitesimal,"<sup>2</sup>) but are sometimes *abrupt, discontinuous, considerable* ("mutations" of specific types)—that, in short, evolution proceeds by "leaps" as well as by slow processes. These "lifts" in nature, as Professor Thomson calls them,<sup>3</sup> will be found, if conceded, to change the entire problem of origins. For here the causes lie obviously within, and are not tied to long periods of time. A further weighty fact, pointing in the same direction—one which Darwin was led finally to admit—is the existence of many structures which bear no relation to utility—which cannot therefore, as Darwin grants, "be accounted for by any form of selection, or by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts."<sup>4</sup>

Darwin's theory was originally suggested by the reading of Malthus, and one of its chief pillars has always been

are continually stopped by such phrases as, 'If such and such a variation took place and was favourable,' or, we may easily suppose circumstances in which such and such a variation, if it occurred, might be beneficial, and the like. The whole argument is based on such assumptions as these—assumptions which, were they found in the arguments of Paley or of Butler, we could not too scornfully ridicule" (*Dar. and Human Life*, p. 100).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the essay of De Vries, and *passim*, pp. 179–81, 200, 225, 242, etc. See especially on the views of Grand'Eury and Zeiller, pp. 221–2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Weismann (*Op. cit.*, p. 23; Bateson, who dissents, p. 99).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. his *Darwinism and Human Life*, pp. 104 ff.; *Bible of Nature*, pp. 155–8.

<sup>4</sup> *Descent of Man*, ii. p. 387; i. p. 152; *Life and Letters*, iii. p. 159. Nägeli is quoted as saying: "I do not know among plants a morphological modification which can be explained on utilitarian principles" (*Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 218).



held to be the doctrine of *the struggle for existence*. It is an extraordinary change to find it questioned by Korschinsky and his "moderns" whether this "struggle" exists in anything like the degree supposed,<sup>1</sup> or has the relation to evolution that the Darwinian theory imagines. Korschinsky's conclusion is that, where struggle occurs, "it prevents the establishment of new variations, and in reality stands in the way of new developments. It is rather an unfavourable than an advantageous factor."<sup>2</sup>

Lastly, criticism is directed on the prime agency of the theory, *natural selection* itself, with the view to demonstrate its insufficiency for the enormous tasks assigned to it. Natural selection, it is pointed out, is not a creative but an eliminative agency. It prunes the tree of life, but itself produces nothing.<sup>3</sup> The power ascribed to it of infallibly picking out infinitesimal favourable variations and pre-

<sup>1</sup> In reading the descriptions of the prodigious fecundity of the lower organisms, one is reminded of Sir Arch. Alison's statement, *à propos* of the British Sinking Fund (quoted by Walker, the American economist) that "a penny laid out at compound interest at the birth of our Saviour would in the year 1775 have amounted to a solid mass of gold 1,800 times the whole weight of the globe." The penny was not laid out in the way imagined. So the enormous increase in animal life in geometrical ratio is not realised: but the elimination is not, for the most part, through internecine struggle—indeed takes place before the stage of struggle is reached—and survival or fatality has little to do with the infinitesimal advantages of individuals. From another side a softening of the picture is introduced by the introduction of the element of altruism. Nature is not wholly selfish (cf. Thomson, *Bible of Nature*, pp. 174 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Korschinsky's whole statement for himself and the newer school in Otto, *Op. cit.*, pp. 182-4.

<sup>3</sup> Weismann treats this common objection as "senseless" (*Dar. and Mod. Science*, p. 61), but it is not obvious how he weakens its force. De Vries says truly: "Natural selection acts as a sieve; it does not single out the best variations, but it simply destroys those which are, from some cause or another, unfit for their present environment" (*Ibid.* p. 70). Prof. Thomson says: "Natural selection explains the survival of the fittest, but not the arrival of the fittest" (*Bible of Nature*, p. 162). "Natural selection prunes a growing and changeful tree. Natural selection is a directive [?], not an originative, factor" (*Dar. and Human. Life*, p. 193).

-serving them for many (perhaps millions of<sup>1</sup>) generations till new favourable variations are added, is held to lie beyond human credence. A point is made of the palpably inutile character of most incipient variations in the evolution of organs ultimately useful.<sup>2</sup> Stress is laid by Spencer on the complexity and balance of variations ;<sup>3</sup> by others on the narrow limits of variation, and relative fixity of types ; by others on the indiscriminateness of nature's methods of destruction (" what advantage," it has been asked, " could it afford to an insect that was about to be swallowed by a bird, that it possessed a thousandth fragment of some property not possessed by its fellows ? "); by others on the effects of pairing, on hybridity, etc. Answers more or less plausible may be given to some of these objections, but their cumulative effect is very great. Evolutionist writers claim large rights of scepticism for themselves. They must permit some right of scepticism to others when asking them to believe that a blind force of the kind supposed is really the main explanation of the beauty and adaptation with which the world is filled.<sup>4</sup>

The tendency in these changes, as already said, is to transfer the primary causes of evolution from without to within the organism, and to recognise a definite direction in the working of evolutionary forces. This again leads back to the *teleology* which Darwinism had rejected. Here, fundamentally, is the objection which must always be

<sup>1</sup> Thus Darwin. See above.

<sup>2</sup> It is not a sufficient reply to say that " we cannot tell " whether the smallest variation, in such a case, may not have a selective value. *Prima facie* it has not, and our ignorance cannot warrant us, in the interest of a theory, in assuming that it has.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Principles of Biology*, Sect. 166.

<sup>4</sup> The extent to which natural selection, as main cause, is given up by newer evolutionists may be seen in Otto's work above cited, pp. 154, 158, 184, etc. A trenchant popular criticism in a recent book, *Science, Matter and Immortality*, by R. C. Macfie, chap. xix., may be referred to.

taken to Darwin's, as to every mechanical, theory of nature, that it asks from unintelligent, unguided, forces work that can only be accomplished by mind. "Wherever we tap organic nature," Professor Thomson is fond of quoting from Romanes, "it seems to flow with purpose."<sup>1</sup> Does it only *seem*? This is a position in which thinking minds can never rest. The attempt to make it appear otherwise, it has just been found, breaks down on trial. "If there is Logos at the end" of the process (in man's reason), says Professor Thomson truly, "we may be sure that it was also at the beginning."<sup>2</sup> Not, however, at the beginning only, but as a present, directive principle all through. If so, a "causal-mechanical" view cannot be accepted as even an adequate "modal" interpretation of organic nature. Science is under no call to accept it as such, for it does not truly explain the facts. What would be the "modal interpretation" of the writing of a book, or the making of a machine, which did not recognise the presence of the constructive, guiding mind?<sup>3</sup> This also, if in terms it sometimes seems denied, is in reality accepted by the writer just quoted.<sup>4</sup> Mechanical categories alone do not satisfy.

<sup>1</sup> *Bible of Nature*, p. 25; *Darwin and Human Life*, p. 196.

<sup>2</sup> *Bible of Nature*, p. 86; cf. pp. 26, 242.

<sup>3</sup> It is surely an unwarrantable narrowing down of the idea of science to say that it can take no account of teleology. Paley's watch may be out of date as an analogy to nature's processes, but could a "scientific" explanation be given of a watch which took no account of the part mind played in its construction? If teleology is a fact, why is it unscientific to recognise its presence in nature, even while seeking for secondary causes?

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the fine pages in the close of *The Bible of Nature*, pp. 238 ff. One passage may be quoted. "May it not be that mind lies in the egg—not inactive like a sleeping bird—but doing for the egg what the mind does for the body, unifying, regulating, in a sense directing it, not insinuating itself into the sequences of metabolism, but, so to speak, informing them and expressing itself through them? We mean that the regulative principle, the entelechy, which many embryologists find it necessary to postulate, in giving a more than chronological account of an individual development, is that resident quality of a living organism which in its full expression we call mind (p. 245).

Science "gives an account of the tactics of nature, but never explains its strategy."<sup>1</sup> It is necessary to interpret nature through purpose. God is "the real agent in nature and in all natural evolution."

The bearings of these altered views on the nature of man and the fact of sin will be considered in a succeeding paper.

JAMES ORR.

<sup>1</sup> P. 239.



THE METHOD OF STUDYING THE PSALTER.

PSALM XXII.

THE greatest and most striking of the 'Psalms of complaint,' or Psalms describing the sufferings of different godly men under the older dispensation. Here the speaker (1) expostulates with God for abandoning him to the scorn and derision of men (*vv.* 1-10); (2) pleads earnestly for help, describing alternately the virulence of his enemies, and his own pitiable condition (*vv.* 11-21); (3) assured suddenly of his deliverance, avows his purpose of proclaiming publicly his gratitude (*vv.* 22-26); and (4) ends by anticipating the far-reaching consequences of his deliverance, how God's kingdom will be extended, and His praises celebrated, in all the world (*vv.* 27-31). A study of the Psalm as a whole seems to show that the speaker can hardly be an individual as such, but an individual identifying himself with the nation at large, and speaking on its behalf: hence Bâthgen heads the Psalm with these words, *Israel's suffering and deliverance, a means to the conversion of the heathen.*

The Psalms which ought in particular to be compared with Psalm xxii. are Psalms lxix., lxxi. and cii.: of course, there are others which describe sufferings and expected deliverance (as vi., xxviii., xxxi., liv., lv.); but the Psalms that have been quoted contain closer and more noticeable resemblances: xxii., lxix. and cii. are constructed on the same model; first the sufferings are described, then follows the outlook into the future, of similar scope and character (xxii. 1-21, 22-31; lxix. 1-21, 30-36; cii. 1-11, 15-22); of lxix. 32*b* and xxii. 26*b*, one must be a reminiscence of the other, cf. also lxix. 33 with xxii. 24; with xxii. 9-10; 11*a*; 19*b* compare also lxxi. 5*b*, 6*a*, *b*; 12*a*; 12*b*, respectively. Of course,

there are at the same time differences: thus in Psalm xxii. there is no allusion to the speaker's sin, as in lxix. 5, nor are there any imprecations as in lxix. 22-28; nor again is there any reference in it to an approaching restoration of exiles and re-building of Zion, as in lxix. 33, 35-36, and cii. 13-14, 16, 20-22.

The Psalmist begins by asking in pleading tones why God has forsaken him, and why his prayers for help bring him no relief: God's refusal to answer his prayers seems to him to be strangely inconsistent with His character—

- 1 My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me,  
(being) far from helping me, and (from) the words of my roaring?
- 2 O my God, I call by day, but thou answerest not;  
and at night, but find no respite.
- 3 And (yet) thou art holy,  
O thou that art enthroned<sup>1</sup> upon the praises of Israel.

V. 1. *From helping me.* Hebrew, *from my salvation or deliverance*: see the note above on xl. 10. A very slight change (בִּישַׁעֲתִי for בְּשִׁעֲתִי), i.e., 'being far from my cry,' would improve the parallelism, and may well be the original reading.

*Of my roaring.* The Hebrew poets indulge sometimes in strong metaphors: in xxxii. 3, xxxviii. 8, also, the groans of a sufferer are spoken of as a lion's roar.

V. 3. God's *holiness* is manifested in *judgment*—in the destruction of sinners, and deliverance of His own faithful worshippers<sup>2</sup>; how comes it then that, being holy, He is deaf to the complaint of His persecuted servant? He is enthroned on the praises of His people—their praises for past

<sup>1</sup> Lit. *that sittest*; but 'sit' in Hebrew, spoken of a king or of God, has usually the implication of being enthroned: cf. ii. 4, xxix. 10, xcix. 1, etc.

<sup>2</sup> See especially Ez. xxviii. 22 'Behold, I am against thee, O Zidon: and I will get me glory (Ex. xiv. 4) in the midst of thee; and they shall know that I am Jehovah, when I execute judgments in her, and *show myself holy* in her.' Similarly v. 22, xx. 41, xxxviii. 16, 23, xxxix. 27.

deliverances : has He ceased to give occasion for such praises to be uttered? The speaker's continued sufferings seem to him a slur on God's attribute of holiness, and inconsistent with His character as one who delivers the righteous when they call upon Him, and evokes from their hearts the praises of joy and thanksgiving.

*Vv.* 4–10. The fathers were delivered, he is deserted; he is despised of all, and mocked: and yet God, who now forsakes him, had been his supporter from his birth; he had been dependent on Him all his life.

- 4 In thee did our fathers trust;  
they trusted, and thou didst deliver them.
- 5 Unto thee they cried, and escaped;  
in thee did they trust, and were not confounded.
- 6 But *I* am a worm, and no man;  
a reproach of men, and despised of the people.
- 7 All they that see me make a mock at me;  
they gape with the lip, they shake the head,<sup>1</sup> (saying,)
- 8 'Commit (thyself) unto Jehovah!<sup>2</sup> let Him deliver him!  
let Him rescue him, seeing He delighteth in him!'
- 9 For thou art he that caused (?)<sup>3</sup> me to burst forth<sup>4</sup> from the womb;

<sup>1</sup> Gestures of derision: xxxv. 21, xlv. 14, cix. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Heb. *Roll* (it) upon Jehovah, i.e., Transfer, commit, thy cause to Him. The same figure, but with an object expressed, in xxxvii. 5 '*Roll thy way upon Jehovah,*' and Prov. xvi. 3 '*Roll thy works upon Jehovah, and thy purposes shall be established.*' LXX ἠλπισεν (hence Vulg. *speravit*), Jerome *confugit*, Pesh. *he trusted*, Matt. xxvii. 43 πέποιθεν (cf. P.B.V. *he trusted*), read presumably *gal* (3 pf.) for *gōl* (*imper.*),—though according to usage, the verb being transitive, *gālal* would have been expected in the perf. (Böttcher, § 1118 (1); cf. G.-K. § 67 *aa, bb*),—and paraphrased. Wellh. would obviate the abrupt change of person by reading לָלַח 'let him commit.' The omission of the object remains, however, in any case, harsh; and לָלַח for לָלַח 'Jehovah is his redeemer!' (Halévy, Cheyne formerly)—of course meant ironically—is a very plausible emendation: the taunt would be the more pointed, as in II. Isaiah Jehovah is repeatedly called Israel's 'redeemer' (viz. from exile and suffering), e.g. xli. 14, xlvii. 4.

<sup>3</sup> The transitive sense is uncertain.

<sup>4</sup> The word is used of the bursting forth of water, Job xl. 23 (of the Jordan: A.V., R.V. *swell*), xxxviii. 8 (of the sea, at the creation, pictured poetically as bursting forth from the womb: A.V., R.V., *brake forth*), Mic. iv. 10 'Be in throes, and *burst forth* (A.V., R.V. *labour to bring forth*),

thou madest me trust<sup>1</sup> (when I was) upon my mother's breasts.  
 10 Upon thee have I been cast from the womb;  
 thou art my God from my mother's belly.

V. 6. For the figure of a worm, denoting something utterly despised and defenceless, compare Isaiah xli. 14 'Fear not, thou worm, Israel' (followed by promises of deliverance and victory). With *v.* 6*b* compare Isaiah xlix. 7 'To him that is despised of men,<sup>2</sup> abhorred of the nation, a servant of rulers,' (of the ideal Israel).

*Vv.* 11–21. The Psalmist pleads for help still more earnestly. Jehovah is far off, and trouble is near: his enemies, like bulls, surround him with menacing mien: he is paralysed with fear, and brought to the point of death: like the troops of hungry and savage dogs with which every Oriental city and village still abounds, his foes come thronging around him, and—keeping up the figure—fly at his hands and feet, biting great holes in them: he is so emaciated that he can count his bones: his foes gloat upon the spectacle of his misery, and are only waiting for his death, that they may strip his body and divide his clothes between them.

O daughter of Zion, like a woman in travail'; fig. of an ambush, bursting forth from its hiding-place, Jud. xx. 33. Ps. lxxi. 6 is evidently based upon reminiscences of *vv.* 10, 9 here:—

Upon thee have I stayed myself from the belly:

thou art he that severed me [or, hast been my rewarder] from my mother's bowels.

The doubtful word *gōzi*—found only here—rendered *he that severed me* (cf. Aram. 𐤒𐤓, usually *to bereave*, but occasionally *to cut off*), or *my rewarder* (as in Arabic, and Christian Palestinian Aramaic)—differs very slightly from the one rendered 'he that caused (?) me to burst forth,' in Ps. xxii. 9 (*gōhî*).

<sup>1</sup> Or, reading with LXX. (*ἐλπῖς*), Syr., Vulg. (*spes*), Jer., מִבְּטִיחִי מִבְּטִיחִי (really only a change of vocalisation; the poet's autograph would hardly have the first ' in מִבְּטִיחִי), (*thou wast*) *my trust*. Cf. Ps. lxxi. 6 'the Lord Jehovah is *my trust* from my youth.' P.B.V. 'my *hope*' (from the Vulg.) implies, of course, the same reading.

<sup>2</sup> Lit. *of soul*, i.e. heartily, intensely, despised: see for the usage Ps. xvii. 9 'my enemies in *soul*'=my greedy, deadly enemies; and cf., on the force of 'soul,' my *Parallel Psalter*, p. 460.



- 11 Be not far from me; <sup>1</sup> for trouble is nigh :  
for there is none to help.
- 12 Many bulls surround me :  
strong ones of Bashan <sup>2</sup> <sup>3</sup> close me in on every side.<sup>3</sup>
- 13 They open their mouth against me,  
(as) a ravening and a roaring lion.
- 14 I am poured out like water,<sup>4</sup>  
and all my bones are parted asunder : <sup>5</sup>  
my heart is become like wax ;  
it is melted <sup>6</sup> in the midst of my bowels.
- 15 My strength <sup>7</sup> is dried up like a potsherd ;  
and my tongue cleaveth to my gums ;  
and thou art laying me in the dust of death.
- 16 For dogs surround me :  
a company of evil-doers have inclosed me ;  
they have digged <sup>8</sup> my hands and my feet.

<sup>1</sup> Comp. the same words in lxxi. 12a.

<sup>2</sup> Bashan, on the East of Jordan, was famed for its rich pastures (cf. Jer. i. 19), and herds of fine cattle (cf. Deut. xxxii. 14, Ezek. xxxix. 18). "Strong" (or, mighty) ones is a poetical expression sometimes for war-horses, as Jud. v. 22, sometimes for bulls, as here, l. 13, and lxviii. 30. LXX, reading  $\text{בָּשָׁן}$  for  $\text{בָּשָׁן}$ , have  $\tau\alpha\upsilon\rho\iota \pi\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  for 'bulls of Bashan' (so Vulg. *tauri pingues*),—and this is the origin of the 'fat bulls of Bashan' of P.B.V.

<sup>3</sup> In the Heb. one word : cf. Jud. xx. 43 ('inclosed . . . round about').

<sup>4</sup> Fig. for, am paralysed with fear. Cf. Ezek. vii. 17 'and all knees shall go into water,' xxi. 7 [Heb. 12].

<sup>5</sup> The very framework of his body seems to give way.

<sup>6</sup> Fig. for, become weak and powerless through fear. Cf. Dt. xx. 8, Josh. ii. 11 *al.* In Josh. vii. 5 'melted and became as water.'

<sup>7</sup> Read probably, transposing two letters, *My palate.* Cf. Lam. iv. 4 'The tongue of the sucking child cleaveth to his palate for thirst.' Here, like 'cleaveth to my gums' in the next line, as an effect of fear.

<sup>8</sup> So LXX. ( $\acute{\omega}\rho\upsilon\xi\alpha\nu$ ), Vulg. (*foderunt*) ; cf. Syr.  $\text{בזעו}$ , i.e. *cleft, pierced.* The Heb. text ( $\text{בָּשָׁן}$ ) can only be rendered *like a lion* (cf. Targ. 'biting like a lion'). Other versions also presuppose a verb : Aq. *they bound* (so Jerome, *vinxerunt*) : Symm. *as seeking to bind* (prob. reading  $\text{בָּשָׁן}$ ). There is no Heb. word like  $\text{כָּוַר}$  meaning *to bind* ; but the Arab.  $\text{כور}$  means *to wind or roll round.* Aq. is also reported to have rendered—presumably in his second edition— $\text{σχοσαν}$  : this implies a derivation from the Syr. *ka'ar, to disgrace.* LXX  $\acute{\omega}\rho\upsilon\xi\alpha\nu$  presupposes presumably  $\text{כָּוַר}$  (with an otiose  $\text{כ}$ , like  $\text{כָּוַר}$ , Hos. x. 14, and  $\text{כָּוַר}$ , Zech. xiv. 10), from  $\text{כָּוַר}$ , a verb not otherwise found in Hebrew, but presupposed by  $\text{מְבוֹרָה}$  *origin*, Ez. xvi. 3, xxi. 35, xxix. 14, if this means properly a *place of digging* (cf. for the figure Is. li. 1), and in any case a possible by-form of  $\text{כָּרָה}$ , one of the ordinary Heb. words for 'dig,' used, for instance, of digging a well, or a pit (Gen. xxvi. 25, Ex. xxi. 33, Jer. xviii. 20). Or we might simply read

- 17 I can count all my bones :  
*they*<sup>1</sup> look (and) gaze upon me.<sup>2</sup>  
 18 They part my garments among them,  
 and upon my vesture<sup>3</sup> do they cast lots.

The Psalmist, reduced thus to extremity, repeats more urgently his prayer for help, and entreats to be rescued from his relentless foes—

- 19 But thou, Jehovah, be not thou far off ;  
 O my succour, haste thee to help me.<sup>4</sup>  
 20 Deliver my soul from the sword,  
 my only one<sup>5</sup> from the power<sup>6</sup> of the dog.  
 21 Save me from the lion's mouth,  
 and from the horns of the wild-oxen<sup>7</sup>—thou hast answered (and delivered)<sup>8</sup> me !

In *v.* 21, if the text is right, the Psalmist, by a sudden impulse of faith, pictures his deliverance accomplished ; and instead of ' and from the horns of the wild-oxen answer (and deliver) me,' says ' and from the horns of the wild-oxen—thou hast answered (and delivered) me !' From this point all thought of the Psalmist's malicious assailants

כָּרַוּ, the normal 3d. pers. plur. of כָּרַו. In any case, however, the use of the word here is peculiar: for כָּרַו does not mean to 'pierce'; nor is it elsewhere construed except with an accusative of the cavity dug.

<sup>1</sup> I.e. my foes.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. with triumphant delight: cf. xcii. 11, exii. 8, cxviii. 7.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. the long tunic, worn next the skin, which would be woven in one piece, and consequently be valuable only as a whole.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. 'haste thee to help me' in lxxi. 12b.

<sup>5</sup> Poet. for *my life*,—the one precious possession, which can never be replaced. So xxxv. 17. It is the word used of an only daughter, Jud. xi. 34.

<sup>6</sup> Heb. *hand*: often used figuratively (as 'from the hands of the sword,' Job v. 20).

<sup>7</sup> A fierce, untameable animal (see the description in Job xxxix. 9–12), with formidable horns (cf. Num. xxiii. 22, Dt. xxxiii. 17), the *Urus* of Caesar (*B.G.* vi. 28), now extinct. It is mentioned, under the same name *rîmu*, by the Ass. kings: Tiglath Pileser I. (c. 1100 B.C.), for instance states that he hunted and killed four in the land of the Mitanni (Schrader, *K.B.* i. 39), and brought back their horns and hides to the city of Asshur.

<sup>8</sup> The word 'answer' is construed pregnantly, as is the case not unfrequently in Hebrew with other verbs construed with 'from': e.g. 'to judge (and save) from,' Ps. xliii. 1 (see B.D.B. p. 578a).

vanishes ; and the depth of despair is abruptly succeeded by the fulness of joy, and the thought of the happy and far-reaching consequences of his deliverance.

In *vv.* 22–31 the Psalmist develops these consequences. The change of tone is striking ; we may remember how, in Mendelssohn’s well-known setting of the Psalm, it is effectively expressed by the change in the music from the minor to the major key of E.

First, then, he will proclaim God’s goodness in a public act of thanksgiving, in which he bids all Israel take part (*vv.* 22–26) :

- 22 I will tell of thy name unto my brethren ;  
in the midst of the congregation will I praise thee :
- 23 ‘ Ye that fear Jehovah, praise him ;  
‘ all ye the seed of Jacob, glorify him ;  
‘ and stand in awe of him, all ye the seed of Israel.
- 24 ‘ For he hath not despised nor abhorred the affliction <sup>1</sup> of the  
afflicted ; <sup>2</sup>  
‘ neither hath he hid his face from him ;  
‘ but when he called unto him, he heard.’
- 25 From thee (cometh) my praise in the great congregation :  
my vows will I pay in the sight of them that fear him.
- 26 The humble shall eat and be satisfied :  
they shall praise Jehovah that seek after him :  
let your heart live <sup>3</sup> for ever !

V. 22. The Hebrews regarded a ‘ name ’ as the manifestation of a character : hence, ‘ thy name ’ means here ‘ all that thou hast shown thyself to be ’—not, i.e., on this occasion only, but in general. By ‘ brethren ’ the Psalmist means his compatriots. For ‘ in the midst of the congregation ’ compare xxxv. 18, xl. 10, and xxvi. 12, lxviii. 26. In Psalm lxix. the parallel (*v.* 30) is, ‘ I will praise the name of God with a song, and magnify him with thanksgiving.’

Vv. 23, 24. Here the Psalmist invites all Israel to join

<sup>1</sup> LXX *δέησιον*, suggesting *קַח צַעַר* ‘ cry ’ (for *עָנָה*—with *צ* fallen out after the preceding *צ*), which may be right ; notice the parallel in *v.* 24c.

<sup>2</sup> Or, *of the poor*. Cf. above, on Ps. lxxii. 2.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. let your failing spirits revive. See p. 515.

with him in praising Jehovah for His deliverance, 'Seed of Jacob,' as Isaiah xlv. 19, Jeremiah xxxiii. 26; 'seed of Israel,' as Isaiah xlv. 25, Jeremiah xxxi. 27. With 'despised' compare the same word in lxix. 33, cii. 17.

V. 25. Jehovah, by delivering him, gives him occasion to praise Him; the thankofferings (Lev. vii. 16) which he had vowed to give, in the event of his deliverance (see Ps. lxvi. 13, 14 [P.B.V. 12]), he can now, therefore, gladly bring. The payment of vows is often mentioned in the Old Testament, as implying an answer to a prayer for deliverance (Ps. l. 14 f., lxi. 8, cxvi. 14, 18, Isa. xix. 21). Notice in P.B.V. the misleading 'of,' used here in its old sense of 'from' (as in 'salvation is *of* the Jews,' 'God *of* God,' etc., in the Nicene Creed, and often): in Ps. lxxi. 6, on the contrary, 'of' in the modern sense of 'about' is correct.

V. 26. The 'humble,'—i.e., as often in the Psalms, the pious worshippers of God<sup>1</sup>—will now also be able to partake of, and enjoy, a eucharistic meal, such as always accompanied a 'peace-' or 'thank-'offering (Deut. xii. 17 f., xxvii. 7; Lev. vii. 15 f.), whether (on the analogy of Deut. xiv. 29, xxvi. 12<sup>2</sup>) as invited by the Psalmist, or as themselves delivered at the same time, and so able likewise to bring their thankofferings. To 'eat,' of partaking of a sacrificial meal, as Genesis xxxi. 54, Exodus xviii. 12, xxiv. 11, xxxiv. 15 and Numbers xxv. 2 (in these two passages, in heathen worship, but the passages illustrate the ancient practice), 1 Sam. ix. 13. To 'eat and be satisfied' is a common combination, Deuteronomy vi. 11, viii. 10, xi. 15, xiv. 29, xxvi. 12, Joel ii. 20 *al.* Those who 'seek' Jehovah, i.e.

<sup>1</sup> See, on the usage of the word, the writer's art. POOR in Hastings' *D.B.*

<sup>2</sup> Though the reference here is not to a sacrificial meal, partaken of at the central sanctuary, but to the meals at which, according to Deuteronomy, the tithe, once in three years, was to be eaten locally by the poor of the district.



His devoted followers, may now unite in praising Him ; the hearts of all His worshippers, which have long been cast down, may also revive, and hope confidently for a continuance of happiness and freedom. For 'live,' or 'revive' (the Hebrew is the same), compare—as David Kimchi did long ago—Genesis xlv. 27 'And Jacob's spirit *revived*' (lit. *lived*), and the opposite in 1 Samuel xxv. 37 'And Nabal's heart *died* within him.' Notice the parallel in Psalm lxix. 32—

The *humble* shall see, and be glad :

Ye that *seek* after God, *let your heart live* (revive) !

Vv. 27–31. The speaker's outlook takes a wider range, embracing all mankind, and extending to future ages : the effect of his deliverance will be that *all* nations, through successive generations, will pay homage to Israel's God. It is a picture of the ideal future which the poet here draws—the future so often looked forward to and delineated by the prophets, in which peace and justice and true religion will prevail, sometimes in Israel, sometimes, as here, in the world at large. It is a specially noticeable feature of the present description that the advent of the ideal age is the consequence of the speaker's deliverance. Other Psalmists, when they look forward to deliverance after suffering, do not contemplate consequences extending beyond themselves (Ps. vi. 8–10, xxviii. 6–7, xxxi. 21, liv. 6–7, lvi. 12–13). But here the speaker is Israel ; and the poet is writing under the influence of the great ideals of Deutero-Isaiah. Psalm cii. 15–22, where the gathering together of the nations to serve Jehovah is represented as a consequence of the restoration of Israel from exile, and of the rebuilding of Jerusalem, ought to be compared.

27 All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn unto Jehovah ;  
and all the families of the nations shall worship<sup>1</sup> before thee.

<sup>1</sup> Heb. (as always) *bow down*.

- 28 For the kingdom is Jehovah's ;  
and he is ruler over the nations.
- 29 All the fat ones of the earth have eaten and worshipped ;<sup>1</sup>  
all that go down into the dust shall bend the knee before him,  
and he that hath not kept his soul alive.
- 30 A seed shall serve him ;  
it shall be told of the Lord unto the coming<sup>2</sup> generation.
- 31 They<sup>3</sup> shall come and shall declare his righteousness  
unto a people that shall be born, that he hath done (it).

V. 27. We have here a lyric echo (cf. lxxxvi. 9, lxxxvii., cii. 15, 22) of the great prophetic thought (Isa. ii. 2-4, Jer. xvi. 19, etc.) of the future acceptance of Israel's religion by the nations of the world. V. 28 states the ground of this : because viz. Jehovah is by right the sovereign of the nations, and the time will come when this truth will be recognised by them. The thought of Jehovah's kingship over the world is prominent in later writings : see especially Isa. lii. 7 *end* (hence Ps. xciii. 1, xcvi. 10, xcvii. 1), Psalm xlvii. 2, 8, Obadiah 21, Zech. xiv. 9.

V. 29. *All the fat ones of the earth*, i.e., those who are well nourished and in the full enjoyment of life, and also, it is no doubt implied, of prosperity,<sup>4</sup> *have eaten* (the perfect is the 'prophetic perfect,' describing a scene which the poet visu-

<sup>1</sup> Heb. *bowed down*.

<sup>2</sup> It is next to impossible that 'the generation' can mean 'the next generation' : notice the italic *next* in R.V. : in xlvi. 17, lxxviii. 4, 6, cii. 18 the idea is expressed by דָּוָר אַחֲרָיו, lit. the 'after generation.' Most probably בָּנָה has dropped out before the following בָּנָה (v. 31a). Recent commentators indeed generally bring back בָּנָה (in the form יָבֵן) to the end of v. 30 ; but this seems to shorten unduly the first line of v. 31. With 'come' (viz. to declare) in v. 31 comp. lxxi. 16 'I will *come* with the mighty acts of the Lord Jehovah (viz. in my mouth) ; I will make mention of thy righteousness, even of thine only.' Ps. lxxi. 18 seems indeed to contain a parallel for this absolute use of דָּוָר : but there also it can hardly be doubted that the text is in some disorder.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. the 'seed' and 'generation' of v. 30.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Dt. xxxi. 20 'when they shall have eaten, and satisfied themselves [above, v. 26, here], and *waxen fat*' ; Ps. xcii. 14 (where 'full of sap' is in the Heb. 'fat,' as here) ; and the fig. use of 'be made fat' in Prov. xi. 25, xiii. 4, xxviii. 25.

alises, as if it were already present; comp. e.g. Isa. ix. 2-6, xxxiii. 5) *and worshipped*—viz. again, as in *v.* 26, at a sacrificial meal, of which they will partake in token of homage. Moreover, not only those in the pride of life, but *those also who go down to the dust and he that hath not kept his soul alive*, i.e. those sinking into the grave, will *bow* (Ps. lxxii. 9, Isa. xlv. 23) *before him*, and own his sway. *Have eaten* can be explained, as is done above, from usage (Exod. xviii. 12, xxiv. 11; cf. on *v.* 26): still the thought comes in here abruptly; and the emendation, made independently by Bruston in 1873, and by B athgen in 1880, which has been widely accepted (Nowack, Kirkp., Cheyne, *al.*), and which implies a very slight change in the Hebrew (אכלו וישתחוו אדך לו ישתחו) is quite possibly right—

*Unto him* all the fat ones of the earth shall *surely* bow down,  
to which the following line forms an excellent parallel—

Before him shall bend the knee all that go down into the dust.

The two classes of persons mentioned do not form a logical dichotomy; but two representative classes of men are mentioned—those well nourished and prosperous, and those sinking into the grave—who, in the future which the Psalmist here anticipates, will alike acknowledge Jehovah's sway.

*Vv.* 30, 31. The children of the persons mentioned in *v.* 29 will serve Him; and the story of the deliverance will thus be handed on to successive generations: cf., for the practice, Judges vi. 13, Psalm xlv. 1, lxxviii. 3, 4; Joel i. 3. The 'seed' means the immediate descendants of the persons mentioned in *v.* 29, and is equivalent to the 'coming generation' of the following line. This 'generation,' in its turn, recounts the story of Jehovah's doing to its successors: so that altogether it is pictured by the poet as handed on through three generations (*vv.* 29, 30, 31). Jehovah's 'righteousness' (*v.* 31) is that manifested in the deliverance

of His servant and the discomfiture of his foes : compare xl. 9, 10, and in II. Isaiah (above, p. 353, note 2) ; and see Skinner in Hastings' *D.B.*, iv. 280*a*. In *v.* 31*b* 'done' is used absolutely, as sometimes elsewhere, in a full and pregnant sense which it is difficult to represent effectively in English : cf. xxxvii. 5 'Commit thy way unto Jehovah, and trust in him, and *he* will *do* (or *act*)' : lii. 9 ; cxix. 126 ; Isaiah xlv. 23. With 'a people that shall be born' compare 'a people that shall be created,' also of a future generation, in Ps. cii. 18 (|| 'an after generation').

For the construction in the Hebrew of *v.* 29*c*, as rendered above, see G.K. § 155 *n* (*b*). It is difficult, however, to be sure of the exact sense of *v.* 29. It is not certain how some of the terms used are to be understood: do the 'fat ones,' for instance, denote simply those in the vigour of life and strength? or does the expression imply also the collateral ideas of wealthy, self-sufficient, worldly, and impious, such as certainly were sometimes associated by the Hebrews with 'fatness' (see especially Job xv. 25-27; and cf. Deut. xxxi. 20, xxxii. 15, Jer. v. 29: on the other hand, to be 'made fat' is a blessing in Prov. xi. 25, xiii. 4, xxviii. 25)? The exact point of the antithesis between clauses *a* and *b*, *c* is not clear; there are also well-founded doubts whether the text is entirely in order. Thus *v.* 29*c* appears to many scholars to be superfluous and to drag heavily after *v.* 29*b*, so that Professor Cheyne (*Psalms*, 1888, p. 378) says, 'Sense and symmetry require us, with Hupfeld and Bickell, to attach the last clause of *v.* 29 to *v.* 30.' The absolute use of 'generation' in *v.* 30*b* (without 'next' or 'coming'), as remarked above, is also strange. Hence various views have been taken of the meaning of the text, and various attempts have been made to emend it. Thus Cheyne in 1888 rendered and read—

29 Unto him<sup>1</sup> all the fat ones of the earth shall surely bow down,  
all that have gone down into the dust shall bend the knee before  
him ;

And as for him that kept not his soul alive,

30 his<sup>2</sup> seed shall be reckoned unto the Lord.

32 <sup>3</sup>To the coming generation<sup>3</sup> they shall declare his righteousness,

<sup>1</sup> Adopting the emendation mentioned above (p. 517).

<sup>2</sup> זרעו for זרע. LXX ('my seed') express יעבדנו זרעי 'shall serve him' is omitted, it being supposed that it was inserted to make sense after the disarrangement of the verses.

<sup>3</sup> לדור יבואו ויגידו for לדור יבואו יגידו (the verses being divided differently). LXX also have 'the coming generation.' Cf. p. 516*n*.



to a people that shall be born, that he hath<sup>1</sup> done nobly.<sup>1</sup>

In the rendering given above, the meaning of *v.* 29 is that healthy and *dying*, i.e. all mankind, will alike own Jehovah's sway; with this rendering the meaning of *v.* 29*a*, *b* is that living and *dead*—those in the full vigour of life and the feeble shades in the underworld—will alike own His sway (cf. for the thought Job xxvi. 5 R.V. marg.; Phil. ii. 10). The participle, it is true, expresses quite regularly the present or approaching future (see Deut. *passim*); but in this and similar expressions it generally denotes in usage not those who *are* going down, but those who *have* gone down, to the grave (Ps. cxv. 17, Isa. xxxviii. 18, Ezek. xxvi. 20 (second time), xxxi. 14, 16); so that Professor Cheyne's rendering, if not necessary, is at least thoroughly legitimate.

Bäthgen in 1880, in a note in the *Studien und Kritiken*, pp. 756–9, proposed—

- 29 Unto him all the fat ones of the earth shall surely bow down,<sup>2</sup>  
 before him shall bend the knee all that go down into the dust.  
 But my soul liveth unto him,<sup>3</sup> (30) my seed<sup>4</sup> shall serve him:  
 it shall be told of the Lord unto the coming generation.<sup>2</sup>  
 31 They shall declare his righteousness unto a people that shall  
 be born,  
 that he hath done (it).

The same renderings and readings were adopted by Nowack in his revised edition of Hupfeld's Commentary (1888); and they are also to be found in Bäthgen's own Commentary (1892; ed. 2, 1904). Upon the view expressed by them, those who 'go down into the dust' in *v.* 29*b* are the same as the 'fat ones of the earth' in *v.* 29*a*; and these are not merely men in the vigour of health, but strong and prosperous heathen magnates, who, as they sink into the grave, own implicitly thereby the power of Jehovah: 'The great ones of the earth sink into the dust: Israel, on the contrary, lives for its God; its individual members indeed perish, but their descendants (*vs.* 30, 31) perpetuate the worship of God, and through this uninterrupted service the community lives for ever to its God.'

Kirkpatrick (1891) read—

- 29 Surely him<sup>2</sup> shall all earth's fat ones worship,  
 before him shall bow all they that go down into the dust.  
 And as for him that hath not kept his soul alive,

<sup>1</sup> Cheyne's rend. of the absolute use of עֲשָׂה, noticed above.

<sup>2</sup> With the same emendations that have been mentioned before.

<sup>3</sup> I.e. וּנְפִשׁוּ לֹא חַיָּה (so LXX καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἀτρεῖ ζῆν) for וּנְפִשׁוּ לֹא חַיָּה.

<sup>4</sup> זרעי for זרע, also with LXX. P.B.V. also has 'my seed.'

- 30 his seed shall serve him;  
 it shall be told of the Lord to the coming<sup>1</sup> generation.
- 31 And they shall declare his righteousness unto a people that shall  
 be born  
 that he hath done (it).

Kirkpatrick reads and interprets *v. 29a, b* as Bâthgen and Nowack do: the 'fat ones' are prosperous magnates, and *v. 29b* denotes what their fate nevertheless will be: earth's mightiest are but mortals, and must yield their homage to the King of kings. On the other hand (*vv. 29c, 30a*), the faithful Israelites who perish will leave a posterity behind them to serve Jehovah and perpetuate His praise.

But who is the speaker in the Psalm? In spite of the title, certainly not David: we know pretty fully the circumstances of his life; and we may be sure that he was never reduced to straits such as are here described: the prophetic expectation of the conversion of the nations appears otherwise for the first time long afterwards, in the writings of Isaiah: the easy, flowing style points also to a later age; and the Psalm is in parts palpably dependent upon Deutero-Isaiah. If the Psalm be a unity, also, the far-reaching consequences of the speaker's deliverance are much beyond what can be referred to David, or indeed to any single individual of the Old Testament dispensation. The speaker, it can hardly be doubted, is Israel. This, as Kautzsch observes,<sup>2</sup> is the only supposition which does justice to the triumphant close of the Psalm (*v. 22 ff.*), and makes it intelligible. The first person singular must not mislead us. In prose and poetry alike, Israel and other nations often speak, and are spoken to, or of, in the singular number. See, for instance, Lamentations i. 11c-16, 18-22, where the sufferings of the people, after the capture and sack of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans, are all described

<sup>1</sup> With the emendation mentioned before.

<sup>2</sup> In the new edition of his *Die heilige Schrift des A.Ts.*, ii. p. 129.

in the first person singular ;<sup>1</sup> and compare Psalm cii., where, at first sight, it seems as if the sorrows of an individual were being described (*vv.* 1-11, 23), but where a more careful reading of the Psalm shows that they are so contrasted with the rebuilding of Zion, the restoration of the nation, and the future gathering of peoples to serve Jehovah (*vv.* 13-22, 28), as to make it clear that the speaker is in reality the nation, and the conversion of nations is the effect of Israel's restoration. It was by reflexion on the character of Israel, in so far as in the persons of its more faithful members it suffered undeservedly, that the portrait of the suffering but righteous servant of God (Isaiah xlii., xlix., l., li. 13-liii. 12) arose ; and the speaker here is the same : Israel, and in particular faithful Israel, personified as an individual, persecuted but delivered, and its deliverance issuing in momentous consequences for the world. It is remarkable that in Deutero-Isaiah God's servant, the ideal Israel, is described, in terms similar to those used here, as a worm, as one whom men despised and turned from in aversion, as persecuted and brought to the verge of the grave, but, nevertheless, with a great future before him (Isa. xli. 14, xlix. 7, l. 4-9, li. 7, lii. 14, liii. 2 f.)<sup>2</sup> : ideal Israel is, moreover, expressly called

<sup>1</sup> For other examples see Isa. xii. 1, 2, Jer. x. 19, 20, 24, Micah vii. 7-10, Hab. iii. 14 ; and comp. the EXPOSITOR, April, 1910, p. 356. In Ps. cxviii. also the first person undoubtedly denotes the nation.

<sup>2</sup> For the figure (Ps. xxii. 9-10) of Israel being 'born,' and the object of God's care from its 'mother's womb,' cf. also Is. xlv. 2, xlvi. 3 (of the actual historic Israel), xlix. 1, 5 (of ideal Israel).

It may be deemed an objection to this interpretation of the Psalm, that in *v.* 22 the speaker is represented as addressing his 'brethren.' It must, however, be remembered that in II. Isaiah, also, though the same term is used to describe both the actual, historic Israel (as xli. 8-9, xlii. 19-20), and the ideal Israel (as xlii. 1-4, xlix. 1-9), yet ideal Israel is sometimes set over against the actual Israel, and sharply distinguished from it (comp. my *Isaiah : his life and times*, pp. 175-8 ; Skinner, *Isaiah*, vol. ii. pp. xxxiii.-iv., xxxvi., 235-6). This is notably the case in xlix. 5-6 ; it is also the case in liii. 1-6, where (at least as the passage is usually understood) the repentant Israelites reflect upon their previous misconception

a 'light of the Gentiles' (xlii. 6, xlix. 6), and the restoration of Israel is represented as a signal manifestation of Jehovah's glory, producing a profound impression upon the nations who behold it, and disposing them to accept the religion of Israel (Isa. xl. 5, xlv. 6, lii. 10 ; cf. xlii. 1*b*, 3*b*, 4 [where ideal Israel is represented as establishing 'judgement,' i.e. *religion*,<sup>1</sup> in the earth], xlv. 23, li. 4, lxvi. 23). The teaching of the prophets often finds in the Psalms a lyrical echo : in Psalm xciii., xevi., xevii., xeviii., for instance, the thoughts of hope and deliverance expressed by Deutero-Isaiah are thus echoed ; in Psalm xxii. the thoughts echoed are those of persecution and suffering, of deliverance and the consequences following from it. The Psalmist, a godly Israelite himself, speaks in the person of the nation of which he is a member ; and on the basis of his own and his nation's sufferings, constructs a 'mosaic of suffering, to represent the woes of a faithful community, abandoned by God to their cruel foes' (Briggs, p. 190). The exact situation we do not know : but it must have been at some time after the return from Babylon, when misfortune and the hostility of envious neighbours combined to make the outlook dark, and fill Israel with the gloomiest apprehensions. The expressions need not be all understood literally, any more than many of those in Lamentations iii. or Job xvi. In Lamentations iii. we read, for instance (v. 4) 'My flesh and my skin he hath worn out ; he hath broken my bones,' (v. 13) 'He hath made the shafts of his quiver to enter into my reins,' (v. 16) 'He hath broken my teeth with gravel stones, he hath covered me with ashes,' and in Job xvi. (v. 13) 'His archers compass

of the servant's character and work. The analogy of these passages sufficiently justifies the distinction implied in v. 22, if the speaker be Israel, between Israel and his 'brethren.'

<sup>1</sup> See Skinner's note on Is. xlii. 1 in the *Camb. Bible*, or Whitehouse's in the *Century Bible*. 'Judgement' in Jer. v. 4, 5 (A.V., R.V.) has the same meaning : see my *Book of the Prophet Jeremiah*, p. 344 f.



me round about, He cleaveth my reins asunder, and doth not spare, He poureth out my gall upon the ground.' These and many other passages show clearly that the language of Hebrew poetry is often not to be understood literally. The really striking thought in Psalm xxii. is that of the world-wide consequences attached to Israel's deliverance ; but this is a thought closely akin to what is expressed in Deutero-Isaiah (xlix. 6 f.).

It is thus not an actual individual, it is faithful Israel, speaking as an individual, who is persecuted and delivered ; and it is Israel's salvation which brings with it these far-reaching consequences affecting humanity at large. This view of the Psalm enables us to understand better than we could otherwise do its application to Christ. Christ is the ideal representative of Israel, the Man in whom the genius of Israel found its truest and fullest expression ; the righteous servant of II. Isaiah is a prefigurement of Him ; and the ideal both of the prophet and of the Psalm was fulfilled by Him. And so, though the Psalm is no *prediction* of the sufferings of Christ—for the intensely personal character of the descriptions shows that they spring from, and reflect, the personal experiences of the writer and his faithful compatriots—yet the sufferings of godly Israel, so pathetically described in it, were realised by Him in His person ; while the glorious hopes for the future, with which the Psalm closes, foreshadow remarkably the blessed consequences of the life and death of Christ. The bringing of the world to a knowledge of God, set forth in the Psalm as a consequence of Israel's deliverance, was in any case conditioned by Israel's continued existence as a nation : the ground was prepared for it by various events taking place in the centuries between the restoration and the birth of Christ—for instance, by the diffusion of Jews in the world, and the translation of the Old Testament into Greek : but the religion of Israel, in

order to become a universal religion, had in many respects to be developed and transformed; and these necessary changes were effected only as a consequence of the life and work of Christ.

S. R. DRIVER.

### ISAIAH AND ISAIANIC.

IN the present paper an attempt will be made to answer a question concerning the Book of Isaiah, which by its very nature is closely connected with a number of other critical problems, the question namely how all the prophecies contained in the sixty-six chapters of the book came to be bound up and issued as one work. The statement made by Cornill, and in one form or another practically accepted by all modern writers of the critical school,<sup>1</sup> that the later portions of the book, and presumably also much in chapters i.-xxxix., were united with the prophecies of Isaiah the son of Amoz "by error or accident," can only be accepted as a solution of despair. If no other answer could be given, one should indeed be obliged to have recourse to this one. That, however, another solution is possible the present paper is designed to show; and it will be seen presently that if the theory here proposed can be accepted, an answer would be found which in a measure is capable of mediating between the traditional view of one Isaiah only and the modern critical theory of two or more Isaiahs.

We must first of all bear in mind that the problem is intimately bound up with the study of parallel passages. The defenders of the traditional view of the unity of the book, whose last great representative was the elder Delitzsch, have always made much of the fact that there are a number of striking linguistic and other affinities running through the prophecies ascribed by tradition to Isaiah the son of Amoz. Later investigation has, however, shown that the differences between the acknowledged prophecies of Isaiah and other

<sup>1</sup> The latest statement on the subject is found in Prof. Sanday's article, "Bible," in the second volume of Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. The error is there ascribed to the inclusion of heterogeneous prophecies in one leather scroll.

parts of the book are even more incisive and more numerous than the affinities,<sup>1</sup> and the force of the latter by themselves is undoubtedly diminished by the fact that similar correspondences (which, however, still await some further study and tabulation) can be shown to exist between II. Isaiah and several others of the earlier prophets.

But the evidence afforded by the study of parallel passages has so far only been allowed to play a part in the discussions concerning the unity or diversity of authorship of the Book of Isaiah, whilst the question as to how—on the theory of divers authorship—the different prophecies came to be united in one work has not been closely associated with this branch of investigation. What we want is a theory that would not only explain the affinities and diversities of the prophecies, but also throw light on the circumstances under which the compilers decided to issue the book in the form in which it has come down to us. If such a theory could be successfully formulated, it would clearly possess the merit of accounting for more facts than the older explanations were able to embrace, and it is just such a theory that the present writer ventures to propose.

The existence of the book in its present form may be explained on the supposition that Isaiah the son of Amoz was the founder of a prophetic school, which continued to bear his name down to the exile and later. We know that there were in early times societies or guilds of prophets. In the time of Elijah and Elisha these societies, which have been aptly designated as schools, come before us definitely under the title of “sons of the prophets.” Some think that the phrase “I am no prophet, neither a prophet’s

<sup>1</sup> See Essay VIII. affixed to Prof. Cheyne’s *Prophecies of Isaiah* (1882); the same author’s *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah* (1895), p. 251 sqq.; Dr. Driver’s statements on the subject in his *Isaiah: his Life and Times*, and *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*.



son" in Amos vii. 14 bears testimony to the existence of such schools of prophets in the period to which Isaiah the son of Amoz himself belonged. This inference is, indeed, very doubtful, for the term "a prophet's son" might properly be taken to refer to the ordinary relationship of father and son. But much more decisive testimony on the essential point (though not on the title "prophet's son") is found in an undoubted utterance of Isaiah himself. There is namely the prophecy (or part of a prophecy) contained in Isaiah viii. 11-16, which concludes with the words: "Bind up the testimony, seal the teaching among My disciples,"<sup>1</sup> thus showing with absolute clearness that the address beginning, "Say ye not, A conspiracy, concerning all whereof this people shall say, A conspiracy," was spoken to a circle of disciples,<sup>2</sup> who formed the prophet's close entourage, and into whose midst he retired when all around looked dark and hopeless. It is also probable that Isaiah xxviii. 23-29 (likewise an undoubted prophecy of Isaiah the son of Amoz) refers to the method, dealt out in various degrees of severity, which the prophet found it necessary to use in the instruction and disciplining of certain classes of disciples. It would, indeed—even apart from the extant decisive evidence—seem hardly likely that such a mighty prophetic figure as Isaiah the son of Amoz should not have had a following among the younger and less mighty prophetic spirits of his age, who, in the full sense of the term, would form an Isaianic school of prophecy; and one has a right to think that such a school once formed would be capable

<sup>1</sup> On this passage, see Dr. Skinner's remarks in his work on Isaiah, vol. i. p. xxxi. (Cambridge Bible).

<sup>2</sup> לְפָנָיִם. It is in view of this theory noteworthy that לְפָנָיִם in exactly the same sense only occurs again in II. Isaiah (ch. l. 4: twice); the full title having probably been לְפָנָיִם יְהוָה (disciples of Yahweh, ch. liv. 13). The בְּלִמְדָי, My disciples, in Isa. viii. 16 must indeed go back to יהוה in v. 11. The other two passages in which the form is found are in Jeremiah (chs. ii. 24, xiii. 23), but the application is quite different there ("A wild ass used to the wilderness"; "accustomed to do evil").

of carrying on its traditions to later epochs of Hebrew history.

If, moreover, the persistent tradition of Isaiah's martyrdom in the time of Manasseh (possibly referred to in Heb. xi. 37: "sawn asunder") has (as may, indeed, reasonably be supposed) a basis in fact, the theory of the continuance of an Isaianic school of prophecy would appear to be strengthened; for it is only too well known how much—in the providence of the Eternal, as one may rightly add—the sufferings of the founder of a school have to do with its subsequent energy and vitality.

But if the idea of an Isaianic school of prophecy lasting beyond Isaiah's lifetime be favourably considered, there would be no difficulty in assuming that such a prophetic school would, besides a name, also have a local habitation, and that this habitation may have been from time to time changed in consequence of such events as the captivity and the vicissitudes which followed.

Now assuming such a condition of things, the prophetic writings of the original Isaiah and also those of the chief Isaianic prophets of subsequent times would naturally be kept in such a habitation, so that when the time came for editing the prophecies, utterances of later representatives of the school would be found side by side with—and in some cases even seem indistinguishable from—the prophetic portions which emanated from the founder of the school. And a satisfactory explanation would at the same time be provided for both the affinities and the diversities that have been noted in the prophecies included in the Book of Isaiah. There would naturally be a systematic close study of the writings of the founder by the later members of the school, and each of these—if he had any original genius at all—would at the same time develop a style of his own, besides making use of the literary vocabulary current

in his own days, and being more or less influenced besides by prophets of other Schools.

On this view, it may be regarded as very probable that the intention of the early editors was not to edit the prophecies of Isaiah the son of Amoz only, but to make a collection—and possibly merely a selection—of the prophecies uttered by members of the Isaianic school of prophecy belonging to different times. They would, of course, head the work with prophecies spoken by the great founder of the school, and then proceed to arrange the rest partly in a chronological order, and partly according to the subject matter or some other principle of which no certain knowledge is perhaps now attainable.

When they arrived at the great prophecy of the restoration, beginning with what we now call chapter xl., they may even be assumed to have indicated the fact by a distinct break in their text, so as to show that a fresh period of Isaianic prophecy was commencing. Such a distinction would, however, become disregarded by copyists or even editors of later times, when the historical perspective became blurred, and the literary sense more or less blunted. It is to these later forms of the text that on this theory the misapprehension and confusion that have so long reigned in Isaianic studies may be ascribed. The original editors, it is here suggested, had quite sufficient light and to spare to distinguish between the work of Isaiah the son of Amoz and the great prophet of exilic times, who indited the great prophecy of hope and consolation in the reign of Cyrus. For let it be remembered that criticism in very many cases merely rediscovers what had been clearly understood, say, thousands of years ago. Criticism—the true kind of course only is meant—is the light of reason capable of illumining the distant past in the sight of men whose span of life lies in the present.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

*ATHANASIUS AND THE BOOK OF TESTIMONIES.*

At various times, during recent years, I have drawn attention, in the pages of the *EXPOSITOR*,<sup>1</sup> to the evidence which exists for the belief that the early Christians made use of a manual of controversy in their disputes with the Jews which was composed of passages from the Old Testament, arranged under appropriate headings, with brief introductory statements or accompanying comments.

Although I made the discovery, without the knowledge that other scholars had expressed similar suspicions, and had argued for the antiquity of the book, it was not the less pleasing to find that the late Dr. Hatch and Professor Drummond had anticipated or endorsed me; for it furnished at once a confirmation and a check; it was a confirmation where we agreed, and suggested suspense of judgment and a revision of the argument where we differed. Recently the hypothesis has met with the support of Professor Burkitt, who has ventured the very bold conjecture that the primitive collection of Testimonies to which we are led was nothing more nor less than the lost book of *Dominical Oracles* of Papias. The matter, then, is certainly important enough to the critic, and the subject will require, before long, an exhaustive treatment. For this treatment I am not yet quite ready, as a wide area of patristic literature is involved in the investigation, with probably some publication or collation of fresh documents, and, perhaps, a re-collation of documents already known.

Meanwhile I have been assiduously following the traces of the lost book in the Fathers; it was natural that one

<sup>1</sup> E.g. "Spoken by Jeremy the Prophet," *EXPOSITOR*, 1905. "The Use of Testimonies in the Early Church," *EXPOSITOR*, 1906. "Irenaeus on the Apostolical Preaching," *EXPOSITOR*, 1907.



should do this, in view of the fact that the first suspicions on the subject were provoked by the existence of curious coincidences in the texts of Justin and Irenaeus, both of whom can be now proved to have been intimately acquainted with the method of the Testimony Book, which, in one of its early forms, they had at their finger-ends.

From Justin and Irenaeus it was easy to work backwards, in search of the missing planet. Their coincidence in the treatment of prophetic matter could only be reasonably explained by allowing antiquity to the composition. But this brought one to the borders of New Testament times and necessitated an inquiry, which turned out to be very fruitful, into the influence of the early forms of the book upon Evangelists and Apostles. That the investigation has not been fruitless nor the arguments unconvincing may be inferred from the following sentences in Professor Gwatkin's recently published Church History :

Vol. i. p. 199. "If they [the early Christian writers] were all borrowing from some very early manual of proof texts [Rendel Harris and Burkitt have this theory] which must be at least earlier than the First Gospel, we may safely say that few books have so influenced Christian thought."

We shall, I think, be able to show that Professor Gwatkin's statement does not over-estimate either the antiquity or the importance of the writing in question.

But what, to me at least, is as surprising as the demonstrable antiquity of the book, is its remarkable persistence, often with comparatively slight modifications, in the writings of later fathers than Irenaeus and Justin, from whom our inquiry started.

In the present article I am going to show that the *Testimony Book* was a part of the intellectual apparatus of no less a person than Athanasius, and that he drew upon it

freely in his controversial works and in the public disputes into which he threw himself.

That something of the kind had affected him might have been suspected from the fact that he supported the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship, in his conflict with Arius, on a text from the 110th Psalm: "Before the day-star I begat thee." This argument did not originate with Athanasius; it is in Justin<sup>1</sup> and elsewhere, and a study of the sequences in which it occurs will prove that it came from the Testimony Book. It is, in fact, actually extant in Cyprian's *Testimonies*,<sup>2</sup> in Gregory of Nyssa's *Testimonies against the Jews*,<sup>3</sup> and in Bar Ṣalibi's tract on the same subject. So the suggestion arises as to whether Athanasius may not have been brought up on the same religious handbook as so many fathers of the second century.

If we turn to Athanasius' treatise *On the Incarnation*, we shall find that eight chapters (33-40) are occupied with a refutation of the unbelief of the Jews by means of arguments from the Prophets. Almost the first passage that he quotes is the prophecy of the Star in the Blessing of Jacob, which he introduces in the name of Moses:

"And Moses also, who was really great and was accredited amongst the Jews as a true man, esteemed what was said of the incarnation of the Saviour as of great weight, and having recognised its truth, he set it down, saying, 'There shall arise a star out of Jacob, and a man out of Israel, and he shall break the princes of Moab.'"

The point to notice is the intrusion of Moses into the argument, where he is awkwardly apologised for as not being the actual author but only the one who gave the passage its imprimatur: that this reference is not a mere

<sup>1</sup> *Dial.* 63.

<sup>2</sup> *Testim.* i. 18.

<sup>3</sup> *l.c.* p. 292.

accident, may be seen by turning to a contemporary writer, Lactantius, who also quotes the prophecy :

*De Div. Inst.* iv. 13. "And Moses also, in Numbers, thus speaks : There shall arise a star out of Jacob : and a man shall spring forth from Israel. . . ."

Athanasius and Lactantius agree, then, in the odd ascription of the prophecy to Moses.

It is easy to show (see EXPOSITOR for 1906<sup>1</sup>) that this passage, together with a companion text from Isaiah, stood in the Testimony Book, as known to Irenæus and Justin ; the primitive form was something like this :

Moses first prophesied : There shall come a star out of Jacob, etc.

And Isaiah : A flower shall spring out of the root of Jesse.

This passage suffered a displacement of title, and the whole of it was covered by the name of Isaiah, as in Irenæus and Justin. But the original form with Moses persisted in other quarters, as we see in Athanasius and Lactantius.

In the next place we find a second case of the reference of prophecies in the Old Testament to Moses in the case of the Messianic prediction in the blessing of Jacob. For in the 40th chapter of Athanasius' treatise we have, in the ordinary texts, the following statement ;

"And Jacob prophesies that the kingdom of the Jews should stand until this day, saying :

"A ruler shall not fail from Judah."

Examination of the authorities for the text shows that, according to the best MS. in the Bodleian library, we ought to read :

"And *Moses* prophesied, etc."

So here is another case of the direct ascription of an Old Testament prophecy to Moses. Is that a blunder on the part of Athanasius, or of some one who preceded him ?

<sup>1</sup> Pt. ii. p. 397.

Let us examine how Justin and Irenaeus quote the passage.

When we turn to Justin's *Apology*, c. 32, we find the following statement :

“ And Moses also, who was the first of the prophets, says expressly as follows : A ruler shall not fail from Judah, etc.”

Moreover we can see if this is a blunder on the part of Justin, it is a deliberate one ; for, as we read his text a little further, we come to this :

“ It is your part, then, to examine accurately and to learn until whom the Jews had a ruler and a king of their own : it was until the manifestation of Jesus Christ, our teacher and the interpreter of the recognised prophecies, as was said aforetime by the holy and divine and *prophetical spirit through Moses.*”

So it is clear that Justin was speaking deliberately when he put the famous Messianic prophecy into the mouth of Moses.

Let us see, in the next place, whether other people can be found making the same mistake. Irenaeus, for example, has a whole chapter in which he shows that Moses foretold the advent of Christ.<sup>1</sup> In the course of his argument he says that “ Moses had already foretold his advent, saying, A ruler shall not fail, etc.,” and ends up, in language very like that of Justin, by saying, “ Let those look into the matter who are said to investigate everything, and let them tell us, etc.” Clearly Irenaeus has made the same mistake as Justin and had the matter in a somewhat similar setting. So Athanasius has simply repeated a blunder which was earlier than Justin and Irenaeus, and was probably found in the original book of proof-texts.

For further cases of the occurrence of the same mistake in Justin Martyr, we may take the following :

<sup>1</sup> Iren. lib. iv. c. 20.



1 *Ap. c.* 54. "Moses, then, the prophet, as we said before, was senior to all the chroniclers, and by him, as we previously intimated, the following prophecy was uttered, A ruler shall not fail, etc."

In the *Dialogue with Trypho* he has found out the mistake, and tries to get rid of it, much as Athanasius does :

*Dial. c.* 54. "By Jacob the patriarch it was foretold, etc. That which was recorded by Moses, but prophesied by the patriarch Jacob, etc."

*l.c.* 76 : "Concerning whose blood also Moses spake figuratively, that he should wash his robe in the blood of the grape," where Moses still stands uncorrected : a similar statement will be found in *c.* 63.

We will now test Athanasius by seeing how he quotes the prophecies in Isaiah xxxv. It will be remembered that these passages in reference to the "lame man leaping like an hart" were the starting point for my inquiry, because it was found that both Irenaeus and Justin had agreed in prefixing to the quoted prophecy the words "At his coming," ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ, the motive for which was implicit in the previous verse :

"Your God shall come with vengeance, even God with a recompense : He will come and save you.

"Then [sc. at His coming] shall the lame man leap like an hart, etc."

Let us see, then, whether Athanasius knows anything of the introductory words which Justin and Irenaeus took from their Testimony Book. In *c.* 38 Athanasius quotes against the Jews the words of Isaiah, beginning with "Be strong, ye relaxed hands and paralysed knees," and continues the quotation down to "the tongue of the stammerers shall be plain." Here there is no sign of the introductory comment, but as we read on, we find him saying as follows :

"What then can the Jews say even on this point ? and

how can they dare even to face this statement? For the prophecy intimates the arrival of God, and makes known the signs and the time of *His coming*: for they say that, when *the Divine coming* takes place, the blind will see, etc." Here the words which we based an argument on in the comparison of Justin and Irenaeus, are found lurking in the context of Athanasius. So we say again, in view of the quotation and the involved comment, that Athanasius was using the *Book of Testimonies*.

It would be easy to point out further agreements in the order and matter of prophecies quoted, but probably what has been said will suffice. The case of Athanasius was important in view of his central position in the Teaching and Life of the Church: he was evidently little disposed to original treatment of Christian questions and much disposed to rearrange and slightly to modify teaching which he had received in early life. And one is disposed to wonder whether this question of the Prophecies may not have been the principal factor in early Christian education; for we are gradually finding out that almost all the early Fathers have been learning out of the same book, and repeating the same arguments. Professor Gwatkin must be right in his statement as to the extraordinary influence of the text-book in question upon the development of the Christian religion.

In conclusion it may not be out of place to add a few remarks in reference to Professor Burkitt's suggestion that we should identify the *Book of Testimonies* with the missing *Dominical Oracles* (λόγια κυριακά) of Papias. Assuming that the case has been made out for the influence of Testimonies on Athanasius' famous treatise on the Incarnation, let us see how he introduces the section in which he proposes to deal with the Jews, and in what terms he describes his material.

The opening section (c. 33) does not go beyond the statement that the Jews who disbelieve are confuted from their own scriptures. When, however, in c. 38, Athanasius brings forward a fresh batch of prophecies, he does so in the following terms :

“ If what has been said is not sufficient, let the Jews be persuaded from other oracles (*λόγια*) which are in their possession.”

Here the very term is used which Papias has transmitted to us : and the language might be regarded as a direct confirmation of Professor Burkitt's hypothesis.

There is, however, one consideration which should be allowed weight on the other side. The very same prophecies which Athanasius proceeds to quote in c. 38 from the *Book of Testimonies*, occur also in Justin's *Apology*,<sup>1</sup> and we can compare the formula with which Justin introduces them : he says that “ it has been foretold by Isaiah . . . that the Jews who have always been expecting Christ have failed to recognise Him when He came. And the sayings (*λόγοι*) were spoken as in the person of Christ Himself. They are as follows : ‘ I was manifest to them that seek not after me, etc.’ ” Here the very same prophecies which Athanasius calls *Logia* are called *Logoi* by Justin. So it will not do to hastily assign *Logia* to the prophecies of the Old Testament, and *Logoi* to the sayings of Jesus. The terms are more nearly equivalent than has been generally supposed ; and the final decision on Professor Burkitt's hypothesis must be sought in other considerations. For the present we leave the matter in suspense.

RENDEL HARRIS.

<sup>1</sup> 1 *Ap.* 49.

*THE HISTORICAL VALUE OF THE FOURTH  
GOSPEL.*

X. THE PROBABILITY OF A MINISTRY IN JERUSALEM.

WE have now considered in some detail those sections of the Fourth Gospel which cover ground common to it and the Synoptists. We claim to have shown that there is nothing in these parts of the Gospel seriously at variance with the Synoptic account of the same events. The only difference of any importance concerns the date of the Crucifixion, but in regard to this we have seen reasons for thinking that the Fourth Evangelist is right, and the Marcan account incorrect. While we do not deny that our Evangelist was in all probability acquainted with the other three Gospels, which every one acknowledges to be earlier than the Fourth Gospel in point of time, there is a marked independence in his treatment of his subject. Moreover the independence which the writer shows is suggestive of first-hand information concerning the things he has to tell of. The narrative cannot, in my opinion, be explained as an embellishment, with a purpose, of the Synoptic narrative. If these portions of the Fourth Gospel which we have had under our consideration in the preceding papers of this series had stood alone and the Judæan ministry had found no place in the Gospel, I hardly think that any one would have doubted their independent historical value.

But we have yet to consider those parts of the Gospel in which the ministry of Jesus is presented from a wholly different point of view from that which the Synoptists take. And here of course we cannot judge of the historical value of our document on the same principles as those which have served us hitherto, for thus far we have been able to make a comparison between a part of a document,



whose historicity we are seeking to establish, with other documents whose historicity is, speaking generally, admitted, inasmuch as the same events, or, in some cases, closely connected events, are found detailed in both the one and the other. I think it ought to be allowed that if our Evangelist has shown up well in the comparison we have made of his work with the Synoptic writings, so far as a comparison could be made, there is a presumption in favour of the historicity of the other parts of his Gospel. Some of my readers may not allow that I have proved my case up to the present point of the inquiry. Such will not of course allow that we have any right to approach the remaining sections of the Gospel with any prejudice in their favour. I contend, however, that the parts of the Gospel already considered are certainly not in themselves of such a nature as to create prejudice *against* the remainder.

Speaking broadly, this remainder consists of an account of a ministry of Jesus at different times in or near Jerusalem. It is true that our Evangelist tells of events in Galilee as to which the Synoptists are silent, and these will demand our consideration in due course. In the present paper, however, I do not propose to go into them, nor indeed is it my intention yet to consider *in detail* our Evangelist's account even of the activity of Jesus in Jerusalem. It seems desirable first of all to inquire whether a Jerusalem ministry has historical probability in its favour, without troubling ourselves yet with the question whether, if it has, that recorded in the Fourth Gospel is likely to be historical.

I propose then to argue for the two following propositions :

A. It is antecedently probable that Jesus visited Jerusalem during His ministry and before the Passover visit when He was crucified.

B. Certain points in the Synoptic narratives are rendered more intelligible if Jesus had thus previously visited Jerusalem and taught there.

(A.)

It will not be necessary to dwell long on the first of these two propositions. It is true that the impression created by the Synoptic narratives may well be that only one Passover Feast occurred during the public ministry of Jesus, namely that one at which He was crucified. According to the Fourth Gospel there were at any rate three Passovers, at two of which Jesus was present in Jerusalem. For the third, the middle of the three, He seems not to have gone up to the capital, for the reason that the authorities there were bent on His death (St. John vii. 1), the time for which had not, however, yet come. It is easily to be understood that Jesus might have absented Himself from the capital even during "a Feast of obligation" for reasons of personal safety if His hour had not yet come, but it seems highly improbable that He should have kept away from Jerusalem altogether. Even if there were no Passover Feast during His Galilæan ministry, there must have occurred some Feast, attendance at which was obligatory. Even if it be possible to date the various stages of the Galilæan Ministry, as told by the Synoptists, so that no Passover Feast fell within it, there must have been one Feast of Pentecost, for the incident of the plucking of the ears of corn on the Sabbath day (Mark ii. 23) gives a clear indication that it can only have happened somewhere about the time of harvest. And then, before the next Passover Feast occurred, there would be the Feast of Tabernacles on the fifteenth day of the seventh month. Now attendance at these three Feasts—the Passover, Pentecost and the Feast of Tabernacles—was obligatory, and it

is difficult to believe that Jesus would have absented Himself from two successive Feasts of obligation falling within His Galilaean ministry unless indeed there were special reasons why He did not wish to come into conflict with the authorities in Jerusalem. It may be said, of course, that He absented Himself because He knew of the hostility towards Him of the religious leaders there, this having become clear to Him from the attitude of the Scribes and Pharisees who had come down from Jerusalem to Galilee to question and oppose Him. But it is surely far more easy to explain their advent in Galilee if, as the Fourth Evangelist tells us, Jesus had already visited Jerusalem and they had there fallen out with Him.

I claim, then, that it is antecedently probable that Jesus visited Jerusalem during His ministry and before the Passover visit when He was crucified. By using the word 'antecedently' here I do not mean that the probability is independent of the Synoptic story of the ministry of Jesus, but what I contend for is that it does not depend on the particular statements of the Fourth Gospel. At least two Feasts of obligation must have occurred during the Galilaean ministry, and the absence of Jesus from both of these, if He had not previously tested the attitude of Jerusalem towards Him, is highly improbable. Such a test could only properly be made by a personal visit.

(B.)

Further, we can argue that certain points in the Synoptic narratives are rendered more intelligible if Jesus had visited Jerusalem during His ministry and before the fatal Pass-over Feast.

For consider first St. Mark xiv. 57 f. Jesus is on His trial before the high priest, who, with the Sanhedrin, desires to find some cause why He should be put to death. They

invited witness against Him. And many bore false witness against Him, but agreed not together. Then, we read, there stood up certain, and bare false witness against Him, saying, "We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands." The same incident is recorded in St. Matthew xxvi. 60. Now it is true that in Matthew the witnesses are not represented as saying, "We heard Him say" but "This man said." It is clear, however, that the evidence would be worthless unless they could give personal testimony to having heard Jesus thus speak. These witnesses—two in number according to Matthew—are testifying to having heard Jesus say certain blasphemous words against the temple. We are not told who the witnesses were nor whence they came, but it is most natural to suppose that they were men of Jerusalem, and that they are referring to words which Jesus had spoken in Jerusalem. This supposition is confirmed by the words used in Mark: I will destroy *this* temple. Now when did Jesus use these words, or words like them which could be twisted so as to be turned against Himself? There is no evidence of any words like them having been spoken by Him in those few days at Jerusalem before the fatal Passover Feast, for what He said about the coming destruction of the Temple to His disciples (Mark xiii. 2) had been said privately; and further, there is nothing at all in His words which in any way corresponds with the statement testified against Him: "In three days I will build another, made without hands."

Further, the fact that the witnesses did not agree in the evidence they gave suggests that the words to which they were referring had been spoken some time before, and their recollection of them was therefore confused and their testimony conflicting.



The conclusion, then, is obvious. Jesus had spoken in Jerusalem words which these witnesses now tried to use against Him. That He had used words capable of being misunderstood or misinterpreted after this manner is stated by the Fourth Evangelist (ii. 19). We have then an argument in favour of the historicity of the Fourth Gospel in regard to this particular statement. It is, however, open to an objector to say that the Evangelist put the words into the mouth of Jesus in consequence of what he found written in Mark and Matthew respecting the false witness against Jesus. But even if this were so, which I do not for a moment allow to be probable, it would be an argument in favour of the proposition which we are at present seeking to establish. As has been said, we are not yet specially concerned with the proof that the particular narrative of the Fourth Gospel relating to the visits of Jesus to Jerusalem is historical. We are arguing that certain points in the Synoptic narratives are rendered more intelligible if Jesus had during His public ministry visited Jerusalem and taught there. If the Fourth Evangelist invented this saying of Jesus in ii. 19 because of what he found in the first two Synoptists, it would be a proof that to him some explanation of the accusation brought against Jesus by these false witnesses was necessary. And that explanation, on this hypothesis, is that Jesus had uttered words capable of this misconstruction *on a previous visit to Jerusalem*.

We will next consider the reference to Joseph of Arimathaea in connexion with the burial of Jesus. The site of Arimathaea, so far as I know, has not yet been identified. St. Luke, however, calls it "a city of the Jews," which implies that it was in Judaea. Moreover the fact that in Mark (and St. Luke repeats the statement) Joseph is called a "councillor" would seem to suggest that he lived in or

near Jerusalem. In Matthew he is called a disciple of Jesus. Parenthetically we may remark that the Fourth Evangelist so indicates him likewise, and adds that he was only a disciple *secretly*, for fear of the Jews. It may be objected that the statement in Matthew that Joseph was a disciple cannot be pressed, as Mark does not so speak of him, but describes him as one "who was looking for the kingdom of God." I can see, however, no reason, except prejudice, for rejecting the description in Matthew. And we ask: How came this man to be a disciple of Jesus? The answer is simple enough if Jesus had during His ministry visited, and taught in, Jerusalem. Moreover—but this again only parenthetically—the use of the word "boldly" in Mark's description of Joseph's approach to Pilate seems to me a confirmation of the statement in the Fourth Gospel that Joseph had been only a *secret* disciple. The appropriateness of the word "boldly" is at once apparent if, until now, Joseph's discipleship had been a secret thing. It is hardly conceivable that the Fourth Evangelist concluded that Joseph was a secret disciple by arguing from the boldness of his approach to Pilate as Mark represents it. He may well have had independent knowledge of the fact.

Next let us reflect on our Lord's lament over Jerusalem as St. Luke records it (xix. 41 ff.). Is it conceivable that Jesus would have thus lamented over the city if He had as yet made no direct appeal to its inhabitants? What meaning otherwise have such words as: "O that thou hadst known in this day, even thou, the things which belong unto peace!"? It is an utterance devoid of all significance unless a refusal had already been made. But it is perfectly explicable on the hypothesis that there had already been a Jerusalem ministry, and a rejection, as according to the Fourth Gospel there had been.

Similar to this lament of Jesus over the holy city is that other which St. Luke gives, and which finds a place in Matthew too (Matt. xxiii. 37; Luke xiii. 34); "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killeth the prophets and stoneth them that are sent unto her! how often would I have gathered thy children together even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!"

Schmiedel has proved to his own satisfaction<sup>1</sup> that these words are not words of Jesus at all, but that they are an utterance of "Wisdom" quoted from some literature not now extant. He points out that in Matthew they follow immediately upon the words: "Therefore behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and scribes: some of them shall ye kill and crucify; and some of them shall ye scourge in your synagogues, and persecute from city to city: that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed on the earth, from the blood of Abel the righteous unto the blood of Zechariah, son of Barachiah, whom ye slew between the sanctuary and the altar. Verily I say unto you, all these things shall come upon this generation." Now words like these, but with the third person instead of the second, occur also in St. Luke (xi. 49 ff.) and they are prefaced by the words: "Therefore also said the wisdom of God," which mark them out as a quotation. The quotation, according to Schmiedel, does not stop at Matthew xxiii. 36, but continues in the following words already cited: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, etc.," though it is to be noticed that in St. Luke this lament is placed in another connexion altogether (Luke xiii. 34). It is unfortunate for Schmiedel's argument that the connexion in St. Luke is so entirely different. Still he is right in drawing attention to the fact that the correct reading gives: "O Jerusalem,

<sup>1</sup> *The Johannine Writings*, pp. 57 ff. The reference in the original German is p. 45, *Das vierte Evangelium*,

Jerusalem, which killeth the prophets and stoneth them that are sent unto *her*," and not, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto *thee*." So that in these words something is said *about* Jerusalem rather than *to* her, and Jerusalem is only addressed in the words which follow: "How often would I have gathered thy children together, etc."

It does not, however, appear to me that Schmiedel has satisfactorily proved that these last words are not original words of Jesus. There may well be mingled with His words a quotation, as Schmiedel supposes; but it seems clear that both the First Evangelist and St. Luke regard the lamentation as one proceeding from the heart of Jesus Himself. Whatever former utterance He may be making use of, He is giving expression to the bitter sorrow of His own soul that Jerusalem had refused to heed His message and that her children would not be gathered to Himself. But even if we were to give away, as Schmiedel would have us do, this apostrophe addressed to Jerusalem, I venture to say that the lamentation over the city in St. Luke xix. 41 f. remains unintelligible unless Jesus had already suffered rejection from her. It is only explained if He had already visited Jerusalem and taught there.

Indeed the final rejection and murder of Jesus at the fatal Passover stands unexplained in the Synoptic narrative. We may well ask whether it is historically probable that Jesus should have confined His ministry to Galilee and the north, only presenting Himself to Jerusalem at last to be immediately taken and crucified. Surely the whole attitude of the religious authorities at Jerusalem towards Jesus, as this is set before us by the Synoptists, demands some explanation beyond what they give! Whether the *details* of the Fourth Gospel respecting the Jerusalem ministry be correct or not, some such ministry



there must have been if the Synoptic narrative itself is to be believed.

And, again, there are traces in St. Luke's Gospel of visits to Jerusalem before the final one. The parable of the Pharisee and the publican would find its appropriate setting in the holy city. That of the Good Samaritan suggests that it was delivered somewhere in the neighbourhood of the scene mentioned in the parable itself. In close proximity to this parable there stands in St. Luke's Gospel the visit of Jesus to the house of Martha and Mary in some unnamed village. The Fourth Gospel, if historical, determines this village as Bethany, near to Jerusalem. It is extremely difficult to construct from St. Luke's Gospel an outline of the journeyings of Jesus. But we may gather from it that a wider sphere of activity was embraced than that which the Marcan story mentions or suggests. The Synoptic narrative, if by this term we understand not merely the Marcan account but all that is contained in the other two Synoptists as well, and especially the matter peculiarly Lucan, is not unfavourable to the theory that the ministry of Jesus extended even to Jerusalem itself; on the contrary, it seems to demand this extension. But whether or no the Fourth Gospel is to be accounted historical in its description of the mission of Jesus to the Jews in Jerusalem is a question which must be separately considered. This will form the subject of our next paper.

E. H. ASKWITH.

*HORT'S POSTHUMOUS COMMENTARY ON  
ST. JAMES.*

SECOND NOTICE.

THERE may seem to be something unfair in criticizing a posthumous publication, especially when, as in Hort's case, it had been long withheld from the press during the author's own lifetime. Such delay might of course, in a particular case, be due to mere accident, but when it is so widely prevalent as to become characteristic of the author, it seems more reasonable to ascribe it either to his uncertainty as to the accuracy of some of the views propounded,<sup>1</sup> or at all events to a sense that he had failed to realize in its full completeness the ideal after which he was striving. Such a modest estimate of his own achievements was entirely in keeping with the character of one who might without presumption have used the language of Solon,

*γηράσκω δ' αἶει πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.*

LOVER of truth, as he was, and always growing in the knowledge of truth, he certainly could not have wished that the free interchange of opinion, in which he delighted while he was still amongst us, should suddenly be stopped because he had himself passed into the world of truth, where our crude guesses are exchanged for certainty, and we shall know even as we are known.

I propose then to consider here (1) the Introduction to the Epistle, and (2) a very interesting speculation on what the Editor calls St. James' Doctrine of Creation,<sup>2</sup> involving the interpretation of some of the most obscure passages in the Epistle.

Hort has no doubt that the Epistle was written by James,

<sup>1</sup> For signs of this see Hort's note on *λόγῳ ἀληθείας* in p. 34 of his edition.

<sup>2</sup> See p. iii. n. 1.

the Lord's brother. For the meaning of this phrase he refers to Lightfoot's Essay, 'leaving details to the books on the subject' (pp. xv., xix., xx.). He has no doubt that the Hieronymian theory is wrong, and that 'the biblical evidence, which alone is decisive . . . leaves open the choice between the Helvidian and Palestinian.'<sup>1</sup> 'Even allowing that the word "brother" might be rightly used of a step-brother, as the word "father" (not *genitor* but *pater*) is used in some true sense of Joseph, still this leaves neutrality only.'<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, as far as tradition is concerned, 'there is a decided preponderance of reason for thinking the Epiphianian view to be right'; though 'the evidence is not such as one would like to rest anything important upon.' This, I think, represents fairly the conclusion which would be naturally drawn, and which in fact I myself drew from the evidence adduced by Lightfoot, until further evidence and further consideration induced me to exchange it for the Helvidian view, as I have explained in the first chapter of my Introduction. As to the readers whom St. James addresses I quite agree that 'in the first instance they are Christian Jews of the Dispersion. It is neither unnatural nor wrong that St. James should regard Jewish Christians positively as the true Israel. . . . His own position, as head of the Jerusalem Church, gave him a special right to address Jewish Christians, but no such

<sup>1</sup> He prefers this name to 'Epiphianian,' as Epiphanius only borrowed the theory from the *Protevangelium Jacobi* and other obscure writings probably connected with Palestine.

<sup>2</sup> I cannot see that anything is gained by insisting on the distinction between *genitor* and *pater*. If *πατήρ* is used by St. Luke in ii. 33, 48, *οἱ γονεῖς αὐτοῦ* is used in ii. 27, 41, 43. When the Jews say (John vi. 42), 'Is not this Jesus the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?' they merely give utterance to the general belief that Joseph was in the strict sense *genitor* of Jesus, and his sons in the strict sense brothers of Jesus. That is, they assume, with the people of Nazareth, that the Child whom Mary and Joseph had brought back with them, after their long absence from home, was their own child.

special right to address others (whether Jews or Gentiles) : though doubtless he would not refuse to speak to such as were associated with Christian Jewish communities.' I think, however, that Hort goes too far, when he says that 'unbelieving Jews' are outside the scope of this Epistle. The Editor refers to the note on iv. 4, as somewhat limiting this statement. We read there that 'it would seem as if St. James extended his vision beyond the immediate state of things . . . and contemplated what would naturally spring from the roots which were already there, and what did indeed already exist among the unbelieving Jews.' Westcott seems to me to take the true view, where he says (Heb. p. xxxviii.) that 'for a time the fellowship of the Church and the Synagogue was allowed on both sides. Little by little the growth of the Gentile element in the Church excited the active hostility of the Jews against the whole body of Christians, as it troubled the Jewish converts themselves.'

The next point dealt with is the date, which Hort puts 'at 60 or a little after.' In ch. vii. of my Introduction I have given the reasons which lead me to suppose that it was written about 45. The argument is of a cumulative nature, but the points on which I mainly rely are (1) the silence as to the question, which was so hotly debated from the year 50 onwards, as to the conditions on which Gentiles should be admitted into the Church ; and (2) the references to our Epistle in the Epistles of St. Peter and St. Paul, especially in the Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. These references are given at length in my third chapter. They are not mentioned by Hort in his edition of St. James ; but in his later work on St. Peter (*Introduction*, p. 5), after speaking of that Epistle as 'full of Pauline language and ideas,' he goes on, 'One more Epistle has to be named, that of St. James, as having been used by St. Peter in this



Epistle.' Again, in p. 15, he says, 'The phrase *παρεπιδήμοις διασπορᾶς* was apparently suggested by the salutation of St. James' Epistle, *ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ*. So he says that the phrase *ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς* (i. 7) is doubtless taken from James i. 2; and in his note on i. 22 suggests that St. Peter may have had in his mind James iv. 8. Again in his note on i. 23 he says, 'The peculiar phrase *ἀναγεγεννημένοι . . . διὰ λόγου* cannot but remind us of James i. 18, *βουληθεῖς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας*. In his note on ii. 1 *ἀποθέμενοι οὖν πᾶσαν κακίαν* he refers to James i. 21, a passage 'which, as we shall see, is closely connected with this.' In the same verse he speaks of James iv. 11 with its thrice repeated verb (*καταλαλῶ*) as the most direct antecedent to St. Peter's *ἀποθέμενοι πᾶσας καταλαλίαν*. The note on ii. 2, *ὡς ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα ἐπιποθήσατε*, is full of references to what he calls the difficult corresponding verse (i. 21, see iv. 5). The note on ii. 16, *ὡς ἐλεύθεροι*, suggests that St. Peter may have had in his mind the remarkable language twice used in St. James respecting 'a law of liberty.' (See also the notes on i. 24, ii. 11.) These resemblances are all mentioned under the head of 'James' in the Index to St. Peter, but are not referred to at all in the Index to St. James, and are very slightly touched on in the notes. This may account for the fact that, in speaking of the Reception of St. James (*Introd.* xxv.) Hort says, 'The first traces of St. James . . . are in 1 Clement about the year 95,' though, as I have pointed out, he finds many traces of it in the Epistle of St. Peter, which he considers to have been written in 62.

In the same section there are some valuable remarks on Irenaeus.

'He never cites James, but uses phrases from it, which taken singly are uncertain, but they confirm each other. Thus it is nothing in itself that he says (iv. 13. 4) that Abraham "amicus factus est

Dei." But it is something that it occurs in a passage contrasting the Law of Moses and the word of Christ, as an enlargement and fulfilment of the Law, "superextendi decreta libertatis et augeri subjectionem quae est ad regem," which looks very like the νόμον τελείτε βασιλικόν of ii. 8, and νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας of i. 25. And this becomes certainty when not long afterwards (iv. 16. 2) we get the consecutive words about Abraham, "credidit Deo et reputatum est illi ad justitiam, et amicus Dei vocatus est," i.e. the justification from Genesis is instantly followed by the "Friend" clause, as in ii. 23. There is no reason to suppose that the last words as well as the former were borrowed by St. James from a traditional form of text. Subsequently (iv. 34. 4) Irenaeus uses the peculiar phrase "libertatis lex," explaining it thus: "Id est verbum Dei ab apostolis . . . adnuntiatum." Again (v. i. i.) we get, within seven lines, "factores autem sermonum ejus facti" (cf. ποιηταὶ λόγου in i. 22), and facti autem initium facturae (cf. εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχὴν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων), neither phrase being likely to suggest the other except as being very near in the Epistle. These instances give force to other resemblances, cited by him, 'which might, but for them, be problematical.'

I pass on now to the consideration of what has been referred to as St. James' 'Doctrine of Creation,' set forth in the notes on i. 18, 21, 23-25 and iii. 6-9. The last will serve as the best starting point for our discussion. As Hort says, 'Here the latent doctrine of the Epistle breaks out into plain words in the phrase τοὺς καθ' ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ γεγονότας.' I do not see, however, why we need find in this clause any deliberate reference to a 'doctrine of creation.' It is quoted simply for a practical purpose, as in Gen. ix. 6, 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made He man.' So here, 'You think yourself bound to bless God; and yet you have no scruple in cursing man, who is made after the likeness of God.' All that we can safely infer from this is that, as Hort says, 'In St. James' eyes mankind are still in the likeness of God, for all their sin and evil.' We will go back therefore to i. 18, βουληθεῖς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχὴν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων,

in his notes on which Hort goes further into detail upon the subject. His first point is to prove that *ἡμᾶς* here refers to 'us men, the recipients of God's word of reason (in creation); not *us sons of Israel* (Jews and Christians not distinguished), the recipients of God's word of revelation generally; nor *us Christians*, the recipients of God's word of the Gospel.' This conclusion is supported by the following arguments; (1) A chosen race or Church would have been called a firstfruit of men, as in Apoc. xiv. 4, *ἡγοράσθησαν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπαρχὴ τῷ θεῷ*, rather than *ἀπαρχὴ κτισμάτων*; (2) the preceding verses (12-17) evidently refer to God's dealings with men generally; (3) if the reference had been to Jews or Christians, we should have had not 'a word of truth,' but the definite article, *τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀληθείας* (4) *τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον* in ver. 21 can only mean 'the inborn word.'

We will take these arguments in order. The nearest parallel to this sentence of St. James is found, not in the Apocalypse, but in Rom. viii. 19 foll., where the earnest expectation of the creation (*τῆς κτίσεως*) is represented as waiting for the unveiling of the sons of God . . . because the creation itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now, and not only so, but ourselves also which have the firstfruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.' So here the writer uses the widest word (*κτισμάτων*) embracing not only Christians, but mankind in general; not only men, but all created things. Compare the *παλιγγενεσία* of Matt. xix. 28, the prophecies of Isaiah xi. 6 foll., lxv. 3, and 2 Pet. iii. 12, 13, 'Looking for and earnestly desiring the coming of the day of God . . . according to his promise we look for

new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.' And the promise, the earnest, the firstfruit of all this is shown in those who have received the Spirit, having been begotten *λόγω ἀληθείας* according to the will of God.

Hort's second argument is that the preceding verses refer to God's dealings with men generally, and cannot therefore be limited to Christians in verse 18. But is this so? The 13th verse describes the blessedness of him who endures temptation, because, when he has been thus tested, he shall receive the crown of life, which the Lord has promised to them that love Him. Then he points out that man is tempted by his own desires, that it is God who is the source of all good, and who has brought it about (*λόγω ἀληθείας*) that we should be the firstfruit of His creation.

The third argument turns on the omission of the article with *λόγω* by St. James, who 'never indulges in a lax omission of articles.' Yet Hort himself allows, in his note on i. 1, *κυρίου* 'I. X. *δούλος*, that the R.V. translation, 'servant of the Lord Jesus Christ,' is quite compatible with the absence of the article, absence which he rightly explains as due to 'abbreviation and compression of phrase.' To the same effect he says, in his note on 1 Pet. i. 1, *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις διασπορᾶς Πόντου* (to which he here refers), that 'the absence of an article before *διασπορᾶς* would hardly exclude the sense "strangers of the Dispersion"; for, in sentences having the nature of headings, articles are often omitted in places where they would naturally be inserted in ordinary composition.' He adds that it is doubtless for this reason that the articles are omitted in the following verse; *κατὰ πρόγνωσιν θεοῦ πατρός, ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος, εἰς ὑπακοὴν καὶ ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος* 'I. X. I quite agree that a main cause of the omission of the article in biblical Greek was the desire to shorten and compress, especially in familiar phrases where this could be done without causing



confusion. It was a part of the general process of adaptation, which followed upon the conquests of Alexander, when the language of Attica received those modifications which fitted it to become the organ of communication for the whole civilized world. Commentators seem to me sometimes to forget this when they seek by all manner of subtleties to tie down the *κοινή* to the old classical rules. In my edition I have maintained, in opposition to Middleton and others, that the phrase *νόμον τελεῖτε βασιλικόν* in ii. 8 should be translated 'Ye fulfil the royal law.' It seems to me that the indefinite 'a royal law' suggests a whole class of royal laws, whereas St. James is apparently referring to the one commandment of love, on which hang all the law and the prophets.

Deferring for the moment the difficult word *ἔμφυτον*, let us see what can be made of Hort's rendering of the particular phrase in question, 'He gave us birth by a word of truth.' If this phrase stood alone, I think we should naturally interpret it by the Jewish saying, quoted from Schürer in my note, 'A man's father only brought him into this world; his teacher, who taught him wisdom, brings him into the life of the world to come.' Nor do I see how this reference to teaching can be excluded by prefixing the words, 'God of His own will.' Yet Spitta, arguing for the pre-Christian origin of our Epistle, understands it to mean 'God gave us life by His creative word.' Would not this have required the Greek *ἔκτισεν* (or *ἐποίησεν* or *ἔπλασεν*) *ἡμᾶς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ*, or at any rate *λόγῳ δυνάμεως*? And, so far as Hort agrees with Spitta, it seems to me that he suffers under the same difficulty. It is not by an indefinite word of truth, but 'by the word of God, that the worlds were framed' (Heb. xi. 2; 2 Pet. iii. 5). If we want to know the precise meaning of *λόγῳ ἀληθείας*, we must be guided by its use elsewhere, as in 2 Cor. vi. 7 (In everything commending

ourselves as ministers of God) ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας, ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ (where the R.V. has 'In the word of truth, in the power of God'), these being summary phrases suited for the rapid enumeration of the ways in which the Apostle had proved himself a minister of God. The full meaning involved is given in Col. i. 5 ('The hope which is laid up for you in the heavens, whereof ye heard before') ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ εὐαγγελίου (which is bearing fruit and increasing in all the world); in Eph. i. 13 ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ὑμῶν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ πιστεύσαντες ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύματι τῆς εὐαγγελίας τῷ ἀγίῳ, ὃ ἐστὶν ἄρραβὼν τῆς κληρονομίας<sup>1</sup> ἡμῶν; 2 Tim. ii. 15 (Give diligence to present thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed) ὀρθοτομοῦντα τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας. If any doubt remains, compare the parallel passage in 1 Pet. i. 23, ἀναγεγεννημένοι οὐκ ἐκ σπορᾶς φθαρτῆς ἀλλὰ ἀφθάρτου, διὰ λόγου ζῶντος θεοῦ καὶ μένοντος, διότι πᾶσα σὰρξ ὡς χόρτος . . . τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα κυρίου μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς. And St. Paul speaks to much the same purport in Rom. x. 13-15, Whoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How, then, shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? So ἡ ἀλήθεια is used by itself for the Gospel in St. John, and in our Epistle v. 19 εἰάν τις ἐν ὑμῖν πλανηθῆ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἐπιστρέψῃ τις αὐτὸν . . . σώσει ψυχὴν ἐκ θανάτου.

And not only is λόγος ἀληθείας a *vox technica* with the early Christians for 'the good seed,' 'the Gospel of the grace of God,' 'the power of God unto salvation'; but the reception of that Gospel is described as the rooting of the seed in the heart, as a new birth, a new creation, a new

<sup>1</sup> Compare James ii. 5 κληρονόμους τῆς βασιλείας.

nature, ἀναγεννᾶσθαι, ἄνωθεν γεννᾶσθαι, ἐκ θεοῦ γεννᾶσθαι, or, as here, ἀποκνεῖσθαι. No doubt this word is used here in the first instance by way of antithesis to ἀποκνεῖ in ver. 15.<sup>1</sup> Its exact reference is to the close of the embryonic, pre-natal stages of life; that is, it implies an evolution. This, I think, is neglected in Hort's note on p. 33 ἀπεκύησεν, 'Gave us birth at the outset, antecedently to growth.' The figurative use may be paraphrased in ver. 15 by the words: Desire makes use of the imagination to picture in glowing colours the pleasure which it seeks, and thus paves the way for the sinful act: the act of sin leads on to the sinful habit, and this results in death. So we might paraphrase ver. 18: the will of God uses the instrumentality of the word of truth in order to make us, as it were, the first-fruit of the glory which shall hereafter overspread the whole creation. And this, too, comes about by a gradual evolution, not only in the heart of the individual Christian, but in the growing and expanding light of revelation, as we read in Heb. i. 1, God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of the days spoken unto us in his Son. And the word ἀπαρχή, as we read in 1 Cor. xv. 23, has a definite Christian application in reference to Christ Himself and to His followers, in whom is seen the pledge and fore-taste of the new heaven and new earth.

The verses which follow teach us something more about

<sup>1</sup> It is true that ἀποκνεῖ θάνατον is itself antithetic to the reward which follows resistance to temptation in ver. 12, λήμψεται τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς: but it also introduces the first term of another antithesis, ἀποκνεῖ θάνατον, as opposed to ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχὴν τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων. Similarly in iv. 7 we have a triple antithesis, in which the second term of the first antithesis must be understood as the first term of the second antithesis as follows:—

- A. Submit yourselves to God (a); resist the devil (b).
- B. Resist the devil (a); he will flee from you (b).
- C. Draw nigh to God (a); he will draw nigh to you (b).

‘the word of truth.’ It is a word to be listened to, a word that roots itself in the heart; we are to be doers of it, and not hearers only. Nor is it only a word, but a law, a perfect law, a law of liberty. It is not easy to reconcile this description with Spitta’s, or even with Hort’s, view of the creative word. According to the former a Jew writing to Jews in the first century B.C., according to the latter a Jewish Christian writing to Jewish Christians, founds his appeal to them on the story of the Creation as given in Genesis. Such an appeal is not unknown in the New Testament. St. Paul vindicates for the whole human race the claim put forward by the old Greek poet, ‘We are also his offspring,’ and in his Epistle to the Romans speaks of the revelation made to all mankind in the world of nature, in God’s providential dealings with His creatures, and in conscience. But whom does he thus address? Not Jews or Christians who have received a higher and fuller revelation, but Gentiles, who are still under the pre-Mosaic and pre-Abrahamic dispensation; who, as Bishop Butler would say, have only the twilight of natural religion, not the full daylight of the Gospel.

But may it not be said, such an appeal to natural religion, even from the standpoint of revelation, is recognized in the words of St. John i. 9, *ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον*?—words which Westcott paraphrases as follows: ‘The words declare that men were not left alone to interpret the manifestations of the Light in the Life around them and in them. The Light, from whom that Life flows, made Himself known more directly. From the first He was (so to speak) on His way to the world, advancing towards the Incarnation by preparatory revelations.’

I think these words of Westcott probably represent what Hort meant to say, but Hort has hardly succeeded in



guarding against the danger of misconception in the notes of which I give the substance below. ‘*Βουληθεῖς* might mean “spontaneously,” “of his own will,” but such a sense is feeble in this context.’ I cannot see this. My note is ‘So far from God’s tempting us to evil, His will is the cause of our regeneration. It is the doctrine expressed by St. Paul (Eph. i. 5) *προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἰοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰ. Χ.*’ Hort seems to me to insist too much on the distinction (a true one, I admit) between *βούλομαι* and *θέλω*, and on the connexion of the former with *βουλή*, holding that—

*βουληθεῖς* ‘refers to the peculiarity of man’s creation in the Mosaic narrative, as having been preceded by the deliberative words “Let us make man, etc.” It is morally certain (?) that the rest of the verse is a paraphrase of what had been said of the creation in God’s image: and if so, St. James, in recalling God’s purpose concerning man, might naturally point to the mysterious language of Genesis which seemed to invest man’s creation with special glory on this special ground as well as on the other. It is at least certain that the same interpretation was placed on these words of Genesis by several of the Fathers.’

On *λόγω ἀληθείας* (p. 34) Hort writes<sup>1</sup> :—

‘We must at least see whether the words cannot naturally bear a meaning which connects them with the original creation of man. It is at first sight tempting to have recourse to the Jewish conception of the creation as accomplished by ten words of God. . . . Aristobulus says that “Moses has spoken of the whole creation of the world as *θεοῦ λόγους*,” But it is not easy to see how they could be called *λόγ. ἀλ.* and, moreover, this sense does not harmonize with *ἀπεκύησεν*. We must therefore seek the explanation in the special in-breathing from God Himself, by which man became in a higher sense than the animals, “a living soul.” But how was this a word of truth?’ For this Hort refers to 1 Pet. i. 23, as showing that the essence of the Gospel was an utterance of God’s Word to mankind. Here the abiding word of God stands to the new birth in the same position as *λόγ. ἀλ.* in St. James to the original Divine birth, and the word is called a seed. . . . St. James looks back beyond the Law to the original implanting of a divine seed in man by God.

<sup>1</sup> This is the note to which I referred at the beginning as suggesting that Hort himself was not unconscious of the difficulties in the way of his interpretation of the passage.

Thus the distinctly perceived word of truth of the Gospel enables St. James to regard the creation as a divine birth in virtue of a divine seed, which was also a word of truth, the means by which all other words of truth were to enter man.' Similarly in his note on 1 Pet. i. 23 Hort says that 'St. James is apparently speaking of the original creation of man which, in virtue of its special circumstances and of the Divine image, was not a creation only, but, by a Divine begetting, a word or utterance of God entering into man and making him capable of apprehending truth. St. Peter, on the other hand,<sup>1</sup> speaks not directly of mankind but of Christians, and not directly of the original Divine birth, but of the Divine new birth. The link between them is the idea that the new birth is a restoration of that which was at the beginning. . . . It is doubtless the Divine word uttered in Christ that suggested to St. James the, in itself, paradoxical phrase *λόγῳ ἀληθείας* in reference to the creation of man.'

I go on now to Hort's note on i. 21 *δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν*. The proper meaning of *ἔμφυτον*, he says, is 'inborn' or rather 'ingrown,' but he allows there may be 'a secondary ingrowth, a second nature, as we say.' He considers, however, that it is impossible to understand it of 'the outward message of the Gospel. St. James could never have used in that sense a word which every one who knew Greek would of necessity understand in the opposite sense.' What, then, are we to say of such a phenomenon as the growth of the mistletoe? This, if anything, may surely be taken as a type of what is *ingrown*, yet its seed is entirely foreign to the tree in which it has been deposited by some passing bird. So the seed is foreign to the ground, yet it is chosen in the parable of the sower to represent the word of the kingdom, which roots itself in the soil already prepared to receive it. It is this property of rooting itself which seems to me to constitute the *λόγος ἔμφυτος*. Hort speaks above of 'the creation as

<sup>1</sup> It seems to me far more natural to suppose, as I have said before, that St. Peter is here giving in his own words what he supposed to be the meaning of St. James, and that he added the clause, 'This is the word which is preached unto us,' in order to leave no loophole for misunderstanding.

a divine birth in virtue of a divine seed, which was also a word of truth,' but the thought of creation seems more applicable to the soil, the 'honest and good heart,' than to the seed, as, I think, is recognised by Hort himself in his note on p. 38, 'What St. James is referring to here is not the original reception of the Gospel, as a word from without . . . it is the original capacity involved in the creation in God's image, which makes it possible for man to apprehend a revelation at all.'

We now go on to another feature of the word. It is compared in ver. 23 to a mirror, which shows a man whether his face is clean or not. The Greek for 'face' is peculiar. It is called τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως, translated in A.V. and R.V. 'his natural face,' literally 'the face of his birth,' i.e. 'his bodily face.' Hort's note is, 'If such a meaning were intended, no such circuitous and obscure phrase would have been used; τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ would have been enough, no other face being mentioned.' But surely, as the mirror is compared to the Word of God, so the face of the outer man, reflected in the mirror, is compared to the face of the inner man reflected in the Word. Hort gives two accounts of the word γένεσις. He says it is strictly—

'his birth, in antithesis to later corruption; but the face is the invisible face, the reflexion of God's image in humanity. The face which a man beholds, when he receives the Divine word, is the representation of what God made him to be, though now defaced by his own wrong doings.' 'To a Christian Jew the only γένεσις could be that of the Pentateuch, Psalms and Prophets, the beginning of things as coming from the hand of God.'

I cannot but think this explanation not only misses the force of ἔοικεν, but quite destroys the meaning of the parable. The man who looks at his face in the mirror and is satisfied with one hasty glance to show that all is as it should be, is contrasted with the man who bends over and peers into the perfect law of liberty. The former may be compared to



the young man who said of the law, 'All these things have I observed': the latter to him who, reflecting as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, the supreme Word, is transformed into the same image from glory to glory. Even in Genesis the word *γένεσις* is sometimes used where it is impossible to find any reference to the creation or to the Divine ideal of man. In xl. 20 *ἡμέρα γενέσεως* is simply 'Pharaoh's birthday,' as in xxxi. 13 *γῆ τῆς γενέσεως* is 'Jacob's native land.' In Philo and in Greek philosophy *γένεσις* is constantly used for the seen and temporal, as opposed to the unseen and eternal. And I cannot doubt that this is its meaning, both here and in iii. 6. I think, therefore, that Hort is wrong in his note on *ὅποῖος ἦν*, 'he forgetteth what manner of man he was,' 'forgets, *i.e.* his original image antecedent to change and becoming.' On the contrary, it is, I think, just this 'change and becoming' that is expressed by *γένεσις* in the numerous examples quoted in my note. So again in Judith xii. 18, *πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς γενέσεώς μου* means 'all the days of my life' or 'since I was born,' as the R.V. has it.

Now comes the question as to the meaning of the word *παρακύπτω* in ver. 25. My note on this is 'bending over the mirror in order to examine it more minutely,' 'peering into it.' But Hort thinks it never has any such meaning. 'When used figuratively, as here, it seems always to imply a rapid, hasty, and cursory glance,' of which he gives examples, as I had also done. He does not, however, touch on the contrary instances quoted by me, such as John xx. 5 and 11, where it is used of Peter, and afterwards of Mary, looking into the tomb and seeing, one the grave-clothes lying, the other the two angels, sitting one at the head and the other at the feet where the body of Jesus had lain. Surely this could be no 'hasty or cursory' glance. I agree with Westcott that 'the idea conveyed is that of looking intently



with eager desire and effort at that which is partially concealed.' So Epictetus (*Diss.* I. i. 16) speaks of travellers detained by contrary winds, as continually looking to see (*παρακύπτομεν συνεχῶς*) what wind is blowing. Cf. *Eccles.* xiv. 20-23, 'Blessed is the man that shall meditate in wisdom . . . he that considereth her ways in his heart . . . he that prieth in (*παρακύπτων*) at her windows.' It surprises me that Hort refuses to allow this meaning in I Pet. εἰς ἃ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄγγελοι παρακύψαι. The Apostle had spoken just before of 'the prophets searching diligently to know what the Spirit of Christ which was in them was disclosing to them with regard to His sufferings and the glory that should follow them,' and then he adds that 'the angels desire to look into the same things'; surely with no cursory glance but with the same earnest seeking as the prophets. And this is borne out by Eph. iii. 10 ἵνα γνωρισθῇ νῦν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἡ πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ.

I pass on now to the very difficult passage in iii. 6, ἡ γλῶσσα . . . ἡ σπιλοῦσα ὄλον τὸ σῶμα καὶ φλογίζουσα τὸν τροχόν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γεέννης. Hort here asks—

'In what sense the tongue can be said to stain the body?' He thinks it is 'with reference to the idea that there is a Divine image received by man at creation, and that all moral evil is to be regarded in relation to this as a defilement or an unnatural growth' (i. 21). 'Still why "the body"? for St. James certainly regarded the Divine image as inward and spiritual. Probably because he regarded the body as the outward expression of the inward mind. . . . Moreover, the *action* of the tongue might be regarded as the action of the whole body, the total conduct of which the body is the organ.'

[I am rather inclined to accept the last as the true explanation. One may compare i. 27, ἄσπιλον ἑαυτὸν τηρεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, that world, of which the tongue is the organ, and Matt. xv. 11, 'that which cometh out of the mouth, this

defileth the man.' The interpretation of i. 21 seems to me still somewhat doubtful.]

Then comes the crux, *τροχὸν γενέσεως*, by which Hort understands—

'The wheel of man's creation, *i.e.* of man's nature according to its original Divine purpose.' 'What, then, is meant by the wheel? It can hardly be the detached wheel, rolling uselessly along, as in the classical image. It must be the chariot-wheel of man, as he advances on the way of life, fulfilling his appointed course. Probably there is an allusion to the wheel in the vision of Ezekiel. This may sound fanciful, till we remember that the vision of Ezekiel, called the Chariot by the later Jews, was in Jewish thought associated with the Creation. According to the imagery of the vision, the wheel might be the body and all its activities, by means of which the spirit moves upon the earth. This is represented as set on fire by the tongue, because its orderly, Divinely-appointed motion is made violent and irregular by the passions which the tongue excites: it catches fire and loses its power to fulfil its proper course.'

There is an additional note on pp. 106, 107, in which many additional examples are given, illustrating the phrase *τροχ. γεν.*

I cannot accept the explanation here given of *γένεσις*, any more than I could that in the earlier passage.<sup>1</sup> Without venturing to speak confidently about such an obscure phrase, by *τροχὸν* I understand the shape of the wheel, and by *τροχὸν γενέσεως* the circle or round of this transitory life, which is so easily inflamed and disturbed by misused speech, stirring up man against man, class against class, nation against nation; such speech as sets at naught truth,

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps it may be worth while to quote here from a note on *Orig. de Orat.* 29 (Lomm. vol. 17, p. 260). *Orig. c. Cels.* vii. 46 *σκοποῦντες οὐ τὰ γενέσεως, ἅπερ ἐστὶ βλεπόμενα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρόσκαιρα, ἀλλὰ τὰ κρείττονα*, and just below *οὕτω τοῖς τῆς γενέσεως ἐνορῶσιν οἱ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ μαθηταί, ὥστε οἰονεὶ ἐπιβάθρα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν κατανόησιν τῆς τῶν νοητῶν φύσεως: τὰ γὰρ ἄβρατα τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται.* In the previous section Celsus is cited for *οὐσία καὶ γένεσις: νοητὸν, ὁρατὸν· μετὰ οὐσίας μὲν ἀλήθεια, μετὰ δὲ γενέσεως πλάνη.* In viii. 62 Origen speaks of the works of demons who drag down the souls of men *εἰς τὰ τῆς γενέσεως πράγματα*, and Suidas has *γένεσις: ὁ κόσμος.* I have not been able to find a single example which would support Hort's ethical and spiritual use of *γένεσις*.

morality, and religion, and is itself set on fire of hell. Surely such a state of things must be limited to this lower existence. It could find no place in heaven, no place in the Creator's ideal of man.

I have treated of this question with some fulness, both on account of its special interest as bringing together into one focus many scattered passages of the Epistle, and also as affording a good specimen of Hort's resourceful ingenuity and independence of thought in grappling with an acknowledged difficulty. It may, however, leave an exaggerated impression of the extent to which he seems sometimes to be carried away by an ingenious hypothesis, and to rest his argument upon what others may think to be insecure foundations. In any case it tends to suggest a greater amount of disagreement than really exists between us, so that it may be well to rectify the balance by giving further quotations from his more average notes in which I find nothing to question and much to admire.

The first shall be one from i. 1, *θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰ. Χ. δοῦλος*.

'This coupling of God and Christ in a single phrase covered by *δοῦλος* is significant as to St. James' belief. Without attempting to say *how much* is meant by it, we can see that it involves at least some Divineness of nature in our Lord, something other than glorified manhood. This is peculiarly true as regards a man with Jewish feelings, unable to admit lower states of deity. It thus shows that he cannot have been an Ebionite. . . . The conception is not of two distinct and co-ordinate powers, so to speak; as though he were a servant of two lords. But the service of the one at once involves and is contained in the service of the other. Christ being what He is as the Son of the Father, to be His servant is impossible without being God's servant; and the converse is also true. *Κυρίου Ἰ. Χ.* is the full phrase illustrated by the early chapters of the Acts, especially ii. 36, "God hath made Jesus both Lord and Christ."'

i. 4, *ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω*. Endurance is represented as having a work to do, a result to accomplish, which must not be suffered to cease prematurely. Endurance itself is the first and a necessary



step, but it is not to be rested in, being chiefly a means to higher ends. Here the Stoic constancy is at once justified, and implicitly pronounced inadequate, because it endeavours to be self-sufficing and leads the way to no diviner virtue. The work of the Christian endurance is manifold (elicited by *divers* trials, *v.* 2) and continuous, not easily exhausted; it remains imperfect (so the connexion of the two clauses teaches) while we are imperfect.'

i. 12, *λήμψεται τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς, ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν.* 'Life is itself the crown, the genitive being that of apposition. There is no earlier or contemporary instance of this genitive with *στέφανος*, except 1 Pet. v. 4; but the form of expression recalls Ps. ciii. 4. "Life" is probably selected here in contrast to the earthly perishableness dwelt on in *vv.* 10 f. But it does not follow that perpetuity is the only characteristic in view. Fulness and vividness of life are as much implied. The life is an imparting of God's life: "enter thou into the joy of thy Lord." The subject of *ἐπηγγείλατο* is to be inferred from the sense, rather than fetched from *v.* 5 or 7: it is doubtless God. The analogy of ii. 5 shows that words of Christ would be to St. James as promises of God; and sayings as that in Matt. xix. 29, Lk. xviii. 29 f., may be intended here. But equally pertinent language may be found in the Old Testament as Ps. xvi. 8-11, where the comprehensive idea of "life" well illustrates that of St. James. . . . Probably the promise comes from Deut. xxx. 15, 16, 19, 20. The phrase *τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν* is common in the Old Testament, usually joined with "keeping of God's commandments," but singularly absent from the prophets (exc. Dan. ix. 4), who speak much of God's love to men. As St. James describes endurance as leading to the crown promised to those who love God, he must have regarded it as at least one mark of the love of Him. But then all the preceding verses show that he considered endurance, when perfected, to involve trust in Him, unwavering conviction of His ungrudging goodness, and boasting in that low estate which Christ had declared to be height in His kingdom. Probably, specially chosen, the words sum up, in the Deuteronomic phrase adopted by Christ, the Law as towards God, just as we have the second part of the Law in ii. 8, conforming with St. James' treatment of the Law as spiritualized in the Gospel.'

No one, I think, can read such words as these without being struck with the depth of meaning which Hort draws out naturally and easily from passages, which to most of us are so familiar that we have almost ceased to look for any further teaching from them. It was this special faculty in Hort which gave rise to the common saying that, while



the effect of Lightfoot's teaching was to make the hard easy, Hort's teaching had the opposite, but no less needed effect, of making the easy hard.<sup>1</sup>

I will conclude my remarks with the note on iii. 14, 15. *μὴ κατακαυχᾶσθε καὶ ψεύδεσθε κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας. οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη, ἀλλὰ ἐπίγειος, ψυχικὴ, δαιμονιώδης.* Throughout this note Hort seems to me to have risen to his full height, and I would gladly substitute the whole of it for what I have written on the passage, in which I can now see that I have lost much of the author's meaning. 'The meaning,' he says, 'appears to be this. "Do not set up for teachers, for then your teaching will be a boasting, etc." The possession of wisdom was made a claim to teachership. He deals with it first positively. There is a right way to show forth wisdom (*v.* 13 *δειξάτω, κ.τ.λ.*). But, he goes on, if when searching your hearts you find bitter jealousy and ambition there, do not speak and teach, for in showing forth what you regard as wisdom, you will be boasting, etc. *κατακαυχᾶσθε* exactly expresses the tone, spirit and purpose of the ambitious teachership. It was boasting against other men, partly against the multitude, still more against rival teachers. But St. James unexpectedly puts in another object. The boasting directed against other men would in effect be a boasting against the truth itself, which was supposed to be spoken. Nay, it would be more, it would turn to falsehood uttered against the truth. . . . The implied doctrine is a paradox, but amply attested by experience. The mere possession of truth is no security for true utterance of it; all utterance is so coloured by the moral and spiritual state of the speaker that truth issues as falsehood from his lips in proportion as

<sup>1</sup> I am told that this saying was originally used of Lightfoot and Westcott, but it is certainly equally appropriate of Hort.

he is not himself in a right state: the correct language which he utters may carry a message of falsehood and evil in virtue of the bitterness and self-seeking which accompany his speaking. At bottom such speakers do not cherish the truth except as a possession of their own, or a missile of their own.<sup>1</sup> . . . No evil wisdom has been directly spoken of. But it is implied in *κατακαυχᾶσθε*. The speech there spoken of is the speech which claims to be the speech of wisdom; now therefore St. James will show what the wisdom is. Wisdom as such is what he specially prized, which makes him all the more hostile to its counterfeit.'

*δαιμονιώδης*. 'The word itself, a rare word, in all the known examples means "demon-like," except in two very late authors, where (like *δαιμόνιος*) it means "supernaturally sent." The interpretation "inspired by demons" is not unnaturally suggested by *κάτωθεν ἐρχομένη* and *v. 6 φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γέεννης*; cf. 1 Tim. iv. 1 *διδασκαλίαις δαιμονίων*. But that sense is stronger than really suits the context; and the more correct sense "demon-like," or rather "such as demons have," makes the triad more natural and complete. The origin and sphere of the spurious wisdom is the earth, not heaven; its seat in man is his soul, not his spirit; the beings with whom he shares it are the demons not the angels; thus the wisdom shared by demons answers to the faith shared by demons of ii. 19.'

JOSEPH B. MAYOR.

[*PS.*—The following appear to be misprints: p. 3, note on *χαράν*, 'Joy from ground of joy.' Should we not read 'for' instead of 'from'? P. 12, middle of col. 2, for *ἀμφοτερῆς* read *ἀμφοτεριστῆς*.]

<sup>1</sup> Hort illustrates the force of *ἀλήθεια* here by a reference to Rom. i. 18, *ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων*: ii. 8, *τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, πειθομένοις δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ θυμὸς καὶ ὀργή*: v. 20, *διδάσκαλον νηπίων, ἔχοντα τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ νόμῳ*, 1 John i. 6, 8.

## INDEX.

	PAGE
<b>Rev. E. H. Askwith, D.D.</b>	
The Historical Value of the Fourth Gospel	
VI. The Resurrection . . . . .	86
VII. The Resurrection . . . . .	132
VIII. Cleansing of Temple—Feeding of Five Thousand—Walking on the Sea . . . . .	228
IX. The Triumphant Entry, and the Last Supper	440
X. The Probability of a Ministry in Jerusalem.	538
<b>Rev. Professor W. Emery Barnes, D.D.</b>	
Nathan and David . . . . .	449
<b>Rev. J. Llewelyn Davies, D.D.</b>	
St. Paul's Beliefs : some Reconciliations . . . . .	254
<b>Rev. Professor Ernst von Dobschütz, D.Theol.</b>	
The Eschatology of the Gospels	
I. The Problem and its History . . . . .	97
II. Various Tendencies in Transmission—Stock of Jesus-Tradition . . . . .	193
III. Two more Features in the Genuine Jesus-Tradition . . . . .	333
IV. Jesus . . . . .	398
<b>Rev. Professor S. R. Driver, D.D.</b>	
The Method of Studying the Psalter	
Psalm ii. . . . .	20
An Ode Celebrating a Royal Marriage . . . . .	114
Psalm cx. . . . .	217
Psalm xl. . . . .	348
Psalm xxii. . . . .	507
<b>Rev. C. W. Emmet, M.A.</b>	
Galatians the Earliest of the Pauline Epistles . . . . .	242
<b>Rev. Principal E. Griffith-Jones, B.A.</b>	
Dr. Forsyth on the Atonement . . . . .	307
<b>Professor J. Rendel Harris, M.A., Litt.D.</b>	
Athanasius and the Book of Testimonies . . . . .	530





Rev. R. H. Strachan, M.A.

The Christ of the Fourth Gospel . . . . . 139

Rev. W. L. Walker,

Eucken and Christianity . . . . . 472

INDEX OF TEXTS.

	PAGE		PAGE		PAGE
Gen. vi. 5-12. . . . .	493	1 Kings iv. 21 . . . . .	127	Isa. viii. 11-16 . . . . .	527
12 . . . . .	369	xviii. 26 . . . . .	358	x. 17 . . . . .	298
x. 4 . . . . .	127	2 Kings i. 1 . . . . .	449	xi. 4 . . . . .	117
xii. 3 . . . . .	128	1 Chron. xxiv. 7 . . . . .	223	xiii. 21 . . . . .	126
xix. 13 . . . . .	114	2 Chron. ix. 8. . . . .	387	xvii. 12-14 . . . . .	38
xxiii. 7 . . . . .	119	xi. 23 . . . . .	122	xxxii. 15-17. . . . .	124
xxxix. 9. . . . .	264	Job v. 8 . . . . .	222	xl. 19 . . . . .	30
xl. 1. . . . .	449	ix. 13 . . . . .	350	xlii. 2 . . . . .	362
xlix. 19-20 . . . . .	36	xi. 4 . . . . .	35	xlv. 8 . . . . .	124
Exod. iv. 22 . . . . .	32	xxxiii. 10 . . . . .	23	lxi. 3 . . . . .	118
xx. 13 . . . . .	148	xxxix. 9-12. . . . .	512	Jer. v. 5 . . . . .	29
xxiii. 5 . . . . .	148	Ps. i. 5 . . . . .	119	xxii. 20 . . . . .	115
31 . . . . .	126	ii. . . . .	29	xxix. 21 . . . . .	129
xxvi. 36 . . . . .	121	ii. 11 . . . . .	34	Ezek. vii. 17 . . . . .	511
xxviii. 4, 39 . . . . .	121	xi. . . . .	26	xxiii. 5, 12. . . . .	297
Lev. xvi. 29 . . . . .	389	xiv. . . . .	493	Dan. iv. 3. . . . .	124
xix. 18 . . . . .	143	xviii. 38 . . . . .	116	Hos. xi. 1. . . . .	32
Num. xxv. 2 . . . . .	514	xxi. 4. . . . .	125	xiv. 4 . . . . .	35
xxxv. 12 . . . . .	148	xxii. . . . .	507	Amos ii. 4 . . . . .	350
Deut. xiii. 18. . . . .	46	9, 10 . . . . .	521	vii. 14 . . . . .	527
xvii. 20 . . . . .	125	xxx. 2, 3 . . . . .	37	Zech. xi. 1-3 . . . . .	305
xx. 8 . . . . .	511	xxxi. 13 . . . . .	30	Matt. i. 19 . . . . .	146
xxii. 14 . . . . .	47	xxxvi. 8 . . . . .	125	iii. 2 . . . . .	199
xxxi. 20 . . . . .	516	xxxvii. 11 . . . . .	44	v. 3-11. . . . .	43
xxxii. 18 . . . . .	32	xl. . . . .	348	15 . . . . .	212
Josh. xix. 51 . . . . .	392	xli. . . . .	26	17 . . . . .	157
Judges vi. 24. . . . .	45	xlv. 6. . . . .	31	22 . . . . .	149
1 Sam. xii. 16 . . . . .	114	xlv. . . . .	114	48 . . . . .	155
xiv. 27 . . . . .	221	li. 4 . . . . .	60	vi. 7 . . . . .	358
xviii. 22 . . . . .	387	lxix. 2, 14 . . . . .	349	vii. 21 . . . . .	193
xxiii. 15, 19 . . . . .	298	lxx. . . . .	123	x. 25 . . . . .	288
xxvii. 8-12 . . . . .	449	lxxii. 2 . . . . .	117	34-35 . . . . .	341
2 Sam. v. 2 . . . . .	33	xci. 11 . . . . .	362	xi. 12, 13 . . . . .	337
vi. 14-22. . . . .	457	cii. 18. . . . .	518	xii. 19 . . . . .	362
17. . . . .	225	ciii. 17 . . . . .	441	34 . . . . .	295
vii. 12-14 . . . . .	31	civ. 15 . . . . .	118	xiii. 16 . . . . .	341
14 . . . . .	38	cx. . . . .	217	xxi. 19 . . . . .	287
viii. 15 . . . . .	115	cxii. 1. . . . .	387	xxiii. 37 . . . . .	545
xv. 26 . . . . .	387	cxviii. 25-28 . . . . .	440	xxvi. 47 . . . . .	287
xvii. 11, 12 . . . . .	219	Prov. viii. 23 . . . . .	30	60 . . . . .	542
xxi. 1. . . . .	36	xi. 26 . . . . .	34	64 . . . . .	201
xxi. 8. . . . .	115	xxxi. 2. . . . .	35	75 . . . . .	230
xxiii. 3, 4 . . . . .	125	Isa. i. 2 . . . . .	32	xxviii. 16 . . . . .	135
1 Kings i. 25 . . . . .	128	iv. 6 . . . . .	37	Mark i. 15 . . . . .	199
ii. 19. . . . .	118	vi. 1-5 . . . . .	266	ii. 23 . . . . .	287
iii. 5 . . . . .	225	5 . . . . .	287	iii. 24-27 . . . . .	334

	PAGE		PAGE		PAGE
Mark iii. 35 . . .	194	Acts ii. 36. . . .	565	Eph. iv. 13-17 . . .	269
iv. 8 . . . . .	339	iv. 20 . . . . .	40	v. 23 . . . . .	184
21 . . . . .	212	29 . . . . .	156	Phil. i. 17. . . . .	298
vi. 54 . . . . .	240	v. 35 . . . . .	195	ii. 3 . . . . .	298
viii. 38 . . . . .	202	37 . . . . .	454	Col. ii. 16 . . . . .	286
ix. 1 . . . . .	207	vi. 1. . . . .	436	18 . . . . .	385
7 . . . . .	405	ix. 39 . . . . .	436	iii. 10 . . . . .	269
x. 18 . . . . .	70, 155, 263	xi. 20 . . . . .	244	1 Thess. v. 19 . . . .	325
xii. 29 . . . . .	164	xiii. 2-4. . . . .	324	1 Tim. i. 1. . . . .	331
30 . . . . .	495	xv. 1, 2 . . . . .	248	3 . . . . .	329
xiii. 12 . . . . .	341	5 . . . . .	387	18 . . . . .	321
15, 16 . . . . .	197	xvi. 1-4. . . . .	325	ii. 11 . . . . .	184
xiv. 12 . . . . .	445	xxi. 11 . . . . .	287	ii. 15 . . . . .	320
57 . . . . .	541	xxvi. 4 . . . . .	330	iv. 6-16 . . . . .	319, 433
61 . . . . .	200	xxviii. 23 . . . . .	286	10 . . . . .	320
Luke ii. 40, 52 . . . .	376	Rom. i. 4 . . . . .	40	14 . . . . .	324
v. 8. . . . .	281	21 . . . . .	163, 369	v. 3-16 . . . . .	436
vi. 20-23 . . . . .	43	25 . . . . .	378	14 . . . . .	180
27 . . . . .	143	ii. 1. . . . .	163	2 Tim i. 6 . . . . .	321
44 . . . . .	296	8. . . . .	297	ii. 18 . . . . .	413
vii. 46 . . . . .	118	14, 15 . . . . .	153	Titus i. 9 . . . . .	332
viii. 16 . . . . .	212	iii. 20 . . . . .	450	ii. 5 . . . . .	181
21 . . . . .	194	23 . . . . .	153	7 . . . . .	332
xi. 2-4 . . . . .	357	vii. 2 . . . . .	285	10 . . . . .	285
xii. 51-53 . . . . .	341	7-13 . . . . .	157	12 . . . . .	374
xvi. 16, 17 . . . . .	150	14-25 . . . . .	381	iii. 13 . . . . .	285
xvii. 20, 21. . . . .	335	21-22 . . . . .	496	Heb. i. 1 . . . . .	557
21. . . . .	410	viii. 6, 7 . . . . .	398	13. . . . .	271
xviii. 17 . . . . .	337	19. . . . .	553	ii. 2 . . . . .	391
xix. 41 . . . . .	546	1 Cor. vii. 19 . . . .	376	vi. 12 . . . . .	286
xxi. 20 . . . . .	198	x. 5 . . . . .	207	ix. 27 . . . . .	107
32 . . . . .	205	xi. 39 . . . . .	184	x. 5-7 . . . . .	351
xxiii. 31 . . . . .	287	xiii. 12. . . . .	72	xi. 37 . . . . .	528
xxiv. 22 . . . . .	94	13. . . . .	321	38 . . . . .	295
50 . . . . .	239	xv. . . . .	132	xii. 29 . . . . .	268
John i. 18. . . . .	281	55 . . . . .	284	Jas. i. 13 . . . . .	368
ii. 1-21 . . . . .	140	2 Cor. xii. 20 . . . .	297	ii. 5 . . . . .	556
9 . . . . .	187	Gal. i. 6 . . . . .	248	ii. 10 . . . . .	383
19 . . . . .	543	ii. 2 . . . . .	244	iii. 12, 13 . . . . .	290
iii. 11, 12 . . . . .	59	iii. 19 . . . . .	391	14 . . . . .	295
vi. 22 . . . . .	237	iv. 3 . . . . .	156	vi. 12 . . . . .	306
x. 41 . . . . .	339	10 . . . . .	391	ix. 19 . . . . .	302
xiii. 34 . . . . .	147	13 . . . . .	252	x. 7 . . . . .	303
xvi. 29 . . . . .	448	v. 6 . . . . .	376	1 Pet. ii. 9 . . . . .	53
xix. 40 . . . . .	288	20 . . . . .	298	iv. 7 . . . . .	284
xx. . . . .	87	Eph. i. 13. . . . .	556		
11-17 . . . . .	90	iv. 4. . . . .	175		



